When documentary evidence shall be preferred over oral evidence?

 Oral evidence can also be
taken into consideration but in the facts of this case, the best evidenceis documentary evidence which has to prevail. In the face of the
documentary evidence evincing the price of the land per sq.yd. the
oral evidence which was based upon ipse dixit and without any sound
basis, could not have been accepted by the Reference Court. Thus, the
grave error which was committed had been rightly set at naught by the
single Bench of the High Court, which determination of compensation
has also not been interfered by a Division Bench.
Reliance has been placed upon State of Gujarat & Ors. v.
Rama Rana & Ors. [1997 (2) SCC 693] with respect to acceptance of
oral evidence in which case there was failure on the part of the
Agricultural Department to produce statistics as to the nature of the
crops and the prices prevailing at that time. In that context, it was
observed that oral evidence cannot be rejected due to such failure and
the court has a duty to subject the oral evidence to great scrutiny and
to evaluate the evidence objectively and dispassionately to reach a
finding on compensation.
Reliance has also been placed on Satyanarayana v. Bhu Arjan
Adhikari & Ors. [2011 (15) SCC 133] in which it has been laid down
that an analysis of the evidence by the Reference Court has to be
satisfactory. Reliance has also been placed on Ramanlal Deochand
Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2013 (14) SCC 50] laying down
that it is for the claimant to prove that the amount awarded by the
Collector needs an enhancement and for that purpose, oral and
documentary evidence can be adduced and when there is
non-consideration of material evidence, the case can be remanded to
lead evidence. In this case, there is proper scrutiny and evaluation of
oral and documentary evidence by the High Court. The decision of the
High Court with respect to determination of compensation deserves to

be upheld.

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1527-1536 OF 2013
Rajasthan Housing Board
... Appellant
- Vs –
New Pink City Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd.
& Anr.
... Respondents
WITH
Civil Appeal Nos.1557-1566/2013, 1577-1586/2013, 1597-1606/2013,
Dated;May 1, 2015.
Citation;(2015) 7 SCC601,AIR 2015 SC 2126

The appeals arise out of a common judgment and order dated
29.10.2009 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of
Rajasthan in Special Appeal No.13/2001 and other connected matters.
The Rajasthan Housing Board, original Khatedars and the New Pink
City Housing Construction Co-operative Society Ltd. (transferee)
(hereinafter referred to as the Society’) have assailed the impugned
judgment and order on different grounds. The Rajasthan Housing
Board has prayed for setting aside direction to consider 25% of
developed land and compensation, whereas the original khatedars
have prayed for payment of compensation to them. Similarly, the
Rajasthan Housing Board has also questioned the entitlement of the
Society to claim compensation. The Society has also claimed for more
value of land.
3.
The State Government issued a notification under
section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short ‘the
Act of 1953’) on 12.1.1982. The land had been acquired for the
purpose of housing scheme of Rajasthan Housing Board. On
22.5.1982 the possession had been handed over to Rajasthan Housing
Board under section 9 of the Act of 1953. The Society preferred
objections before the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO). The objections
preferred by the Society were rejected vide order dated 4.9.1982.
Page 2
3
Thereafter, Award was passed with respect to four cases by the LAO
on 30.11.1982 in favour of Khatedars. With respect to the remaining
cases the award was passed on 2.1.1989 by the LAO. Notice under
section 12(2) of the Act of 1953 was issued to the Society with respect
to the award of 30.11.1982 on 31.12.1988.
4.
The Society applied for reference under section 18 of
the Act of 1953. On 17.4.1989, the reference was made to the Civil
Court. One of the Khatedars namely Prabhu also sought reference
registered as Case No.43/1989. The Civil Court answered the
reference on 23.1.1994 determining the compensation at Rs.260 per
sq.yd. The objection raised by the Housing Board with respect to the
entitlement of Society under section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,
was brushed aside. On appeal to the High Court, the single Bench vide
impugned judgment and order dated 22.3.1999 reduced the
compensation to Rs.100 per sq.yd. The Division Bench has not only
affirmed the aforesaid award but has additionally directed to consider
allotment of 25% of developed land in view of circular dated
27.10.2005 in terms of the order passed by a Division Bench in
Special Appeal No.697/1995.
Page 3
4
5.
The Khatedars have claimed that they are ‘Bairwa’ by caste
which is a Scheduled Caste notified under the Constitution Scheduled
Castes Order, 1950.
6.
The Society has claimed that it had entered into an
agreement to sell with Khatedars of the land on 15.2.1974, 17.2.1974,
21.2.1974 and 22.1.1976. The Society has also claimed that it had
applied to the Rajasthan Housing Finance Society Ltd. for financial
assistance for construction of houses and an NOC dated 7.6.1982 was
issued to it by the Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur. The Society
objected to the acquisition but objections were rejected on 3.9.1982 in
four cases out of which Reference Case No.1989, 2089, 3089 and
4089 arose. The award was passed on 30.11.1982. Later on, the
Society appears to have filed a civil suit for specific performance of
agreement to sell in the year 1986 against the Khatedars and
compromise decrees are said to have been passed on 2.10.1986,
3.10.1986 and 24.1.1988 thereby decreeing the suit in favour of the
Society.
7.
It was submitted on behalf of the State Government,
Rajasthan Housing Board and also by the Khatedars that the
transactions between the Society and Khatedars, if any, were ab initio
void in view of the provisions contained in section 42 of the Rajasthan
Page 4
5
Tenancy Act. Thus, decree obtained on the basis of void transaction is
a nullity and no right had accrued to the Society to claim
compensation.
8.
It was urged before us on behalf of the Society that the
compensation determined is inadequate. Oral evidence has been
ignored by the High Court while reducing the quantum of
compensation determined by Reference Court. The Society has a right
to claim compensation on the basis of the agreement which has been
culminated into a decree passed by the civil court. No action has been
taken by Khatedars to take back the possession under section 175 of
the Rajasthan Tenancy Act within the period of limitation of 30 years
which is prescribed therein. The High Court has rightly ordered
allotment of 25% of the developed land to the Society. The Society is
a person interested to receive the compensation on the strength of the
judgment and decree of civil court. It has developed the land and has
spent certain amount on development and the right to hold the
property cannot be taken away except in accordance with the
provisions of a statute. In order to claim superior right to hold the
property the procedure prescribed in a statute must be complied with
as provided in Article 300A of the Constitution of India. The State is
bound to treat various incumbents similarly as others have been
Page 5
6
allotted the land. It is bound to act upon its decision and allot the 25%
of the developed land to the Society. The plea based upon the bar
created by section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act has not been
substantiated by adducing the evidence.
9.
It was contended on behalf of the Khatedars that though
the civil court’s decrees are fraudulent and bogus even otherwise the
decrees are a nullity and opposed to public policy on the strength of
provisions contained in section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act;
Transaction being void, the Society has no locus standi, right, title or
interest to claim the enhanced compensation; more so, in view of the
rejection of its objection vide order dated 4.9.1982. The award in 1982
was passed by Land Acquisition Officer in favour of Khatedars. They
are entitled to enhanced compensation and not the Society. The land
was recorded in the names of Khatedars in the revenue records. The
agreements of 1974 and 1976 have not been produced and once the
transaction is void, it can be questioned in the instant proceedings.
They are entitled to compensation and also to obtain developed land,
as and when allotted.
10.
It was contended on behalf of the State Government as
well as the Rajasthan Housing Board that the Society is not entitled to
any compensation as such transactions are declared void by section 42
Page 6
7
of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The reference sought in the year 1989
with respect to the lands covered by the award dated 30.11.1982 was
clearly barred by limitation. The objection had been raised before the
Reference Court based upon section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act
and it has not been disputed at any stage that Khatedars belong to
“Bairwa” caste which is a Scheduled Caste. Thus, the bar enacted
under section 42 on transfer of such land is clearly attracted. The
judgments passed by the High Court and the Reference Court deserve
to be set aside. On merits, no case for enhancement of compensation
was made out. The Society has no right, title or interest in the land.
The Division Bench of the High Court had gravely erred in law in
directing allotment of 25% of the developed land. The prayer made by
the Society for allotment of the developed land was rejected by the
Rajasthan Housing Board on 14.5.2009 and 16.9.2009. The said
orders were not questioned. Even otherwise the Circulars dated
13.11.2001 and that of 27.10.2005 are not applicable and not
enforceable as held by this Court. The direction to allot the developed
land deserves to be set aside.
11.
