Whether it is necessary to implead all co-owners in eviction suit?

Coming to the first question, in our considered
opinion, the High Court erred in holding that the
daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan, i.e., Tmt. R.
Kanjana was a necessary party to the eviction petition
filed by the appellants and hence failure to implead
her rendered the eviction petition as not maintainable.
This finding of the High Court, in our view, is against
the law laid down by this Court in the case of
Dhannalal (supra), wherein it is laid down that it is

not necessary to implead all the co-owners in the
eviction petition.
38) In the light of law laid down in the case of
Dhannalal (supra), in our view, it was not necessary
for the appellants to implead the Tmt. R. Kanjana –
the daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan in the eviction
petition.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.5158 OF 2009
Tmt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan & Ors. V M. Chinniyan & Anr
Dated;January 28, 2016.
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) This appeal is filed by the plaintiffs against the
final judgment and order dated 11.07.2007 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Civil
Revision Petition No. 337 of 2002 whereby the High
Court allowed the revision petition filed by respondent
No.1 herein and set aside the judgment dated
28.06.2001 of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Erode
in R.C.A. No. 5 of 2001 and order of eviction dated
1Page 2
31.10.2000 passed by the Rent Controller (I Addl.
District Munsif), Erode in RCOP No. 26 of 1998.
2) In order to appreciate the issue involved in this
appeal, it is necessary to set out in brief the relevant
facts in relation to eviction case out of which this
appeal arises and also state the facts of three cases
filed by the parties in respect of the suit premises
because they were referred to in the proceedings out of
which this appeal arises.
3) The appellants (plaintiffs) are the wife and sons
of one A. Radhakrishnan. The suit premises bearing
Door No. S-3, Periyar Nagar Housing Unit, Erode
Town, comprised in T.S. No. 909/3, Block No. 17 and
598/2 Part, Ward 1, Block 20, Surampatti Village,
Erode Taluk, Erode sub-District, Erode Registration
District was allotted to A. Radhakrishan by Tamil
Nadu Housing Board. In fact, entire area was acquired
by the Housing Board and one house site therein was
2Page 3
allotted to A. Radhakrishnan. Subsequently, A.
Radhakrishnan made construction on the site allotted
to him.
4) On 22.02.1987, A. Radhakrishnan executed a
general power of attorney in favour of one V. Dhanapal
and nominated him to administer and manage the suit
premises on his behalf.
5) One N. Kalidass was in occupation of the suit
premises as tenant. On 04.02.1988, he vacated and
surrendered the possession of the suit premises to
Dhanapal. Thereafter respondent No.1 took the suit
premises on lease rent from Dhanapal under a written
lease deed dated 12.02.1989 for a period of 11 months
on a monthly rent of Rs.850/- and paid Rs.4000/- as
advance. Respondent No.1 then obtained possession of
the suit premises and started residing therein with his
family.
3Page 4
6) The appellants, however, came to know that A.
Radhakrishnan without their knowledge entered into a
sale agreement dated 30.07.1987 to sell the suit
premises to one A.S. Pongianna. The appellants,
therefore, instituted a suit being O.S. No. 53 of 1989
(re-numbered as O.S.549/1989) in the Court of
District Judge, Erode and sought a declaration that
the sale agreement dated 30.07.1987 was neither valid
and nor binding on them and also sought a permanent
injunction against A. Radhakrishnan restraining him
from executing the sale deed in favour of A.S.
Pongianna and delivering possession of the suit
property to him. In this suit, respondent No. 1 was
impleaded as one of defendants.
7) Respondent No.1 filed a written statement in the
aforesaid suit reiterating therein that he was inducted
in the suit premises as a tenant under a lease deed
dated 12.02.1989 for a period of 11 months at
4Page 5
monthly rent of Rs.850/- and on the expiry of the
contractual period of lease, he continued to remain in
the suit premises as a tenant.
8) Respondent No.1 also, in the meantime, filed a
suit being O.S. No. 87 of 1989 in the Court of
Subordinate Judge, Erode against A. Radhakrishnan
and the appellants herein seeking permanent
injunction restraining the appellants from
dispossessing them from the suit premises. According
to respondent No.1, he was a tenant and was put in
possession of the suit premises by Dhanapal, the
power of attorney holder of A. Radhakrishnan,
pursuant to a lease deed dated 12.02.1989 for a
period of 11 months at a monthly rent of Rs.850/-. He
also alleged that since the appellants were dissatisfied
with the rent fixed under the lease deed, therefore,
they were attempting to dispossess him from the suit
premises. In this suit, on 22.02.1990, A.
5Page 6
Radhakrishnan filed a written statement stating inter
alia that respondent No.1 was put in possession of the
