Upon consideration of the facts admitted and which have been reproduced earlier what emerges on record is that defendant no. 3 was inducted as tenant by mortgagors Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar in the year 1971 and that was the time when the proceedings challenging the preliminary decree passed on 30.9.1958 in the mortgage suit bearing Civil Suit No. 3-A/1956 were pending before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the nature of Civil Appeal no. 582/1969. This appeal was allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 9.4.1974 whereby the judgment and decree of the High Court were set aside and the preliminary decree dated 30.9.1958 passed by the trial Court was restored. This judgment thus, brought to an end the mortgage on 9.4.1974, and restored the preliminary decree
dated 30.9.1958 passed by the trial Court. That means, its effect would relate back to 30.9.1958 when the mortgage between Vijaysing Mohta and his two sons on one hand and original plaintiff Gangabai on the other was put to an end and preliminary decree for sale of joint half share of plaintiff was passed. Therefore, the question of holding lease created in or about the year 1971 by the mortgagors in favour of the respondents as legally valid on the basis of Section 65A of the TPA, 1882, would not arise. Under sub-Section 2(a) of Section 65 of the TPA, 1882, lease made by a mortgagor while being lawfully in possession of mortgaged property binds the mortgagee, if the lease is made in the ordinary course of management of property and is in accordance with any local law. But, in the instant case, mortgage itself being not in existence in 1971, by virtue of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court confirming the preliminary decree dated 30.9.1958, there was no relationship of mortgagor-mortgagee at that time and therefore, Section 65-A power to lease was not available.
Bombay High Court
Original vs Smt. Jankibai Pyarelal Shrivas on 28 March, 2014
Bench: S.B. Shukre
Citation;AIR 2015(NOC)546 Bom
This appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree passed on 25.9.2001 by the Joint District Judge, Amravati in Regular Civil Appeal No. 21/1995 filed against the judgment and decree passed on 26.10.1994 in Regular Civil Suit No. 402/1990 by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Amravati, thereby dismissing the appeal and confirming the decree passed by the trial Court.
2. The appellant is the grand daughter in law of the original plaintiff to whom the suit property, which is a shop situated in a building popularly known as Mathuradas building, Amravati, was bequeathed by the original plaintiff. Deceased respondent nos.1 and 2 were original defendant nos.1 and 2 and remaining respondents were substituted as defendant nos.
3(1) to 3(4) after the original defendant no. 3. Nandalal Pyarelal Shrivas died during the pendency of the suit, they being legal representatives in the capacity as widow and children of said Nandalal respectively. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereto are being referred to as the plaintiffs and defendants.
-- 3 -- S.A.No. 21/09
3. It was the case of the original plaintiff Gangabai Gilda that she became owner of the joint half share in the building popularly known as Mathuradas building situated on Nazul plot bearing Nos. 21/50, 21/51 and 21/52 of sheet No. 56-
A in Ward No. 26(new) bearing Municipal Corporation House No. 271 and 272 by virtue of an auction sale dated 2.3.1960 held in execution of a decree passed in her favour to the extent of half share in the said building in a mortgage suit. There was a challenge made to the said sale by the defendants in the mortgage suit and litigation went up to Supreme Court.
Auction sale was confirmed by the Supreme Court by the Judgment and decree passed on 9.4.1974. It was averred that plaintiff was already put in possession of the suit property by the Court on 25.11.1960 and this sale became absolute after it was confirmed on 9.4.1974. However, the joint half share in the said building came to be defined and separated later on when there was a compromise decree passed by Additional District Judge, Amravati on 21.8.1987 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 234/1980. The portion that came to be allotted to the plaintiff in the compromise decree encompassed within it the shop in possession of the defendants and this property, hereafter called as "suit property", is the subject matter of the present dispute
-- 4 -- S.A.No. 21/09 between the parties.
4. The plaintiff submitted that the suit property was purchased by her in auction sale, which was then occupied by one Nandalal Rathi and thereafter at the time of confirmation of the sale, it came to be occupied by Tekchand Sawaldas and after some years one Pyarelal Shrivas, the husband of original defendant no.1 Smt. Janakibai and father of original defendant nos. 2 and 3 namely Smt. Sharda and Nandalal, entered into possession of the suit property without consent of the plaintiff.
It was further submitted that since Pyarelal was trespasser having been in occupation of the suit property without her consent, the plaintiff orally requested Nandalal, who after death of his father Pyarelal, started occupying the property, to vacate the same.