First, we advert to the question whether reference, with
respect to the four cases in which award was passed on 30.11.1982,
was within period of limitation. Admittedly, possession from the
Page 7
8
Society had been taken on 22.5.1982. The Society submitted the
objections before the LAO on 20.7.1982. While rejecting the
objections on 4.9.1982, the Special Officer, Urban Development
Authority, LAO, had unilaterally observed that the acquisition cannot
be said to be in violation of the provisions contained in Article 300A
of the Constitution of India, the Society has no ownership of the land,
it has no interest in the land. Thus, it has no right to raise the
objection. The said order had attained finality and the award was
passed on 30.11.1982. In the award so passed, it has also been
mentioned that an Advocate had appeared on behalf of the Khatedars
and wanted to file objections regarding compensation. The said
Advocate appeared on behalf of some of the Khatedars and stated that
they had sold the land to the Society. However, no claim petition was
filed on their behalf. There is also a reference in the award dated
30.11.1982 as to the objection filed by the Society had been rejected
on 4.9.1982. It is apparent from the award that it was passed after
rejecting the objections raised by the Society in favour of Khatedars.
12.
The provisions of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act are in
pari materia with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
and section 12 of the Act of 1953 is extracted hereinbelow :
Page 8
9
“12. Award of Collector when to be final.—(1)
Such award shall be filed in the Collector’s officer and
shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and
conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the
persons interested, whether they have respectively
appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area
and value of the land, and the apportionment of the
compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of
his award or the amendment thereof to such of the
persons interested as are not present personally or by
their representatives when the award or the amendment
thereof is made.”
13.
Section 12(2) requires immediate notice to be given of the
award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or
by their representative/s when the award is made. Section 18(2) of the
Act of 1953 requires to file the objections within six weeks from the
date of the award if the person or the representative was present when
the award was made. In other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of
notice from the Collector under section 12(2) or within six months
from the date of the award whichever period shall first expire.
14.
In the instant case, notice under section 12(2) was
issued to the Society by the Special Officer on 31.12.1988, treating the
Society as ‘person interested’ and informing that an award had been
passed on 30.11.1982 in accordance with section 11 of the Land
Page 9
10
Acquisition Act. On the strength of the aforesaid notices it was urged
on behalf of the Society that the limitation to seek the reference would
commence from the date of receipt of the notices issued and received
on 31.12.1988. The reference sought was within the period of
limitation.
15.
Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court
in Madan & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra [(2014) 2 SCC 720] and in
Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition
Officer & Anr. [AIR 1961 SC 1500] in which it has been laid down
that the party must have either actual or constructive communication
of the order which is an essential requirement of fair play and natural
justice. The date of award used in proviso (b) to section 18(2) of the
Act must be the date when the award is either communicated to the
party or known by him either actually or constructively. The award in
the said case was passed on 25.3.1951. Notice of the award was
however given to the appellant as required by section 12(2) on
13.1.1953 by which he received information about making of the said
award. It was observed that it was necessary for the Collector to give
immediate notice of his award under section 12(2) of the Act. This
Court has laid down in Raja Harish Chandra (supra) with respect to
the knowledge of the award by a party thus :
Page 10
11
“6 ..... The knowledge of the party affected by such a
decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential
element which must be satisfied before the decision
can be brought into force. Thus considered the making
of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act
of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the
office of the Collector, it must involve the
communication of the said award to the party
concerned either actually or constructively. If the
award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose
rights are affected by it it can be said to be made when
pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the
award is communicated to the party and it is
accordingly pronounced on the date previously
announced the award is said to be communicated to the
said party even if the said party is not actually present
on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without
notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is
pronounced and a party is not present the award can be
said to be made when it is communicated to the party
later. The knowledge of the party affected by the
award, either actual or constructive, being an essential
requirement of fair-play and natural justice the
expression "the date of the award" used in the proviso
must mean the date when the award is either
communicated to the party or is known by him either
actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it
would be unreasonable to construe the words "from the
date of the Collector's award" used in the proviso to
s. 18 in a literal or mechanical way.”
16.
The decision of the Madras High Court in Muthia Chettiar v.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras [AIR 1951 Mad. 204] had been
Page 11
12
considered and approved by this Court in Harish Chandra (supra)
thus:
“10 It may, however, be pertinent to point out that the
Bombay High Court has taken a somewhat different
view in dealing with the effect of the provision as to
limitation prescribed by s. 33A(2) of the Indian
Income-tax Act. This provision prescribes limitation
for an application by an assessee for the revision of the
specified class of orders, and it says that such an
application should be made within one year from the
date of the order. It is significant that while providing
for a similar period of limitation s. 33(1) specifically
lays down that the limitation of sixty days therein
prescribed is to be calculated from the date on which
the order in question is communicated to the assessee.
In
other
words,
in prescribing limitation
s. 33(1)expressly provides for the commencement of
the period from the date of the communication of the
order, whereas s. 33A(2) does not refer to any such
communication; and naturally the argument was that
communication was irrelevant under s. 33A(2) and
limitation would commence as from the making of the
order without reference to its communication. This
argument was rejected by the Bombay High Court and
it was held that it would be a reasonable interpretation
to hold that the making of the order implies notice of
the said order, either actual or constructive, to the party
affected by it. It would not be easy to reconcile this
decision and particularly the reasons given in its
support with the decision of the same High Court in the
case of Jehangir Bomanji AIR 1954 Bom. 419. The
relevant clause under s. 33A(2) of the Indian
Income-tax Act has also been similarly construed by
the Madras High Court in O.A.O.A.M. Muthia
Chettiar v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras
Page 12
13
[I.L.R. 1951 Mad. 815.]. "If a person is given a right to
resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within
a prescribed time", observed Rajamannar, C.J.,
"limitation should not be computed from a date earlier
than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew
of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order
and therefore must be presumed to have the knowledge
of the order". In other words the Madras High Court
has taken the view that the omission to use the words
"from the date of communication" in s. 33A(2) does
not mean that limitation can start to run against a party
even before the party either knew or should have
known about the said order. In our opinion this
conclusion is obviously right.”
It is thus clear that either party should have actual knowledge
or constructive notice i.e., should have known about the said order.
17.
In the instant case it is apparent that the Housing Society had
preferred objections and was aware of the land acquisition process and
determination of compensation and has filed objections which stood
rejected on 4.9.1982. Thus, the constructive knowledge of the award is
fairly attributable to it when it was so passed. Constructive notice in
legal fiction signifies that the individual person should know as a
reasonable person would have. Even if they have no actual knowledge
of it. Constructive notice means a man ought to have known a fact. A
person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows a fact
but for wilful abstension from inquiry or search which he ought to
Page 13
14
have made, or gross negligence he would have known it. Constructive
notice is a notice inferred by law, as distinguished from actual or
formal notice; that which is held by law to amount to notice. The
concept of constructive notice has been upheld by this Court in Harish
Chandra (supra).
18.
It is also apparent that the Society had actively
participated in the other pending cases with respect to determination
of compensation in which award had been passed on 2.1.1989. Thus
the reference sought on the strength of the notice under section 12(2)
issued and received on 31.12.1988 would not provide limitation to the
Society for seeking reference with respect to the four cases in which
the award was passed on 30.11.1982 as notice to it was wholly
unnecessary in view of rejection of its objection on the ground that it
was not having right, title or interest in the land. Thus it could not be
said to be ‘person interested’ in view of the order dated 4.9.1982. The
notice was issued for reasons best known to the Special Officer. It is
surprising how and for what reasons notice was issued after six years.
We need not go into this aspect any further as we are of the opinion
that in the facts and circumstances, the Society had a constructive
notice of the award dated 30.11.1982. Thus, in view of the conjoint
reading of sections 12(2) and 18(2) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition
Page 14
15
Act, it was not open to the LAO to refer the case to the civil court on
the basis of the time barred application.
19.
Coming to the question whether in view of section 42 of
the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, the transaction entered into by the Society
with the original Khatedars are void and whether on that basis, it had a
right to maintain the reference and to claim compensation? The
Society is said to have entered into agreements to sell on 17.2.1974,
21.2.1974 and 21.2.1976. These agreements have not been placed on
record by the Society. It was incumbent upon the Society to file these
agreements. Be that as it may. The Society has filed certain affidavits
of Khatedars along with counter affidavits filed by it. In the case of
Ram Pyari and others, the affidavits of various Khatedars have been
filed by the Societey in which their caste has been mentioned as
‘Bairwa’. The caste of the original Khatedars has never been disputed.
