Section 7 of the Easements Act, 1882 deals with
natural rights. It says that easements are restrictions on one or
other of the two rights mentioned therein. Section 7 (a) of the
Act recognizes the exclusive right of every owner of immovable
property to enjoy and dispose of the same and all products
thereof and accessions thereto. Section 7(b) of the Act deals with
the right of every owner of immovable property to enjoy without
disturbance by another the natural advantages arising from its
situation. The illustrations added to the Section clarifies the
nature and extend of the natural rights. Natural rights are those
incidents and advantages, which are provided by nature for the
use and enjoyment of a man's property. It is to be distinguished
from an act of man or some artificial cause. So, the only
deduction possible is that the rights enumerated in Section 7 of
the Easements Act are claimable only in respect of immovable
properties in its natural situation. All these rights cannot be
extended to man made constructions. It is well settled that
natural rights are rights in rem and are inherent in land ex jure
naturae and they are not to be acquired by immemorial user.
Their continuous enjoyment is not essential for their continued
existence, though they are capable of being lost by adverse
enjoyment. (See, Subbarayudu v. Secretary of State (AIR 1927
Mad. 988) and Secretary of State v. Subbarayudu (AIR 1932
P.C 46).)
13. If the right to prospect or view is not a natural
right, then the next question probable is whether it can be
acquired as an easement ? It can never be acquired as an
easement for the primary reason that such a right does not fit in
the definition of easement in Section 4 of the Act. The
requirement in the Section for having dominant and survient
heritages may not be fulfilled in such a claim.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
FRIDAY,THE 26TH DAY OF JUNE 2015/
RSA.No. 786 of 2011 ( )
------------------------
THAMBI CHERIYAN,S/O.CHIRIYAKKUNNY,
KOLLANNUR HOUSE, MANGAD DESOM VILLAGE,
Vs
BABU,S/O.THOMAS, PUTHUKKARA VEEDU,
Citation; AIR 2015 Kerala 231
This regular second appeal raises important questions of
law. Does the law permit a person to claim unhindered or
unobstructed prospect or view to any building (here a
commercial building) as a matter of right ? Can a person claim a
decree for permanent prohibitory injunction based on the
alleged violation of such a right ?
2. Heard Sri.K.Ramachandran, learned counsel for the
appellant and Sri.T.N.Manoj, learned counsel for the
respondent.
3. The defendant in a suit for such a relief is the
appellant and the plaintiff, the respondent. Parties are
hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff and defendant. Decree
passed by the trial court, which was confirmed in appeal, reads
thus :
" That the defendant and his men are
restrained by permanent prohibitory
injunction from installing any new fixtures
or stair case infront of the plaintiff's plaint
schedule shop room causing any hindrance
or obstructions to the view, vicinity or
access to the plaint schedule shop room."
4. Even though in the plaint a right to have an
unhindered or unobstructed vicinity is also claimed and the same
was allowed by the courts below, the learned counsel for the
plaintiff fairly conceded that there is no legal foundation for that
claim. Further, the claim for a permanent prohibitory injunction
based on a right called unhindered vicinity is not legally
recognizable one and too vague to be granted by a court of law
either under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or
otherwise. Therefore, what is remaining as a bone of contention
is the legality and propriety of a legal right called the right to
prospect (view) to the plaintiff's building.
5. Relevant pleadings, in nutshell, are as follows :
Plaint schedule shop room was purchased by father of the
plaintiff from the defendant as per Ext.A1 assignment deed in
the year 1996. Plaintiff's father died and the property devolved
on his legal heirs, including the plaintiff. He is conducting
jewellery business in the plaint schedule shop room. The
defendant is the owner of a building complex in which the plaint
schedule shop room is also a part. From the descriptions in the
schedule to the plaint, it can be seen that on the western
boundary of the plaint schedule shop room, a main road and an
open space are situated. On the southern boundary, an open
space and a way through the building exist. It is an admitted
case that a staircase is in existence on the north-western corner
of the building for facilitating access to the upper stairs. The
plaintiff alleged that the PWD authorities had taken steps to
widen the road on the west. It is the contention of the plaintiff
that on taking measurements, the authorities found that the
staircase built by the defendant on the north-western side of the
room was projecting into the government puramboke. Plaintiff
reliably learnt that the authorities had issued notice to the
defendant directing him to demolish the staircase encroaching
onto the puramboke. Plaintiff's jewellery is facing a main
thoroughfare. His father purchased the room considering various
factors like the road frontage, unhindered view from the road,
easy access from the road etc. Plaintiff contended that the
defendant was taking hectic steps to install some fixtures and a
staircase infront of the shop room of the plaintiff causing
obstruction to the view to his jewellery from the main road. Acts
intended by the defendant may even adversely affect the access
to jewellery.