5. The plaintiff also submitted that she had intimated the original defendant no. 3 Nandalal about confirmation of the compromise decree dated 21.8.1987 by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 57/1989 by virtue of which she had become sole owner of the suit property. She further submitted that she had also intimated original defendant no. 3 that she had acquired right to recover damages for use and occupation of
-- 5 -- S.A.No. 21/09 the suit property w.e.f. 1.7.1987. She further submitted that she learnt that defendant no. 3 had put a slab on the suit property and extended the area of the suit property by constructing a new wall without her consent. She protested against the same by lodging a police complaint with Police Station, City Kotwali, Amravati and also with Municipal Corporation, Amravati. She further submitted that possession of original defendant no. 3 of the suit property being without consent and having been acquired by him during the pendency of litigation between herself and the mortgagers, the defendant's occupation of the suit property was as trespasser and, therefore, they were liable to vacate the same and pay her damages for unauthorised use and occupation. Accordingly, she filed a civil suit for recovery of possession and damages and mesne profits.
6. Original defendant nos. 1 to 3 resisted the suit by filing their common written statement. They claimed that original defendant no.1 being the mother and original defendant no. 2 being the sister of defendant no. 3 with defendant no. 3 occupying the suit property as a tenant of the owners Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar, had no concern with the suit property. They, therefore, claimed their discharge from
-- 6 -- S.A.No. 21/09 the suit property.
7. Defendant nos. 1 to 3 submitted that building was known as Mathuradas building being owned by Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar through father Vijaysingh Mohta. They submitted that this building was mortgaged by Vijaysingh Mohta for himself and on behalf of his sons Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar to the original plaintiff as a security for repayment of loan of `.15,000/- ( Rupees fifteen thousand only).
They submitted that plaintiff had filed a suit on said mortgage and it was held that mortgage was without legal necessity in so far as shares of two sons were concerned and therefore, the mortgage was released to the extent of their half share together in the mortgaged property. The suit was decreed in favour of original plaintiff to the extent of half share of Vijaysingh Mohta of which he was in possession.
8. It was the case of the defendants that in spite of sale of joint half share of Vijaysingh Mohta in the said building, Vijaysingh Mohta continued to remain in possession of entire building and continued recovering rents from various tenants and also letting out premises in the usual course of management of the building. According to the defendants, the
-- 7 -- S.A.No. 21/09 fact that plaintiff had purchased joint half share in the said building was learnt by them only sometime later.
9. They further submitted that defendant no. 3 was inducted as tenant of suit property by Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar on monthly rent of Rs.25/- some time in the year 1966 and they denied that defendant no. 3 was a trespasser. They submitted that Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar being in possession of the building in which suit property is situated, had a right to let out the same in the ordinary course of management of the building and accordingly, it was let out to defendant no. 3 and this lease was binding upon the plaintiff also. They further submitted that plaintiff never informed that she was owner of joint half share. They learnt about the same only after present suit was instituted against them. They also submitted that they had paid the rent up to April 1990 to Vijay Kumar and were willing to pay the rent to the plaintiff thereafter. They also submitted that all that plaintiff could ask for was only payment of rent and not delivery of possession of the suit property. They also submitted that the suit was not brought with the permission of the Rent Controller. They denied that they had made any extension in the suit property and whatever repairs were carried out by them, were with the
-- 8 -- S.A.No. 21/09 permission of the landlord.
10. After death of original defendant no. 3 Nandalal, his legal heirs were bought on record and defendant no.3(1), the daughter, filed her written statement adopting the written statement filed by original defendant nos. 1 to 3. She, however, submitted that after the death of Nandalal, she had become tenant of Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar. She submitted that since plaintiff became the owner of the suit property on 21.8.1989 when the compromise decree was confirmed by High Court, at the most, she could claim the rent of suit property from her and she had a right to pay the rent.
It was also averred that even if it was held that tenancy of defendants was invalid still, plaintiff could not recover possession of the suit property as defendants became owner by adverse possession and suit was barred by limitation.