‘Bairwa’ caste is a Scheduled Caste. Before this Court also in the case
of Ram Pyari in the SLP preferred, averments have been made to the
effect that the original Khatedars belong to Scheduled Caste and the
sale in favour of a person not belonging to Scheduled Caste is void as
per the mandate of section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. In the
counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Society, the factum that
Khatedars are ‘Bairwa’ and belongs to Scheduled Caste, has not been
Page 15
16
denied. Before the Reference Court also, the stand of the State
Government was that as the Khatedars belong to Scheduled Caste, the
transaction was prohibited by section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy
Act. On behalf of the Society, it was submitted in counter affidavit
that as it is a Society, the rigor of provisions of section 42 is not
attracted and it had relied upon the circular dated 1.9.1984 issued by
the Government of Rajasthan for regularisation of the land sold in
violation of section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The Society has
failed to deny clear and categorical averments, non-denial makes the
aforesaid facts undisputed one. There is not even an evasive denial
that Khatedars do not belong to Scheduled Caste. Even in the
additional affidavit filed on behalf of the Society in the wake of the
rejoinder filed by the petitioner in reply to the counter affidavit of
respondent No.2, the caste of the original Khatedars has not been
disputed. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the original
Khatedars are ‘Bairwa’ by caste which is a Scheduled Caste and they
are entitled to the protection of the provisions contained in section 42
of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.
20.
The provisions of section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy
Act declare the transaction entered into by a Scheduled Caste with any
person other than a person of a Scheduled Caste or by a Scheduled
Page 16
17
Tribe with any other tribe to be void. Section 42 of the Rajasthan
Tenancy Act is extracted hereunder :
“Section 42 - General restrictions on sale, gift &
bequest
1
[The sale, gift or bequest by a Khatedar tenants of his
interest in the whole or part of his holding shall be void,
if
2
[***]
(b) such sale, gift or bequest is by a number of Scheduled
Caste in favour of a person who is not a member of the
Scheduled Caste, or by a member of a Scheduled Tribe in
favour of a person who in not a member of the Scheduled
Tribe.
3
[***]
"[(bb) such sale, gift or bequest, notwithstanding anything
contained in clause (b), is by a member of Saharia
Scheduled Tribe in favour of a person who is not a
member of the said Saharia tribe."]4
21.
The so-called agreements dated 15.2.1974, 17.2.1974,
21.2.1974 and 21.2.1976 which were purportedly entered into by the
Society with the Khatedars were thus clearly void as per the mandate
of section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The notification in the
instant case under section 4 was issued on 12.1.1982. The plea of
part-performance under section 53A of Transfer of Property Act was
also not available to the Society as transaction is void.
Page 17
18
22.
The equally futile is the submission that since the Society is a
juristic person, sale cannot be said to be in contravention of section 42
of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. ‘Sale’ is permitted by a person of
Scheduled Caste to another person of Scheduled Caste. The Society
cannot be said to be a person of ‘Scheduled Caste’. The Society
cannot be said to be a person included in the notification issued under
Article 341 of the Constitution of India. Article 341 of the
Constitution envisages notification to be issued for inclusion of
Scheduled Caste in relation to a State or Union Territory. The
expression ‘person’ in section 42(b) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is
to a natural person and not a juristic person and the mere fact that
some of the persons of the Society belong to Scheduled Caste would
not make the transaction with such a Housing Society valid one. This
Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Aanjaney Organic Herbal Pvt.
Ltd. [(2012) 10 SCC 283] has considered the question of provisions of
section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and held that bar is attracted
to a juristic person :
“12. The expressions “Scheduled Castes” and
“Scheduled Tribes”, we find in Section 42(b) of the Act
have to be read along with the constitutional provisions
and, if so read, the expression “who is not a member of
the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe” would mean
a person other than those who have been included in
the public notification as per Articles 341 and 342 of
the Constitution. The expression “person” used in
Page 18
19
Section 42(b) of the Act therefore can only be a natural
person and not a juristic person, otherwise, the entire
purpose of that section will be defeated. If the
contention of the Company is accepted, it can purchase
land from Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe and then
sell it to a non-Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, a
situation the legislature wanted to avoid. A thing which
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly
overreaching the statutory restriction.
13. We are, therefore, of the view that the reasoning
of the High Court that the respondent being a juristic
person, the sale effected by a member of Scheduled
Caste to a juristic person, which does not have a caste,
is not hit by Section 42 of the Act, is untenable and
gives a wrong interpretation to the abovementioned
provision.”
In view of the aforesaid dictum it is crystal clear that the sale to
the Society which is a juristic person is ab initio void and not
recognisable in the eye of law.
23.
This Court in Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka &
Ors. [(1984) 3 SCC 301] has considered the validity of sections 3, 4
and 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 which prohibited
transfer of granted lands and provided for resumption thereof, it was
held that even the prohibited transaction effected prior to
commencement of the Act can be nullified and sections 4 and 5 are
not violative of Article 19(1)(f) as it stood prior to its omission in
1978. Neither the provision is violative of Articles 31 and 31A of the
Page 19
20
Constitution of India and a transferee shall have no property right and
recovery of such property would not attract Article 31 or 31A. This
Court also held that the provisions have reasonable nexus with the
object sought to be achieved. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes form a distinctive class. Exclusion of other communities from
the provision is not discriminatory. The right of the Legislature to
declare such transactions to be void has been upheld by this Court in
following manner :
“12. In pursuance of this policy, the Legislature is
undoubtedly competent to pass an enactment providing
that transfers of such granted lands will be void and not
merely voidable for properly safeguarding and
protecting the interests of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes for whose benefit only these lands
had been granted. Even in the absence of any such
statutory provisions, the transfer of granted lands in
contravention of the terms of the grant or in breach of
any law, rule or regulation covering such grant will
clearly be voidable and the resumption of such granted
lands after avoiding the voidable transfers in
accordance with law will be permitted. Avoidance of
such voidable transfers and resumption of the granted
lands through process of law is hound to take time.
Any negligence and delay on the part of the authorities
entitled to take action to avoid such transfers through
appropriate legal process for resumption of such grant
may be further impediments in the matter of avoiding
such transfers and resumption of possession of the
granted lands. Prolonged legal proceedings will
undoubtedly be prejudicial to the interests of the
members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
Page 20
21
for whose benefit the granted lands are intended to be
resumed. As transfers of granted lands in contravention
of the terms of the grant or any law, regulation or rule
governing such grants can be legally avoided and
possession of such lands can be recovered through
process of law, it must be held that the Legislature for
the purpose of avoiding delay and harassment of
protracted litigation and in furthering its object of
speedy restoration of these granted lands to the
members of the weaker communities is perfectly
competent to make suitable provision for resumption of
such granted lands by stipulating in the enactment that
transfers of such lands in contravention of the terms of
the grant or any regulation, rule or law regulating such
grant will be void and in providing a suitable procedure
consistent with the principles of natural justice for
achieving this purpose without recourse to prolonged
litigation in Court in the larger interests of benefiting
the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes.”
24.
Without payment of compensation, land can be resumed has
also been held by this Court and even in a case when grant was for a
certain period, the land could be resumed. The vires of the provisions
contained in sections 4 and 5 resuming the land without compensation
has been upheld. In Manchegowda (supra), this Court has laid down
thus :
“19. We have earlier noticed that the title which is
acquired by a transferee in the granted lands,
transferred in contravention of the prohibition against
the transfer of the granted lands, is a voidable title
Page 21
22
which in law is liable to be defeated through
appropriate action and possession of such granted lands
transferred in breach of the condition of prohibition
could be recovered by the grantor. The right or
property which a transferee acquires in the granted
lands, is a defeasible right and the transferee renders
himself liable to lose his right or property at the
instance of the grantor. We have further observed that
by the enactment of this Act and particularly
Section 4 and Section 5 thereof the Legislature is
seeking to defeat the defeasible right of the transferee
in such lands without the process of a prolonged legal
action with a view to speedy resumption of such
granted lands for distribution thereof the original
grantee or their legal representatives and in their
absence to other members of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes Communities. In our opinion, this
kind of defeasible right of the transferee in the granted
lands cannot be considered to be property as
contemplated in Article 31 and 31A. The nature of the
right of the transferee in the granted land on transfer of
such lands in breach of the condition of prohibition
relating to such transfer, the object of such grant and
the terms thereof, also the law governing such grants
and the object and the scheme of the present Act
enacted for the benefit of weaker sections of our
community, clearly go to indicate that there is in this
case no deprivation of such right or property as may
attract the provisions of Articles 31 and 31A of the
Constitution.
20. In the case of Amar Singh v. Custodian, Evacuee
Property, Punjab (1957) S.C.R. 801, this Court while
considering the provisions of Administration of
Evacuee Property Act 1930 (XXXI of 1950) and the
nature of right in the property allotted to a
quasi-permanent allottee held that the interests of a
quasi-permanent allottee did not constitute property
within
the
meaning
of
Articles 19(1)
Page 22
23
(f), 31(1) and 31(2) of the Constitution. This Court
observed at p. 834:
“Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has
strenuously
urged
that
under
the
quasi-permanent allotment scheme the
allottee is entitled to a right to possession
within the limits of the relevant notification
and that such right to possession is itself
'property'. That may be so in a sense. But it
does not affect the question whether it is
property as to attract the protection of
fundamental rights under the Constitution. If
the totality of the bundle of rights of the
quasi-permanent allottee in the evacuee land
constituting an interest in such land, is not
property
entitled
to
protection
of
fundamental rights, mere possession of the
land by virtue of such interest is not on any
higher footing.”
