Sunday, 3 May 2015

Whether tenant of agricultural land can sell agricultural land without previous permission of collector?



In this case, Section 43(2) of the said Act provides that a transfer in contravention of sub-section (1) shall be invalid. When consequences of nullification on failure to comply with a prescribed requirement is provided by the statute itself, there can be no manner of doubt that such statutory requirement must be interpreted as mandatory. Besides the provisions of Section 43(1) of the said Act provide that no land purchased by a tenant under specified sections of the said Act shall be transferred without previous sanction of the Collector. Thus the legislature has made use of negative words. One of the well known modes of showing a clear intention that the provision enacted is mandatory, is by clothing the command in a negative form. CRAWFORD, on statutory construction has observed that prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory and this is so even though the statute provides no penalty for disobedience.
15. The provisions specifically makes reference to 'previous sanction'. If the objective of said enactment is taken into consideration alongwith phraseology employed by the legislature, then the mandatory nature of the requirement contained in Section 43(1) cannot be diluted by permitting some post-facto sanction for a transfer in breach of Section 43(1) of the said Act. This would render the provisions of Section 43(2) as otiose. Accordingly, there is no merit in the contention that the provisions of Section 43 of the said Act are are only directory and that post-facto sanction constitutes substantial compliance.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL   APPELLATE  JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.   1484    OF  1992
Smt.  Saraswati Shamrao  Dhere
vs.
Khutub Babu Malani & Ors.


CORAM :  M. S. SONAK, J.

  Date of Pronouncing the Judgment : 05 February 2015
Citation; 2015(2) ALLMR533,2015(2)MhLj566

This petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 
9 August 1990 made by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (MRT) 
setting aside the orders made by the Tahsildar declaring as invalid 
the sale of the suit property by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in favour of 
respondent No.1.
2]
This petition concerns the following property situate at Shiroli, 
Kolhapur :
Gat No.
131
43/1
43/2
3]
H.A.
1­17
1­52
0­02
Assessment
15­00
18­06
00­19
The petitioner was the tenant in respect of the half portion of 
the aforesaid property and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were the tenants 

in respect of the other half. By resort to the provisions contained in 
Section   32G   of   the   Bombay   Tenancy   and   Agricultural   Lands   Act, 
1948   (said   Act),   the   petitioner   and   respondent   Nos.   1   and   2 
purchased respective one half portion of the aforesaid property. This 
petition concerns the one half portion purchased by respondent nos. 
By   an   instrument   of   transfer   dated   13   December   1983, 

4]
2 and 3 and therefore it shall be referred to as 'the said property'.
respondent   Nos.2   and   3   transfered   the   said   property   to   Khutub 
Malani   (original   respondent   No.1).   Upon   demise   of   said   Khutub 
Malani,   his   legal   heirs   are   now   brought   on   record.   There   is   no 
serious dispute that at the time of execution of instrument dated 13 
December 1983, no previous sanction as contemplated by Section 43 
of the said Act had been obtained from the Collector. Accordingly, 
the   petitioner   instituted   Tenancy   Case   No.10   of   1984   before   the 
Tahsildar,  inter   alia,  seeking   declaration   that   the   transfer  or 
alienation   of   the   said   property   was   invalid   and   the   said   property 
ought to be disposed of in terms of Section 84C of the said Act.
5]
The Tahsildar, by order dated 2 September 1985, declared the 
transfer as invalid and directed action under Section 84C of the said 
Act. The appeal against such order was dismissed by the Assistant 