11. Learned Civil Judge framed several issues out of which issues relating to status of defendant no. 3 being trespasser, bar of suit by limitation and entitlement of plaintiff to possession of the suit premises and to damages were answered as in the negative by the trial court. The trial Court found that defendant no. 3 was inducted as tenant by Vijay
-- 9 -- S.A.No. 21/09 Kumar and Rajendra Kumar during the subsistence of mortgage in the year 1972 and he was not the trespasser. The trial Court also found that even though the joint half share in the building was purchased in auction sale by the plaintiff in the year 1960, her half share in the building came to be defined only after the compromise decree passed on 21.8.1987 was confirmed by the High Court in the year 1989. It further held that at the time of passing of compromise decree, the plaintiff had accepted allotment of that portion of the building to her in which the suit property was situated knowing fully well that there were inhabitants residing therein as tenants. These facts, according to the trial Court, only established that defendant no. 3 was not trespasser in the suit property when he initially occupied it nor the present defendants made their entry in the suit property as trespassers. The trial Court also held that the limitation to file present suit would be governed by Article 65 and since the suit was filed on the basis of compromise decree dated 21.8.1987, it was not barred by limitation. The trial Court also found that since the defendants were in possession of the suit property as tenants of the previous owner and the claim of the plaintiff for possession and damages was not maintainable, the trial Court dismissed the suit.
-- 10 -- S.A.No. 21/09
12. In the appeal filed against the said decree in the District Court, the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the defendants were inducted in the suit property as tenants by the original landlord Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar since the year 1971 and such action of letting out the premises could not be said to be without any right. He further held that during the period from 1960 to 1976 there were no proceedings pending in any Court and therefore a lease created in 1971 could not be said to be a lease made during the pendency of the suit so as to attract Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ( "the TPA, 1882" for short) and that lease was not hit by doctrine of lis pendens. Learned District Judge also found that even if it was held that Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar had inducted the defendants as tenants without consent of the plaintiff, the possession of the defendants would be that of trespassers in the eyes of Gangabai and as defendant no. 3 was occupying the suit property since the year 1971 without any authority from the original plaintiff Gangabai, the suit filed in the year 1990 would be barred by limitation. The learned District Judge also found that since the time of grant of joint half share in the building in the year 1960 till the year 1987, plaintiff never protested against action of Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar in managing
-- 11 -- S.A.No. 21/09 the property and, therefore, there was implied consent of the plaintiff in letting out suit property to the defendant no. 3. Thus, learned District Judge, dismissed the appeal confirming the dismissal of the suit by the trial Court.
13. I have heard Shri V. R. Mundra, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri P. C. Madkholkar, learned counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned judgments and decrees, paper book and record and proceedings before trial Court.
14. By the orders passed by this Court on various dates such as 20.1.2009, 22.3.2012, 11.9.2013 and 23.9.2013, this Court had indicated substantial questions of law on which this appeal would be heard.
15. In the first of such orders, dated 20.1.2009 it was mentioned that one of the contentions is induction of defendant no. 3 as tenant by Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar during the subsistence of the mortgage and so a question would arise as to the status of present respondent nos. 3 to 6 as trespassers or otherwise.
-- 12 -- S.A.No. 21/09
16. In the second order dated 22.3.2012, this Court gave an indication of another substantial question of law making reference to the compromise decree of 1987 and it was stated that the effect of 1987 compromise would require evaluation.
17. By third order passed on 11.9.2013, a specific substantial question of law was framed by this Court which was later on re-formulated on 23.9.2013.
18. Learned counsel for the respondents has taken an exception to the fact that in this appeal no substantial questions of law have been formulated nor do they arise for consideration in this appeal. Therefore, according to him, on this count itself, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. He has placed reliance on the law laid down in the case of Taher Akhatoon Vs. Salambin Mohammad, (1999) 2 SCC 635, in this regard.
19. Shri Mundra, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that initially, substantial questions of law may not have been formulated by this Court in the form of questions but the Court had given an indication of the aspects which
-- 13 -- S.A.No. 21/09 required consideration and they were in the nature of substantial questions of law only and, therefore, it cannot be said that in this case, no substantial questions of law have been formulated. He has further submitted that phraseology of a question is not important and what is important is to indicate the aspect or point of law which is substantial and which requires a consideration by the Court. According to him, these requirements of Section 100 CPC have been fulfilled in this case.
