Union and in the United States to the extent indicated above. To some extent,
the obligations imposed by the World Trade Organisations upon its member
countries, are the same. In such circumstances, we do not see any reason as to
why the Scheme of the Competition Act, 2002 should be taken to prohibit any
settlement, especially when the scope of Section 27 of the Act is very wide,
conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission to pass residuary orders. Hence, our
answer to the first question is that it is possible within the framework and
scheme of the Competition Act, 2002, to allow settlements and compromises to
be reached between parties, provided the Commission is of the considered view
that such settlements and compromises (1) would not lead to the continuance of
Anti-Competitive Practices (2) would not allow the abuse of dominant position to
continue and (3) would not be prejudicial to the interest of consumers or to the
freedom of trade.w
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Delivered on: 27-03-2015
Coram:
The Honourable Mr.Justice V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN
and
The Honourable Mr.Justice P.R.SHIVAKUMAR
Writ Appeal Nos.1806 and 1807 of 2013
The Tamil Nadu Film Exhibitors Association
Vs
Competition Commission of India
Citation;AIR 2015 MADRAS 106
These Writ Appeals arise out of the dismissal of two writ petitions filed by
the appellant herein, one challenging an order of the Competition Commission of
India directing an investigation to be initiated and the other seeking a direction
to the local police, to take action on a complaint lodged by the appellant.
2. We have heard Mr.Nithyesh Nataraj, learned counsel for the appellant,
Mr.G.Masilamani,
learned
Senior
Counsel
appearing
for
the
Competition
Commission of India, Mr.Rahul Balaji, learned counsel for the second respondent
and Mr.R.Ravichandran, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for
the State.
3. The appellant herein is the Tamil Nadu Film Exhibitors Association. It is
registered as a society under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act.
The
3
second respondent herein is a producer of feature films. On 8.1.2013, the
second respondent filed a complaint before the Competition Commission of India
(which is the first respondent herein), alleging that by a resolution dated
20.12.2012, the Tamil Nadu Theatre Owners Association decided to ban the
screening of films which are released via DTH. It was claimed by the second
respondent herein that the resolution would tantamount to an anti-competitive
practice, violating Section 3(3)(b) of the Competition Act, 2002.
4. After examining the said complaint, the Competition Commission of
India, passed an order on 16.01.2013 in terms of Section 26(1) of the
Competition Act, 2002, holding that there existed a prima facie case requiring an
investigation by the Director General of the Competition Commission.
5. In the meantime, the second respondent also faced opposition from a
small group of intolerant people, who managed to force the Commissioner of
Police, Chennai to issue an order on 23.1.2013 under Section 144 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, prohibiting the exhibition of the feature film "Viswaroopam"
for public view. However, after a series of dramatic twists and turns that were
more interesting than even the film itself, the Commissioner of Police passed an
order on 3.2.2013 under Section 144(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
revoking the earlier ban order. Therefore, the film got released in the theatres.
6. However, the Director General of the Competition Commission issued a
notice dated 1.4.2013 under Section 36 (2) read with Section 41(2) of the Act,
calling upon the appellant to furnish certain information as well as documents.
7. Immediately upon receipt of the said notice, the appellant filed a writ
4
petition in W.P.No.12085 of 2013 on the file of this Court challenging the order
of the Competition Commission of India, dated 16.01.2013 passed in Case No.1
of 2013.
8. Simultaneously, the appellant herein also lodged a complaint dated
13.4.2013, with the Commissioner of Police, alleging that the complaint filed by
the second respondent before the Competition Commission of India was on the
basis of a forged document, namely the alleged resolution dated 20.12.2012.
Thereafter, the appellant filed another writ petition in W.P.No.14411 of 2013
seeking a mandamus to direct the Commissioner of Police to take their complaint
on record and initiate action against the second respondent. Both the writ
petitions were taken up by a learned Judge and by a common order dated
16.8.2013, the learned Judge dismissed both the writ petitions. Aggrieved by the
said order, the appellant is before us.
9. While ordering notice in the writ appeals, this Court took note of the
fact that the Director General of Investigation of the Competition Commission
was proceeding with the investigation. Therefore, this Court passed an interim
order in these writ appeals on 11.2.2014, permitting the Director General to
proceed with the investigation and finalise the same. However, the Competition
Commission was directed not to proceed with the matter without the leave of the
Court.
