this Court in Bhura Ram and Others vs.
State of Rajasthan and Another, (2008) 11
SCC 103 wherein following the decision in
Y. Abraham Ajith and Others (supra), this
Court held that “cause of action”; having
arisen within the jurisdiction of the court
where the offence was committed, could not
be tried by the court where no part of
offence was committed. For the same
reasons, as mentioned in the earlier
paragraph, while there is no dispute as to
the proposition in view of the fact that in
the case on hand, the offence was a
continuing one and the episode at Gaya was
only a consequence at the continuing
offence of harassment and ill-treatment
meted out to the complainant, clause (c) of
Section 178 is attracted. In view of the
above reason, both the decisions are not
applicable to the facts of this case and we
are unable to accept the stand taken by Mr.
Sanyal.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION NO.2163/2013
Harikesh Dhanak & Anr.
V/S
State of Rajasthan & Anr.
Date of Order : 10th April, 2014
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAY BISHNOI
Citation; 2015(2)crimes 322 Raj
The instant Criminal Misc. Petition has
been filed by the petitioners while claiming
following reliefs:-
I. In the interest of justice the record
of the Criminal Complaint No.229/13
registered before A.C.J.M. Rajgarh
may be called for.
II. The order framing charges as well as
the complete proceedings initiated
against the humble petitioners may
kindly be ordered to be quashed,
III.The Criminal Misc. Petition may
kindly be allowed with costs.
IV. Any other order this Hon'ble Court
deems fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case may kindly
be passed in favour of the humble
petitioner.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has
contended that in the complaint filed by the
respondent No.2 against the petitioners, she has
no where mentioned that the alleged act of
cruelty and criminal breach of trust has been
committed by the petitioners within the
territorial jurisdiction of Tehsil Rajgarh,
District Churu and, therefore, the Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajgarh, District
Churu has no territorial jurisdiction to try the
case against the petitioners. Learned counsel
for the petitioners has also argued that earlier
also the complainant has filed a complaint
against the petitioners alleging the similar
allegations pertaining to cruelty and criminal
breach of trust however, the Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Rajgarh, District Churu in
Criminal Case No.530/2008 decided on 07.08.2011
has acquitted the petitioners for the offence
punishable under Sections 489-A and 406 IPC and,
therefore, the present prosecution lunched
against the petitioners is barred by the
principle of res judicata.
In support of his contention, the learned
counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance
on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Kamlesh Negi & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan &
Anr. reported in 2013(3) RLW 2420 (Raj.); Geeta
Mehrotra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
reported in AIR 2013 SC 181; State of U.P. Vs.
Nawab Hussain reported in AIR 1977 SC 1680;
Shahjad Ali & Ors. Vs. The State of Rajasthan &
Anr. reported in 2009 Cri.L.J. 3400 and
Venkatapathi Naidu & Ors. Vs. State of A.P. &
Anr. reported in 2008 Cri.L.J. 179.
Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor as
well as learned counsel for the respondent No.2
have argued that in the complaint lodged at the
instance of the respondent No.2 it is clearly
stated that she was subjected to cruelty after
07.04.2011 and it is also mentioned in the
complaint that on 28.11.2012 the petitioners
have left her at Rajgarh Bus Stand while
demanding dowry and has also refused to return
her stridhan. It has also been contended that
the earlier the complaint lodged by the
respondent No.2 in the year 2009 was in relation
to the incidents took place up to the year 2009,
whereas the present complaint is lodged by the
respondent No.2 in relation to the incidents
happened after 07.04.2011. It is also contended
that since the respondent No.2 was subjected to
cruelty at Rajgarh on 28.11.2012 the criminal
court at Rajgarh has all the jurisdiction to try
the case against the petitioners.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material placed on record.
From the perusal of the complaint filed by
the respondent No.2 in the court of Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajgarh, District
Churu on 13.12.2012 it is reveled that she has
clearly stated in the complaint that on
28.11.2012 the petitioners have left her at Bus
Stand Rajgarh while demanding dowry and has also
refused to return the stridhan of her at
Rajgarh.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunita Kumhari
Kashyap vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in
2011 Cr.L.R. (SC) 400, after taking into
consideration the provisions of sections 177 to
179 Cr.P.C. and after taking into consideration
its earlier pronouncements on the same subject
has held as under:-
“6. Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (in short “Code”) deals
with jurisdiction of the criminal courts in
inquiries and trials. Sections 177-179 are
relevant which are as follows:
“177. Ordinary place of inquiry and
trial-. Every offence shall
ordinarily be inquired into and
tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction it was committed.
178. Place of inquiry or trial. (a) When
it is uncertain in which of several
local areas an offence was
committed, or (b) where an offence
is committed partly in one local
area and partly in another, or
(c)where an offence is a continuing
one, and continues to be committed
in more local areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several
acts done in different local areas,
it may be inquired into or tried by
a Court having jurisdiction over
any of such local areas.
