Distinction between error within jurisdiction and jurisdictional error of arbitrator

In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006)
11 SCC 181, this Court held as under:

“112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or
implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant
factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The
construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of
the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit
of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have
misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into
consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that
correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be
taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a
contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator
to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of
law. (See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC [(2003) 8 SCC
593] and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India [(2004) 5 SCC 325]).
113. Once, thus, it is held that the arbitrator had the jurisdiction,
no further question shall be raised and the court will not exercise
its jurisdiction unless it is found that there exists any bar on the
face of the award.”
In MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 10 SCC
573, the Court held:
“17. If the arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the
contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction. But if he wanders
outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he
commits a jurisdictional error. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in
such cases because the dispute is not something which arises
under or in relation to the contract or dependent on the
construction of the contract or to be determined within the award.
The ambiguity of the award can, in such cases, be resolved by
admitting extrinsic evidence. The rationale of this rule is that the
nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined
outside and independent of what appears in the award. Such a
jurisdictional error needs to be proved by evidence extrinsic to the
award. 

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10531
OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.14767 OF 2012)

Associate Builders Vs Delhi Development Authority

Dated;November 25, 2014
Citation;(2015) 3 SCC 49.

1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant herein was awarded a certain construction work contract
by the DDA vide a letter of award dated 14 th May, 1992. DDA was building a
colony consisting of 7,000 houses in Trilok Puri in the trans-Yamuna area. 168
Middle Income Group houses and 56 Lower Income Group houses, Grade-A
Pocket- B (balance work) was awarded for the tendered amount of
Rs.87,66,678/-. The contract was to be completed in 9 months. Admittedly, it
was ultimately completed only in 34 months, the contractor completing 166
Middle Income Group houses and 36 Lower Income Group houses. The total
value of work that was done amounted to Rs.62,84,845/-. As many as 15
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claims were made by the contractor and the High Court of Delhi appointed one
Shri K.D. Bali to arbitrate the present dispute.
3.
We are concerned here with claims 9, 10, 11 and 15, for these claims
have been allowed by the Arbitrator and the DDA’s objections have been
dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi. The
Division Bench in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 has
stepped in to set aside the judgment of the Single Judge and negative these
claims. We are also concerned with claims 12 and 13 which have been scaled
down by the Division Bench.
4.
Claims 9, 10, 11 and 15 read as follows:
“Claim No.9: Claimants claim Rs. 20,950/- on account of hire
charges of centering shuttering due to delay in laying of
conduiting.
a) That the respondents had granted certain work of
electrification but the said agency did not lay the conduit
resulting in delay in removing the shuttering and causing hire
charges. This fact was reported to the respondents vide
claimant's letter dated 30.10.92 followed by reminders and also
found place in hindrance register.
b) That this is the actual expenditure incurred and thus the
claimant is entitled for its refund.
c) That the detailed break-up of this claim has been appended
separately.
Claim No.10: Claimants claim Rs.33,450/- being the hire
charges of shuttering due to stoppage of work in block no. 100
and 101.
a) That the department had virtually stopped the work in block
100 & 101 on 20.7.93 and it continued up to 26.2.94. During
this period no work was allowed to be executed in these two
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blocks resulting in blockade or centering and shuttering in the
said two blocks.
b) That by stoppage of work in these two blocks the claimants
had suffered hire charges of shuttering due to respondent's
lapses and defaults.
c) It is further stated that there was no justification for stoppage
of work and the action was arbitrary and totally unjust.
d) That the detail of this claim has been outlined and appended
separately and the same shall from part of the statement of
facts.
Claim No. 11: Rs.2,00,000/- payable as damages on account of
hire charges of tools & plants and scaffolding.
a) That due to prolongation of the contract on account of the
respondents the claimants had to maintain tools & plants,
scaffolding etc, during the prolongation of the contract resulting
in expenditure for the same.
b) That the said articles remained at site beyond the stipulated
period and the claimants suffered loss due to the said
prolongation.
Claim No. 15: Claimants claim damages Rs.6,25,979/- on
account of establishment due to prolongation of the contract.
a) That the claimants had contemplated maintenance of
establishment during stipulated period of completion but the
work was prolonged due to various delays and defaults on the
part of the respondents.
b) It is further stated that the claimants had to pay the
establishment payment during prolongation and the said
expenditure was unproductive and un contemplated.
c) It is further stated that the claimants had maintained
establishment beyond the stipulated completion due to the
respondent's breach and thus entitled for payment.
d) That the respondents were also aware that the claimant has
maintained regular establishment and thus, incurred expenditure
and the claimants had also made several representations.”
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Claims 12 and 13 read as follows:
“Claim No. 12: Claimants claim Rs.7,12,394/- as damages
@20% for execution of the work.
a) That the work was delayed because of the Respondents for
the reasons as set out in the letter indicating hindrances
encountered during execution of the work resulting delay in
execution of the work for a period of 25 months.
b) It is further stated that the claimants incurred unproductive
after stipulated date of completion.
c) It is further stated that during prolongation there had been
steep rise in cost of material and labour.
d) That the claim of 20% is also lent support from the cost
index as issued by the competent authority and only applicable
on the work which was executed during prolongation.
e) That as per cost index it comes to more than 30% whereas
the claimants had claimed 20 & being highly rational and just.
f) That the claimants had appended the details of this claim
separately based on cost index to show that the claimant had
actually incurred this additional expenditure due to the
respondents. Copy of the hindrances encountered during the
execution of the work at the hands of the respondents has been
enclosed.
g) That the respondents had committed breach and thus liable
for damages.
h) It is further stated that the cost of material issued by the
department has been deducted by assessing the cost.
Claim No. 13: Claimants claim Rs.97,5000/- being the extra at
35% for the work executed in block 100 & 101 effective from
28.2.94 till actual completion.
a) It is further stated that due to delayed execution of the work
of these two blocks the claimants had to incur extra expenditure
as the stoppage of work was utterly arbitrary.
b) That the detailed break-up of this claim is appended with the
statement of facts.”
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5.
Though the challenge to claims 2, 3 and 4 were given up before the
Division Bench, they are also relevant and read as follows:
“Claim No.2: Claimants claim Rs.1,62,387/- being the
reimbursement of statutory increase in labour under clause 10-C
a) That the claimants submitted the tender on 6.2.92 and said
offer was accepted on 14.5.92. The date of commencement was to
be reckoned from 24.5.92. The date of stipulated completion was
9 months i.e. 23.2.93 but the work could be completed on 28.3.95.
b) It is further stated that the claimants had submitted the bill for
the value to the extent the work was executed till 4.10.94 for a
sum of Rs. l,12,067/- as per the formula applicable.
c) That the respondents however, did not make a single payment
though, the work was executed after submission of the said bill.
d) That however, a consolidated bill was furnished the
respondents for a sum of Rs. l,62,287/-. Even the said payment
has not been liquidated so far.
e) That the claimants advised the statutory increase as and when
enforced and the claimants also submitted the labour reports
indicating the nature of the labour employed at site.
f) That the respondents had also certified on the bill that the
labour payment has been made as per the labour rate.
g) That it is further stated that since it is a statutory increase, the
same is payable by the respondents. Copy of the both the bills
attached. And thus the claimants be awarded a sum of Rs.
1,62,287/- to the claimants.
Claim No.3: Claimants claim Rs.l,49,862/- being the increase in
cost of stone grit on account closure of the quarry by the order of
the Supreme Court.
a) That it is stated that the claimants had submitted the tender on
the basis of the rate prevailing but due to the Hon'ble Court's
directions for closure of the stone quarry resulting in shortage of
stone chips in the market and consequently rates increased.
b) That the claimants informed the quantum of the increase on
22.6.92 and followed by reminders.
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c) That the respondents had agreed in principle to pay the increase
which was prevailing in the market.
d) That the detailed break-up of this claim has been appended
separately.
e) It is further stated that the claimant was not instrumental for
increase in cost but due to the interference of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. And the said increase has been taken into account
till the stipulated completion dated 23.2.93.
f) That the claimant is entitled for recovery of the said increase.
Claim No. 4: Claimants claim Rs.12,922/- payable by virtue of
clause 10-C of the agreement and up to the stipulated period
a)
That there was steep rise in cost of steel and the claimant
was exposed and the respondents were liable to pay the increase
in steel.
b)
That the detailed break-up of this claim has been prepared
and appended.