20. The orders passed by this Court on the dates aforementioned sufficiently indicate that this Court has indicated the aspects or points in the nature of substantial questions of law although some of them may not be in the form of questions as such. But, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, what we have to look for is the substance of the matter raised to be a substantial question of law and not it's form. Therefore, in my view, the requirement of Section 100, CPC regarding framing of substantial question of law as laid down in the aforestated case of Taher Akhatoon (supra) has been substantially met in this case. These substantial questions of law, some of them being in narrative form and some of them being in question form, would require
-- 14 -- S.A.No. 21/09 reformulation, so that we can have precise idea of the questions on which this appeal has been heard and is being now decided and they are reformulated as under:-
1. Whether the status of respondent nos. 3 to 6 inducted as tenant by Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar who had mortgaged the property in favour of present appellant is as trespassers?
2. What is the effect of compromise decree dated 21.8.1987 of Regular Civil Appeal No. 234/1980 on the rights of Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar to induct a tenant in the concerned joint property?
3. When will limitation begin to run against the co-owner, who is not a party to the alleged tenancy, for claiming possession from a person alleging to be a tenant from another co-owner without the consent of the former?
21. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that defendant no. 3 was inducted as tenant by Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar sometime in the year 1971 without the consent of the mortgagee, Gangabai, the original plaintiff and
-- 15 -- S.A.No. 21/09 that was done when the litigation between Gangabai, the mortgagee and Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar, the mortgagors was pending. He submitted that since the defendant no. 3 was inducted as tenant during the pandency of the litigation, without consent of the plaintiff, tenancy was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of TPA, 1882, and therefore, defendant no. 3 and the remaining defendants claiming through him were the trespassers in the suit property and thus liable to be evicted therefrom. He has invited my attention to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of this appellant and other persons, who were inducted in the same building as tenants by mortgagors without consent of the present appellant. This case is reported as Sunita Jugalkishore Gilda Vs. Ramanlal Udhoji Tanna(dead) thr. Lrs. and others, 2013(10) Scale 519. This case lays down the law that when a property which is subject matter of a suit between mortgagors and mortgagee is transferred or otherwise dealt with by a party to the suit during the pendency of the suit, the other party is entitled to avoid the transfer on the ground that it was done during the pendency of the suit on the basis of principle of lis pendens incorporated under Section 52 of the TPA, 1882.
22. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted
-- 16 -- S.A.No. 21/09 that the judgment in the said case of Sunita Jugalkishore (supra) is relevant only for the purpose of application of principle of lis pendens to the transfers made during the pendency of the suit, without consent of the mortgagee. He submits that said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case for the reason that defendant no. 3 has been inducted as the tenant during the subsistence of a mortgage in the ordinary course of management of property and in accordance with law and therefore, the lease so created is binding upon the plaintiff/ appellant. He has further submitted that there has been also an admission given in evidence by father in law of the appellant, late Tikkamchand Ramvilas Gilda (PW1), that he used to collect rent from the respondents and this would mean that he had accepted the lease created by the mortgagors and therefore, permission of the rent controller to evict the respondents from the suit property was necessary and same having been not obtained, the suit has been correctly dismissed by both the Courts below. He has also submitted that the mortgage proceedings came to an end in the year 1960 after joint half share in the building was purchased in auction sale by the plaintiff and as lease was created in the year 1971, there was no litigation pending between the mortgagee and mortgagors and as such doctrine of lis pendens
-- 17 -- S.A.No. 21/09 has no application to the facts of the present case.
23. In order to appreciate the arguments and make an attempt to answer the substantial questions of law, it would be necessary to first consider the facts of the case which are not in dispute. They are stated in brief as follows:-
Mathuradas building in which the suit property is situated, was mortgaged by Vijay Singh Mohta for himself and for his two sons Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar in favour of the original plaintiff, Gangabai, on 24.3.1953 as security for repayment of loan of `. 20,000/- that he had obtained from the plaintiff. The plaintiff lady filed a civil suit bearing no. 3-A/1956 on the file of first Additional District Judge Amravati in which preliminary decree for sale of joint half share of the plaintiff in mortgaged property came to be passed on 30.9.1958. Final decree was passed on 23.10.1959. In execution of final decree, an auction sale of the mortgaged property was held on 2.3.1960 in which joint half share in the mortgaged property was purchased by the plaintiff with the permission of the Court.
Auction sale was confirmed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Amravati on 21.9.1960 and the plaintiff was put in possession of her joint half share in the mortgaged building on 5.11.1960.