6. The defendant filed a written statement stating that he
did not receive any notice from the PWD authorities demanding
demolition of the staircase. Defendant further contended that he
has not trespassed into the government puramboke. The
staircase is well within the limits of his property. Defendant also
disputed the claim of the plaintiff based on a right to prospect.
According to the defendant there is no cause of action for the
suit.
7. The trial court, after considering the oral and
documentary evidence produced by parties and also the
Commissioner's report and sketch, decreed the suit. In the
appeal by the defendant, lower appellate court confirmed the
decree passed by the trial court.
8. Sri.K.Ramachandran contended that the decree
passed by the court below is legally unsustainable. According to
him, the suit itself is a preposterous action. He vehemently
contended that the court below should not have granted a decree
for injunction as claimed.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiff
contended that the defendant is bound to respect the rights
derived by the former as per Ext.A1 assignment deed. Ext.A1 is
an admitted document. Terms in Ext.A1 would show that one
room described in the plaint schedule was assigned by the
defendant to father of the plaintiff for valuable consideration. It
further shows that the plaintiff's father was conducting a
jewellery in the premises as a tenant prior to the assignment.
Preponderance of probabilities would certainly indicate that the
predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff, at the time of Ext.A1
assignment deed, was having enough reasons for purchasing the
shop room. On a reading of Ext.A1 assignment deed, it can be
seen that sufficient safeguards had been taken by the parties to
protect the rights of the assignor and assignee. In Ext.A1, it is
specifically mentioned that the buyer (plaintiff's father) was
entitled to have right of access through the open space on the
western and southern sides of the building. Ext.A1 further
shows that the defendant could not claim any right blocking the
access to the shop room of the plaintiff through the areas
mentioned therein. The defendant in his written statement has
stated clearly that there was no attempt on his part to invade or
obstruct the plaintiff's right of access to the building. However,
there can be no doubt that the plaintiff will be entitled to restrain
the defendant by a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction, if
it is established that his right under Ext.A1 is in jeopardy.
10. The core issue is about the legality of the claim of
plaintiff for a permanent prohibitory injunction on the basis of a
right of view or prospect, as it legally understood. Let me
initially examine the nature of such a right. As mentioned earlier,
the claim to have an unhindered vicinity is not pressed at the
hearing.
11. For obtaining a decree for permanent prohibitory
injunction, the plaintiff should establish a threat to or the
possibility of infringement of his legal right. Of course,the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 contains no list or catalogue of legal
rights on the breach of which a decree for permanent prohibitory
injunction can be granted. In Part III of the said Act, one can
find the rules regarding grant of injunction decrees, both in
mandatory and prohibitory forms. Decree for permanent
prohibitory injunction can be granted only on establishment of
an attempt to invade any statutory right or other rights based on
common law principles. That too, being an equitable relief, only
if it is not prohibited by the provisions in Section 41 of the Act.
Now, let me examine whether the plaintiff has any legal right to
maintain such a claim.
12. Section 7 of the Easements Act, 1882 deals with
natural rights. It says that easements are restrictions on one or
other of the two rights mentioned therein. Section 7 (a) of the
Act recognizes the exclusive right of every owner of immovable
property to enjoy and dispose of the same and all products
thereof and accessions thereto. Section 7(b) of the Act deals with
the right of every owner of immovable property to enjoy without
disturbance by another the natural advantages arising from its
situation. The illustrations added to the Section clarifies the
nature and extend of the natural rights. Natural rights are those
incidents and advantages, which are provided by nature for the
use and enjoyment of a man's property. It is to be distinguished
from an act of man or some artificial cause. So, the only
deduction possible is that the rights enumerated in Section 7 of
the Easements Act are claimable only in respect of immovable
properties in its natural situation. All these rights cannot be
extended to man made constructions. It is well settled that
natural rights are rights in rem and are inherent in land ex jure
naturae and they are not to be acquired by immemorial user.