10. Subsequently, the appellant as well as the second respondent arrived
at a settlement, in and by which, the appellant agreed to withdraw the police
complaint made against the second respondent and the second respondent
5
agreed
to
withdraw
the
complaint
before
the
Competition
Commission.
Thereafter, the parties filed a memo praying for the recording of the compromise
memo and the disposal of the writ appeals in accordance with the memo.
11. However, the same is being opposed by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Competition Commission on the ground that the Director
General of Investigation had already filed a report before the Competition
Commission, holding that the allegations relating to infringement of the
provisions of the Act are found to be true and that therefore, a settlement inter
parties cannot be accepted in matters of this nature.
12. In other words, the disputes as between the appellant and the second
respondent have culminated in a settlement. But, that settlement has triggered
a fresh dispute between the appellant and the Competition Commission.
Therefore, it has become necessary to deal with a different set of questions in
these appeals than those that were dealt with by the learned single Judge.
13. Before the learned single Judge, the appellant raised several issues
including the issue of jurisdiction. But, today, those issues have paled into
insignificance, in view of the settlement reached between the appellants and the
second respondent. If it is a normal civil litigation of adversarial nature, we
would have simply recorded the Memorandum of Compromise and closed the
writ appeals without much ado. But unfortunately for the appellant, an inquiry
undertaken by the Competition Commission, is not in the nature of an
adjudication of a private dispute between two private parties. What is
undertaken by the Competition Commission is actually an inquiry either into the
6
existence of any anti-competitive agreement or into the abuse of dominant
position by an enterprise or a group. Therefore, despite the fact that an
investigation may be triggered initially by a complaint given by an
individual,
the
inquiry
assumes
larger
proportions,
leaving
the
individual complainant, as a speck in the galaxy. Hence, the learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the Competition Commission opposes the request made
by the appellant and the second respondent to record the compromise and close
the matter.
14. In view of the above, we are of the view that two questions of primary
importance arise. They are:-
(A) whether it is possible, in the context of the scheme of the Competition Act,
2002, for two adversaries to reach a settlement, thereby closing the doors for an
investigation or inquiry; and
(B) whether this court can record a memorandum of settlement like the one that
the parties have reached in this case.
We are deliberately pushing the question relating to our own jurisdiction, to the
second place, in view of the fact that unless the Scheme of the Act permits the
recording of such compromises, it is not possible for this court to record the
same.
Question-A:-
15. In order to find an answer to the first question as to whether the
Scheme of the Competition Act, 2002 permits a compromise to be reached
between two parties, it is necessary to examine the historical background of the
7
Competition Act, 2002 and the Scheme of the Act.
16. Fundamentally, the Competition Act, 2002 is a law that addresses
Anti-Trust issues. The Sherman Act, 1890, which proscribes agreements in
restraint of trade, appears to be the earliest Anti-Trust Statute in the world.
However, the Indian Contract Act, which is anterior in point of time to the
Sherman Act of US, also contain a provision declaring agreements in restraint of
trade as void. The expression "restraint of trade" was explained by the US
Supreme Court in Business Electronics Corp. vs. Sharp Electronics Corp.
[485 US 717 (1988)], to mean not merely a particular list of agreements, but
also a particular economic consequence that may be produced by different sorts
of agreements in varying time and circumstances.
17. Even before the advent of Glasnost and globalisation that started in
the early 1990s, India had an Anti-Trust Act that was known as the Monopolies
and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969. Interestingly, the preamble to the
MRTP Act, 1969 advocated a socialistic philosophy by declaring that the Act was
intended to ensure that the operation of the economic system did not result in
the concentration of economic power to the common detriment. The Act was
intended to control Monopolies and to provide for the prohibition of Monopolistic
and Restrictive Trade Practices.
18. But MRTP Act, 1969 was found to be very ineffective due to a variety
of reasons, one of which was the frequent shift in the industrial policy of the
Government. Chapter-III of the MRTP Act, 1969 conferred power upon the
Central Government to regulate the expansion of and the establishment of a new
8
undertaking by any undertaking falling under Chapter-III. But, after the new
Industrial Policy was introduced in 1991, the Government removed some
important regulatory provisions from Chapter-III of the Act. In other words, the
pre-entry restriction on the investment by the Corporate Sector was removed.