suit premises as his tenant and that he had already
cancelled the power of attorney executed by him in
favour of Dhanapal by executing a registered
cancellation deed dated 13.03.1989.
9) Since A. Radhakrishnan was refusing to accept
the rent from February 1989, respondent No.1 filed a
petition bearing R.C.O.P. No. 2 of 1991 under Section
8(5) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act in the Court of the Rent Controller of
Erode. In the meantime on 23.09.1994, A.
Radhakrishnan expired intestate leaving behind him
the present appellants as his class I heirs and one
daughter – Tmt. R. Kanjana. The appellants thus
became the owners of the suit premises by
inheritance.
6Page 7
10) On 14.10.1998, respondent No.1 through his
advocate sent a notice to the appellants herein and
Tmt. R. Kanjana, the daughter of late A.
Radhakrishnan, claiming that upon payment of Rs. 1
lakh on 08.05.1988, A.S. Pongainna had assigned his
rights in the agreement dated 30.07.1987 executed
between him and late A. Radhakrishnan, in his favour,
therefore, he called upon the appellants to execute the
sale deed of the suit premises in his favour.
11) The appellants then filed Eviction Petition
bearing R.C.O.P. No. 26 of 1998 in the Court of the
Rent Controller (District Munsif) Erode against
respondent No. 1 out of which the present appeal
arises seeking eviction of respondent No.1 from the
suit premises under Sections 10 (2) and 10(3)(a)(i) of
the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act
1960 (in Short “the Act”). The eviction was sought
essentially on two grounds, namely, willful default in
7Page 8
paying monthly rent since 12.02.1989 and secondly,
bona fide need for the use and residence of the
appellants in the suit premises because according to
the appellants they were residing in rented
accommodation and had no other suitable house of
their own in the city where they could live.
12) Vide order dated 21.12.1998, the Court of the
Subordinate Judge, Erode decreed O.S. No. 87 of 1989
filed by respondent No.1 against the appellants on the
basis of an endorsement made by the appellants and
passed a permanent injunction restraining the
appellants from interfering with the peaceful
enjoyment of respondent No.1 over the suit property
and from dispossessing him till he was evicted under a
due process of law.
13) Vide order dated 05.01.1999, O.S. No. 53/1989
(which was renumbered as O.S. No. 549/1989) was
dismissed as not pressed by the appellants.
8Page 9
14) So far as the eviction petition out of which this
appeal arises is concerned, the Rent Controller allowed
RCOP No. 26 of 1998 filed by the appellants vide order
dated 31.10.2000 and directed the eviction of
respondent No.1 from the suit premises. It was held
that the appellants are the owners/landlords of the
suit premises. It was also held that respondent No. 1
is in occupation of the suit premises as tenant. It was
further held that respondent No. 1 has committed
willful default in paying the monthly rent and being a
defaulter in payment of rent is liable to be evicted from
the suit premises. It was also held that the appellants
have proved bona fide need for their personal
residence in the suit premises because they were living
in the rented house at a place called Salem. The
appellants were, therefore, held entitled to claim
eviction of respondent No. 1 from the suit premises on
these findings.
9Page 10
15) Against the said order, respondent No.1 filed an
appeal bearing T.C.A. No. 5 of 2001 in the Court of
Subordinate Judge, Erode. Vide order dated
28.06.2001, the subordinate Judge, Erode dismissed
the said appeal and confirmed the judgment passed by
the Rent Controller.
16) Against the said order, the respondent filed a
revision petition being C.R.P. No. 337 of 2002 before
the High Court. The High Court, by judgment dated
19.12.2003, dismissed the revision petition filed by
respondent No.1.
17) Respondent no. 1 then filed an application
seeking review of the order dated 19.12.2003 passed
by the High Court in C.R.P. No. 337 of 2002.
18) The High Court by judgment dated 05.02.2007,
allowed Review Application No. 91 of 2004 filed by the
respondent No.1.
10Page 11
19) As a result of review being allowed C.R.P. No.
337/2002 was restored to file for its hearing on
merits. The High Court, this time, by impugned order
dated 11.07.2007 allowed the revision filed by
respondent No.1 on two legal grounds and set aside
the order of the first appellate Court and also of Rent
Controlling Authority. As a consequence, thereof, the
eviction petition (RCOP No.26 of 1998) filed by the
appellants was dismissed. It was held that the
eviction petition filed by the appellants is not
maintainable because the daughter of Late A.
Radhakrishnan, Tmt. R. Kanjana was not made a
party to the eviction petition. According to the High
Court she being one of the co-owners of the suit
premises was a necessary party to eviction petition. It
was also held that appellants failed to establish the
relationship of landlord and tenant with the
respondent No.1 and on the other hand it appeared