Their continuous enjoyment is not essential for their continued
existence, though they are capable of being lost by adverse
enjoyment. (See, Subbarayudu v. Secretary of State (AIR 1927
Mad. 988) and Secretary of State v. Subbarayudu (AIR 1932
P.C 46).)
13. If the right to prospect or view is not a natural
right, then the next question probable is whether it can be
acquired as an easement ? It can never be acquired as an
easement for the primary reason that such a right does not fit in
the definition of easement in Section 4 of the Act. The
requirement in the Section for having dominant and survient
heritages may not be fulfilled in such a claim.
14. Learned counsel for the defendant placed reliance on
a decision of the King's Bench Division in Campbell v. Mayor
(1911(1) K.B 869). In that case, the plaintiff sued the municipal
authorities alleging that certain constructions made by them
caused an invasion on his legal right to have an uninterrupted
view to Edgware Road, a main thoroughfare, through which a
public procession was expected to pass. On facts, it was found
that when the stand intended to be constructed by the authorities
if allowed to be completed, it would have caused obstruction to
the plaintiff's view to the road. After considering the legal
authorities on the point and the principles threadbare, it was laid
down that a view or prospect from the windows of a house is not
an easement or right in the nature of an easement. It was further
held that the law does not recognize a view or prospect from a
house as a right in the nature of an easement, which can belong
to anybody as of right, and that no period of enjoyment will give
a person a right of action against another, who on his own land
erects a structure or plants trees which obstruct the view or
prospect.
15. My view that such a right is not claimable is fortified
by an observation in Halsbury's Laws of England. In the
treatise, on the discussion of the topic "Nuisance" (Volume 78
paragraph 128), the following observations are made :
"128. Interference with prospect, view or
television reception. Where there is no
infringement of a right to light, and where the
act complained of is otherwise lawful, no
action lies for the invasion of privacy by the
opening of windows, or for the obstruction of
a view or prospect, even though the value of
a house or premises may be diminished
thereby."
So, there is no legal reason for recognizing the right to prospect
as a natural right or as an easement. What is claimable as a
natural right under Section 7 of the Act is a right to light or air
passing vertically to the property. Even light or air received
horizontally is not a natural right. In Re Penny and South
Eastern Rly Co (1857) 7 E & B 660, it has been held that no
easement can exist in relation to the enjoyment by a land owner
of the prospect or view from his property or in relation to the
privacy of the property. Learned Author N.D.Basu on a Law of
Injunctions (Fifth Edition), based on certain English authorities
has stated that erection of a building will not be restrained
because it injures the plaintiff by obstructing the view of his
place of business.
16. Upshot of the discussion is that the claim of a right
to view or prospect to one's building cannot be recognized as a
legal right enforceable by a court of law. Therefore, that part of
the decree is legally unsustainable.
17. Insofar as the apprehension of the plaintiff regarding
interference of his rights conferred by Ext.A1 is concerned, it
has to be found that there is sufficient cause of action for
maintaining an action. Commissioner's report and oral evidence
show that there was an attempt to interfere with the plaintiff's
use of the open space on the western side of the building, which
was used for entry to the shop room. Learned counsel harping
on Section 38(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act contended that the
evidence collectively probablize the case pleaded by the
plaintiff. It is true that there is a challenge raised by the
defendant against the rights conferred on the plaintiff as per
Ext.A1. Therefore, I am of the view that the decree can be
limited to the rights conferred by Ext.A1 on the plaintiff.
The appeal is partly allowed. The decree passed by
the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court is modified
as follows :
The appellant (defendant) is restrained by a
permanent prohibitory injunction from causing any obstruction
to the respondent's (plaintiff's) enjoyment of the plaint schedule
property in terms of the recitals in Ext.A1 assignment deed.
No costs.
All pending interlocutory applications will stand dismissed.