25.
In the instant case, the transaction is ab initio void that is right
from its inception and is not voidable at the volition by virtue of the
specific language used in section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.
There is declaration that such transaction of sale of holding “shall be
void”. As the provision is declaratory, no further declaration is
required to declare prohibited transaction a nullity. No right accrues to
a person on the basis of such a transaction. The person who enters into
an agreement to purchase the same, is aware of the consequences of
the provision carved out in order to protect weaker sections of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The right to claim
compensation accrues from right, title or interest in the land. When
Page 23
24
such right, title or interest in land is inalienable to non-SC/ST,
obviously the agreements entered into by the Society with the
Khatedars are clearly void and decrees obtained on the basis of the
agreement are violative of the mandate of section 42 of the Rajasthan
Tenancy Act and are a nullity. Such a prohibited transaction opposed
to public policy, cannot be enforced. Any other interpretation would
be defeasive of the very intent and protection carved out under section
42 as per the mandate of Article 46 of the Constitution, in favour of
the poor castes and downtrodden persons, included in the Schedules to
Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India.
26.
In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Babu Lal & Ors. [1977 (2) SCC
435] the provisions contained in section 165(6) of M.P. Land Revenue
Code, 1959 came up for consideration before this Court. The High
Court directed the State to file a suit for declaring the decree null and
void. The decision was set aside. It was held that the case was a
glaring instance of violation of law as such the High Court erred in not
issuing a writ. The decision of the High Court was set aside. The
transfer which was in violation of proviso to section 165(6)
transferring the right of Bhuswami belonging to a tribe, was set aside.
27.
This Court in Lincal Gamango & Ors. v. Dayanidhi Jena &
Ors. [AIR 2004 SC 3457] while considering the provisions of Orissa
Page 24
25
Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (by Scheduled
Tribes) Regulation, 1956 which prohibited alienation of rural property
by a tribal to a non-tribal, declared such transaction to be null and
void. This Court while relying upon the decision in Amrendra Pratap
Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors. [AIR 2004 SC 3782] has laid
down that no right can be acquired by adverse possession on such
inalienable property. Adverse possession operates on an alienable
right. It was held that non-tribal would not acquire a right or title on
the basis of adverse possession. Relevant discussion is extracted
hereunder :
“7. We find both these reasons given by the High
Court are not sustainable. Coming first to the second
point, we find that there is a decision of this Court
direct on the point. It is reported in AIR 2004 SC
3782, Amrendra
Pratap
Singh v. Tej
Bahadur
Prajapati and Ors. The matter related to transfer of
land falling in tribal area belonging to the Scheduled
Tribes. The matter was governed by Regulations 2, 3
and 7-D of the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of
Immovable Property (By Scheduled Tribes)
Regulations, 1956 viz. the same Regulations which
govern this case also. The question involved was also
regarding acquisition of right by adverse possession.
Considering the matter in detail, in the light of the
provisions of the aforesaid Regulation, this Court
found that one of the questions which falls for
consideration was "whether right by adverse
possession can be acquired by a non-aboriginal on the
property belonging to a member of aboriginal tribe"?
Page 25
26
(para 14 of the judgment). In context with the above
question posed, this Court observed in para 23 of the
judgment as follows :
"......The right in the property ought to be one
which is alienable and is capable of being
acquired by the competitor. Adverse
possession operates on an alienable right The
right stands alienated by operation of law, for
it was capable of being alienated voluntarily
and is sought to be recognized by doctrine of
adverse possession as having been alienated
involuntarily, by default and inaction on the
part of the rightful claimant....."
“This Court then noticed two decisions one that of the
Privy Council reported in AIR 1923 P.C.
205 Madhavrao Woman Saundalgekar and Ors. v.
Raghunath Venkatesh Deshpande and Ors., and
Karimullakhan
s/o.
Mohd
Ishaqkhan
and
Anr. v. Bhanupratapsingh, holding that title by adverse
possession on inam lands, Watan lands and Debutter
was incapable of acquisition since alienation of such
land was prohibited in the interest of the State. We
further find that the decision in the case of Madhiya
Nayak (supra) relied upon by the High Court was
referred to before this Court and it is observed that the
question as to whether a non-tribal could at all
commence prescribing acquisition of title by adverse
possession over the land belonging to a tribal which is
situated in a tribal area, was neither raised nor that
point had arisen in the case of Madhiya Nayak. It is
further observed that the provisions of Section 7-D of
the Regulations are to be read in the light of the fact
that the acquisition of right and title by adverse
possession is claimed by a tribal over the immovable
property of another tribal but not where the question is
in regard to a non-tribal claiming title by adverse
possession over the land belonging to a tribal situate in
a tribal area. It is, therefore, clear in view of the
decision in the case of Amrendra Pratap Singh (supra)
that a non-tribal would not acquire right and title on the
basis of adverse possession. Therefore, the second
Page 26
27
ground for setting aside the order passed by the
appellate court falls through. Therefore, the other
factual aspect about the possession of the respondents
over the disputed land and entries in their favour may
also not be of much consequence, in any case, this
aspect of the matter has to be seen and considered
afresh in the light of other facts and circumstances of
the case.”
28.
This Court in Amrendra Pratap (supra) has laid down that the
expression ‘transfer’ would include any dealing with the property
when the word ‘deal with’ has not been defined in the statute.
Dictionary meaning as the safe guide can be extended to achieve the
intended object of the Act. The transaction or the dealing with
alienable property to transfer title of an aboriginal tribe and vesting
the same in non-tribal was construed as transfer of immovable
property. Extending the meaning of the expression ‘transfer of
immovable property’ would include dealing with such property as
would have the effect of causing or resulting in transfer of interest in
immovable property. When the object of the legislation is to prevent a
mischief and to confer protection on the weaker sections of the
society, the court would not hesitate in placing an extended meaning,
even a stretched one, on the word, if in doing so the statute would
succeed in attaining the object sought to be achieved. When the
intendment of the Act is that the property should remain so confined in
Page 27
28
its operation in relation to tribals that the immovable property to one
tribal may come but the title in immovable property is not to come to
vest in a non-tribal the intendment is to be taken care by the protective
arm of the law and be saved from falling prey to unscrupulous
devices, and this Court concluded any transaction or dealing with
immovable property which would have the effect of extinguishing
title, possession or right to possess such property in a tribal and
vesting the same in a non-tribal, would be included within the
meaning of ‘transfer of immovable property’.
29.
It was further submitted on behalf of the Society that though a
purchaser after issuance of notification under section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act cannot question the legality of the notification, but,
can lay a claim for payment of compensation. Reliance has been
placed on U.P.Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman & Anr. v.
Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow & Ors. [1996 (3) SCC 124].
When we consider the aforesaid dictum, this Court has laid down that
after notification under section 4(1) was published, sale of land is void
against the State and M/s. Kalra Properties acquired no right, title or
interest in the land and it is a settled law that it cannot challenge the
validity of the notification or the regularity in taking possession of the
land before publication of the declaration under section 6. M/s. Kalra
Page 28
29
Properties, though acquired no title to the land, at best would be
entitled to step into the shoes of the owner and claim compensation.
However, in the instant case, it was a transaction which was not only
void against the State but also void inter se vendor and vendee.
30.
The right to claim compensation cannot be enforced by the
Society on the basis of such transaction as that would defeat the very
object of the Act and the constitutional provisions including such
castes and tribes under the protective umbrella of the Schedules to
Articles 341 and 342, they cannot be deprived of right to obtain the
compensation of the land legally held by them and they cannot be
made to fall prey to unscrupulous devices of land grabbers. The right
to claim compensation is based on right, title or interest in the land,
cannot be transferred by virtue of the mandate of section 42 to a
juristic person like the Society. It is the duty of the State to ensure that
the benefit reaches to such persons directly and not usurped by
intermeddlers as what is intended by the protection of the right to hold
property of SC/ST, cannot be taken away by disbursing the
compensation to Society. Persons of SC/ST, as the case may be, are
the only rightful claimants to disbursal of compensation and such right
cannot be tinkered with by void transaction as the purpose of
compensation is the re-settlement of Scheduled Castes or tribes.
Page 29
30
31.