that tenancy in relation to suit property was between
Dhanapal and respondent No.1. The High Court thus
allowed the respondents’ revision essentially on these
two grounds
20) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants
have filed this appeal by way of special leave before
this Court.
21) Heard Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, learned counsel for the
appellants and Mr. B. Adinarayan Rao, learned senior
counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. Amit Gupta,
learned counsel for respondent No.2.
22) Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, learned counsel appearing for
the appellants while assailing the legality and
correctness of the impugned order urged three
submissions.
23) In the first place, learned counsel submitted that
the High Court having rightly dismissed the revision
petition filed by respondent No.1 in the first round
12Page 13
erred in allowing the review petition of respondent
No.1 and in any event after its restoration erred in
allowing the said revision petition. It was his
submission that the High Court committed
jurisdictional error in interfering in its revisionary
jurisdiction in upsetting well reasoned concurrent
findings of facts recorded by the Rent Controller and
the first appellate Court in appellants’ favour and that
too on two grounds, which were not urged before the
Rent Controller and the appellate Court by respondent
No.1.
24) In the second place, learned counsel urged that
two legal grounds on which the High Court allowed the
revision petition, namely, that non-joinder of one of
the co-owners of the suit property (daughter of late A.
Radhakrishnan) to the eviction petition was fatal to
the filing of eviction petition and secondly, the
appellants were not able to establish the relationship
13Page 14
of landlord and tenant with respondent No.1 in
relation to the suit premises, have no merit and
deserve rejection.
25) Elaborating this submission, learned counsel
contended that so far as the first ground is concerned
it is untenable in the light of the law laid down by this
Court in Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai and Others,
(2002) 6 SCC 16, wherein it is laid down that it is not
necessary to implead all the co-owners of the suit
premises in eviction petition and even if some of the
co-owners have filed the eviction petition, it is
maintainable in law. According to learned counsel
since this finding was recorded by the High Court
without taking into consideration the law laid down by
this Court in the case of Dhanalal (supra), the same
deserves to be set aside.
26) Learned counsel also pointed out that in any
event, the aforementioned infirmity was cured by the

appellants factually because the daughter of late A
Radhakrishnan, Tmt R. Kanjana was later added as a
party in the eviction proceedings.
27) In the third place, learned counsel urged that so
far as the second ground is concerned, namely,
respondent No. 1 was inducted by Dhanapal in the
suit premises and not by the appellants and,
therefore, the appellants were not able to establish
their relationship of landlord and tenant with
respondent No.1 also has no merit for the reason that
Dhanapal did not execute the tenancy agreement with
respondent No.1 in his capacity as owner/landlord of
the suit premises but executed the said tenancy
agreement on behalf of late A. Radhakrishnan as his
power of attorney holder.
28) Learned counsel pointed out that in these
circumstances any act done by Dhanapal in relation to
suit premises including creation of tenancy was an act

done for and on behalf of A. Radhakrishnan. It was,
therefore, urged that the tenancy was, as a fact,
between A. Radhakrishnan being owner/landlord of
suit premises and respondent No.1 as his tenant
which later devolved on the appellants after the death
of A. Radhakrishanan by operation of law thereby
conferring a right on the appellants as co-owners of
suit premises to file the eviction petition against
respondent No.1 for his eviction from the suit
premises.
29) Lastly, learned counsel contended that on the
aforementioned grounds, which had no substance, the
High Court could not have set aside the concurrent
findings of facts recorded in appellants’ favour by the
Rent Controller and the first appellate Court, which
had ordered the eviction of respondent No.1 from the
suit premises.