Sd/-
A.HARIPRASAD,
JUDGE.
natural rights. It says that easements are restrictions on one or
other of the two rights mentioned therein. Section 7 (a) of the
Act recognizes the exclusive right of every owner of immovable
property to enjoy and dispose of the same and all products
thereof and accessions thereto. Section 7(b) of the Act deals with
the right of every owner of immovable property to enjoy without
disturbance by another the natural advantages arising from its
situation. The illustrations added to the Section clarifies the
nature and extend of the natural rights. Natural rights are those
incidents and advantages, which are provided by nature for the
use and enjoyment of a man's property. It is to be distinguished
from an act of man or some artificial cause. So, the only
deduction possible is that the rights enumerated in Section 7 of
the Easements Act are claimable only in respect of immovable
properties in its natural situation. All these rights cannot be
extended to man made constructions. It is well settled that
natural rights are rights in rem and are inherent in land ex jure
naturae and they are not to be acquired by immemorial user.
Their continuous enjoyment is not essential for their continued
existence, though they are capable of being lost by adverse
enjoyment. (See, Subbarayudu v. Secretary of State (AIR 1927
Mad. 988) and Secretary of State v. Subbarayudu (AIR 1932
P.C 46).)
13. If the right to prospect or view is not a natural
right, then the next question probable is whether it can be
acquired as an easement ? It can never be acquired as an
easement for the primary reason that such a right does not fit in
the definition of easement in Section 4 of the Act. The
requirement in the Section for having dominant and survient
heritages may not be fulfilled in such a claim.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
FRIDAY,THE 26TH DAY OF JUNE 2015/
RSA.No. 786 of 2011 ( )
------------------------
THAMBI CHERIYAN,S/O.CHIRIYAKKUNNY,
KOLLANNUR HOUSE, MANGAD DESOM VILLAGE,
Vs
BABU,S/O.THOMAS, PUTHUKKARA VEEDU,
Citation; AIR 2015 Kerala 231
This regular second appeal raises important questions of
law. Does the law permit a person to claim unhindered or
unobstructed prospect or view to any building (here a
commercial building) as a matter of right ? Can a person claim a
decree for permanent prohibitory injunction based on the
alleged violation of such a right ?
2. Heard Sri.K.Ramachandran, learned counsel for the
appellant and Sri.T.N.Manoj, learned counsel for the
respondent.
3. The defendant in a suit for such a relief is the
appellant and the plaintiff, the respondent. Parties are
hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff and defendant. Decree
passed by the trial court, which was confirmed in appeal, reads
thus :
" That the defendant and his men are
restrained by permanent prohibitory
injunction from installing any new fixtures
or stair case infront of the plaintiff's plaint
schedule shop room causing any hindrance
or obstructions to the view, vicinity or
access to the plaint schedule shop room."
4. Even though in the plaint a right to have an
unhindered or unobstructed vicinity is also claimed and the same
was allowed by the courts below, the learned counsel for the
plaintiff fairly conceded that there is no legal foundation for that
claim. Further, the claim for a permanent prohibitory injunction
based on a right called unhindered vicinity is not legally
recognizable one and too vague to be granted by a court of law
either under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or
otherwise. Therefore, what is remaining as a bone of contention
is the legality and propriety of a legal right called the right to
prospect (view) to the plaintiff's building.
5. Relevant pleadings, in nutshell, are as follows :
Plaint schedule shop room was purchased by father of the
plaintiff from the defendant as per Ext.A1 assignment deed in
the year 1996. Plaintiff's father died and the property devolved
on his legal heirs, including the plaintiff. He is conducting
jewellery business in the plaint schedule shop room. The
defendant is the owner of a building complex in which the plaint
schedule shop room is also a part. From the descriptions in the
schedule to the plaint, it can be seen that on the western
boundary of the plaint schedule shop room, a main road and an
open space are situated. On the southern boundary, an open
space and a way through the building exist. It is an admitted
case that a staircase is in existence on the north-western corner
of the building for facilitating access to the upper stairs. The
plaintiff alleged that the PWD authorities had taken steps to
widen the road on the west. It is the contention of the plaintiff
that on taking measurements, the authorities found that the
staircase built by the defendant on the north-western side of the
room was projecting into the government puramboke. Plaintiff
reliably learnt that the authorities had issued notice to the
defendant directing him to demolish the staircase encroaching
onto the puramboke. Plaintiff's jewellery is facing a main
thoroughfare. His father purchased the room considering various
factors like the road frontage, unhindered view from the road,
easy access from the road etc. Plaintiff contended that the
defendant was taking hectic steps to install some fixtures and a
staircase infront of the shop room of the plaintiff causing
obstruction to the view to his jewellery from the main road. Acts
intended by the defendant may even adversely affect the access
to jewellery.