6.
The Arbitrator by a reasoned award dated 23rd May, 2005 held that the
entire delay of 25 months in the execution of the project was thanks to the
DDA, none of this delay being attributable to the contractor. The learned
Arbitrator found:
“That all the above four claims are inter linked being related to
the overhead expenses and therefore dealt together.
That the date of commencement of work was 24.5.92 and the
period for completion was 9 months and therefore, the disputed
date of completion was 23.2.93 but the work could be actually
completed on 28.3.95.
That there was delay of 25 months in completion of the work
beyond the stipulated date of completion.
That the Claimants urged that there had been various delays in the
execution of work due to the lapses and defaults of the
Respondents from the very commencement of work. The progress
was held up time and again and the claimants therefore, as back as
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17.2.93 advised the Respondents (C-9 page 167) that the
Claimants are not interested to execute the work beyond the
stipulated date of completion and therefore, their contract be
finalized on the stipulated date of completion as the Claimants
shall be exposed to incur heavy expenditure in overheads for
maintaining establishment watch and ward and tools and plants
and other shuttering material but the Respondents did not refute.
The chief reasons for delay are highlighted below:-
I) Delay in supply of structural and architectural drawings.
II) That out of 9 Blocks 2 blocks are abnormally delayed as the
site of the said 21 blocks was made available in piecemeal which
stretched till 26.2.94 whereas the stipulated completion was
23.2.93.
III) Delay in laying the conduit by the electrical agency resulting
in delay in casting of RCC slab and plastering work besides
development work. The said hindrance was removed lastly on
28.3.95.
IV) Abnormal delay in making availability of the alignment
sketch for electrical cables.
V) Inordinate delay in supply of stipulated material such as
cement, steel and pipes.
VI) Delay in decision of finishing· work in kitchen and bath
rooms.
VII) There was inordinate delay in making availability of colour
scheme.
VIII) That the Respondents also abnormally delayed the supply of
door shutters which were to be supplied by the Respondents. The
same were supplied as late as 8.11.94.
IX) Inordinate delay in writing in the electrical conduits resulting
in delay in completion of finishing work.
X) Suspension of work by the Respondents for the period 17.1.94
to 25.2.94 and from 7.8.94 to 22.3.95 because of non-removal of
hindrances.
XI) Delayed payment due to non-sanction of Administrative
Approval and Expenditure Sanction.
That all the delays as set out had been duly recorded 733 to 739
and M.A.S. register pages from 747 to 768 as highlighted by the
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Claimants. The Claimants also relied upon certain documents of
MAS Register supplied by the Respondents.
That the Claimants further stated that the Claimants had also filed
reasons for delay and hold up of the work various defaults of the
Respondents in Annexure pages 740 to 746. The Claimants also
highlighted the correspondence made by the Claimants with
Respondents.
That the Claimants further stated that the said hindrances were
avoidable but the Respondents did not take timely steps.
That the Claimants also referred the contents of the letter dated
10.7.95 (page 885) wherein it was observed that the
Superintending Engineer appreciated the working of the
Claimants and also observed that there was no fault of the
contractor and they have successfully completed the work. The
Claimants further stated that, they had incurred heavy expenditure
on overheads of the lapses and default of the Respondents.
As against this the Respondents stated that there was poor
planning of the claimants and also contended that since the
compensation has been levied under Clause 2 of the agreement
therefore, claim of the claimants deserves to be rejected.
That on record it is conclusively proved that the Respondents
committed breach of contract as they failed to discharge their
obligations in time resulting in prolongations did not deny the
deployment of the tools and plants and machinery at site besides
watch and ward during the prolongation.”
7.
It is important to note that before the Division Bench, the learned
counsel for the DDA conceded that this being a pure finding of fact, he would
not be challenging it before the Division Bench.
8.
Of the total claim of Rs.37.28 lakhs, the learned Arbitrator awarded an
amount of Rs.23.39 lakhs. Further, the learned Arbitrator has laboriously gone
through all the evidence and answered each claim giving reasons for the same.
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9.
By a judgment dated 3rd April, 2006, the learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Delhi dismissed the objections of the DDA and upheld the
award. In an appeal filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, vide the
impugned judgment dated 8th February, 2012, a Division Bench of the High
Court of Delhi set aside the judgment of the Single Judge on claims 9, 10, 11
and 15, and negatived these claims in toto. Further, claims 12 and 13 were
scaled down doing “rough and ready justice”. Resultantly, the awarded amount
of Rs.7,20,000/- was scaled down to Rs. 5,57,137.50/-.
10.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Shri M. L. Verma, learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the
Division Bench has lost sight of the law laid down by this Hon’ble Court when
it comes to challenges made to arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Act. He
has submitted that the Division Bench has acted as if this was a first appeal
from the award and has further submitted that the Division Bench has taken
into account facts which were neither pleaded nor proved before the learned
Arbitrator in order to negative certain claims. He further submitted that it is not
possible for a Bench hearing an objection against an arbitral award to do
“rough and ready justice” – it is bound by the law laid down by this Hon’ble
Court. In particular, he argued that the conceded position is that 25 months
delay was due to the DDA alone. The award read as a whole is just, fair and
reasonable as only certain claims have been granted and every claim granted
has been supported with reasons. The Arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality
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and quantity of evidence before him and he has decided on that evidence. No
errors of law arise from the award and the award has, therefore, been wrongly
set aside.
11.
Mr. Amarendra Sharan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of
the DDA has relied strongly on clause 10C and clause 22 to support the
judgment of the Division bench and has further argued that there has been
duplication so far as certain claims are concerned. He argued that an award in
the teeth of clause 10C and clause 22 would be a jurisdictional error which
would vitiate the award.
12.
In as much as serious objections have been taken to the Division Bench
judgment on the ground that it has ignored the parameters laid down in a series
of judgments by this Court as to the limitations which a Judge hearing
objections to an arbitral award under Section 34 is subject to, we deem it
necessary to state the law on the subject.
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act reads as follows-
“Application for setting aside arbitral award.—(1) Recourse
to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an
application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-
section (2) and sub-section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if—
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that—
(i) a party was under some incapacity; or
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(ii) The arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration,
or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only
that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on
matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision
of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or
(b) the Court finds that—
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of
India.
Explanation.—Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause
(ii), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that
an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the
making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or
corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81.
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on which the party making
that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request
had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that
request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
within the said period of three months it may entertain the
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application within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter.
(4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court
may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party,
adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in
order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the
arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the
opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting
aside the arbitral award.”
This Section in conjunction with Section 5 makes it clear that an arbitration
award that is governed by part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
can be set aside only on grounds mentioned under Section 34 (2) and (3), and
not otherwise. Section 5 reads as follows:
“5. Extent of judicial intervention.—Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters
governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except
where so provided in this Part.”
It is important to note that the 1996 Act was enacted to replace the 1940
Arbitration Act in order to provide for an arbitral procedure which is fair,
efficient and capable of meeting the needs of arbitration; also to provide that
the tribunal gives reasons for an arbitral award; to ensure that the tribunal
remains within the limits of its jurisdiction; and to minimize the supervisory
roles of courts in the arbitral process.
It will be seen that none of the grounds contained in sub-clause 2 (a) deal
with the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitral award. It is only when
we come to the award being in conflict with the public policy of India that the
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merits of an arbitral award are to be looked into under certain specified
circumstances.
In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electronic Co., 1994 Supp
(1) SCC 644, the Supreme Court construed Section 7 (1)(b) (ii) of the Foreign
Award (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961.
“7. Conditions for enforcement of foreign awards.—(1) A
foreign award may not be enforced under this Act—
(b) if the Court dealing with the case is satisfied that—
(ii) the enforcement of the award will be contrary to the public
policy.”
In construing the expression “public policy” in the context of a foreign
award, the Court held that an award contrary to
1. The fundamental policy of Indian law
2. The interest of India
3. Justice or morality,
would be set aside on the ground that it would be contrary to the public policy
of India. It went on further to hold that a contravention of the provisions of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act would be contrary to the public policy of
India in that the statute is enacted for the national economic interest to ensure
that the nation does not lose foreign exchange which is essential for the
economic survival of the nation (see para 75). Equally, disregarding orders
passed by the superior courts in India could also be a contravention of the
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fundamental policy of Indian law, but the recovery of compound interest on
interest, being contrary to statute only, would not contravene any fundamental
policy of Indian law (see paras 85,95).