The
other
decision
relied
upon
by
the
Society
is
V.Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative Officer & Ors. [2012 (12)
SCC 133] wherein this Court laid down thus :
“15. The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions
by the person who purchases the land subsequent to a
notification being issued under Section 4 of the Act has
been considered by this Court time and again.
In Pandit Leela Ram v. Union of India AIR 1975 SC
2112, this Court held that, any one who deals with the
land subsequent to a Section 4 notification being
issued, does so, at his own peril. In Sneh Prabha v.
State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1996 SC 540, this Court
held that a Section 4 notification gives a notice to the
public at large that the land in respect to which it has
been issued, is needed for a public purpose, and it
further points out that there will be "an impediment to
any one to encumber the land acquired thereunder."
The alienation thereafter does not bind the State or the
beneficiary under the acquisition. The purchaser is
entitled only to receive compensation. While deciding
the said case, reliance was placed on an earlier
judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Shri Shiv
Kumar Bhargava and Ors.: JT (1995) 6 SC 274.
16. Similarly, in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties
Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 1170, this Court held that,
purchase of land after publication of a
Section 4 notification in relation to such land, is void
against the State and at the most, the purchaser may be
a person-interested in compensation, since he steps into
the shoes of the erstwhile owner and may therefore,
merely claim compensation. (See also: Star Wire
(India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors.
17. In Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India AIR 1996
SC 2677; Mahavir and Anr. v. Rural Institute,
Amravati and Anr. (1995) 5 SCC 335; Gian Chand v.
Gopala and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 528; and Meera Sahni
Page 30
31
v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. (2008) 9
SCC 177, this Court categorically held that, a person
who purchases land after the publication of a
Section 4 notification with respect to it, is not entitled
to challenge the proceedings for the reason, that his
title is void and he can at best claim compensation on
the basis of vendor's title. In view of this, the sale of
land after issuance of a Section 4 notification is void
and the purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition
proceedings. (See also: Tika Ram v. State of U.P.
(2009) 10 SCC 689).
18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarized to the effect that a person who purchases
land
subsequent
to
the
issuance
of
a
Section 4 notification with respect to it, is not
competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition
proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for the reason
that the sale deed executed in his favour does not
confer upon him, any title and at the most he can claim
compensation on the basis of his vendor's title.”
32.
Reliance has been placed on Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v.
P.M.Bharucha [1958 (60) Bom.LR 1208] so as to contend that the
‘person interested’ in the land under section 9 of the Land Acquisition
Act would include a person who claims interest in compensation to be
paid on account of acquisition of land and the interest contemplated
under section 9 is not restricted to legal or proprietary estate or interest
in the land but such interest as will sustain a claim to apportionment,
is the owner of the land. In our opinion, the decision is of no avail.
The instant transaction being void as per section 42 of the Rajasthan
Tenancy Act and the property was inalienable to non-SC. Obviously,
Page 31
32
the logical corollary has to be taken that no right in apportionment to
compensation can be claimed by the Society.
33.
In Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor
Coutinho (dead) by LRs. [1980 (3) SCC 223), it was laid down that
‘person interested’ within the meaning of section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act would include a body, local authority, or a company
for whose benefit the land is acquired . The company for whose
benefit the land had been acquired was liable to pay compensation,
was held to be a ‘person interested’. The decision is of no help to the
cause espoused by the Society and the reliance on same is misplaced.
34.
It was vehemently urged on behalf of the Society that
having failed to take recourse to the provisions of section 175 of the
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, the Khatedars have lost their remedy for
ignoring the title acquired by the Society which has been perfected by
the compromise decrees passed by the civil court. Section 175 of the
Rajasthan Tenancy Act is extracted below :
“Section 175 - Ejectment for illegal transfer or sub-letting
1
[(1)] If a tenant transfers or sub-lets, or executes an
instrument purporting to transfer or sublet, the whole
or any part of his holding otherwise than in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and the transferee or
sub-lessee or the purported such part in pursuance of
such transfer or sub lease, both the tenant and any
person who may have thus obtained or may thus be in
Page 32
33
possession of the holding or any part of the holding,
shall on the application of the land holder, be liable to
ejectment from the area so transferred or sub-let or
purported to be transferred or sub-let.
(2) To every application, under this Section the
transferee or the sub-tenant or the purported transferee
or the sub-tenant, as the case may be, shall be joined as
a party.
(3) On an application being made under this section,
the court shall issue a notice to the opposite party to
appear within such time as may be specified therein
and show cause why he should not be ejected from the
area so transferred or sublet or purported to be
transferred or sub-let.]
(4) If appearance is made within the time specified in
the notice and the liability to ejectment is contested,
the court shall, on payment of the proper court fees,
treat the application to be a suit and proceed with the
case as a suit:
Provided that in the event of the application having
been made by a tehsildar in respect of land held
directly from the State Government no court-fee shall
be payable.
1
[4(a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in sub-section (4), if the application is in
respect of contravention of the provision contained in
section 42 or the proviso to sub-section (2) of section
43 or section 49A, the court shall, after giving a
reasonable opportunity to the parties of being heard,
conclude the enquiry in a summary manner and pass
order, as far as may be practicable within a period of
three months from the date of the appearance of the
non-applicants before it, directing ejectment of the
tenant and his transferee or sub-lessee from the area
transferred or sub-let in contravention of the said
provisions.]
(5) If no such appearance is made or if appearance is
made but the liability to ejectment is not contested the
Page 33
34
court shall pass order on the application as it may deem
proper.”
35.
There is no doubt about it that section 175 provides for
ejectment for illegal transfer or subletting in contravention of the
provisions of the said Act. However, there is no question of ejectment
proceedings being filed in the instant case under the aforesaid
provision that would have been exercised in futility as admittedly the
possession has already been taken by the State on 22.5.1982. Apart
from that, voidity of the transaction can be looked into in these
proceedings also when right to claim compensation is asserted by the
Society and from factual conspectus of the instant case it is apparent
that Khatedars belong to Scheduled Castes and they cannot be
deprived of their right to claim compensation, intendment of section
42 can be effectuated in these proceedings.
36.
On behalf of the Society, reliance has been placed on a
decision of this Court In Nathu Ram (dead) by LRs. & Ors. v. State of
Rajasthan & Ors. [2004 (13) SCC 585] in which this Court has
considered the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act as it stood
prior to its amendment made in the Act. The limitation prescribed was
12 years from the date of transfer. After the amendment, it is thirty
years. It was also laid down that though the transfer was by itself void
Page 34
35
but the period of limitation would be applicable. In the instant case,
there is no question of initiating the process under section 175 of the
Rajasthan Tenancy Act as much before passing of the decrees by the
civil court in the year 1986, possession had been taken by the State in
May, 1982 much before limitation lapsed. Thus, institution of
proceedings for ejectment was not warranted.
37.
In Ram Karan (dead) through LR & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan
& Ors. [2014 (8) SCC 282], this Court has laid down that transfer of
holding by a member of Scheduled Caste to a member not belonging
to Scheduled Caste by virtue of section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy
Act is forbidden and unenforceable. Such a transaction is unlawful
even under section 23 of the Contract Act and an agreement or such
transfer would be void under section 2(g) of the Contract Act. This
Court also considered limitation for filing ejectment under section
175. The proceeding filed after 31 years was held to be barred by
limitation. The decision is distinguishable for aforesaid reasons.
38.
It was next contended on behalf of the Society that the Society
has acquired a right and such right to hold property cannot be taken
away except in accordance with the provisions of a statute. If a
superior right to hold the property is claimed, the due procedure must
be complied with. Reliance has been placed on Lachhman Dass v.
Page 35
36
Jagat Ram & Ors. [2007 (10) SCC 448], in which this Court has laid
down thus:
“16.
Despite such notice, the appellant was not
impleaded as a party. His right, therefore, to own and
possess the suit land could not have been taken away
without giving him an opportunity of hearing in a
matter of this nature. To hold property is a
constitutional right in terms of Article 300A of the
Constitution of India. It is also a human right. Right to
hold property, therefore, cannot be taken away except
in accordance with the provisions of a statute. If a
superior right to hold a property is claimed, the
procedures therefore must be complied with. The
conditions precedent therefore must be satisfied. Even
otherwise, the right of pre-emption is a very weak
right, although it is a statutory right. The Court, while
granting a relief in favour of a pre-emptor, must bear it
in mind about the character of the right, vis-a-vis, the
constitutional and human right of the owner thereof.”
39.