19. Simultaneously with the process of liberalisation, India became a party
to two important agreements of the World Trade Organisations (WTO), namely
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). As a result, many multinational companies
entered the Indian Market. Therefore, realizing that there was no teeth for the
MRTP Commission under the MRTP Act and that a new law was the need of the
hour, the Central Government constituted in 1999, a High Level Committee of
Competition Policy and Law. The Committee undertook an extensive study of the
Government Policies, their effect on the Industrial Structure in India, the
deficiencies of the Indian Industry to compete with multi-nationals and then
submitted its report. The major recommendations made by the Committee were:
(a) to repeal the MRTP Act and to enact a Competition Act for the regulation of
Anti-Competitive Agreements and to prevent the abuse of dominance and
combinations including mergers; (2) to eliminate reservation of products in a
phased manner for the Small Scale Industries and the Handloom Sector; (3) to
divest the shares and assets of the Government in State Monopolies and
privatise them; and (4) to bring all industries in the private as well as Public
Sector within the proposed legislation.
20. On the basis of the recommendations of the said Committee, the
9
Competition Act, 2002 was passed and it received the assent of the President on
13.1.2003. Within a few months thereafter, the Central Government also notified
the Rules for the selection of Chairperson and other Members of the Competition
Commission.
21. But, the validity of the Act and the Rules came to be challenged before
the Supreme Court of India in Brahm Dutt vs. Union of India [(2005) 2 SCC
431]. In the course of hearing, the Central Government informed the Supreme
Court that they intended to make amendments to the Act. Thereafter, the Act
was amended substantially by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007. Under
the Amended Act, the Competition Commission was to function only as a Market
Regulator and an Expert Body performing Adversary and Regulatory functions.
In the year 2009, there was yet another amendment.
22. The Act, as it stands today, seeks to cover three Anti-Trust issues
namely: (a) Anti-Competitive Agreements by an Enterprise or association of
Enterprises or person or association of persons; (2) Abuse of Dominant Position;
and (3) Combinations. While Anti-Competitive Agreements are dealt with by
Section 3, Abuse of Dominant Position is dealt with by Section 4 and
Combination by way of acquisition or merger or amalgamation is dealt with by
Sections 5 and 6.
Scheme of the Act:-
23. Having seen the historical background that lead to the enactment of
the Competition Act, 2002, let us now have a look at the Scheme of the Act. The
Act is divided into 9 Chapters, Chapter-I dealing with preliminaries, Chapter-II
10
dealing with Anti-Competitive Agreements, abuse of dominant position and
regulation of combinations, Chapter-III dealing with the establishment of the
Competition Commission, Chapter-IV dealing with the duties, powers and
functions of the Commission, Chapter-V dealing with the duties of Director
General, Chapter-VI dealing with penalties, Chapter-VII dealing with Competition
Advocacy, Chapter-VIII dealing with finance, accounts and audit and Chapter-IX
dealing with miscellaneous. In between Chapters VIII and IX, we have Chapter
VIII-A dealing with the establishment of the Appellate Tribunal, its procedure
and powers and the appeal to the Supreme Court. Since we are concerned now
with a question as to whether the Scheme of the Competition Act, 2002 permits
the parties to reach a settlement, the only Chapter that is required to be focused
is Chapter IV.
24. Chapter IV comprises of about 22 Sections, namely Sections 18 to 39.
Section 18 imposes upon the Competition Commission certain duties. The duties
enlisted in Section 18 of the Act are:-
(i) to eliminate practices having adverse effect on Competition;
(ii) to promote and sustain Competition;
(iii) to protect the interest of consumers; and
(iv) to ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in the
markets in India.