30) In reply, learned counsel for respondent No.1
supported the impugned judgment and contended that
it deserves to be upheld, calling no interference
therein.
31) Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
on perusal of the record of the case, we find force in
the submissions urged by learned counsel for the
appellants.
32) Before we proceed to examine the issues raised in
this appeal, we consider it apposite to take note of the
law laid down by this Court on three issues which are
involved in this appeal, viz., issue in relation to
revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in
rent matters; second, the scope of inquiry to examine
the title of the landlord of the suit premises in eviction
matters; and third, whether all the co-owners/colandlords
of suit premises are necessary parties in theeviction petition filed under the Rent Laws and lastly

law relating to power of attorney executed by principal
in favour of his agent.
33) So far as the issue pertaining to exercise of
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court while hearing
revision petition arising out of eviction matter is
concerned, it remains no more res integra and stands
settled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs.
Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78. Justice R.M. Lodha,
the learned Chief Justice speaking for the Bench held
in para 43 thus:
“43. We hold, as we must, that none of the
above Rent Control Acts entitles the High
Court to interfere with the findings of fact
recorded by the first appellate court/first
appellate authority because on reappreciation
of the evidence, its view is different from the
court/authority below. The consideration or
examination of the evidence by the High
Court in revisional jurisdiction under these
Acts is confined to find out that finding of
facts recorded by the court/authority below
is according to law and does not suffer from
any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by
court/authority below, if perverse or has
been arrived at without consideration of the
material evidence or such finding is based on

no evidence or misreading of the evidence or
is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand,
it would result in gross miscarriage of justice,
is open to correction because it is not treated
as a finding according to law. In that event,
the High Court in exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction under the above Rent Control
Acts shall be entitled to set aside the
impugned order as being not legal or proper.
The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as
to the correctness or legality or propriety of
any decision or order impugned before it as
indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to
the regularity, correctness, legality or
propriety of the impugned decision or the
order, the High Court shall not exercise its
power as an appellate power to reappreciate
or reassess the evidence for coming to a
different finding on facts. Revisional power is
not and cannot be equated with the power of
reconsideration of all questions of fact as a
court of first appeal. Where the High Court is
required to be satisfied that the decision is
according to law, it may examine whether the
order impugned before it suffers from
procedural illegality or irregularity.”
34) Similarly, so far as the scope and nature of
inquiry, which is required to be undertaken to
examine the title of the landlord in eviction matter is
concerned, it also remains no more res integra and
stands settled in the case of Sheela & Ors. vs. Firm
Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375.
19Page 20
Justice R.C.Lahoti (as His Lordship then was)
speaking for the Bench held that the concept of
ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by
Rent control laws has to be distinguished from the one
in a title suit. Indeed, ownership is a relative term, the
import whereof depends on the context in which it is
used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be
said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal
right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of
someone else to evict the tenant and then to retain
control, hold and use the premises for himself. What
may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in
landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be
enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership
in a title suit.
35) Likewise, so far as issue pertaining to joinder of
all co-owners in eviction petition filed against the
tenant under the Rent Laws is concerned, the same

also remains no more res Integra and stands settled by
several decisions of this Court. In Dhannalal vs.
Kalawathibai Ors., (Supra), this Court took note of
all case laws on the subject and explained the legal
position governing the issue. Justice R.C.Lahoti (as
His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench held in
paragraph 16 as under :
“16. It is well settled by at least three
decisions of this Court, namely, Sri Ram
Pasricha v. Jagannath,(1976) 4 SCC 184
Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814
and Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, (1989) 1 SCC
444 that one of the co-owners can alone and
in his own right file a suit for ejectment of
the tenant and it is no defence open to the
tenant to question the maintainability of the
suit on the ground that the other co-owners
were not joined as parties to the suit. When
the property forming the subject-matter of
eviction proceedings is owned by severalowners, every co-owner owns every part and
every bit of the joint property along with
others and it cannot be said that he is only a
part-owner or a fractional owner of the
property so long as the property has not been
partitioned. He can alone maintain a suit for
eviction of the tenant without joining the
other co-owners if such other co-owners donot object. In Sri Ram Pasricha case reliance
was placed by the tenant on the English rule
that if two or more landlords institute a suit
for possession on the ground that a dwelling
house is required for occupation of one of