When it came to construing the expression “the public policy of India”
contained in Section 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, this Court in
ONGC v. Saw Pipes, 2003 (5) SCC 705, held-
“31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase “public policy of India”
used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider
meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy
connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public
interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what
would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public
interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which
is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions
cannot be said to be in public interest. Such
award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the
administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to
narrower meaning given to the term “public policy”
in Renusagar case [1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] it is required to be
held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The
result would be — award could be set aside if it is contrary to:
(a) Fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(b) The interest of India; or
(c) Justice or morality, or
(d) in addition, if it is patently illegal.
Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is
of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public
policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and
unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. Such
award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged
void.
74. In the result, it is held that:
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(A) (1) The court can set aside the arbitral award under Section
34(2) of the Act if the party making the application furnishes
proof that:
(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice
of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings
or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or
it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration.
(2) The court may set aside the award:
(i)(a) if the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties,
(b) failing such agreement, the composition of the Arbitral
Tribunal was not in accordance with Part I of the Act.
(ii) if the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with:
(a) the agreement of the parties, or
(b) failing such agreement, the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with Part I of the Act.
However, exception for setting aside the award on the ground of
composition of Arbitral Tribunal or illegality of arbitral
procedure is that the agreement should not be in conflict with the
provisions of Part I of the Act from which parties cannot
derogate.
(c) If the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is in
contravention of the provisions of the Act or any other substantive
law governing the parties or is against the terms of the contract.
(3) The award could be set aside if it is against the public policy
of India, that is to say, if it is contrary to:
(a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(b) the interest of India; or
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(c) justice or morality; or
(d) if it is patently illegal.
(4) It could be challenged:
(a) as provided under Section 13(5); and
(b) Section 16(6) of the Act.
(B)(1) The impugned award requires to be set aside mainly on the
grounds:
(i) there is specific stipulation in the agreement that the time and
date of delivery of the goods was of the essence of the contract;
(ii) in case of failure to deliver the goods within the period fixed
for such delivery in the schedule, ONGC was entitled to recover
from the contractor liquidated damages as agreed;
(iii) it was also explicitly understood that the agreed liquidated
damages were genuine pre-estimate of damages;
(iv) on the request of the respondent to extend the time-limit for
supply of goods, ONGC informed specifically that time was
extended but stipulated liquidated damages as agreed would be
recovered;
(v) liquidated damages for delay in supply of goods were to be
recovered by paying authorities from the bills for payment of cost
of material supplied by the contractor;
(vi) there is nothing on record to suggest that stipulation for
recovering liquidated damages was by way of penalty or that the
said sum was in any way unreasonable.
(vii) In certain contracts, it is impossible to assess the damages
or prove the same. Such situation is taken care of by Sections 73
and 74 of the Contract Act and in the present case by specific
terms of the contract.”
The judgment in ONGC v. Saw Pipes has been consistently followed
till date.
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In Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC
445, this Court held:
“14. The High Court did not have the benefit of the principles
laid down in Saw Pipes [(2003) 5 SCC 705] , and had
proceeded on the assumption that award cannot be interfered
with even if it was contrary to the terms of the contract. It went
to the extent of holding that contract terms cannot even be
looked into for examining the correctness of the award. This
Court in Saw Pipes [(2003) 5 SCC 705] has made it clear that
it is open to the court to consider whether the award is against
the specific terms of contract and if so, interfere with it on the
ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public
policy of India.”
In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd.,
(2006) 11 SCC 181, this Court held:
“58. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric
Co. [1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] this Court laid down that the
arbitral award can be set aside if it is contrary to (a)
fundamental policy of Indian law; (b) the interests of India; or
(c) justice or morality. A narrower meaning to the expression
“public policy” was given therein by confining judicial review
of the arbitral award only on the aforementioned three grounds.
An apparent shift can, however, be noticed from the decision of
this Court in ONGC Ltd.v. Saw Pipes Ltd. [(2003) 5 SCC 705]
(for short “ONGC”). This Court therein referred to an earlier
decision of this Court in Central Inland Water Transport
Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly [(1986) 3 SCC 156 : 1986
SCC (L&S) 429 : (1986) 1 ATC 103] wherein the applicability
of the expression “public policy” on the touchstone of Section
23 of the Indian Contract Act and Article 14 of the Constitution
of India came to be considered. This Court therein was dealing
with unequal bargaining power of the workmen and the
employer and came to the conclusion that any term of the
agreement which is patently arbitrary and/or otherwise arrived
at because of the unequal bargaining power would not only be
ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India but also hit by
Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. In ONGC [(2003) 5 SCC
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705] this Court, apart from the three grounds stated
in Renusagar [1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] , added another ground
thereto for exercise of the court's jurisdiction in setting aside
the award if it is patently arbitrary.
59. Such patent illegality, however, must go to the root of the
matter. The public policy violation, indisputably, should be so
unfair and unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the
court. Where the arbitrator, however, has gone contrary to or
beyond the expressed law of the contract or granted relief in the
matter not in dispute would come within the purview of Section
34 of the Act. However, we would consider the applicability of
the aforementioned principles while noticing the merits of the
matter.
60. What would constitute public policy is a matter dependent
upon the nature of transaction and nature of statute. For the
said purpose, the pleadings of the parties and the materials
brought on record would be relevant to enable the court to
judge what is in public good or public interest, and what would
otherwise be injurious to the public good at the relevant point,
as contradistinguished from the policy of a particular
Government. (See State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata [(2005)
12 SCC 77].)”
In Centrotrade Minerals & Metals Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd.,
(2006) 11 SCC 245, Sinha, J., held:
“103. Such patent illegality, however, must go to the root of the
matter. The public policy, indisputably, should be unfair and
unreasonable so as to shock the conscience of the court. Where
the arbitrator, however, has gone contrary to or beyond the
expressed law of the contract or granted relief in the matter not
in dispute would come within the purview of Section 34 of the
Act.”
104. What would be a public policy would be a matter which
would again depend upon the nature of transaction and the
nature of statute. For the said purpose, the pleadings of the
parties and the materials brought on record would be relevant
so as to enable the court to judge the concept of what was a
public good or public interest or what would otherwise be
injurious to the public good at the relevant point as
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contradistinguished by the policy of a particular government.
(See State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata [(2005) 12 SCC
77].)”
In DDA v. R.S. Sharma and Co., (2008) 13 SCC 80, the Court
summarized the law thus:
“21. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge:
(a) An award, which is
(i) contrary to substantive provisions of law; or
(ii) the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996; or
(iii) against the terms of the respective contract; or
(iv) patently illegal; or
(v) prejudicial to the rights of the parties;
is open to interference by the court under Section 34(2) of the
Act.
(b) The award could be set aside if it is contrary to:
(a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(b) the interest of India; or
(c) justice or morality.
(c) The award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and
unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court.
(d) It is open to the court to consider whether the award is
against the specific terms of contract and if so, interfere with it
on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the
public policy of India.
With these principles and statutory provisions, particularly,
Section 34(2) of the Act, let us consider whether the arbitrator
as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were justified
in granting the award in respect of Claims 1 to 3 and
Additional Claims 1 to 3 of the claimant or the appellant DDA
has made out a case for setting aside the award in respect of
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those claims with reference to the terms of the agreement duly
executed by both parties.”
J.G. Engineers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 5 SCC 758, held:
“27. Interpreting the said provisions, this Court in ONGC
Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd.[(2003) 5 SCC 705] held that a court can
set aside an award under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act, as
being in conflict with the public policy of India, if it is (a)
contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b)
contrary to the interests of India; or (c) contrary to justice or
morality; or (d) patently illegal. This Court explained that to
hold an award to be opposed to public policy, the patent
illegality should go to the very root of the matter and not a
trivial illegality. It is also observed that an award could be set
aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the
conscience of the court, as then it would be opposed to public
policy.”