6. The defendant filed a written statement stating that he
did not receive any notice from the PWD authorities demanding
demolition of the staircase. Defendant further contended that he
has not trespassed into the government puramboke. The
staircase is well within the limits of his property. Defendant also
disputed the claim of the plaintiff based on a right to prospect.
According to the defendant there is no cause of action for the
suit.
7. The trial court, after considering the oral and
documentary evidence produced by parties and also the
Commissioner's report and sketch, decreed the suit. In the
appeal by the defendant, lower appellate court confirmed the
decree passed by the trial court.
8. Sri.K.Ramachandran contended that the decree
passed by the court below is legally unsustainable. According to
him, the suit itself is a preposterous action. He vehemently
contended that the court below should not have granted a decree
for injunction as claimed.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiff
contended that the defendant is bound to respect the rights
derived by the former as per Ext.A1 assignment deed. Ext.A1 is
an admitted document. Terms in Ext.A1 would show that one
room described in the plaint schedule was assigned by the
defendant to father of the plaintiff for valuable consideration. It
further shows that the plaintiff's father was conducting a
jewellery in the premises as a tenant prior to the assignment.
Preponderance of probabilities would certainly indicate that the
predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff, at the time of Ext.A1
assignment deed, was having enough reasons for purchasing the
shop room. On a reading of Ext.A1 assignment deed, it can be
seen that sufficient safeguards had been taken by the parties to
protect the rights of the assignor and assignee. In Ext.A1, it is
specifically mentioned that the buyer (plaintiff's father) was
entitled to have right of access through the open space on the
western and southern sides of the building. Ext.A1 further
shows that the defendant could not claim any right blocking the
access to the shop room of the plaintiff through the areas
mentioned therein. The defendant in his written statement has
stated clearly that there was no attempt on his part to invade or
obstruct the plaintiff's right of access to the building. However,
there can be no doubt that the plaintiff will be entitled to restrain
the defendant by a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction, if
it is established that his right under Ext.A1 is in jeopardy.
10. The core issue is about the legality of the claim of
plaintiff for a permanent prohibitory injunction on the basis of a
right of view or prospect, as it legally understood. Let me
initially examine the nature of such a right. As mentioned earlier,
the claim to have an unhindered vicinity is not pressed at the
hearing.
11. For obtaining a decree for permanent prohibitory
injunction, the plaintiff should establish a threat to or the
possibility of infringement of his legal right. Of course,the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 contains no list or catalogue of legal
rights on the breach of which a decree for permanent prohibitory
injunction can be granted. In Part III of the said Act, one can
find the rules regarding grant of injunction decrees, both in
mandatory and prohibitory forms. Decree for permanent
prohibitory injunction can be granted only on establishment of
an attempt to invade any statutory right or other rights based on
common law principles. That too, being an equitable relief, only
if it is not prohibited by the provisions in Section 41 of the Act.
Now, let me examine whether the plaintiff has any legal right to
maintain such a claim.
12. Section 7 of the Easements Act, 1882 deals with
natural rights. It says that easements are restrictions on one or
other of the two rights mentioned therein. Section 7 (a) of the
Act recognizes the exclusive right of every owner of immovable
property to enjoy and dispose of the same and all products
thereof and accessions thereto. Section 7(b) of the Act deals with
the right of every owner of immovable property to enjoy without
disturbance by another the natural advantages arising from its
situation. The illustrations added to the Section clarifies the
nature and extend of the natural rights. Natural rights are those
incidents and advantages, which are provided by nature for the
use and enjoyment of a man's property. It is to be distinguished
from an act of man or some artificial cause. So, the only
deduction possible is that the rights enumerated in Section 7 of
the Easements Act are claimable only in respect of immovable
properties in its natural situation. All these rights cannot be
extended to man made constructions. It is well settled that
natural rights are rights in rem and are inherent in land ex jure
naturae and they are not to be acquired by immemorial user.