them as a residence the suit would fail; the
requirement must be of all the landlords. The
Court noted that the English rule was not
followed by the High Courts of Calcutta and
Gujarat which High Courts have respectfully
dissented from the rule of English law. This
Court held that a decree could be passed in
favour of the plaintiff though he was not the
absolute and full owner of the premises
because he required the premises for his own
use and also satisfied the requirement of
being “if he is the owner”, the expression as
employed by Section 13(1)(f) of the W.B.
Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.”
36) The issues involved in this case need to be
decided keeping in view the law laid down in the
aforesaid three cases and the one cited infra.
37) Coming to the first question, in our considered
opinion, the High Court erred in holding that the
daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan, i.e., Tmt. R.
Kanjana was a necessary party to the eviction petition
filed by the appellants and hence failure to implead
her rendered the eviction petition as not maintainable.
This finding of the High Court, in our view, is against
the law laid down by this Court in the case of
Dhannalal (supra), wherein it is laid down that it is
not necessary to implead all the co-owners in the
eviction petition.
38) In the light of law laid down in the case of
Dhannalal (supra), in our view, it was not necessary
for the appellants to implead the Tmt. R. Kanjana –
the daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan in the eviction
petition. Even otherwise, as rightly argued by learned
counsel for the appellants, the High Court should not
have allowed respondent No.1 to raise such objection
for the first time in the revision because it was not
raised in the courts below. Be that as it may, the
daughter having been later impleaded in the
proceedings, this objection was not even available to
respondent No.1.
39) In view of foregoing discussion, we can not
concur with the finding of the High Court and while
reversing the finding hold that the eviction petition can
not be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of Tmt.

R. Kanjana – the daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan
and is held maintainable.
40) Now coming to the question as to whether the
tenancy was between the appellants and respondent
No.1 or whether it was between Dhanapal and
respondent No.1, we are of the considered view that to
begin with the tenancy was between A.
Radhakrishanan and respondent No.1 and on the
death of A. Radhakrishnan, it was created between
the appellants being the Class-I heirs of A.
Radhakrishnan and respondent No.1 by operation of
law.
41) In our opinion, Dhanapal was a power of attorney
holder of A. Radhakrishnan. He executed the tenancy
agreement on behalf of the original owner – A.
Radhakrishnan in favour of respondent No.1. Such
act done by Dhanapal did not create any right, title
and interest in his favour and nor he ever asserted any
such right in himself and indeed rightly qua A.
Radhakrishnan or the appellants in relation to suitpremises. That apart, respondent No.1 in clear terms
admitted in his evidence and in the pleading of cases
filed by him against the appellants about his status as
being the tenant. In the light of this legal position, the
High Court should have held this issue in appellants’
favour.
42) The law relating to power of attorney is governed
by the provisions of the Power of Attorney Act, 1982.
It is well settled therein that an agent acting under a
power of attorney always acts, as a general rule, in the
name of his principal. Any document executed or thing
done by an agent on the strength of power of attorney
is as effective as if executed or done in the name of
principal, i.e., by the principal himself. An agent,
therefore, always acts on behalf of the principal and
exercises only those powers, which are given to him in

the power of attorney by the principal. Any act or thing
done by the agent on the strength of power of attorney
is, therefore, never construed or/and treated to have
been done by the agent in his personal capacity so as
to create any right in his favour but is always
construed as having done by the principal himself. An
agent, therefore, never gets any personal benefit of anynature. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court in
Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (2) vs.
State of Haryana & Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 656 held in
paragraphs 20 and 21 as under:
“20. A power of attorney is not an instrument
of transfer in regard to any right, title or
interest in an immovable property. The power
of attorney is creation of an agency whereby
the grantor authorises the grantee to do the
acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor,
which when executed will be binding on thegrantor as if done by him (see Section 1-A
and Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act,
1882). It is revocable or terminable at any
time unless it is made irrevocable in a
manner known to law. Even an irrevocable
attorney does not have the effect of
transferring title to the grantee.