Collector   on   8   August   1988.   Mr.   Khutub   Malani,   then   preferred 
revision   petitions   to   the   Maharashtra   Revenue   Tribunal   (MRT), 
which has since been allowed by the impugned judgment and order 
dated 9 August 1990. The MRT, in its impugned order, has mainly 
relied upon sanction accorded by the Sub­Divisional Officer on 17 
July 1984 as constituting 'regularisation'  of the transfer effected by 
Mr. M. J. Patil, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted 
6]
the instrument dated 13 December 1983.  
that Section 43 of the said Act contemplates 'previous sanction' in the 
matter of  transfer of property purchased by a tenant under the said 
Act.   In this case, admittedly there was no such   previous  sanction 
and the transfer was in breach of of Section 43 of the said Act. There 
is  no provision   for  regularization  of  such  invalid  transfer  and the 
only option open was to proceed under Section 84C of the said Act. 
In this regard, reliance was placed by Mr. Patil upon the following 
decisions:  
(i)
(ii)
(ii)
Ashok Baburao Ingavale & Ors. vs. Pralhad Hari Bhate  
& Ors.1;
Dadu  Rau  Yelavade (dead) by  his heirs and Lrs vs.  
Himmat Rasul Patel2; and
Chandrabhan   Chunnilal   Gour   vs.   Shravan   Kumar  
Khunnolal Gour & Anr.3
1 2005(1) Mh.L.J. 446
2 AIR 1992 SCC 1093
3 1980 Mh.L.J. 690

Ms   Mudbidri,   learned   counsel   appeared   for   legal   heirs   of 
7]
respondent No.1, only to state that they have taken away the papers 
from her. In such circumstances, learned counsel expressed inability 
to make any submissions in the matter, although due  opportunity 
was duly afforded to her. 
Mr. Surel Shah, the learned counsel appearing for respondent 
8]
following submissions:
That under Section 84C of the said Act, Tahsildar can 
(A)
Nos.   3(a)   to   3(d),   defended   the   impugned   order   by   making   the 
exercise jurisdiction either  suo  motu  or on application of any 
person interested in the land which is alleged to have been 
transferred in breach of any of the provisions of the said Act. 
The   present   case,   is   not   a   case   of   exercise   of  suo  motu 
jurisdiction.   The   petitioner   cannot   be   regarded   as  'person 
interested'. Therefore, the very invocation of jurisdiction under 
Section 84C was infirm ;
(B)
The obtaining of 'previous sanction' under Section 43  of 
the said Act is not a mandatory requirement. The obtaining of 
post­facto  sanction constitutes substantial compliance. In this 
regard, reliance was placed upon the decision in case of 

(C)
Bardez vs. Shri Dinkar Vassant Budkule & Anr4;
Shri   Deu   Rudreshwar   Temple   Arvalem,   Sanquelim,   Bicholim,  
The said Act has been amended by Maharashtra Act No. 
I of 2014, which introduced an additional proviso   after the 
existing proviso to Section 43(1). This amendment   provides 
that   no  previous  sanction  shall   be   necessary   for   transfer   of 
land, in respect of which ten years have elapsed from the date 
of   purchase   or   sale   of   land   under   the   said   Act,   subject   to 
certain conditions. Such amendment, will clearly apply to the 
transaction in question and this is an additional reason not to 
interfere with the impugned order made by the MRT. In this 
regard, reliance was placed upon the decisions in cases of  K. 
C. Mukerjee, Official  Receiver vs. Mr. Ramratan Kuer & Ors.5, 
Dahiben (widow of   Ranchhodji Jivani)   vs. Vasanji Kevalbhai  
(dead) & Ors.6, and   Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula (Deceased)  
after   him   his   heirs   and   legal   representatives   vs.   Motibhai  
Nagjibhai7.
9]
4
5
6
7
The rival contentions, now fall for my determination.
1999(4) ALL MR 35
AIR 1936 Privy Council 49
1995 Supp (2) SCC 295
AIR 1966 SC 459