-- 18 -- S.A.No. 21/09 Meanwhile, defendant nos. 2 and 3 in the said mortgaged suit, i.e Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar, preferred First Appeal No. 72/1959 before the High Court against the preliminary decree passed on 30.9.1958. Appeal was allowed by the High Court and preliminary decree passed by the trial court on 30.9.1958 was set aside and a fresh preliminary decree was ordered to be drawn. Plaintiff filed Civil Appeal No. 582(n) of 1969 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the judgment and decree passed by High Court in First Appeal No. 72/1959. The appeal was allowed by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court came to be restored by the judgment dated 9.4.1974. This judgment is reported as Gangabai Vs. Vijaykumar and others, (1974)2 WCC 393 equivalent citation AIR 1974 SC 602.
Defendant nos. 2 and 3 in the said mortgage suit i.e Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar, thereafter filed a special Civil Suit No. 76/74 for setting aside the preliminary decree dated 30.9.1958 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Amravati. The suit, however, was dismissed with costs by Civil Court on 31.1.1980. These defendants then preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 234/1980 before the District Judge, Amravati in which a compromise application came to be filed on 21.8.1987.
It was accepted by the District Judge and he passed a
-- 19 -- S.A.No. 21/09
compromise decree dated 12.10.1988. Defendant nos. 2 and 3 to the said proceedings, however, preferred, Second Appeal No. 57/1989 challenging the compromise decree dated 12.10.1988.
The Second Appeal, was dismissed by the High Court vide its judgment dated 31.8.1989. Thus, the compromise decree dated 12.10.1988 came to be confirmed. It was by this decree that the half share of the plaintiff in the mortgaged building came to be defined and separated and the plaintiff became sole owner of this portion of the building. The suit property is situated in the said portion of the building which portion is allotted as per the compromise decree dated 12.10.1988 to the plaintiff.
24. In the present case, both the courts below upon consideration of the evidence on record have found that the defendant no. 3 was inducted as tenant by Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar in or about the year 1971. Both the parties do not dispute these concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below. What they dispute is the status of the defendant no. 3 and the remaining defendants who claim through defendant no. 3. According to the plaintiff, these defendants are trespassers having been in unauthorised occupation of the suit property without consent of the plaintiff
-- 20 -- S.A.No. 21/09 and are the trespassers. The respondents on the other hand submit that they have entered into possession of the suit property as lessees of the mortgagors at a time when mortgage proceedings were pending and if they were held to be not pending, still, they having been accepted as tenants by the plaintiff, the suit for recovery of possession without obtaining of permission of rent controller was not maintainable. According to the respondents, the lease is also not adversely affected by the principle of lis pendens under the Section 52 of TPA, 1882.
25. Upon consideration of the facts admitted and which have been reproduced earlier what emerges on record is that defendant no. 3 was inducted as tenant by mortgagors Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar in the year 1971 and that was the time when the proceedings challenging the preliminary decree passed on 30.9.1958 in the mortgage suit bearing Civil Suit No. 3-A/1956 were pending before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the nature of Civil Appeal no. 582/1969. This appeal was allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 9.4.1974 whereby the judgment and decree of the High Court were set aside and the preliminary decree dated 30.9.1958 passed by the trial Court was restored. This judgment thus, brought to an end the mortgage on 9.4.1974, and restored the preliminary decree
-- 21 -- S.A.No. 21/09 dated 30.9.1958 passed by the trial Court. That means, its effect would relate back to 30.9.1958 when the mortgage between Vijaysing Mohta and his two sons on one hand and original plaintiff Gangabai on the other was put to an end and preliminary decree for sale of joint half share of plaintiff was passed. Therefore, the question of holding lease created in or about the year 1971 by the mortgagors in favour of the respondents as legally valid on the basis of Section 65A of the TPA, 1882, would not arise. Under sub-Section 2(a) of Section 65 of the TPA, 1882, lease made by a mortgagor while being lawfully in possession of mortgaged property binds the mortgagee, if the lease is made in the ordinary course of management of property and is in accordance with any local law. But, in the instant case, mortgage itself being not in existence in 1971, by virtue of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court confirming the preliminary decree dated 30.9.1958, there was no relationship of mortgagor-mortgagee at that time and therefore, Section 65-A power to lease was not available.
26. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the mortgage proceedings came to an end only in the year 1974 after Civil Appeal was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme
-- 22 -- S.A.No. 21/09 Court and since the lease was made in ordinary course of management of property and in accordance with local law, suit without permission of the Rent Controller under the provisions of clause 13 of Rent Control Order was not maintainable. The mortgage proceedings may have ended in the year 1974, but the effect of the decision dated 9.04.1974 of Hon'ble Supreme Court related back to 30.09.1958 as the decision confirmed the preliminary decree passed on 30.09.1958. Therefore, as said earlier, the mortgage itself came to an end w.e.f. 30.9.1958 and so any lease created thereafter would not be covered by Section 65-A of the TPA, 1882. Thus, there being no valid lease in existence, the question of permission of Rent Controller under the said Order for filing of eviction suit would not arise. I, therefore, find no merit in the said argument of learned counsel for the respondents.
27. Now, the question that is required to be determined is whether the lease created in or about the year 1971 was hit by principle of lis pendens under Section 52 of the TPA, 1882.
The facts of this case sufficiently indicate that proceedings relating to the mortgage were finally closed on 9.4.1974 when the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeal No. 582/1969 and confirmed preliminary decree dated 30.9.1958
-- 23 -- S.A.No. 21/09 Thus, when the lease was created in favour of defendant no. 3, a suit involving direct and specific right to immovable property in question i.e mortgaged property was pending, appeal proceeding being continuation of the suit, and therefore, this lease was subject to the provisions of Section 52 TPA, 1882. It must be mentioned here that for the purposes of Section 52 of TPA, 1882 what is important is pendency of suit or proceedings and not the decision rendered therein or its effect. Therefore, the lease created in or about the year 1971 in this case would be a lease created during the pendency of suit or proceedings.
This lease was made without express consent of the mortgagee and without any permission having been obtained from the Court. In the case of Sunita Jugalkishore (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the tenancy or lease is created by the mortgagors during the pendency of the mortgage proceedings, it would be hit by the principle of lis pendens and the mortgagee would be entitled to avoid transfer on the ground that proceedings relating to mortgage were pending.
Facts of the instant case as discussed earlier clearly show that this principle of law squarely applies to the present case. The inevitable conclusion would be that respondents' possession of the suit property would have to be held as illegal and they would not be entitled to resist the claim for possession by
-- 24 -- S.A.No. 21/09 auction purchaser, which the appellant is claiming through the original plaintiff.
28. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that there has been an admission given by PW1 Tikkamchand Gilda that he had collected rent from the respondents. Upon a careful perusal of his testimony, what I find is only an admission in general terms and that too without any specific reference to these respondents. In his cross examination, he has only admitted, as seen from paragraph 8 of his deposition, that he had collected rent. He does not elaborate as to from whom and for which period or for which month he had collected the rent.
On the contrary, his evidence shows that he had asserted that lease was without the consent of the original plaintiff and it has not been controverted by the respondents. This being the position emerging from the evidence available on record, it must be held that the original plaintiff has established the fact that the lease was without her express consent and so, the question of obtaining any permission from the Rent Controller for filing an eviction suit would not arise in this case.
29. Learned counsel for the respondents has also submitted that it is not permissible for this Court to re-
-- 25 -- S.A.No. 21/09 appreciate the evidence and take another view only because other view is possible while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of C.P.C. He has placed his reliance upon the following cases:-
1. Navaneethammal Vs. Arjuna Chetty, (1996)6 SCC
2. Gurdev Kaur and others Vs. Kako and others, AIR 2006 SC 1975.
3. Pakeerappa Rai Vs. Seethamma Hengsu dead by LRS and others, (2001)9 SCC 521.
4. Amol Kishor Mule and another Vs. Vishwanath Rajaram Shahande and another, 2006(0) BCI 359.
30. In the above cases, it is held that scope of High Court's jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is limited to deciding the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and while doing so, it is not permissible for the High Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of Courts below by re-appreciating the evidence and arriving at another view, only because it is possible. It is also held that howsoever the findings of facts might be wrong or grossly inexcusable, unless the same are perverse or shown to be not based upon evidence on record or based upon non-consideration of the material evidence or
-- 26 -- S.A.No. 21/09 consideration of some extraneous material, the findings of facts must not be upset in the Second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C.
31. In the instant case, It is seen that there is no error in the finding of fact recorded by the Courts below relating to induction of defendant no. 3 as tenant in the suit property in or about the year 1971 and this finding being based upon the evidence available on record, there is no question of interfering with the same. However, after having noted existence of this fact, both the Courts below have committed an error of law in not appreciating the principle of lis pendens incorporated in Section 52 and resultantly arrived at conclusions totally inconsistent with the law applicable to the facts of the case.