Reliance has also been placed in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors.
through
Power-of-Attorney
holder
v. Maharashtra
Industrial
Development Corpn. & Ors. [2013 (1) SCC 353] in which it has been
laid down thus :
“8. The Appellants were deprived of their immovable
property in 1964, when Article 31 of the Constitution
was still intact and the right to property was a part of
fundamental
rights
under
Article 19 of
the
Constitution. It is pertinent to note that even after the
Right to Property seized to be a Fundamental Right,
taking possession of or acquiring the property of a
Page 36
37
citizen most certainly tantamounts to deprivation and
such deprivation can take place only in accordance
with the "law", as the said word has specifically been
used in Article 300-A of the Constitution. Such
deprivation can be only by resorting to a procedure
prescribed by a statute. The same cannot be done by
way of executive fiat or order or administration
caprice. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar, etc. etc. v. State
of Gujarat and Anr. AIR 1995 SC 142, it has been held
as follows: -
“In other words, Article 300-A only limits
the power of the State that no person shall
be deprived of his property save by authority
of law. There is no deprivation without due
sanction of law. Deprivation by any other
mode is not acquisition or taking possession
under Article 300-A. In other words, if there
is no law, there is no deprivation.””
40.
In Rajendra Nagar Adarsh Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd.
v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [2013 (11) SCC 1] and Mathew Varghese
v. M.Amritha Kumar & Ors. [2014 (5) SCC 610], observations as to
the similar effect had been made.
41.
When we consider the aforesaid submission, it is apparent that
the right to hold property cannot be taken away except in accordance
with the provisions of the statute but in the instant case, we are of the
considered view that the right to hold property albeit had not been
acquired by the Society, transction was ab initio void and a nullity. On
the other hand, the land has been acquired by the State Government

and even the right to claim compensation was denied to the Society in
the award passed on 30.11.1982 by rejecting their objections. The
recourse to section 175 was not required as already held by us. The
question of entitlement of the Society is involved in the cases in view
of award dated 30.11.1982 rejecting right of the Society to claim
compensation. Thus, it cannot be said that there is violation of the
principles laid down by this Court in aforesaid cases with respect to
right to hold property which cannot be taken away except as provided
in the provisions of the statute.
42.
Coming to the question of direction to consider allotment of
land and quantum of compensation determined in the instant case, the
Reference Court had determined compensation at Rs.260 per sq.yd.
whereas the High Court has determined it at Rs.100 per sq.yd. and the
Division Bench has in addition ventured into directing the State
Government to consider the prayer for allotment of 25% of the
developed land to the Society in the light of Circular dated 27.10.2005
issued by the State Government and its decision in Smt. Ratni Devi v.
State of Rajasthan & Ors. – DB Special Appeal No.697/1995 decided
on 12.4.2007.
First, we take up the question as to the legality of the direction
issued by the High Court with respect to allotment of 25% of
Page 38
39
developed land in terms of the order passed in the case of Smt. Ratni
Devi (supra).
43.
When we consider the Circular dated 27.10.2005, the State
Government considered the prevalent scheme in which Khatedars
could ‘surrender’ their land without compensation and would obtain
25% of the developed residential area in lieu thereof. Paras 1 and 4 of
the Circular are relevant and are quoted below :
“1. In the matters of land acquisition on making a
surrender of the land by the Khatedar, he will be
entitled for maximum 20% residential and 5%
commercial land to the said person from whom the
land has been acquired. But for the Khatedar no other
person shall be allotted the land, even if nominated by
him.”
xxxxx
“4. These provisions shall only be applicable, in case
of future acquisitions. These provisions shall be
specifically be applicable, wherein the Land
Acquisition Officer have already declared the award
and the compensation amount has been paid/deposited
in the Court or 15% land have been allowed to be
allotted in the award.”
44.
It is apparent from para 1 that the Circular is applicable in the
matter of land acquisition when the Khatedars surrendered their lands.
Page 39
40
45.
Para 4 of circular makes it clear that the provisions shall apply
in case of future acquisitions and the provisions shall not apply where
the Land Acquisition Officers have already passed the award/s.
46.
In the instant case, even the prevalent instructions which have
been modified did not confer any right on the Society or the Khatedars
to claim the developed land. It was not a case of surrender of land;
thus there was no question of the provisions of the circular being
applied as the circular was in the form of guidelines for future
acquisitions where Khatedars surrendered their lands and award has
not been passed. For the aforesaid reasons, the aforesaid circular could
not have been pressed into service by the Society and that too at the
appellate stage before the Division Bench. The Division Bench has
gravely erred in law while issuing the aforesaid directions which were
wholly unwarranted and uncalled for.
47.
When we consider the decision in Smt. Ratni Devi (supra), it
was based upon a concession made by the counsel who appeared on
behalf of the Jaipur Development Authority. The applicability of the
Circular was not considered by the Division Bench. The matter was
decided on the basis of concession and the agreement between the
parties. It was submitted before us on behalf of the Rajasthan Housing
Board that a review petition had been preferred for recalling the
Page 40
41
aforesaid concession made unauthorisedly before the court. Be that as
it may. In our opinion, the Circular itself is not applicable and it was
clearly a misadventure on the part of the Division Bench in the instant
case to rely upon the aforesaid decision in Smt. Ratni Devi (supra). No
negative equality could be claimed.
48.
Earlier Circular dated 13.12.2001 had been issued by the
Deputy Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan with respect to
allotment of 15% of the developed land. It has not been issued in the
name of the Governor. This Court has considered the enforceability of
such circulars in Jaipur Development Authority & Ors. v. Vijay Kumar
Data & Anr. [2011 (12) SCC 94]. This Court has referred to the
decision in Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shyam [1994 (4)
SCC 370] in which the decision of the LAO to allot the plots in
addition to compensation was set aside and it was held that even in
execution it was open to raise the question of validity or nullity of the
decree. Following is the relevant discussion in Vijay Kumar Data
(supra) :
“12. The question whether the Land Acquisition Officer
could issue direction for allotment of land to the awardees,
sub-awardees and their nominees/sub-nominees was
considered by this Court in Radhey Shyam case [1994 (4)
SCC 370]. After noticing the provisions of Sections 31(3)
and (4) of the 1953 Act on which reliance was placed by the
Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, this Court
Page 41
42
held that the Land Acquisition Officer did not have the
jurisdiction, power or authority to direct allotment of land to
the claimants. This is clearly borne out from the following
extracts of para 7 of the judgment :
“7. A reading of sub-section (4) of Section 31,
in our considered view, indicates that the Land
Acquisition Officer has no power or jurisdiction
to give any land under acquisition or any other
land in lieu of compensation. Sub-section (4)
though gives power to him in the matter of
payment of compensation, it does not empower
him to give any land in lieu of compensation.
Sub-section (3) expressly gives power ‘only to
allot any other land in exchange’. In other words
the land under acquisition is not liable to be
allotted in lieu of compensation except under
Section 31(3), that too only to a person having
limited interest. ... The problem could be looked
at from a different angle. Under Section 4(1), the
appropriate Government notifies a particular land
needed for public purpose. On publication of the
declaration under Section 6, the extent of the land
with specified demarcation gets crystallised as the
land needed for a public purpose. If the enquiry
under Section 5-A was dispensed with, exercising
the power under Section 17(1), the Collector on
issuance of notice under Sections 17, 9 and 10 is
entitled to take possession of the acquired land for
use of public purpose. Even otherwise on making
the award and offering to pay compensation he is
empowered under Section 16 to take possession of
the land. Such land vests in the Government free
from all encumbrances. The only power for the
Government under Section 48 is to denotify the
lands before possession is taken. Thus, in the
scheme of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer
has no power to create an encumbrance or right
in the erstwhile owner to claim possession of a
part of the acquired land in lieu of compensation.
Such power of the Land Acquisition Officer if is
exercised would be self-defeating and subversive
to public purpose.”
Page 42
43
13. The Court in Radhey Shyam case (supra) also
considered the question whether the appellant could
challenge the award in the execution proceedings and
answered the same in the affirmative. The reasons for this
conclusion are contained in para 8 of the judgment, the
relevant portion of which is extracted below :
“8. ... We have already said that what is
executable is only an award under Section 26(2),
namely, the amount awarded or the claims of the
interests determined of the respective persons in
the acquired lands. Therefore, the decree cannot
incorporate any matter other than the matters
determined under Section 11 or those referred to
and determined under Section 18 and no other.
Since we have already held that the Land
Acquisition Officer has no power or jurisdiction
to allot land in lieu of compensation, the decree
even, if any, under Section 18 to the extent of any
recognition of the directions in the award for the
allotment of the land given under Section 11 is a
nullity. It is open to the appellant to raise the
invalidity, nullity of the decree in execution in that
behalf. Accordingly we hold that the execution
proceedings directing delivery of possession of
the land as contained in the award is, invalid,
void and inexecutable.
(emphasis supplied)”
49.