25. To enable the Commission to perform the duties imposed upon it
under Section 18, the Commission is invested with the power under Section 19
to make an inquiry into the alleged contravention of the provisions dealing with
11
Anti-Competitive practices and abuse of dominant position. The powers and
functions of the Commission, while holding an inquiry under Section 19(1),
include the following:-
(i) to see whether an agreement has an appreciable adverse effect on
competition, in the light of certain factors, such as:
(a) creation of barriers for new entrants in the market;
(b) driving existing competitors out of the market;
(c) foreclosure of competition by hindering entry into the market;
(d) accrual of benefits to consumers;
(e) improvements in production or distribution of goods or provision
of services; or
(f) promotion of technical, scientific and economic development by
means of production or distribution of goods or provision of services;
(ii) to see whether the enterprise enjoys a dominant position, in the light
of certain factors such as:-
(a) market share of the enterprise;
(b) size and resources of the enterprise;
(c) size and importance of the competitors;
(d)economic
power
of
the
enterprise
including
commercial
advantages over competitors;
(e) vertical integration of the enterprises or sale or service network
of such enterprises;
(f) dependence of consumers on the enterprise;
12
(g) monopoly or dominant position whether acquired as a result of
any statute or by virtue of being a Government company or a public sector
undertaking or otherwise;
(h)
entry barriers, including barriers such as regulatory barriers,
financial risk, high capital cost of entry, marketing entry barriers, technical entry
barriers, economies of scale, high cost of substitutable goods or service for
consumers;
(i) countervailing buying power;
(j) market structure and size of market;
(k) social obligations and social costs;
(l) relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the economic
development, by the enterprise enjoying a dominant position having or likely to
have appreciable adverse effect on competition;
(m) any other factor which the Commission may consider relevant
for the inquiry.
Similarly, there are certain factors enlisted under Section 20(4) of the Act, in the
context of which the Competition Commission may hold an inquiry into
combinations. We are not concerned in this case, with combinations and hence,
it is not necessary to make a reference to Section 20.
26. Section 26 of the Act indicates the procedure for inquiry under Section
19. The Commission is empowered under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 26
either to direct the Director General to cause an investigation or to close the
matter, according as the case may be, depending upon whether a prima facie
13
case exists or not. It is upon the report of the investigation by the Director
General, that the Commission is empowered to pass orders as indicated in
Section 27.
27. Section 27 of the Act empowers the Commission to pass all or any of
the following orders namely:
(i) to direct an enterprise or association of enterprises or person or
association of persons who are involved in Anti-Competitive Agreements or the
abuse of dominant position to discontinue and not to enter any such agreement
or discontinue any abuse of dominant position;
(ii) to impose penalty which shall not be more than 10% of the average of
the turnover for the last three preceding financial years;
(iii) to direct the Anti-Competitive Agreements to stand modified to the
extent and in the manner as specified in the order;
(iv) to direct the concerned enterprise to abide by such other orders as
the Commission may pass and comply with the directions including payment of
costs;
(v) to pass such other orders and issue such directions as it may deem fit.
28. In Competition Commission of India vs. Sail [2010 (10) SCC
744], the Supreme Court of India held that the powers conferred upon the
Commission are of wide magnitude and are of serious ramifications. The powers
of the Commission include the power to issue such directions as would achieve
the object of the Act and ensure its proper implementation.
29. Interestingly, the Competition Commission has powers even to issue
14
interim orders. Section 33 confers power upon the Commission to issue a
restraint order including ex parte restraint orders.
30. But it is significant to note that by the Amendment Act 39 of 2007,
Section 34 of the Act was deleted. Section 34 of the Act conferred power upon
the Competition Commission to award compensation. Similarly, the power of
review conferred upon the Commission under Section 37 was also taken away by
Amendment Act 39 of 2007.
31. Section 36 of the Act empowers the Commission to regulate its own
procedure. The Commission is not bound to follow the procedure prescribed by
the Code of Civil Procedure. But, it should be guided by the principles of natural
justice.
32. Therefore, it is clear (1) that the Commission is not really concerned
about a private dispute between two individuals, but is concerned about the
existence of Anti-Competitive Agreements or abuse of dominant position that
has adverse effect on Competition and oppress freedom of trade; and (2) that
the Commission has residuary powers under Section 27 to pass such other
orders and issue such directions as it may deem fit.