Their continuous enjoyment is not essential for their continued
existence, though they are capable of being lost by adverse
enjoyment. (See, Subbarayudu v. Secretary of State (AIR 1927
Mad. 988) and Secretary of State v. Subbarayudu (AIR 1932
P.C 46).)
13. If the right to prospect or view is not a natural
right, then the next question probable is whether it can be
acquired as an easement ? It can never be acquired as an
easement for the primary reason that such a right does not fit in
the definition of easement in Section 4 of the Act. The
requirement in the Section for having dominant and survient
heritages may not be fulfilled in such a claim.
14. Learned counsel for the defendant placed reliance on
a decision of the King's Bench Division in Campbell v. Mayor
(1911(1) K.B 869). In that case, the plaintiff sued the municipal
authorities alleging that certain constructions made by them
caused an invasion on his legal right to have an uninterrupted
view to Edgware Road, a main thoroughfare, through which a
public procession was expected to pass. On facts, it was found
that when the stand intended to be constructed by the authorities
if allowed to be completed, it would have caused obstruction to
the plaintiff's view to the road. After considering the legal
authorities on the point and the principles threadbare, it was laid
down that a view or prospect from the windows of a house is not
an easement or right in the nature of an easement. It was further
held that the law does not recognize a view or prospect from a
house as a right in the nature of an easement, which can belong
to anybody as of right, and that no period of enjoyment will give
a person a right of action against another, who on his own land
erects a structure or plants trees which obstruct the view or
prospect.
15. My view that such a right is not claimable is fortified
by an observation in Halsbury's Laws of England. In the
treatise, on the discussion of the topic "Nuisance" (Volume 78
paragraph 128), the following observations are made :
"128. Interference with prospect, view or
television reception. Where there is no
infringement of a right to light, and where the
act complained of is otherwise lawful, no
action lies for the invasion of privacy by the
opening of windows, or for the obstruction of
a view or prospect, even though the value of
a house or premises may be diminished
thereby."
So, there is no legal reason for recognizing the right to prospect
as a natural right or as an easement. What is claimable as a
natural right under Section 7 of the Act is a right to light or air
passing vertically to the property. Even light or air received
horizontally is not a natural right. In Re Penny and South
Eastern Rly Co (1857) 7 E & B 660, it has been held that no
easement can exist in relation to the enjoyment by a land owner
of the prospect or view from his property or in relation to the
privacy of the property. Learned Author N.D.Basu on a Law of
Injunctions (Fifth Edition), based on certain English authorities
has stated that erection of a building will not be restrained
because it injures the plaintiff by obstructing the view of his
place of business.
16. Upshot of the discussion is that the claim of a right
to view or prospect to one's building cannot be recognized as a
legal right enforceable by a court of law. Therefore, that part of
the decree is legally unsustainable.
17. Insofar as the apprehension of the plaintiff regarding
interference of his rights conferred by Ext.A1 is concerned, it
has to be found that there is sufficient cause of action for
maintaining an action. Commissioner's report and oral evidence
show that there was an attempt to interfere with the plaintiff's
use of the open space on the western side of the building, which
was used for entry to the shop room. Learned counsel harping
on Section 38(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act contended that the
evidence collectively probablize the case pleaded by the
plaintiff. It is true that there is a challenge raised by the
defendant against the rights conferred on the plaintiff as per
Ext.A1. Therefore, I am of the view that the decree can be
limited to the rights conferred by Ext.A1 on the plaintiff.
The appeal is partly allowed. The decree passed by
the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court is modified
as follows :
The appellant (defendant) is restrained by a
permanent prohibitory injunction from causing any obstruction
to the respondent's (plaintiff's) enjoyment of the plaint schedule
property in terms of the recitals in Ext.A1 assignment deed.
No costs.
All pending interlocutory applications will stand dismissed.
Sd/-
A.HARIPRASAD,
JUDGE.
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