Section 43 of the said Act, reads thus:
10]
“43. Restriction   on transfers of land purchased or sold  
under this Act.­ (1) No land purchased by a tenant under  
sections 32, 32F [32I, 32O, [33C or 43ID]] or sold to any  
person under section 32P or 64   shall be transferred by  
sale,   gift,   exchange,   mortgage,   lease   or   assignment  
without   the   previous   sanction  of   the     Collector,   such  
sanction   shall   be   given   by   the   Collector   in   such  
circumstances, and subject to such  conditions, as may be  
prescribed by the State Government:
        Provided     that,   no   such   sanction   shall   be  
necessary where the land is to be  mortgaged in favour of  
Government     or     a   society     registered   or   deemed   to   be  
registered   under   the   Bombay   Co­operative   Societies   Act,  
1925, for raising a loan for effecting of any  improvement  
of such land.
(2)             Any   transfer   of   land   in   contravention   of   sub­
section(1) shall be invalid.”
(emphasis supplied)
Rule   25­A   of   the   Bombay   Tenancy   and   Agricultural   Lands 
11]
Rules, 1956 (said Rules), deal with the circumstances in which and 
conditions subject to which sanction shall be given by the Collector 
under Section 43 for transfer. The same reads thus:
“25­A. Circumstances in which and conditions subject to  
which   sanction   shall   be   given   by   the   Collector   under  
Section   43   for   transfer   ­­­   (1)   Under   section   43,   the  
Collector may give sanction for transfer of land in any of  
the following circumstances, namely:­
(a) that   the   land   is   required   for   an   agricultural  
purpose by industrial or commercial undertaking in  
connection   with   any   industrial   or   commercial  
operations carried on by such­undertaking;
(b) that   the   transfer   is   for   the   benefit   of   any  
educational or charitable institution;

(c) that   the   land   is   required   by   a   cooperative  
farming society;
(d) that the land is being sold in execution of a  
decree of a civil court or for the recovery of arrears of  
land revenue under the provisions of the Code;
(e) that the land is being sold bona fide for any  
non­agricultural purpose;
(g)



(f)
that the land is being sold by a landowner on  
the ground that –

(i)
he   is   permanently   giving   up   the  
profession of agriculturalist, or 

(ii) he is permanently rendered incapable of 
cultivating the land personally;
(h)


that the land is being gifted in favour of ­
(i)
the bodies or institutions mentioned in  
section 88 A and clauses (a) and (b) of section 
88 B, or
(ii) a member of the landowner's family;
that the land is being exchanged ­
(i)
with land of equal or nearly equal value  
owned and cultivated personally by a member 
of the same family, or
(ii) with land of equal or nearly equal value  
situate   in   the   same   village   owned   and  
cultivated   personally   by   another   landowner  
with a view to forming a compact block of his 
holding   or   with   a   view   to   having   better  
management of the land;

Provided   that   the   total   land   held   and  
cultivated   personally   by   any   of   the   parties   to   the  
exchange   whether   as   owner   or   tenant   or   partly   as  
owner   and   partly   as   tenant   does   not   exceed   the  
ceiling area as a result of the exchange;
(i)  that the land is being leased by a landowner  
who is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to  
any physical or mental disability or a member of the  

armed forces or among the landowners holding the  
land jointly;
(j)
that the land is being partitioned among the  
heirs or survivors of the deceased landowner. 
[(k) that the land is being mortgaged in favour of a  
society   registered  or   deemed   to   be   registered   under  
the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, for  
raising a loan for paying the purchase price of such  
land;

(l)
that the land is being transferred to a person  
who   by   reason   acquisition   of   his   land   for   any  
development project, has been displaced and requires  
to be resettled.]
(2)  (a) Where   the   sanction   for   sale   of   land   is  
given in the circumstances specified in clause (a), (b),  
(c),   (e)   of   sub­rule   (1),   it   shall   be   subject   to   the  
condition   of   the   landowner   paying   to   the   State  
Government   a   Nazrana   equal   to   40   times   the  
assessment of the land;
(b) In the case of partition sanctioned under clause  
(j) of sub­rule (1), it shall be subject to the condition  
that the area allotted to each sharer shall not be less  
than   the   unit   specified   by   the   State   Government  
under clause (c) of sub­section (1) of section 27.
12]

The   conjoint   reading   of   provisions   under   Section   43   of   the 
said   Act   and   Rule   25A   of   the   said   Rules,   makes   it   clear   that   the 
sanction contemplated by the provisions, is indeed 'previous sanction'  
of  the Collector or the competent authority as may be prescribed. 
Further, it is also clear that the provisions contained in Section 43 
(1) of the said Act are mandatory and any non­compliance would 
render the transfer of land invalid. 