In Vijay Kumar Data (supra), this Court referred to the
decision in Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain [1997
(1) SCC 35] in following terms :
“14. The legality and correctness of the order dated
24-9-1993 passed by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan
High Court in DBCSAW No. 680 of 1992 was considered in
Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain (supra).
Page 43
44
This Court noted that the Lokayukta of Rajasthan had
severely criticised the actions of the then Minister of Urban
Development and Housing Department, Commissioner,
Jaipur Development Authority and Zonal Officer of the Lal
Kothi Scheme, referred to the Rajasthan Improvement Trust
(Disposal of Urban Land) Rules, 1974 and held :
“22. Therefore, there was no policy laid by the
Government and it cannot be laid contrary to the
aforestated rules and no such power was given to
individual Minister by executive action, as the
land was already notified conclusively under
Section 6(1) for public purpose, namely,
earmarked scheme. Since the persons whose land
was acquired were not owners having limited
interest therein, qua the owners having lost right,
title and interest therein, the sub-awardees or
nominees, after the acquisition under Section
4(1), would acquire no title to the land nor such
ultra vires acts of the Minister would bind the
Government. The actions, therefore, taken by the
Minister-cum-Chairman of the appellate authority
and bureaucrats for obvious reasons would not
clothe the respondents with any vestige of right to
allotment. Acceptance of the contentions of the
respondents would be fraught with dangerous
consequences. It would also bear poisonous seeds
to sabotage the schemes defeating the declared
public purpose. The record discloses that such
allotment in many a case was in violation of the
Urban Land Ceiling Act which prohibits holding
the land in excess of the prescribed ceiling limit of
the urban land. In some instances, a person whose
land of 500 sq yd was acquired, was compensated
with allotment of 2000 sq yd and above, which is
against the public policy defeating even the Urban
Land Ceiling Act. Would any responsible Minister
or a bureaucrat, with a sense of public duty and
responsibility, transfer such land to sabotage the
planned development of the scheme? Answer has
obviously to be in the negative. The necessary
inference is that the policy does not bear any
insignia of a public purpose, but appears to be a
Page 44
45
device to get illegal gratification or distribution of
public property defeating the public purpose by
misuse of public office.”
15. The Court further held in Daulat Mal Jain case (supra)
that the decision taken by the Minister and the actions of the
bureaucrats were meant to benefit only those who had illegally
secured transfer of land after the publication of the notification
issued under Section 4 and that the so-called policy is a policy to
feed corruption and to deflect the public purpose. This is evinced
from para 23 of the judgment, which is extracted below:
“23. There is no iota of evidence placed on
record that under the so-called policy, anyone
from general public could equally apply for
allotment of the plots or was eligible to apply for
such allotment nor any such general policy was
brought to our notice. The allotment has benefited
only a specified class, namely, the awardees,
sub-awardees or nominees and none else. The
decision by the Minister or the actions of the
bureaucrats was limited to the above class which
included the respondents. Legitimacy was given
to the void acts of Chottey Lal, the erstwhile
owner as well as the LAO. Directions were given
by the Minister and the bureaucrats acted to allot
the land under the very void acts. They are ultra
vires the power. These acts are in utter disregard
of the statute and the rules. Therefore, by no
stretch of imagination it can be said to have the
stamp of public policy; rather it is a policy to feed
corruption and to deflect the public purpose and
to confer benefits on a specified category, as
described above.”
50.
The plea of discrimination was adversely commented upon by
this Court in Vijay Kumar Data (supra) referring to the decision in
Daulat Mal Jain (supra) thus :
Page 45
46
“16. The plea of discrimination which found favour with
the High Court was also negatived by this Court in Daulat
Mal Jain case
(supra) by making the following
observations:
“24. The question then is whether the action of
not delivering possession of the land to the
respondents on a par with other persons who had
possession is an ultra vires act and violates Article
14 of the Constitution? We had directed the
appellants to file an affidavit explaining the
actions taken regarding the allotment which came
to be made to others. An affidavit has been filed in
that behalf by Shri Pawan Arora, Deputy
Commissioner, that allotments in respect of 47
persons were cancelled and possession was not
given. He listed various cases pending in this
Court and the High Court and executing court in
respect of other cases. It is clear from the record
that as and when any person had gone to the court
to get the orders of the LAO enforced, the
appellant Authority resisted such actions taking
consistent stand and usually adverse orders have
been subjected to decision in various proceedings.
Therefore, no blame of inaction or favouritism to
others can be laid at the door of the present set-up
of the appellant Authority. When the Minister was
the Chairman and had made illegal allotments
following which possession was delivered, no
action to unsettle any such illegal allotment could
have been taken then. That apart, they were
awaiting the outcome of pending cases. It would
thus be clear that the present set-up of the
bureaucrats has set new standards to suspend the
claims and is trying to legalise the ultra vires
actions of Minister and predecessor bureaucrats
through the process of law so much so that illegal
and ultra vires acts are not allowed to be
legitimised nor are to be perpetuated by aid of
Article 14. That apart, Article 14 has no
application or justification to legitimise an illegal
Page 46
47
and illegitimate action. Article 14 proceeds on the
premise that a citizen has legal and valid right
enforceable at law and persons having similar
right and persons similarly circumstanced, cannot
be denied of the benefit thereof. Such person
cannot be discriminated to deny the same benefit.
The rational relationship and legal back-up are the
foundations to invoke the doctrine of equality in
case of persons similarly situated. If some persons
derived benefit by illegality and had escaped from
the clutches of law, similar persons cannot plead,
nor the court can countenance that benefit had
from infraction of law and must be allowed to be
retained. Can one illegality be compounded by
permitting similar illegal or illegitimate or ultra
vires acts? Answer is obviously no.”
51.
In Vijay Kumar (supra), this Court after quoting circular of the
State Government dated 6.12.2001 issued by the Deputy Secretary of
the Administration has observed thus :
“49. It is trite to say that all executive actions of the
Government of India and the Government of a State are
required to be taken in the name of the President or the
Governor of the State concerned, as the case may be
(Articles 77(1) and 166(1)). Orders and other instruments
made and executed in the name of the President or the
Governor of a State, as the case may be, are required to be
authenticated in such manner as may be specified in the
rules to be made by the President or the Governor, as the
case may be (Articles 77(2) and 166(2)).
xxxxx
52. Article 166 was interpreted in State of Bihar v.
Kripalu Shankar (1987 (3) SCC 34] and it was observed:
Page 47
48
“14. Now, the functioning of Government in a
State is governed by Article 166 of the
Constitution, which lays down that there shall be a
Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at
the head, to aid and advise the Governor in the
exercise of his functions except where he is
required to exercise his functions under the
Constitution, in his discretion. Article 166
provides for the conduct of government business.
It is useful to quote this article:
‘166. Conduct of business of the Government
of a State.—(1) All executive action of the
Government of a State shall be expressed to be
taken in the name of the Governor.
(2) Orders and other instruments made and
executed in the name of the Governor shall be
authenticated in such manner as may be specified
in rules to be made by the Governor, and the
validity of an order or instrument which is so
authenticated shall not be called in question on the
ground that it is not an order or instrument made
or executed by the Governor.
(3) The Governor shall make rules for the
more convenient transaction of the business of the
Government of the State, and for the allocation
among Ministers of the said business insofar as it
is not business with respect to which the Governor
is by or under this Constitution required to act in
his discretion.’
15. Article 166(1) requires that all executive
action of the State Government shall be expressed
to be taken in the name of the Governor. This
clause relates to cases where the executive action
has to be expressed in the shape of a formal order
or notification. It prescribes the mode in which an
executive action has to be expressed. Noting by an
official in the departmental file will not, therefore,
come within this article nor even noting by a
Minister. Every executive decision need not be as
Page 48
49
laid down under Article 166(1) but when it takes
the form of an order it has to comply with Article
166(1). Article 166(2) states that orders and other
instruments made and executed under Article
166(1), shall be authenticated in the manner
prescribed. While clause (1) relates to the mode of
expression, clause (2) lays down the manner in
which the order is to be authenticated and clause
(3) relates to the making of the rules by the
Governor for the more convenient transaction of
the business of the Government. A study of this
article, therefore, makes it clear that the notings in
a file get culminated into an order affecting right
of parties only when it reaches the head of the
department and is expressed in the name of the
Governor, authenticated in the manner provided in
Article 166(2).”
53. It is thus clear that unless an order is expressed in the
name of the President or the Governor and is authenticated in the
manner prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an
order made on behalf of the Government. A reading of the Letter
dated 6-12-2001 shows that it was neither expressed in the name
of the Governor nor was it authenticated in the manner
prescribed by the rules. That letter merely speaks of the
discussion made by the Committee and the decision taken by it.