Union of India v. Col. L.S.N. Murthy, (2012) 1 SCC 718, held:
“22. In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. [(2003) 5 SCC 705] this
Court after examining the grounds on which an award of the
arbitrator can be set aside under Section 34 of the Act has said:
(SCC p. 727, para 31)
“31. ... However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently
in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in
public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to
adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our
view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term ‘public
policy’
in Renusagar
case [Renusagar
Power
Co.
Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] it is
required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is
patently illegal”.
Fundamental Policy of Indian Law
Coming to each of the heads contained in the Saw Pipes judgment, we
will first deal with the head “fundamental policy of Indian Law”. It has already
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been seen from the Renusagar judgment that violation of the Foreign Exchange
Act and disregarding orders of superior courts in India would be regarded as
being contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law. To this it could be
added that the binding effect of the judgment of a superior court being
disregarded would be equally violative of the fundamental policy of Indian
law.
In a recent judgment, ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd.,
2014 (9) SCC 263, this Court added three other distinct and fundamental
juristic principles which must be understood as a part and parcel of the
fundamental policy of Indian law. The Court held-
“35. What then would constitute the “fundamental policy of
Indian law” is the question. The decision in ONGC [ONGC
Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705] does not elaborate that
aspect. Even so, the expression must, in our opinion, include all
such fundamental principles as providing a basis for
administration of justice and enforcement of law in this country.
Without meaning to exhaustively enumerate the purport of the
expression “fundamental policy of Indian law”, we may refer to
three distinct and fundamental juristic principles that must
necessarily be understood as a part and parcel of the fundamental
policy of Indian law. The first and foremost is the principle that in
every determination whether by a court or other authority that
affects the rights of a citizen or leads to any civil consequences,
the court or authority concerned is bound to adopt what is in
legal parlance called a “judicial approach” in the matter. The
duty to adopt a judicial approach arises from the very nature of
the power exercised by the court or the authority does not have to
be separately or additionally enjoined upon the fora concerned.
What must be remembered is that the importance of a judicial
approach in judicial and quasi-judicial determination lies in the
fact that so long as the court, tribunal or the authority exercising
powers that affect the rights or obligations of the parties before
them shows fidelity to judicial approach, they cannot act in an
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arbitrary, capricious or whimsical manner. Judicial approach
ensures that the authority acts bona fide and deals with the
subject in a fair, reasonable and objective manner and that its
decision is not actuated by any extraneous consideration. Judicial
approach in that sense acts as a check against flaws and faults
that can render the decision of a court, tribunal or authority
vulnerable to challenge.
38. Equally important and indeed fundamental to the policy of
Indian law is the principle that a court and so also a quasi-
judicial authority must, while determining the rights and
obligations of parties before it, do so in accordance with the
principles of natural justice. Besides the celebrated audi alteram
partem rule one of the facets of the principles of natural justice is
that the court/authority deciding the matter must apply its mind to
the attendant facts and circumstances while taking a view one
way or the other. Non-application of mind is a defect that is fatal
to any adjudication. Application of mind is best demonstrated by
disclosure of the mind and disclosure of mind is best done by
recording reasons in support of the decision which the court or
authority is taking. The requirement that an adjudicatory
authority must apply its mind is, in that view, so deeply embedded
in our jurisprudence that it can be described as a fundamental
policy of Indian law.
39. No less important is the principle now recognised as a
salutary juristic fundamental in administrative law that a decision
which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person
would have arrived at the same will not be sustained in a court of
law. Perversity or irrationality of decisions is tested on the
touchstone of Wednesbury principle [Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223:
(1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] of reasonableness. Decisions that fall
short of the standards of reasonableness are open to challenge in
a court of law often in writ jurisdiction of the superior courts but
no less in statutory processes wherever the same are available.
40. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to attempt an
exhaustive enumeration of what would constitute the fundamental
policy of Indian law nor is it possible to place the expression in
the straitjacket of a definition. What is important in the context of
the case at hand is that if on facts proved before them the
arbitrators fail to draw an inference which ought to have been
drawn or if they have drawn an inference which is on the face of
it, untenable resulting in miscarriage of justice, the adjudication
even when made by an Arbitral Tribunal that enjoys considerable
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latitude and play at the joints in making awards will be open to
challenge and may be cast away or modified depending upon
whether the offending part is or is not severable from the rest.”
It is clear that the juristic principle of a “judicial approach” demands that
a decision be fair, reasonable and objective. On the obverse side, anything
arbitrary and whimsical would obviously not be a determination which would
either be fair, reasonable or objective.
The Audi Alteram Partem principle which undoubtedly is a fundamental
juristic principle in Indian law is also contained in Sections 18 and 34 (2) (a)
(iii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. These Sections read as follows:
“18. Equal treatment of parties.— The parties shall be treated
with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to
present his case.
34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if
—
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that—
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; ”
The third juristic principle is that a decision which is perverse or so
irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same is
important and requires some degree of explanation. It is settled law that where-
1. a finding is based on no evidence, or
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2. an arbitral tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to the
decision which it arrives at; or
3. ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision,
such decision would necessarily be perverse. A good working test of perversity
is contained in two judgments. In H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-
cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312 at p.
317, it was held:
“7. ...................It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is
arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking
into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so
outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality
incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is
rendered infirm in law.”
In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 at
para 10, it was held:
“10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between
the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a
decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is
thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon
it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on
record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon,
howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be
treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered
with.”
It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the “public
policy” test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and
consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the
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Page 24
arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate
master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he
delivers his arbitral award. Thus an award based on little evidence or on
evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would
not be held to be invalid on this score 1. Once it is found that the arbitrators
approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the last word on facts. In P.R.
Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd.,
(2012) 1 SCC 594, this Court held:
“21. A court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral
Tribunal by reassessing or reappreciating the evidence. An award
can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section
34(2) of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal has examined the facts and
held that both the second respondent and the appellant are liable.
The case as put forward by the first respondent has been
accepted. Even the minority view was that the second respondent
was liable as claimed by the first respondent, but the appellant
was not liable only on the ground that the arbitrators appointed
by the Stock Exchange under Bye-law 248, in a claim against a
non-member, had no jurisdiction to decide a claim against
another member. The finding of the majority is that the appellant
did the transaction in the name of the second respondent and is
therefore, liable along with the second respondent. Therefore, in
the absence of any ground under Section 34(2) of the Act, it is not
possible to re-examine the facts to find out whether a different
decision can be arrived at.”
It is with this very important caveat that the two fundamental principles
which form part of the fundamental policy of Indian law (that the arbitrator
1
Very often an arbitrator is a lay person not necessarily trained in law. Lord Mansfield, a famous
English Judge, once advised a high military officer in Jamaica who needed to act as a Judge as follows:
“General, you have a sound head, and a good heart; take courage and you will do very
well, in your occupation, in a court of equity. My advice is, to make your decrees as your head and
your heart dictate, to hear both sides patiently, to decide with firmness in the best manner you can;
but be careful not to assign your reasons, since your determination may be substantially right,
although your reasons may be very bad, or essentially wrong”.
It is very important to bear this in mind when awards of lay arbitrators are challenged.
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Page 25
must have a judicial approach and that he must not act perversely) are to be
understood.
Interest of India
The next ground on which an award may be set aside is that it is contrary
to the interest of India. Obviously, this concerns itself with India as a member
of the world community in its relations with foreign powers. As at present
advised, we need not dilate on this aspect as this ground may need to evolve on
a case by case basis.
Justice
The third ground of public policy is, if an award is against justice or
morality. These are two different concepts in law. An award can be said to be
against justice only when it shocks the conscience of the court. An illustration
of this can be given. A claimant is content with restricting his claim, let us say
to Rs. 30 lakhs in a statement of claim before the arbitrator and at no point
does he seek to claim anything more. The arbitral award ultimately awards him
45 lakhs without any acceptable reason or justification. Obviously, this would
shock the conscience of the court and the arbitral award would be liable to be
set aside on the ground that it is contrary to “justice”.
Morality
The other ground is of “morality”. Just as the expression “public policy”
also occurs in Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, so does the expression
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Page 26
“morality”. Two illustrations to the said section are interesting for they explain
to us the scope of the expression “morality”.
“(j) A, who is B's Mukhtar, promises to exercise his influence, as
such, with B in favour of C, and C promises to pay 1,000 rupees
to A. The agreement is void, because it is immoral.