179. Offence triable where act is done
or consequence ensues. When an act
is an offence by reason of anything
which has been done and of a
consequence which has ensued, the
offence may be inquired into or
tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction such thing has been
done or such consequence has
ensued.”
From the above provisions, it is clear that
the normal rule is that the offence shall
ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a
court within whose local jurisdiction it
was committed. However, when it is
uncertain in which of several local areas
an offence was committed or where an
offence is committed partly in one local
area and partly in another or where an
offence is a continuing one, and continues
to be committed in more than one local area
and takes place in different local areas as
per Section 178, the Court having
jurisdiction over any of such local areas
is competent to inquire into and try the
offence. Section 179 makes it clear that if
anything happened as a consequence of the
offence, the same may be inquired into or
tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction such thing has been done or
such consequence has ensued.
7. .........
8. .........
9. Mr. S.B. Sanyal, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondents fairly stated
that there is no dispute about the
jurisdiction of the Court at Gaya insofar
as against the husband, however, in respect
of other relatives of the husband in the
absence of any act at Gaya, the said Court
has no jurisdiction and if at all, the wife
has to pursue her remedy only at Ranchi. In
support of his contention, he relied on a
decision of this Court in Y. Abraham Ajith
and others Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai
and another, (2004) 8 SCC 100 in
particular, paragraph 12 of the said
decision which reads as under:
“12. The crucial question is whether any
part of the cause of action arose
within the jurisdiction of the
court concerned. In terms of
Section 177 of the Code, it is the
place where the offence was
committed. In essence it is the
cause of action for initiation of
the proceedings against the
accused.”
It is true that Section 177 of the Code
refers to the local jurisdiction where the
offence is committed. Though the expression
“cause of action” is not a stranger to
criminal cases, in view of Sections 178 and
179 of the Code and in the light of the
specific averment in the complaint of the
appellant herein, we are of the view that
the said decision is not applicable to the
case on hand.
10. Mr. Sanyal also relied on a decision of
this Court in Bhura Ram and Others vs.
State of Rajasthan and Another, (2008) 11
SCC 103 wherein following the decision in
Y. Abraham Ajith and Others (supra), this
Court held that “cause of action”; having
arisen within the jurisdiction of the court
where the offence was committed, could not
be tried by the court where no part of
offence was committed. For the same
reasons, as mentioned in the earlier
paragraph, while there is no dispute as to
the proposition in view of the fact that in
the case on hand, the offence was a
continuing one and the episode at Gaya was
only a consequence at the continuing
offence of harassment and ill-treatment
meted out to the complainant, clause (c) of
Section 178 is attracted. In view of the
above reason, both the decisions are not
applicable to the facts of this case and we
are unable to accept the stand taken by Mr.
Sanyal.
11. We have already adverted to the details
made by the appellant in the complaint. In
view of the specific assertion by the
appellant-wife about the ill-treatment and
cruelty at the hands of the husband and his
relatives at Ranchi and of the fact that
because of their action, she was taken to
her parental home at Gaya by her husband
with a threat of dire consequences for not
fulfilling their demand of dowry, we hold
that in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the
Code, the offence in this case was a
continuing one having been committed in
more local areas and one of the local areas
being Gaya, the learned Magistrate at Gaya
has jurisdiction to proceed with the
criminal case instituted therein. In other
words, the offence was a continuing one and
the episode at Gaya was only a consequence
of continuing offence of harassment of
illtreatment meted out to the complainant,
clause (c) of Section 178 is attracted.
Further, from the allegations in the
complaint, it appears to us that it is a
continuing offence of ill- treatment and
humiliation meted out to the appellant in
the hands of all the accused persons and in
such continuing offence, on some occasion
all had taken part and on other occasion
one of the accused, namely, husband had
taken part, therefore, undoubtedly clause
(c) of Section 178 of the Code is clearly
attracted.”
In the light of the above principle of law
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, if we
examine the complaint filed by the respondent
No.2 it is clear that she has alleged that the
petitioners have demanded dowry and has refused
to return stridhan of her at Rajgarh and,
therefore, it cannot be said that the court
situated at Rajgarh has no jurisdiction to try
the complaint filed by the respondent No.2.
So far as regarding the fact of earlier
complaint filed by the respondent No.2 against
the petitioners for commission of offences
punishable under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC is
concerned, it is noticed that the same was in
relation to the incidents took place prior to
the year 2009. However, in the instant case the
respondent No.2 has filed complaint against the
petitioners in relation to the incident happened
after 07.04.2011. In such circumstances, it
cannot be said that the earlier judgment passed
by the trial court acquitting the petitioners
for the offence under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC
will bar the instant compliant filed by the
respondent No.2.
Hence, this Court does not find merit in
this Criminal Misc. Petition and the same is
hereby dismissed.
Stay petition also stands dismissed.
[VIJAY BISHNOI],J.
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