The   said   Act   is   a   welfare   legislation,   enacted  inter   alia  to 
13]
prevent   the   exploitation   of   agricultural   tenants   as   a   class.   The 
restriction in form of Section 43(1) of the said Act is necessary; as 
otherwise, it is possible that the tenants are exploited into effecting 
transfers, not merely to the detriment of their own interest, but also 
in the interest of agragrain reform. Further, under the provisions of 
the said Act, the tenants in cultivation on tiller's day, i.e., 1 April 

1957 were vested with rights as deemed purchasers. The purchase 
price is to be determined by the prescribed authority under Section 
32G of the said Act by applying the provisions under Section 32H of 
the said Act. There is no doubt that the purchase price so determined 
is a concessional one and may have no co­relation with the market 
price. Such beneficial provisions came to be enacted in furtherance 
of the vision of agragrain reform and not to enable the tenants to 
make commercial profits, by way of rampant sale of the property 
purchased under the provisions of said Act. If lands purchased by the 
tenants under the provisions of the said Act at concessional rates are 
permitted to be indiscriminately sold by such tenants for commercial 
gains,   then   the   same   would   not   be   in   furtherance   of   agragrain 
reforms. If therefore, the real intention of the Legislature as well as 
the whole scope of statute is to be kept in mind, then it is clear that 
the   provisions   of   Section   43   are   mandatory   in   nature.   For   the 

determination   as   to   whether   some   provision   is   mandatory   or 
directory,     the   language   employed   in   the   provisions   is   no   doubt 
important. Further, it is necessary to consider the nature and design 
of the statute, the consequences which would follow from construing 
it   one   way   or   other;   the   impact   of   other   provisions   whereby   the 
necessity  of  complying with the  provisions in­question  is avoided; 
the   circumstances,   namely,   that   the   statute   provides   for   a 
contingency of the non­compliance with the provisions; and above 
all,   whether   the   object   of   the   legislation   will   be   defeated   or 
furthered. Applying such tests, it has to be held that the provisions of 
Section 43 of the said Act bear a mandatory character. 
14]
In  this  case,  Section  43  (2)  of  the   said  Act  provides  that  a 
transfer in contravention of sub­section (1) shall be invalid. When 
consequences of nullification on failure to comply with a prescribed 
requirement is provided by the statute itself, there can be no manner 
of   doubt   that   such   statutory   requirement   must   be   interpreted   as 
mandatory. Besides the provisions of Section 43(1) of the said Act 
provide that no land purchased by a tenant under specified sections 
of the said Act shall be transferred without previous sanction of the 
Collector. Thus the legislature has made use of negative words. One 
of   the   well   known   modes   of   showing   a   clear   intention   that   the 

provision   enacted  is   mandatory,  is   by  clothing  the   command  in   a 
negative form.  CRAWFORD, on statutory construction has observed 
that prohibitive  or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory 
and   this   is   so   even   though   the   statute   provides   no   penalty   for 
disobedience.
The   provisions   specifically   makes   reference   to   'previous  
15]
sanction'.  If   the   objective   of   said   enactment   is   taken   into 
consideration   alongwith   phraseology   employed   by   the   legislature, 
then the mandatory nature of the requirement contained in Section 
43(1) cannot be diluted by permitting some post­facto sanction for a 
transfer   in   breach   of   Section   43(1)   of   the   said   Act.   This   would 
render the provisions of Section 43(2) as otiose. Accordingly,  there 
is no merit in the contention that the provisions of Section 43 of the 
said   Act   are   are   only   directory   and   that  post­facto  sanction 
constitutes substantial compliance.
16]
In the case of Ashok Baburao (supra), this Court has held that 
even   if   portion   of   the   land   purchased   by   the   tenant   under   the 
statutory   provisions   were   to   be   transferred   without   obtaining 
previous sanction of the Collector under Section 43 of the said Act, 
that would tender such transaction invalid and the entire land will 