(k) A agrees to let her daughter to hire to B for concubinage. The
agreement is void, because it is immoral, though the letting may
not be punishable under the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860).”
In Gherulal Parekh v. Mahadeo Dass Maiya, 1959 Supp (2) SCR 406,
this Court explained the concept of “morality” thus-
“Re. Point 3 - Immorality: The argument under this head is rather
broadly stated by the learned Counsel for the appellant. The
learned counsel attempts to draw an analogy from the Hindu Law
relating to the doctrine of pious obligation of sons to discharge
their father's debts and contends that what the Hindu Law
considers to be immoral in that context may appropriately be
applied to a case under s. 23 of the Contract Act. Neither any
authority is cited nor any legal basis is suggested for importing
the doctrine of Hindu Law into the domain of contracts.
Section 23 of the Contract Act is inspired by the common law of
England and it would be more useful to refer to the English Law
than to the Hindu Law texts dealing with a different matter. Anson
in his Law of Contracts states at p. 222 thus:
"The only aspect of immorality with which Courts of Law
have dealt is sexual immorality........... ."
Halsbury in his Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 8, makes a
similar statement, at p. 138 :
"A contract which is made upon an immoral consideration
or for an immoral purpose is unenforceable, and there is no
distinction in this respect between immoral and illegal contracts.
The immorality here alluded to is sexual immorality."
In the Law of Contract by Cheshire and Fifoot, 3rd Edn., it
is stated at p. 279:
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Page 27
"Although Lord Mansfield laid it down that a contract
contra bonos mores is illegal, the law in this connection gives no
extended meaning to morality, but concerns itself only with what
is sexually reprehensible."
In the book on the Indian Contract Act by Pollock and
Mulla it is stated at p. 157:
"The epithet "immoral" points, in legal usage, to conduct or
purposes which the State, though disapproving them, is unable, or
not advised, to visit with direct punishment."
The learned authors confined its operation to acts which
are considered to be immoral according to the standards of
immorality approved by Courts. The case law both in England
and India confines the operation of the doctrine to sexual
immorality. To cite only some instances: settlements in
consideration of concubinage, contracts of sale or hire of things
to be used in a brothel or by a prostitute for purposes incidental
to her profession, agreements to pay money for future illicit
cohabitation, promises in regard to marriage for consideration,
or contracts facilitating divorce are all held to be void on the
ground that the object is immoral.
The word "immoral" is a very comprehensive word.
Ordinarily it takes in every aspect of personal conduct deviating
from the standard norms of life. It may also be said that what is
repugnant to good conscience is immoral. Its varying content
depends upon time, place and the stage of civilization of a
particular society. In short, no universal standard can be laid
down and any law based on such fluid concept defeats its own
purpose. The provisions of S. 23 of the Contract Act indicate the
legislative intention to give it a restricted meaning. Its
juxtaposition with an equally illusive concept, public policy,
indicates that it is used in a restricted sense; otherwise there
would be overlapping of the two concepts. In its wide sense what
is immoral may be against public policy, for public policy covers
political, social and economic ground of objection. Decided cases
and authoritative text-book writers, therefore, confined it, with
every justification, only to sexual immorality. The other limitation
imposed on the word by the statute, namely, "the court regards it
as immoral", brings out the idea that it is also a branch of the
common law like the doctrine of public policy, and, therefore,
should be confined to the principles recognized and settled by
Courts. Precedents confine the said concept only to sexual
immorality and no case has been brought to our notice where it
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has been applied to any head other than sexual immorality. In the
circumstances, we cannot evolve a new head so as to bring in
wagers within its fold.”
This Court has confined morality to sexual morality so far as section 23
of the Contract Act is concerned, which in the context of an arbitral award
would mean the enforcement of an award say for specific performance of a
contract involving prostitution. “Morality” would, if it is to go beyond sexual
morality necessarily cover such agreements as are not illegal but would not be
enforced given the prevailing mores of the day. However, interference on this
ground would also be only if something shocks the court’s conscience.
Patent Illegality
We now come to the fourth head of public policy namely, patent
illegality. It must be remembered that under the explanation to section 34 (2)
(b), an award is said to be in conflict with the public policy of India if the
making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. This
ground is perhaps the earliest ground on which courts in England set aside
awards under English law. Added to this ground (in 1802) is the ground that an
arbitral award would be set aside if there were an error of law by the arbitrator.
This is explained by Lord Justice Denning in R v. Northumberland
Compensation Appeal Tribunal. Ex Parte Shaw., 1952 1 All ER 122 at page
130:
“Leaving now the statutory tribunals, I turn to the awards of the
arbitrators. The Court of King's Bench never interfered by
certiorari with the award of an arbitrator, because it was a
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private tribunal and not subject to the prerogative writs. If the
award was not made a rule of court, the only course available to
an aggrieved party was to resist an action on the award or to file
a bill in equity. If the award was made a rule of court, a motion
could be made to the court to set it aside for misconduct of the
arbitrator on the ground that it was procured by corruption or
other undue means: see the statute 9 and 10 Will. III, c. 15. At one
time an award could not be upset on the ground of error of law by
the arbitrator because that could not be said to be misconduct or
undue means, but ultimately it was held in Kent v. Elstob, (1802)
3 East 18, that an award could be set aside for error of law on the
face of it. This was regretted by Williams, J., in Hodgkinson v.
Fernie, (1857) 3 C.B.N.S. 189, but is now well established.”
This, in turn, led to the famous principle laid down in Champsey Bhara
Company v. The Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd., AIR
1923 PC 66, where the Privy Council referred to Hodgkinson and then laid
down:
“The law on the subject has never been more clearly stated than
by Williams, J. in the case of Hodgkinson v. Fernie (1857) 3
C.B.N.S. 189.
“The law has for many years been settled, and remains so at this
day, that, where a cause or matters in difference are referred to an
arbitrator a lawyer or a layman, he is constituted the sole and
final judge of all questions both of law and of fact ...... The only
exceptions to that rule are cases where the award is the result of
corruption or fraud, and one other, which though it is to be
regretted, is now, I think firmly established viz., where the
question of law necessarily arises on the face of the award or
upon some paper accompanying and forming part of the award.
Though the propriety of this latter may very well be doubted, I
think it may be considered as established.”
“Now the regret expressed by Williams, J. in Hodgkinson v.
Fernie has been repeated by more than one learned Judge, and it
is certainly not to be desired that the exception should be in any
way extended. An error in law on the face of the award means, in
their Lordships’ view, that you can find in the award or a
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document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note
appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment,
some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which
you can then say is erroneous. It does not mean that if in a
narrative a reference is made to a contention of one party that
opens the door to seeing first what that contention is, and then
going to the contract on which the parties’ rights depend to see if
that contention is sound. Here it is impossible to say, from what is
shown on the face of the award, what mistake the arbitrators
made. The only way that the learned judges have arrived at
finding what the mistake was is by saying: “Inasmuch as the
Arbitrators awarded so and so, and inasmuch as the letter shows
that then buyer rejected the cotton, the arbitrators can only have
arrived at that result by totally misinterpreting Cl.52.” But they
were entitled to give their own interpretation to Cl. 52 or any
other article, and the award will stand unless, on the face of it
they have tied themselves down to some special legal proposition
which then, when examined, appears to be unsound. Upon this
point, therefore, their Lordships think that the judgment of Pratt, J
was right and the conclusion of the learned Judges of the Court of
Appeal erroneous.”
This judgment has been consistently followed in India to test awards
under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
In the 1996 Act, this principle is substituted by the ‘patent illegality’
principle which, in turn, contains three sub heads -
(a) a contravention of the substantive law of India would result in the death
knell of an arbitral award. This must be understood in the sense that such
illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature.
This again is a really a contravention of Section 28(1)(a) of the Act, which
reads as under:
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“28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.—(1) Where the
place of arbitration is situated in India,—
(a) in an arbitration other than an international commercial
arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute
submitted to arbitration in accordance with the substantive law
for the time being in force in India;”
(b) a contravention of the Arbitration Act itself would be regarded as a patent
illegality- for example if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award in
contravention of section 31(3) of the Act, such award will be liable to be set
aside.
(c) Equally, the third sub-head of patent illegality is really a contravention of
Section 28 (3) of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under:
“28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.— (3) In all cases,
the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of
the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade
applicable to the transaction.”