By no stretch of imagination the same can be treated as a policy
decision of the Government within the meaning of Article 166 of
the Constitution.
54. We are further of the view that even if the instructions
contained in the Letter dated 6-12-2001 could be treated as
policy decision of the Government, the High Court should have
quashed the same because the said policy was clearly contrary to
the law declared by this Court in Radhey Shyam case (supra) and
Daulat Mal Jain case (supra) and was a crude attempt by the
political functionaries concerned of the State to legalise what had
already been declared illegal by this Court.”
Page 49
50
52.
Thus, it is apparent that the circular in question cannot be
pressed into service by the Society. Apart from inapplicability, it is
also apparent that the very purpose of issuing such circulars is not to
benefit the purchaser who has acquired the right after issuance of
notification under section 4 of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, and in
violation of mandate of section 42. Consequently, the High Court had
no jurisdiction to direct allotment of land. Even Khatedars were not
entitled to such direction/benefit as the circulars are not applicable in
such cases.
53.
We may refer to the decision in Hari Ram & Anr. v. State of
Haryana & Ors. [2010 (3) SCC 621] relied upon on behalf of the
Society in which this Court considered passing of different orders, in
respect of persons similarly situated, relating to same acquisition
proceedings. The action was held to be violative of Article 14 being
discriminatory. There is no doubt about it that different standards
cannot be applied for withdrawal from acquisition. The present is not
such a case. The circular is not applicable. We cannot direct the State
to act upon the circulars which are not applicable. Under the Code that
all actions of the State are to be fair and legitimate, we cannot create
negative equality and confer a benefit that too on the strength of a
concessional statement which is not provided by circular. Concession
Page 50
51
made by the counsel in Ratni Devi’s case (supra) cannot widen scope
of circular.
54.
We may also refer to other decisions relied upon in Usha Stud
and Agricultural Farms Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.
[2013 (4) SCC 210] laying down that once a State Government has
taken a conscious decision to release the land, there would be no
justification whatsoever for the State for not according similar
treatment to the appellants is also of no avail to the Society.
55.
Coming to the quantum of compensation to be awarded in the
instant case, it was submitted on behalf of the Society and Khatedars
in respective appeals that the compensation determined by the High
Court is on lower side. Adequate compensation has not been
determined. It was submitted that oral evidence which was relied upon
by the Reference Court ought to have been acted upon by the High
Court. It was contended that the oral evidence cannot be ignored. By
virtue of decisions in State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Rama Rana & Ors.
[1997 (2) SCC 693], Satyanarayana & Ors. v. Bhu Arjan Adhikari &
Ors. [2011 (15) SCC 133] and Ramanlal Deochand Shah v. State of
Maharashtra & Anr. [2013 (14) SCC 50].
56.
The price of the land per sq. yd. was determined by the
Reference Court. The documentary evidence which has been referred
Page 51
52
to by the Reference Court comprises of Ex. 1 agreement dated
26.8.1982 at the rate of Rs.135 per sq.yd., Ex. 3 agreement dated
7.1.1982 at the rate of Rs.165 per sq.yd., agreement dated 28.9.1981 at
the rate of Rs.135 per sq.yd. for 244 sq.yd. and agreement dated
5.5.1979 at the rate of Rs.94 per sq.yd. Certain transactions of 1983
were also referred which have to be ignored being subsequent to the
date of notification under section 4. However, referring to the oral
statement of the witnesses in which value was stated to be much more,
the Reference Court has arrived at the conclusion of Rs.260 per sq.yd.
The Single Bench of the High Court considered and referred to both
the oral and documentary evidence. Ex.1 agreement dated 26.8.1982
about the sale of plot No.55 situated in Krishna Vihar Gopalpura @
Rs.115/- per sq. yds., Ex.3 is agreement to sale of land of 200 sq. yds.
Agreement dated 7.1.1982 at the rate of Rs.165/- per sq. yds. situated
at Maharani Farm Duragapura. Ex.4-A agreement to sale of 244 sq.
yds. dated 29.8.1981 @ Rs.135/- per sq.yds. situated at Brijalpur from
Krishnapuri Housing Society, Ex.5 agreement dated 24.7.1982 of
18000 sq.yds. of land @ Rs.125/- per sq.yds. for a total amount of
Rs.22,55,000/- entered between Meena Kumari Housing Society and
trustee Devi Shanker Tiwari, Ex. 7 Agreement dated 16.9.1983 about
the sale of land measuring 147 sq. yds. for Rs.22,100/- approx. @
Rs.150/- per sq. yds. and the land situated in gram panchayat
Page 52
53
Bhagyawas, Ex.8 agreement dated 5.5.1979 of 34,000 sq.yds. @
Rs.90-94 per sq. yds.
57.
It also considered oral evidence in detail and has not relied
upon the same and has arrived at the average price to be Rs.135 per
sq.yd. making certain deduction as large area has been acquired. In
case area in question had been developed, certain area was bound to
go in the development. Thus, deduction which has been made to arrive
at the figure of Rs.100 per sq.yd. is proper. We find in the facts and
circumstances of the case that the finding arrived at by the single
Bench to be appropriate. No doubt about it. Oral evidence can also be
taken into consideration but in the facts of this case, the best evidence
is documentary evidence which has to prevail. In the face of the
documentary evidence evincing the price of the land per sq.yd. the
oral evidence which was based upon ipse dixit and without any sound
basis, could not have been accepted by the Reference Court. Thus, the
grave error which was committed had been rightly set at naught by the
single Bench of the High Court, which determination of compensation
has also not been interfered by a Division Bench.
58.
Reliance has been placed upon State of Gujarat & Ors. v.
Rama Rana & Ors. [1997 (2) SCC 693] with respect to acceptance of
oral evidence in which case there was failure on the part of the

Agricultural Department to produce statistics as to the nature of the
crops and the prices prevailing at that time. In that context, it was
observed that oral evidence cannot be rejected due to such failure and
the court has a duty to subject the oral evidence to great scrutiny and
to evaluate the evidence objectively and dispassionately to reach a
finding on compensation.
59.
Reliance has also been placed on Satyanarayana v. Bhu Arjan
Adhikari & Ors. [2011 (15) SCC 133] in which it has been laid down
that an analysis of the evidence by the Reference Court has to be
satisfactory. Reliance has also been placed on Ramanlal Deochand
Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2013 (14) SCC 50] laying down
that it is for the claimant to prove that the amount awarded by the
Collector needs an enhancement and for that purpose, oral and
documentary evidence can be adduced and when there is
non-consideration of material evidence, the case can be remanded to
lead evidence. In this case, there is proper scrutiny and evaluation of
oral and documentary evidence by the High Court. The decision of the
High Court with respect to determination of compensation deserves to
be upheld.
60.
The High Court has rejected the application under Order 1 Rule
10 filed by the Khatedars. In the facts of this case, particularly when
Page 54
55
the issue of violation of section 42 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act was
raised by the State Government and reference was also as to the award
passed in 1982 in favour of Khatedars in which the Society was
denied the right to receive compensation. Obviously, Khatedars were
required to be heard as the adjudication of their right was involved in
the matter to decide to whom the compensation is payable, and
whether the Society was entitled to claim compensation on the basis
of void transaction. It was also submitted before us that the Khatedars
have sought reference under section 30 against the Society, that
question can be decided in those proceedings. However, the factual
matrix and its determination of the question as to entitlement of
Society is necessary in the instant case, as such we have decided it.
More so, the plight of downtrodden class of the Scheduled Castes
Khatedars cannot be prolonged and considering the provisions which
have been enacted for their protection, and the constitutional mandate,
we are inclined to exercise our power to set at rest the dispute between
the parties and hold that only Khatedars, in case some of them have
died, their legal representatives would be entitled to receive the
compensation which has been determined in the instant case.
61.
In order to protect the interest of the Scheduled Caste persons,
we further direct that the Society or other intermeddler, or power of

attorney holder shall not be paid compensation on their behalf and the
Collector/Land Acquisition Officer to ensure that the compensation is
disbursed directly to the Khatedars or their legal representatives, as
the case may be, and that they are not deprived of the same by any
unscrupulous devices of land grabbers etc. Let the compensation be
disbursed within a period of three months from today along with other
permissible statutory benefits.
62.
The direction issued by the High Court to grant 25% of the
developed land is hereby set aside. The appeals preferred by the
Rajasthan Housing Board and the Khatedars are allowed to the
aforesaid extent and the remaining appeals are dismissed. Parties to
bear their own costs as incurred.
.........................................CJI
(H. L. Dattu)
...........................................J.
(A.K. Sikri)
New Delhi;
May 1, 2015.
...........................................J.
(Arun Mishra)

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