have to be resumed by the State Government in terms of Section 84­
C(4) of the said Act, because Section 43 of the Act opens with the 
expression  'no  land'  which would   mean that even if portion of the 
land is transferred without previous sanction of the   Collector, the 
entire  land  will   have   to   be   resumed  and   would  vest   in  the   State 
 In case of Dadu Rau Yelavade decd. by his heirs & Lrs.(supra),  
17]
Section 84­C of the Act.
Government   free   from   all   encumbrances   for   disposal   in   terms   of 
the Supreme Court has held that where the sale by the landlord of 
his   land   was   void   in   view   of   the   provisions   of   Section   64(8), 
declaring that any transfer by a landlord after tiller's day would be 
void,   the   tenant   would   not   acquire   rights   or   title   under   the   sale 
deed, even though subsequently, the proceedings under Section 32G 
were decided in favour of the tenant, the sale certificate issued in 
favour of tenant was regularised by ratifying the earlier transaction 
of sale. This is because, the sale of land by one of the tenant again 
would be invalid when it was effected prior to the date of the order 
of   Revenue   authorities   under   Section   32G,   as   on   that   date,   the 
tenants would have  no title of land in view of Section 64(8) of the 
said   Act,   which   they   could   validly   convey   in   favour   of   the 
purchasers. Further even if the subsequent conferment title on them 

by the order under Section 32G be treated to date back to the date 
of sale deed, still vendor being a tenant, who acquired title under 
the   said  Act,  is  sale  his  sale   to  purchaser   will   fail   in   view  of   the 
provisions of Section 43(2) of the said Act, providing restrictions on 
transfer of the land purchased under the said Act. 
In case of  Chandrabhan Chunnilal Gour (supra)  in the context 
18]
of Section 36(1) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, this Court 
has   held   that   the  previous  sanction  is     necessary   to   validate   the 
transaction of transfer of trust property. Ex­post facto sanction cannot 
validate   such   a   transaction.   Section   36(1)   of   the   Bombay   Public 
Trust Act 1950,   inter alia provided that no sale, exchange or gift or 
any immovable property and no lease for a period   exceeding   ten 
years in case of agricultural land and for a period exceeding three 
years   in   case   of   non   agricultural   land   or   building   belonging   to   a 
public   trust,   shall   be   valid   without   the   previous   sanction   of   the 
Charity   Commissioner.   Sanction   may   be   accorded   subject   to 
condition   as   the   Charity   Commissioner   may   think   fit   to   impose, 
regard being had to the interest, benefit or protection of the trust. In 
this context, this Court has held that the use of the  word 'previous' 
before   the   word  'sanction'  in   Section   36(1)   means   that   sanction 
contemplated   by   sub­section   (1)   has   to   be   obtained   before   the 

transaction  is  completed and  not  thereafter.  Ex­post  facto  sanction 
cannot validate the transaction. Further, Section 36(1) is not merely 
procedural or technical and the provisions contained in Section 41E 
do not empower the Charity Commissioner to grant an ex­post facto 
sanction.
In  case  of  Shri  Deu  Rudreshwar   Temple  Arvalem, Sanquelim,  
19]
Bicholim, Bardez (supra),  this Court was concerned with provisions 
under the Devasthan Regulations, which provided that a Devasthan 
cannot institute a suit without previous sanction of the Tribunal. In 
the context of the provisions of Devasthan Regulations   and upon 
considering   the   scheme   thereof,   this   Court   held   that   the   sanction 
contemplated was not necessarily previous sanction. The decision, 
cannot afford any assistance to the facts and circumstances of the 
present case.