This last contravention must be understood with a caveat. An arbitral
tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an
arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not
mean that the award can be set aside on this ground. Construction of the terms
of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator
construes the contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that
no fair minded or reasonable person could do.
In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006)
11 SCC 181, this Court held as under:

“112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or
implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant
factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The
construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of
the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit
of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have
misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into
consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that
correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be
taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a
contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator
to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of
law. (See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC [(2003) 8 SCC
593] and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India [(2004) 5 SCC 325]).
113. Once, thus, it is held that the arbitrator had the jurisdiction,
no further question shall be raised and the court will not exercise
its jurisdiction unless it is found that there exists any bar on the
face of the award.”
In MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 10 SCC
573, the Court held:
“17. If the arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the
contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction. But if he wanders
outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he
commits a jurisdictional error. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in
such cases because the dispute is not something which arises
under or in relation to the contract or dependent on the
construction of the contract or to be determined within the award.
The ambiguity of the award can, in such cases, be resolved by
admitting extrinsic evidence. The rationale of this rule is that the
nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined
outside and independent of what appears in the award. Such a
jurisdictional error needs to be proved by evidence extrinsic to the
award. (See Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram [AIR 1954 SC 689],
Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India [AIR 1955 SC 468],
Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros. [AIR 1959 SC 1362],
Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1960 SC 588],
Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth v. Chintamanrao Balaji [AIR 1965 SC
214] and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric
Co. [(1984) 4 SCC 679 : AIR 1985 SC 1156] ).”
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In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, (2012) 5
SCC 306, the Court held:
“43. In any case, assuming that Clause 9.3 was capable of two
interpretations, the view taken by the arbitrator was clearly a
possible if not a plausible one. It is not possible to say that the
arbitrator had travelled outside his jurisdiction, or that the view
taken by him was against the terms of contract. That being the
position, the High Court had no reason to interfere with the
award and substitute its view in place of the interpretation
accepted by the arbitrator.
44. The legal position in this behalf has been summarised in para
18 of the judgment of this Court in SAIL v. Gupta Brother Steel
Tubes Ltd. [(2009) 10 SCC 63: (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 16] and which
has been referred to above. Similar view has been taken later
in Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd. [(2010) 11 SCC
296: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 459] to which one of us (Gokhale, J.)
was a party. The observations in para 43 thereof are instructive in
this behalf.
45. This para 43 reads as follows: (Sumitomo case [(2010) 11
SCC 296 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 459] , SCC p. 313)
“43. ... The umpire has considered the fact situation and
placed a construction on the clauses of the agreement
which according to him was the correct one. One may at
the highest say that one would have preferred another
construction of Clause 17.3 but that cannot make the
award in any way perverse. Nor can one substitute one's
own view in such a situation, in place of the one taken
by the umpire, which would amount to sitting in appeal.
As held by this Court in Kwality Mfg. Corpn. v. Central
Warehousing Corpn. [(2009) 5 SCC 142 : (2009) 2 SCC
(Civ) 406] the Court while considering challenge to
arbitral award does not sit in appeal over the findings
and decision of the arbitrator, which is what the High
Court has practically done in this matter. The umpire is
legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to
be the correct one after considering the material before
him and after interpreting the provisions of the
34
Page 34
agreement. If he does so, the decision of the umpire has
to be accepted as final and binding.”
13.
Applying the tests laid down by this Court, we have to examine whether
the Division Bench has exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the arbitral
award impugned before it.
14.
A large part of the judgment is an extract from the arbitral award. It is
important to note that the Division Bench held:
“9. A perusal of the award would reveal, from the portions
extracted herein above, that with reference to evidence led before
him the learned Arbitrator has held delay attributable to DDA, a
finding of fact which is based on evidence and rightly conceded to
by Sh. Bhupesh Narula, Advocate who appears for DDA as being
beyond judicial review power of this Court pertaining to a
reasoned award. But, while awarding Rs.8,27,960/- the reasoning
adopted by the learned Arbitrator is questioned as being the result
of ignoring the well-recognized legal principles on the subject,
Learned counsel argued that the reasoning is the ipse dixit of the
learned Arbitrator.”
15.
The Division Bench while considering claims 9, 10, 11 and 15 found
fault with the application of Hudson’s formula which was set out by the
learned Arbitrator in order to arrive at the claim made under these heads. The
Division Bench said that it was not possible for an Arbitrator to mechanically
apply a certain formula however well understood in the trade. This itself is
going outside the jurisdiction to set aside an award under Section 34 in as
much as in McDermott’s case (supra), it was held:
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Page 35
“104. It is not in dispute that MII had examined one Mr D.J.
Parson to prove the said claim. The said witness calculated the
increased overheads and loss of profit on the basis of the formula
laid down in a manual published by the Mechanical Contractors
Association of America entitled “Change Orders, Overtime,
Productivity” commonly known as the Emden Formula. The said
formula is said to be widely accepted in construction contracts for
computing increased overheads and loss of profit. Mr D.J. Parson
is said to have brought out the additional project management
cost at US$ 1,109,500. We may at this juncture notice the different
formulas applicable in this behalf.
(a) Hudson Formula: In Hudson's Building and Engineering
Contracts, Hudson Formula is stated in the following terms:
“Contract head
office overhead
and
profit
percentage
×
Contract
sum
×
Contract
period
Period
of
delay”
In the Hudson Formula, the head office overhead percentage is
taken from the contract. Although the Hudson Formula has
received judicial support in many cases, it has been criticised
principally because it adopts the head office overhead percentage
from the contract as the factor for calculating the costs, and this
may bear little or no relation to the actual head office costs of the
contractor.
(b) Emden Formula: In Emden's Building Contracts and Practice,
the Emden Formula is stated in the following terms:
“Head office
overhead and
profit
100
×
Contract
sum
×
Period
of
delay”
Contract
period
Using the Emden Formula, the head office overhead percentage is
arrived at by dividing the total overhead cost and profit of the
contractor's organisation as a whole by the total turnover. This
formula has the advantage of using the contractor's actual head
office overhead and profit percentage rather than those contained
in the contract. This formula has been widely applied and has
received judicial support in a number of cases including Norwest
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Page 36
Holst Construction Ltd. v. Coop. Wholesale Society Ltd. [Decided
on 17-2-1998, [1998] EWHC Technology 339], Beechwood
Development Co. (Scotland) Ltd. v. Mitchell [ Decided on 21-2-
2001, (2001) CILL 1727] and Harvey Shopfitters Ltd. v. Adi Ltd. [
Decided on 6-3-2003, (2004) 2 All ER 982 : [2003] EWCA Civ
1757].
(c) Eichleay Formula: The Eichleay Formula was evolved in
America and derives its name from a case heard by the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, Eichleay Corporation. It is
applied in the following manner:
Step 1
Contract
billings
×
Total
overhead
for
contract
period
=
Overhead
allocable
to
the
contract
Total
billings for
contract
period
Step 2
Allocable overhead
=
Daily overhead rate
Total days of contract
Step 3
Daily
contract
overhead
rate
×
Number
of days
of delay
=
Amount of
unabsorbed
overhead”
This formula is used where it is not possible to prove loss of
opportunity and the claim is based on actual cost. It can be seen
from the formula that the total head office overhead during the
contract period is first determined by comparing the value of
work carried out in the contract period for the project with the
value of work carried out by the contractor as a whole for the
contract period. A share of head office overheads for the
contractor is allocated in the same ratio and expressed as a lump
sum to the particular contract. The amount of head office
overhead allocated to the particular contract is then expressed as
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Page 37
a weekly amount by dividing it by the contract period. The period
of delay is then multiplied by the weekly amount to give the total
sum claimed. The Eichleay Formula is regarded by the Federal
Circuit Courts of America as the exclusive means for
compensating a contractor for overhead expenses.
105. Before us several American decisions have been referred to
by Mr. Dipankar Gupta in aid of his submission that the Emden
Formula has since been widely accepted by the American courts
being Nicon Inc. v. United States [ Decided on 10-6-2003 (USCA
Fed Cir), 331 F. 3d 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003)], Gladwynne
Construction
Co. v. Mayor
and
City
Council
of
Baltimore [Decided on 25-9-2002, 807 A. 2d 1141 (2002) : 147
Md. App. 149] and Charles G. William Construction
Inc. v. White [271 F 3d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2001)].