Learned Joint District Judge even went a step further in recording perversely that between period of 1960 to 1976 there was no proceeding pending in any Court and thus a lease created in the year 1971, could not be said to be a lease made during the pendency of the suit so as to attract the provision of Section 52 of TPA, 1882. This finding of fact is absolutely perverse as it is not based upon the evidence on record and facts admitted by rival parties. There is no dispute about the fact that the proceedings relating to preliminary decree passed
-- 27 -- S.A.No. 21/09 on 30.9.1958 in a mortgage suit between the plaintiff and mortgagors Vijaysingh Mohta and two sons were pending continuously till 9.4.1974 when the Hon'ble Supreme Court decided the civil appeal No. 582/1969 and confirmed the decree dated 30.9.1958.
32. The above referred finding recorded by First Appellate Court was based upon perverse appreciation of evidence. The finding recorded by both Courts below about in applicability of doctrine of lis pendens was also the result of incorrect understanding of the principle of law. Therefore, in my view, they warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC, which exercise, in my humble opinion, has been done only by following the propositions of law laid down in the aforesaid cases cited by learned counsel for the respondents.
33. Learned counsel for the respondents has also referred to me the case of Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs' Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2097, in order to support his argument that respondents cannot be dispossessed by the appellant. With due respect, I must say that in the said case of Krishna Ram Mahale (supra), there was
-- 28 -- S.A.No. 21/09 unlawful dispossession of the licencee by the licencor before expiry of licence period and therefore, licencee filed a suit for recovery of possession and it was held that licencee was entitled to a decree for possession of the suit property. These facts clearly distinguish themselves from the facts of instant suit in which respondents are still in possession of the suit property and suit for recovery of possession has been filed by the appellant on the ground of respondents being trespassers and in illegal possession of the suit property. I have already found that respondents being trespassers, cannot resist the suit for recovery of possession filed by the appellant. Therefore, the said case of Krishna Ram Mahale (supra) would be of no assistance to the respondents herein.
34. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to me the case of Mangru V. Taraknathji, AIR1967, SC 1390 to support his contention that if the mortgagors created a lease during the pendency of the suit by the mortgagee, lessee is bound by the result of the litigation. This proposition has already been considered and applied by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunita Jugalkishore (Surpa), the ratio of which case has been found to be applicable by me to the facts of the case. Therefore, there is no need to separately consider the
-- 29 -- S.A.No. 21/09 law laid down in the in said case of Mangru (supra).
35. Learned counsel for the appellant has also referred to me the following cases:-
1. Lalji Purushottam Vs. Madhavji Meghaji, AIR 1976 Gujarat 161.
2. Jadavji Purshottam Vs. Dhami Navnitbhai Amaratlal and others, AIR 1987 SC 2146.
3. M/s Sachalmal Parasram Vs. Mst. Ratanbai and others, AIR 1972 SC 637.
4. Dev Raj Dogra VS. Gyan Chand Jain, AIR 1981 SC
5. Pomal Kanji Govindji and others Vs. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit and others, AIR 1989 SC 436.
6. Devkinandan Vs. Roshan Lal, AIR 1985 Rajasthan
36. Since the case of Sunita Jugalkishore (supra) has been found to be squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, I do not think it necessary to consider the above referred cases.
37. In view of the above, I find that appellant has
-- 30 -- S.A.No. 21/09 established that the respondents having been inducted by the mortgagors i.e. Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar, without the express consent of the plaintiff and without the authority of the Court during the pendency of the proceedings relating to mortgage, are in illegal occupation of the property. Thus, their status is of trespassers. The compromise decree that was passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 234/1980 on 21.8.1987 only defined the half share of plaintiff in the suit building and since it was confirmed on 12.10.1988 by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 57/1989, it had the effect of making the plaintiff as owner of the half portion of the suit building which was allotted to her in said compromise decree in her own right. But, till that time, it cannot be said that Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar, could have created a lease as mortgagors by exercising their right under Section 65-A so as to bind the mortgagee or the plaintiff Gangabai. I have already found that after the litigation relating to mortgage suit was finally concluded on 9.4.1974, the mortgage came to an end w.e.f. 30.9.1958 when joint half share in the mortgaged building was purchased by the plaintiff in an auction sale held in execution of decree passed in Civil Suit No. 3-A/1956. But, at the same time, litigation being pending, creation of lease in favour of defendant no. 3 was hit by Section 52 of TPA, 1882 and, therefore, the respondents cannot resist
-- 31 -- S.A.No. 21/09 the claim of the appellant to recover possession of the suit property. The first and second substantial questions of law are answered accordingly.
38. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the trial Court has correctly appreciated the law of limitation applicable to the facts of the case and he has invited my attention to the findings recorded by the trial Court in paragraph 21 of its judgment. He has submitted that trial Court has correctly held that limitation period in this case would be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act and it would begin to run from the date on which possession of respondents became actually adverse to the appellant and this date is 12.10.1988 when the compromise decree was passed in Regular Civil Appeal No.234/1980.
39. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that if the suit is found to be governed by Article 134, limitation period prescribed therein being of one year, the suit becomes barred by law of limitation. He alternately submits that if the suit is held to be governed by Article 65, still, the suit is barred by limitation, as limitation period in this suit would start running from 30.9.1958 and not
-- 32 -- S.A.No. 21/09 from 12.10.1988 as it was on the former date that the mortgage came to an end and the plaintiff became co-owner of the mortgaged property, of which suit property is a part.
40. In Article 134 of the Limitation period prescribed is of one year from the date when sale becomes absolute. Article 134 is applicable to a case where the suit is brought for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of decree. Here, the suit is not filed for delivery of possession by purchaser of immovable property purchased in a auction sale held in execution of a decree. The suit that is filed is based on a title and is for recovery of possession from a party who is in illegal occupation of a property. Such suit is governed by Article 65 and the limitation prescribed therein is of 12 years from the date on which the possession of the defendants became adverse to the plaintiff. It must be noted here that in 1958 auction sale, the plaintiff became owner of joint half share of the property and plaintiff 's share was not defined. It was not within the knowledge of the plaintiff as to which portion of the suit building would be partitioned and allotted to her. Till the separation of joint half share in the suit building was done, she only continued to hold an undefined and undivided interest in the suit building to the
-- 33 -- S.A.No. 21/09 extent of her half share as owner thereof. It was only in compromise decree dated 12.10.1988 that her joint half share was crystallized by its physical separation and then it became known to her that what was allotted to her as exclusive owner of the half share was the portion of the building in which suit property was situated. It was from that time onwards i.e from 12.10.1988, the interest of the defendants or respondents became adverse to her and therefore the limitation started to run under Article 65 of the Limitation Act from 12.10.1988.
The suit having been filed in the year 1990 is well within limitation period of 12 years, and is not barred by law of limitation. The trial Court has rightly held so. Learned Joint District Judge, missed these vital aspects of the matter and, therefore, has committed a serious error of law in recording an alternative finding that suit is barred by limitation. This finding is liable to be quashed and set aside. The third substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
41. After having answered all the substantial questions of law in the manner as stated earlier, it has to be considered as to whether or not all the reliefs as prayed for in the suit can be granted by this Court at this stage. So far as the relief of delivery of possession of the suit property is concerned, same
-- 34 -- S.A.No. 21/09 can be granted in the light of the answers given herein above.
However, as regards the relief relating to damages, I am of the view that considering the fact that the respondents though trespassers in relation to the appellant/plaintiff, were the tenants of mortgagors and were also regularly paying rent to the mortgagors till April, 1990. In such a fact scenario, it would be inequitable to grant any damages to the appellant/plaintiff only because respondents/defendants are in occupation of the suit property without the consent of the plaintiff/appellant.
However, so far as relief of payment of rent is concerned, I find no difficulty in granting the same by ordering an inquiry for recovery of rent in terms of provisions of Order 20 rule 12 of CPC, 1908 from the institution of the suit till delivery of possession by the respondents/defendants.
42. In the result, appeal deserves to be partly allowed.
Appeal is partly allowed with proportionate costs throughout.
Judgments and decrees of the trial Court and joint District Judge impugned herein are hereby quashed and set aside.
43. It is directed that respondents/defendants shall deliver vacant possession of the suit property to the appellant/plaintiff within a period of six months from the date
-- 35 -- S.A.No. 21/09 of the order. It is further directed that an inquiry as to the rent from the institution of the suit until the delivery of possession to the appellant/plaintiff shall be held in accordance with provisions of Order 20 Rule 12 of CPC by the Court of Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Amravati.
44. The suit is partly decreed with proportionate costs in above terms.
45. Decree to be drawn up accordingly.
S. B. SHUKRE, J.
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