33. Once it is conceded that the Competition Commission has residuary
powers and its powers to pass such orders are wide in amplitude, it cannot be
contended that the Commission would not have the power to accept a
settlement or compromise between parties. Take for instance a case where an
enterprise is found guilty of entering into Anti-Competitive Agreements in
violation of Section 3(1). Such an agreement, to begin with, may only be
15
between two or three parties. But, by the very nature of its composition, duties,
powers and functions, the Competition Commission is not an adjudicatory body
to resolve the private disputes arising out of such agreements. The Commission
is primarily concerned with the question as to whether the agreement would
have larger ramifications. If the Competition Commission finds after inquiry that
there has been an Anti-Competitive Agreement or abuse of a dominant position,
it is empowered to pass at least three types of orders namely:-
(a) to direct the parties to discontinue the agreement or discontinue the abuse of
dominant position;
(b) to impose such penalty; and
(c) to direct the parties not to re-enter into such agreements or to indulge in
abuse of dominant position.
34. If for instance, a party which is held guilty of entering into an Anti-
Competitive Agreement or abusing its dominant position comes up before the
Commission and agrees for the discontinuance of the agreement with an
undertaking not to re-enter into such agreements or to indulge in the abuse of
dominant position, we see no reason as to why the same should not be accepted
by the Commission. If a party agrees to abide by the mandate of Sections 3 and
4, the Commission will be actually saved of the botheration to proceed with the
full fledged inquiry. In such cases where the parties agree not to continue with
the agreement or agree not to abuse the dominant position, the only question
that would be left for the Commission to deal with, is the question of imposition
of penalty.
16
35. If the only purpose sought to be achieved, by ignoring the
compromise reached between the parties and proceeding with the inquiry, is the
imposition of penalty, we do not think that the same could be a taken as a bar
for the recording of any settlement or compromise. The only question that
the Competition Commission may perhaps be obliged to look into, in
cases where the parties arrive at a settlement, is to see whether the
compromise or settlement is a cover up, so as to prevent an
investigation being made into the Anti-Competitive practices or abuse of
dominant position. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the Scheme
of the Competition Act, 2002 allows the parties to enter into a
compromise or settlement, but the same shall be subject to a scrutiny
by the Commission, for examining whether public interest would
continue to suffer and whether the object of the inquiry would stand
defeated by the acceptance of the compromise.
36. As we have pointed out earlier, the Competition Act, 2002 was the
product of the agreements of the World Trade Organisations to which India
became a party. Therefore, the Committee drew inspiration from the parallel
legislations in other jurisdictions that related to Anti-Trust issues. Hence, it may
be useful to have a look at the position prevailing in the European Union and the
United States.
(i) Both in the European Union as well as the United States, settlement is
permitted in the case of cartels. The cartel settlement procedure under EU rules
allows the Commission to settle a cartel case with the companies involved under
17
a streamlined procedure if the parties agree with the Commission’s findings on
the infringement. This procedure was created in 2008 through an amendment of
Commission Regulation 773/2004.
Cartel settlement decisions are prohibition
decisions based on Articles 7 and 23 of Regulation 1/2003. [COMMISSION
REGULATION (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No
773/2004, as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases]
(ii) In the United States, plea bargain process can be initiated at any time.
The settlement process may be initiated either by the Antitrust Division staff or
the defendant at any state of the investigation. Discussions are held behind
closed doors, away from the Courts. The plea agreement is filed before the court
and the court must accept the plea and impose actual sentence. The rules
governing the negotiation and acceptance of plea agreements can be found in
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”), the Federal Rules of Evidence
(“FRE”), the U.S. Attorney Manual (“USAM”), and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
(“USSG”).
(iii) In European Union, the Commission investigates all cartel cases
(including cases which later on follow the settlement route). However,
settlement remains a choice of the Commission; it is neither a right nor an
obligation for the companies. Even if all parties request to settle, it remains in
the Commission’s discretion to decide if the case is suitable. If the discussions
have already started, the Commission may decide to discontinue them if there is
insufficient progress towards a ‘common understanding’.