106. We do not intend to delve deep into the matter as it is an
accepted position that different formulae can be applied in
different circumstances and the question as to whether damages
should be computed by taking recourse to one or the other
formula, having regard to the facts and circumstances of a
particular case, would eminently fall within the domain of the
arbitrator.”
16.
Obviously, the Division Bench has exceeded its jurisdiction in
interfering with a possible view of the Arbitrator on facts.
17.
The Division Bench then went on to hold:
“17. There is admittedly no evidence that the contractor i.e. the
respondent had a central establishment. It appears to be a case
where the contractor is petty contractor and the only expenses
incurred are at the site. The claim is towards hire charges paid
for centering and shuttering, hiring tools, plants and scaffoldings
i.e. the claim is not for the contractor’s own equipment lying idle.
There is just no evidence that the contractor paid charges as
claimed by him. Not a single bill raised by the alleged person who
let on hire the equipment to the contractor has been filed nor any
evidence adduced for the payment made. Except for listing a 10
HP Water Pump, 4 number 1 HP water pump, 3 mixers, 250
scaffolding bamboos, 150 ballis and 2 vibrators in Annexure-J to
the Statement of Claim, no document proving hiring the same and
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Page 38
brought at the site has been led. We highlight that the claim is on
account of hire Charges paid and there is no evidence of said
payment. It does happen that where a work is stopped, the person
who taken an equipment on hire returns the same and re-hires the
same when work recommences. Thus, Claim No. 9, 10 and 11
cannot be allowed because there is no evidence to support the
claims. Damages on account of establishment expenses incurred
during period contract got prolonged have certainly to be
recompensed, but we find no evidence in the form of books of
accounts, vouchers etc. to show payments to the staff or expenses
incurred in maintaining an establishment at site in the form of a
site office. The wages register, photocopy whereof was filed before
the Arbitrator, pertains to wages paid to the unskilled, semi-
skilled and skilled labour deployed to execute the works. The
pleadings pertaining to the claim would show that as per the
contractor he had deployed one Executive Officer, one Graduate
Engineer, one Junior Engineer, one Accountant, one Storekeeper
and Supervisor and one Mechanic at the site and had also
deployed watch and ward. Details of the persons employed have
been listed in Annexure-N to the Statement of Claim and the
documents filed to establish the same would evidence that the
contractor has filed photocopies of the salary register, which are
available from pages No.1255 to 1322, but unfortunately for the
contractor, the cat is out of the bag when we look at the
documents. They pertain to payments made for a site at Mayur
Vihar. We highlight that the contract in question pertains to flats
and houses at Trilokpuri and not Mayur Vihar. It is apparent that
the contractor has tried to pull the wool on the eyes of the
primary adjudicator of the claim. It is not the case of the
contractor that these persons were simultaneously supervising the
work at two sites. Assuming this was the case, the matter would
then have been adjudicated with reference to same number of
persons supervising two sites and the time spent at each site by
them.
18. Thus, the award pertaining to Claim Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 15 is
liable to be sent aside and it is so set aside. We need not therefore
take corrective action on the apparent error i.e. the learned
Arbitrator has worked out the claim on the original contract value
of Rs. 87,66,678/-, of course by reducing it by 15%, but ignoring
that final work executed was only in sum of Rs.62,84,845/-.”
39
Page 39
18.
Mr. Verma argued correctly that there is nothing on record to show that
the contractor is a petty contractor and that the only expenses incurred are at
the site. He has shown us that the contract itself required execution of the
work by a Class-I contractor and has further shown us that Class-I contractors
require to have certain stipulated numbers of works worth large amounts before
they can apply for the tender and that their financial soundness has to be
attested too by banker’s certificate showing that their worth is over 10 crores of
rupees.
Further, he has pointed out from the statement of claims before the
Arbitrator that there was evidence for claims 9, 10 and 11 laid before the
Arbitrator which the Arbitrator has in fact accepted.
Also establishment
expenses were set out in great detail before the Arbitrator and it is only on this
evidence that the Arbitrator ultimately has awarded these claims. Mr. Verma is
also right in saying that the Division Bench was completely wrong in stating
that the establishment expenses pertained to payments for a site at Mayur Vihar
as opposed to Trilok Puri which were where the aforesaid houses were to be
constructed. He pointed out that in the completion certificate dated 30 th May,
1997 given by the DDA to the appellant, it is clear that the houses that were, in
fact, to be constructed were in Mayur Vihar, Phase-II, which is part of the
Trilok Puri trans-Yamuna area.
It is most unfortunate that the Division Bench did not advert to this
crucial document at all. This document shows not only that the Division
Bench was wholly incorrect in its conclusion that the contractor has tried to
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Page 40
pull the wool over the eyes over the DDA but it should also have realized that
the DDA itself has stated that the work has been carried out generally to its
satisfaction barring some extremely minor defects which are capable of
rectification. It is clear, therefore, that the Division Bench obviously exceeded
its jurisdiction in interfering with a pure finding of fact forgetting that the
Arbitrator is the sole Judge of the quantity and quality of evidence before him
and unnecessarily bringing in facts which were neither pleaded nor proved and
ignoring the vital completion certificate granted by the DDA itself. The
Division Bench also went wrong in stating that as the work completed was
only to the extent of Rs. 62,84,845/-, Hudson’s formula should have been
applied taking this figure into account and not the entire contract value of
Rs.87,66,678/- into account.
19.
Here again, the Division Bench has committed a grave error. Hudson’s
formula as is quoted in McDermott’s case is as follows:
“(a) Hudson Formula: In Hudson's Building and Engineering
Contracts, Hudson Formula is stated in the following terms:
“Contract head
office overhead
and
profit
percentage
×
Contract
sum
Contract
period
×
Period
of
delay”
In the Hudson Formula, the head office overhead percentage is
taken from the contract. Although the Hudson Formula has
received judicial support in many cases, it has been criticised
principally because it adopts the head office overhead percentage
from the contract as the factor for calculating the costs, and this
may bear little or no relation to the actual head office costs of the
contractor.”
41
Page 41
20.
It is clear that to apply this formula one has to take into account the
contract value that is awarded and not the work completed. On this score
again, the Division Bench is to be faulted.
21.
In dealing with claims 12 and 13, the Division Bench stated:
“19. Pertaining to Claim No.12 and 13, the learned Arbitrator
has recompensed the contractor 20% price hike in the cost of
material and labour noting, that there was a steep hike in the
period in question when the contract got prolonged by 25 months.
We highlight that though the Arbitrator has found the delay to be
25 months, recompense has been restricted to only 20 months.
20. As noted herein above, partial recompense under Clause 10C,
has been granted to the contractor, but the same i.e. the Clause in
question requiring applicability during contract stipulated period,
it is apparent that the contractor would be entitled to full
recompense for price hike during the extended 25 months period
and not the 20 months to which the learned Arbitrator has
restricted the recompense to.
21. But, for the benefit granted under Clause 10C wherein Rs.
1,62,387/-, Rs.46,184/- and Rs.12,922/- have been awarded
under Claim Nos. 2, 3 and 4, said amounts have to be adjusted,
but not in full, for the reason these include the amounts payable
during the contract stipulated period.
22. The total of the three sums comes to Rs, 2, 21,493/-. We have
another problem. Neither counsel could help us identify the
components thereof i.e. the component relatable to the 9 months
during which the work had to be completed and the 25 months
during which the contract got prolonged. Thus, we apply the Rule
of ‘Rough and Ready Justice’. We divide the sum by 34 to work
out the proportionate increase per month. Rs. 2,21,493/- divided
by 34 = Rs.6,514.50 and multiplying the same by 25, the figure
comes to Rs.1,62,862.50.
23. Adopting, for the reasons given by the Arbitrator, that 20%
hike in the balance work done after the contract stipulated period
i.e. benefit to be granted under this head for work done in sum of
Rs.37,02,066/- and accepting the sum of Rs.7,20,000/- being the
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Page 42
resultant figure, subtracting Rs.1,62,862.50, the figure arrived at
is Rs.5,57,137.50.”
22.