20]
The  Section  84C  of   the  said Act  empowers a  Mamlatdar  to 
either  suo  motu  or an   application by a person interested to decide 
whether transfer or acquisition, made in contravention of any of the 
provisions of the said Act is or or is not invalid. In the present case, 
the Mamlatdar  may not have exercised   suo moto jurisdiction.  The 
jurisdiction   may have been exercised on basis of complaint by the 

petitioner. But, it may not be correct to accept that the petitioner is 
not   at   all   the   person   interested   in   the   property.     Admittedly,   the 
petitioner and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 purchased the said property 
under the provisions of the said Act. Section 83C(4) provides that 
once a transaction in respect of the land purchased and sold by a 
tenant   is   found   to   be   invalid,   such   land   shall   vest   in   the   State 
Government   free   from   encumbrances.   Thereafter   it   is   for   the 
Mamlatdar to determine the reasonable price and grant such   land 
on new and impartible tenure in the prescribed manner and upon 
following   order   of   priority.   The   priority   list   in   this   regard   is 
contained   in   Section   32P(2)(c),   which  inter  alia  includes     an 
agriculturist who holds either as owner or tenant or partly as owner 
and partly as tenant landless in area than an economic holding  and 
who are artisans.
21]
Taking into consideration   such provisions, it cannot be said 
that the petitioner was not a person interested. Besides  the phrase 
'person   interested',  in   the     context   in   which   it   finds   place   under 
Section 84C of the said Act has to be construed liberally.  It is open 
to   person   to   point   out   to   the   Mamlatdar     that   there   has   been   a 
transfer of land in breach of the provisions of the said Act.   Upon 
verifying the credibility of such information, if the Mamlatdar had 

reason to believe that the same is  true, then  it is for the Mamlatdar 
to   initiate  suo  motu  proceedings   under   Section   84C.   In   such 
circumstances, there is no merit in the contention of Mr. shah  that 
the proceedings under Section 84C  were without jurisdiction.
22]
A similar objection was rejected by this Court in case of Ashok  
Baburao  (supra), by holding that even though the persons referred 

to   under   Section   32P   of   the   said   Act   may   be   the   only   'interested  
persons', the fact remains that  suo motu  proceedings can always be 
initiated by the authorities. Thus, even if, the complainant had no 
locus standi, this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction will be justified 
in maintaining the order passed, if it was more than convinced that 
the reasons recorded were sound and tenable. Moreover, this Court 
would be loathe to exercise writ jurisdiction if erroneous order were 
to   be   restored.   Accordingly,   no   merit   was   found   in   the   objection 
based on doctrine of locus standi. 

23]
There is no necessity to go into the issue as to whether the 
amendment effected to Section 43 by the Maharashtra Act I of 2014 
is retrospective in operation or not. This is because in the present 
case the transaction in question was effected on 13 December 1983 
and the same was questioned by the petitioner soon thereafter, i.e., 

in the year 1984. At the date when the transfer was questioned, ten 
years had not lapsed from the date of purchase or sale of land under 
the sections mentioned in the sub section.   This is also not a case 
where conditions specified in the amendment   are alleged to have 
been complied with. Accordingly, amendment of 2014, even if the 
same is applied to the transaction  in­question, the same does not 
24]
save the transaction from being declared as invalid.
The rest of the decisions relied upon by Mr. Surel Shah were 
basically in the context of requirement taking cognizance of change 
in legal position. These decisions were referred in the context of the 
amendment effected to Section 43 by Maharashtra Act­I of 2014. As 
noted earlier, there is no necessity to go into this issue, because in 
the   present   case,   the   transaction   in­question   was   effected   on   13 
December 1983 and the same was questioned soon thereafter, that is 
in the year 1984. In fact, the Tahasildar by order dated 2 September 
1985   had   declared   the   transaction   as   invalid.   Accordingly, 
amendment of 2014, does not further the case of the respondents. 
25]
The Tahsildar and the Assistant Collector had rightly declared 
the transaction as invalid. The MRT was not right in observing that 
in the present case the requirement of previous sanction   was not 

mandatory in character and that even a post facto sanction would 
suffice. Such view is contrary to the expressed provisions contained 
in Section 43 of the Act as also the decisions of this Court as well as 
the Supreme Court in the context of similar legislations.
26]
For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order is set aside and 

(M. S. SONAK, J.)
no order as to costs.
Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (b). There shall be 

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