21. In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata,
(2005) 12 SCC 77, this Court held: (SCC pp.
90 & 101, paras 13 & 52)
“13. A grant of power of attorney is
essentially governed by Chapter X of
the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of
power of attorney, an agent is formally
appointed to act for the principal in
one transaction or a series of
transactions or to manage the affairs of
the principal generally conferring
necessary authority upon another
person. A deed of power of attorney is
executed by the principal in favour of
the agent. The agent derives a right to
use his name and all acts, deeds and
things done by him and subject to the
limitations contained in the said deed,
the same shall be read as if done by the
donor. A power of attorney is, as is well
known, a document of convenience.
* * *
52. Execution of a power of attorney in
terms of the provisions of the Contract
Act as also the Powers of Attorney Act
is valid. A power of attorney, we have
noticed hereinbefore, is executed by
the donor so as to enable the donee to
act on his behalf. Except in cases where
power of attorney is coupled with
interest, it is revocable. The donee in
exercise of his power under such power
of attorney only acts in place of the
donor subject of course to the powers
granted to him by reason thereof. He
cannot use the power of attorney for
his own benefit. He acts in a fiduciary
capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach
of trust is a matter between the donor
and the donee.”
An attorney-holder may however execute a
deed of conveyance in exercise of the power
granted under the power of attorney and
convey title on behalf of the grantor.”
This was followed by this Court in Church of Christ
Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable
Society vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012)
8 SCC 706 (para 20)
43) When we apply this well settled principle of law to
the facts of the case in hand, we are of the considered
view that when Dhanapal, who was acting as an agent
of A. Radhakrishnan on the strength of power of
attorney, executed the tenancy agreement with
respondent No. 1 in relation to the suit premises then
he did such execution for and behalf of his principal -
A Radhakrishnan, which resulted in creating a
relationship of landlord and tenant between A.
Radhakrishnan and respondent No. 1 in relation to the
suit premises. In this execution, Dhanapal being an
agent did not get any right, title and interest of any

nature either in the suit premises or in tenancy in
himself. The effect of execution of tenancy agreement
by an agent was as if A. Radhakrishnan himself had
executed with respondent No.1.
44) In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
considered opinion that the High Court was not right
in holding that the tenancy in relation to suit premises
was with Dhanapal. We cannot thus concur with the
finding of the High Court and accordingly reverse the
finding and hold that the appellants were able to prove
that the tenancy in relation to the suit premises was
between A. Radhakrishnan and respondent No.1 and
on the death of A. Radhakrishnan, it was created
between the appellants and respondent No.1 by
operation of law which entitled the appellants to
maintain the eviction petition against respondent No.1
seeking his eviction on the grounds available to them
under the Act.

45) Since the High Court allowed the revision filed by
respondent No.1 on the aforementioned two grounds
only, which we have reversed in preceding paras, the
revision petition filed by the respondent No.1 deserves
to be dismissed. That apart keeping in view the law
laid down by this Court in Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Limited Case (supra), the concurrent
findings of facts recorded by the Rent Controller and
affirmed by the first appellate Court in appellants’
favour on the issue of appellants bona fide need for
their personal residence and default committed by
respondent No.1 in paying rent to the appellants were
binding on the High Court.
46) We have also perused these findings with a view
to find out as to whether there is any perversity in
these findings. We, however, find that these findings
are based on proper appreciation of evidence as is
30Page 31
required to be done in eviction matters and hence,
they do not call for any interference in this appeal.
47) Learned Counsel for the respondent made
attempt to support the impugned judgment and urged
submissions but we were not impressed by any of the
submissions urged.
48) In the light of foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned
judgment is set aside and that of the judgment of the
first appellate Court dated 28.06.2001 in R.C.A. No. 5
of 2001 is restored. As a consequence thereof, the
eviction petition filed by the appellants against
respondent No.1 in relation to the suit premises is
allowed. Respondent No.1 is, however, granted three
months’ time to vacate the suit premises from the date
of this judgment subject to furnishing of the usual
undertaking in this Court to vacate the suit premises
within 3 months and further on depositing all arrears

of rent (if there are any arrears still due and not paid)
till date at the same rate at which they had been
paying monthly rent to the appellants and would also
deposit three months’ rent in advance by way of
damages for use and occupation. Let the undertaking,
arrears of rent, damages for three months and cost
awarded by this Court be deposited within 15 days
from the date of this judgment. The appellants on such
deposit being made would be entitled to withdraw the
same after proper verification.
49) The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs
which is quantified at Rs.5000/- to be paid by
respondent No.1 to the appellants.
 .……...................................J.
 [J. CHELAMESWAR]

 ………..................................J.
 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi,
January 28, 2016.

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