Here again, the Division Bench has interfered wrongly with the arbitral
award on several counts. It had no business to enter into a pure question of
fact to set aside the Arbitrator for having applied a formula of 20 months
instead of 25 months. Though this would inure in favour of the appellant, it is
clear that the appellant did not file any cross objection on this score. Also, it is
extremely curious that the Division Bench found that an adjustment would
have to be made with claims awarded under claims 2, 3 and 4 which are
entirely separate and independent claims and have nothing to do with claims 12
and 13. The formula then applied by the Division Bench was that it would
itself do “rough and ready justice”. We are at a complete loss to understand
how this can be done by any court under the jurisdiction exercised under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. As has been held above, the expression
“justice” when it comes to setting aside an award under the public policy
ground can only mean that an award shocks the conscience of the court. It
cannot possibly include what the court thinks is unjust on the facts of a case for
which it then seeks to substitute its view for the Arbitrator’s view and does
what it considers to be “justice”. With great respect to the Division Bench, the
whole approach to setting aside arbitral awards is incorrect. The Division
Bench has lost sight of the fact that it is not a first appellate court and cannot
interfere with errors of fact.
43
Page 43
23.
We come now to the arguments of Mr. Sharan in support of the Division
Bench judgment. The learned counsel strongly relied on clause 10C and clause
22. These two clauses are set out as below:
Clause 10C of the agreement reads as follows:
“If during the progress of the works, the price of any material
incorporated in the works, (not being a material supplied from the
Engineer-in-Charge's stores in accordance with Clause 10 hereof
and/or wages of labour increases as direct result of the coming
into force of any fresh law, or statutory rule or order (but not due
to any changes in sales tax) and such increase exceed ten per cent
of the price and/or wages prevailing at the time of receipt of the
tender for the work, and contractor thereupon necessarily and
properly pays in respect of the material (incorporated in the
work) such increased price and/or in respect of labour engaged
on the execution of the work such increased wages, then the
amount of the contract shall accordingly be varied provided
always that any increase so payable is not, in the opinion of the
Superintending Engineer (whose decision shall be final and
binding) attributable to delay in execution of the contract within
the control of the contractor. Provided, however, no
reimbursements shall be made if the increase is not more than
10% of the said prices/wages and if so the reimbursements shall
be made only on the excess over 10% and provided further that
any such increase shall not be payable if such increase has
become operative after the contract or extended date of
completion of the work in question.
If during the progress of the works, the price of any material
incorporated in the works (not being a material supplied from the
Engineer-in-Charge's stores in accordance with Clause 10 hereof)
and/or wages of labour is decreased as a direct result of the
coming into force of any fresh law or statutory rule or order (but
not due to any changes in sales tax) and such decrease exceeds
ten per cent of the prices and/or wages prevailing at the time of
receipt of the tender for the work, Delhi Development Authority
shall in respect of materials incorporated in the work (not being
materials supplied from the Engineer-in-Charge's stores in
accordance with Clause 10 hereof) and/or labour engaged on the
execution of the work after the date of coming into force of such
law, statutory rule or order be entitled to deduct from the dues of
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Page 44
the contractor such amount as shall be equivalent of difference
between the prices of materials and/ or wages as they prevailed at
the time of receipt of tender for the work minus ten per cent
thereof and the prices of materials and/ or wages of labour on the
coming into force of such law, statutory rule or order.
The contractor shall for the purpose of this condition keep such
books of account and other documents as are necessary to show
the amount of any increase claimed or reduction available and
shall allow inspection of the same by a duly authorised
representative of Delhi Development Authority and further shall,
at the request of the Engineer-in-Charge furnish, verified in such
a manner as the Engineer-in-Charge may require. Any document,
so kept and such other information as the Engineer-in-Charge
may require.
The contractor shall, within a reasonable time of his becoming
aware of any alteration in the prices of any such materials and/ or
wages of labour give notice thereof to the Engineer-in- Charge
stating that the same is given in pursuance to the condition
together with all information relating thereto which he may be in
a position to supply.”
Clause 22 reads as follows:
“All sums payable by way of compensations under any of these
conditions shall be, considered as reasonable compensation to be
applied to this use of Delhi Development Authority without
reference to the actual loss or damage sustained, and whether or
not any damage shall have been sustained.
Specifications and Conditions:
1. The contractor must get acquainted with the proposed site for
the works and study specifications and conditions carefully before
tendering. The work shall be executed as per programme
approved by the Engineer-in-Charge. If part of site is not
available for any reasons or there is some unavoidable delay in
supply of materials stipulated by the Departments, the programme
of construction shall be modified accordingly and the contractor
shall have no claim for any extras or compensation on this
account.”
45
Page 45
24.
Clause 10C concerns itself with the price of material incorporated in the
works or wage or labour increases. It has been seen that claims 9, 10 and 11
have nothing to do with either of the aforesaid subjects. In seeking to apply
this clause to claim 15, the simple answer is that this clause will not apply
when a claim for damages is made. Further, the Arbitrator considered this
clause in detail and only awarded amounts under this clause in excess of 10
percent as required by the clause when it came to awarding amounts under
claims 2, 3 and 4, which fell within the ambit of clause 10C. The DDA in the
appeal before the Division Bench correctly gave up any challenge to these
claims as has been recorded in paragraph 4 of the order under appeal.
25.
The Arbitrator has dealt with this clause in detail and has construed and
applied the same correctly while dealing with claims 2, 3 and 4 and has
obviously not applied the said clause to claims 9, 10, 11 and 15 as no occasion
for applying the same arose. The award cannot be faulted on this ground.
26.
Also, so far as clause 22 is concerned, the DDA did not raise any
argument based on this clause before the learned Arbitrator. However, it must
in fairness be stated that it was argued before the learned Single Judge. In para
15 of his judgment, the learned Judge sets the clause out and then follows a
judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Kochhar Construction Works v.
DDA & Anr., (1998) 2 Arb. LR 209. Apart from the fact that a learned Single
Judge of the same court is bound by a previous judgment of a Single Judge, the
conclusion of the learned Single Judge that if the appellant is at fault and the
46
Page 46
contract is prolonged for an inordinate period of time, it cannot be said that the
respondents cannot be compensated for the same is correct. Besides, this point
was not urged before the Division Bench and must be taken to be given up.
Mr. Sharan cited Harsha Constructions v. Union of India & Ors., (2014) 9
SCC 246 to say that in respect of excepted matters, no arbitration is possible,
and that this being a jurisdictional point, he should be allowed to raise it before
us. Unfortunately for Mr. Sharan, the clause does not operate automatically. It
only operates if an objection is taken stating that part of the site is not available
for any reason. Nowhere has the DDA stated which part of the site is not
available for any reason.
Further, the learned Single Judge’s reason for
rejecting an argument based on this clause also commends itself to us as the
object of this clause is that no claim for extras should be granted only if there is
an unavoidable delay. We have seen that the delay was entirely avoidable and
caused solely by the DDA itself.
27.
One more point needs to be noted. An argument was made before the
learned Single Judge that there has been a duplication of claims awarded. The
learned Judge dealt with this argument as follows:
“18. Learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of ground P,
once again makes a reference to the issue that there is
overlapping of the claim. I am unable to accept the submission
made by the learned counsel. The consequence of delay may have
more than one ramifications including the cost of material the
supervision required at the site, the inability of the contractor to
utilise the manpower at some other place, the inability of the
contractor to make, profits from some other contract by utilisation
of the same resources. All these aspects are liable to be
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Page 47
considered. The Arbitrator has considered the claims separately
and has dealt with, claims 9, 10, 11 & 15 together. Claims 12 &
13 have been thereafter dealt with on the same principles since it
was found that it was not the respondent, who was responsible for
the delay for a period of 25 months beyond the stipulated
condition of 9 months.
19. There is thus no question of overlapping in different heads and
the grievance of the petitioner is rejected.”
28.
The Single Judge is clearly right. We have gone through all the 15
claims supplied to us and we find that none of these claims are in fact
overlapping. They are all contained under separate heads. This argument,
therefore, must also fail.
29.
The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment of the Division Bench
is set aside. The judgment of the Single Judge is upheld and consequently, the
Arbitral award dated 23rd May, 2005 is as a whole upheld. There will be no
order as to costs.
..................................................J.
(Ranjan Gogoi)
......................................J.
(R.F. Nariman)
New Delhi,
November 25, 2014

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