(iv) In the United States, there are certain pre conditions for the
18
acceptance of a settlement. They are:- (A) Presence of a cartel (B) Admission of
guilt or factual basis (the defendant entering into a plea agreement with the
Antitrust Division must be willing to plead guilty to the charged cartel conduct at
arraignment and make a factual admission of guilt) (C) Cartel participant’s
cooperation (the inclusion in cartel settlement, agreements of commitment by
the settling party to provide full, continuing, and complete cooperation) (D)
Promise by the Government not to bring further charges (however certain
violations such as those of federal tax, securities law or crimes of violence are
specifically exempted from the non Prosecution terms of such plea agreements)
37. Therefore, it is clear that a settlement is possible both in the European
Union and in the United States to the extent indicated above. To some extent,
the obligations imposed by the World Trade Organisations upon its member
countries, are the same. In such circumstances, we do not see any reason as to
why the Scheme of the Competition Act, 2002 should be taken to prohibit any
settlement, especially when the scope of Section 27 of the Act is very wide,
conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission to pass residuary orders. Hence, our
answer to the first question is that it is possible within the framework and
scheme of the Competition Act, 2002, to allow settlements and compromises to
be reached between parties, provided the Commission is of the considered view
that such settlements and compromises (1) would not lead to the continuance of
Anti-Competitive Practices (2) would not allow the abuse of dominant position to
continue and (3) would not be prejudicial to the interest of consumers or to the
freedom of trade.
19
Question:B:-
38. The second question that arises for consideration is as to whether this
court can record a memorandum of settlement just as the one that the parties
have reached in this case.
39. Section 62 of the Act declares that the provisions of the Competition
Act, 2002 shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any
other law for the time being in force. Section 61 of the Act excludes the
jurisdiction of Civil Courts, in respect of any matter which the Commission or the
Appellate Tribunal is empowered by the Act to determine. But, the said bar of
jurisdiction, may not apply to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution, as it has been held to be part of the basic structure.
40. Therefore, despite the fact that the orders of the Competition
Commission are subject to the Appellate jurisdiction of the Competition Appellate
Tribunal and despite the fact that the orders of the Appellate Tribunal are subject
to a statutory appeal under Section 53-T of the Act, the jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 will not stand ousted. The fact that this Court may have to
exercise a lot of restraint in cases where specialised adjudicatory bodies are in
existence, is different from holding that the jurisdiction itself stands ousted.
41. Once it is concluded that this Court would have jurisdiction (i) to do
what the Competition Commission had failed to do or (ii) to undo what the
Competition Commission had done, it follows as a corollary that this Court can
also record the compromise or memo of settlement reached between the parties
in a matter pending before the Competition Commission. But, in normal
20
circumstances, this Court would not exercise such a power, as it may prevent an
expert body like the Competition Commission from examining the ramifications
of such a settlement or compromise.
42. In the case on hand, the Director General of the Competition
Commission of India has already completed the investigation and filed a report.
In Chapter 8 of the Report, the Director General has concluded that the practices
and conduct of the appellant are restrictive in nature to control the film
exhibition business. This conclusion has been reached only on the ground that
the appellant limited and controlled the exhibition of movies as well as innovative
use of technology in the exhibition of feature films in the territory of Tamil Nadu,
unless its own directions are obeyed. It is also pointed out in the Report that the
appellant was guilty of violation of the provisions of Section 3(3) (b) read with
Section 3(1) of the Act. The Director General has placed on record that in yet
another case bearing No.78/2011, initiated at the instance of Reliance Big
Entertainment (Private) Limited, the appellant was imposed with a penalty.
43. In other words, the investigation Report of the Director General not
only concludes that the appellant is guilty of violation of the provisions of the Act
relating to Anti-Competitive Practices, but also points out that it is the second
instance of such nature. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the
appellant should file the memorandum of compromise/settlement before the
Competition Commission itself so that the Commission will be in a better position
to appreciate whether the same could be accepted with or without modifications.
44. In view of the above, the writ appeals are disposed of permitting the
21
appellants to file the Memorandum of Compromise/Settlement entered into
between them and the second respondent, before the Competition Commission.
Upon the parties filing the Memorandum, the Competition Commission may look
into the same in the context of what we have indicated above and pass
appropriate orders either rejecting the compromise or accepting the same with
or without modifications. The Commission may bear in mind that if in the light of
the compromise, any further proceeding would only be an exercise in futility, the
same shall not be undergone just for the purpose of completion of formalities.
45. The writ appeals are disposed of with the above directions. There will
be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are
closed.
(V.R.S.J.)
(P.R.S.J.)
27-03-2015
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