As to the second Substantial Question of
Law, I find that grant of temporary or permanent
lease is clearly regulated by the provisions of the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and the Maharashtra
Land Revenue (Disposal of Govt. Lands) Rules, 1971.
These provisions are self-contained code by
themselves. Merely because the Revenue Officer did
not decide the applications filed by the
respondent-plaintiff for grant of temporary or
permanent leases, as the case may be, the
respondent-Plaintiff could not have approached the
Civil Court to ask for a direction, since he could
have easily approached the authorities provided
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue
Code, or the High Court having extraordinary writ
jurisdiction. The jurisdictions of the Civil Court
cannot be widened to enable it to issue directions
to the Govt. to grant temporary or permanent
leases. That is purely a governmental function
governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code and the Rules thereunder. Civil Court
could not have directed that the Collector should
grant temporary leases or permanent leases to the
respondent-plaintiff even on the ground that others
were granted. Therefore, in my opinion, the Civil
Court could not have issued a direction to grant
permanent or temporary leases, which had already
expired by efflux of time and the period of leases
did not exist at the time when the judgment was
delivered by the Civil Court. That being so,
second Substantial Question of Law will have to be
answered in negative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
Second Appeal No. 344 of 1997
With
Second Appeal No. 345 of 1997
With
Second Appeal No. 346 of 1997
[A] Second Appeal No. 344 of 1997
State of Maharashtra, Vs Bhikulal Mahadeo Agrawal,
CORAM : A.B.CHAUDHARI, J.
Date : 13th March, 2014.
Citation;2015(2) ALLMR282
01. The State of Maharashtra had filed these
three Second Appeals against the respective
respondents, who are the heirs of original
plaintiff late Shri Bhikulal Mahadeo Agrawal
being aggrieved by the common Judgment and Decree
dated 2nd May, 1997 passed by learned Second
Additional District Judge, Buldana, in Regular
Civil Appeal Nos. 105, 126 and 127 all of 1990,
arising out the common Judgment and Decree dated
17th August, 1990 passed by learned Second Joint
Civil Judge [Senior Division], Buldana, in Regular
Civil Suit Nos. 134 and 135 both of 1987, so also
the order allowing the Cross-Objection filed by the
Plaintiff in Regular Civil Appeal No. 127 of 1990.
02. In support of the Second Appeals, learned
Asstt. Govt. Pleader for the appellant-State
vehemently argued that the suits filed by the
respondent-original plaintiff in all these cases
were barred in the light of Section 11 of the
Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. The learned
Asstt. Govt. Pleader further contended that the
Civil Court did not have the power to give a
direction to the Govt. to grant fresh leases or
permanent leases of lands after expiry of the
original periods of leases by efflux of time and,
therefore, the suits ought to have been dismissed.
03. Per contra, learned Adv. Mr. Mehadia for
the respondents in all these appeals supported the
impugned Judgments and Decree. He argued that the
subject-matter of the suits does not at all fall
within the parameters of Section 11 of the Bombay
Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, and at any rate,
the said issue about the jurisdiction was not
raised by the Appellant-State. In the alternative,
he argued that the respondent-plaintiff had applied
for renewal of lease of land which was in his
possession and also for grant of permanent lease,
as was done in the cases of other land holders and,
therefore, there was a hostile discrimination by
adopting a different yardstick by the appellant-
State, in which case the Civil Court was also
entitled to make the order directing issuance of
temporary or permanent leases. He, therefore,
contended that at any rate, it was obligatory on
the part of the Collector of the district to decide
the applications which were admittedly pending and
having failed to do so, even now a direction can be
issued to the Collector of the district to decide
those applications in accordance with law.
04. Upon hearing learned counsel for the rival
parties and upon perusal of the impugned Judgments,
so also relevant provisions of law, what this Court
finds is that the issue about jurisdiction can be
raised before this Court if there is a basic lack
of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. That being so,
I proceed to frame the following two Substantial
Questions of Law:-
[a] Whether the jurisdiction of
Civil Court by virtue of
Section 11 of the Bombay
Revenue Jurisdiction
Act, 1876, to entertain
a suit in the facts
of the case in the subject-matter
of grant of temporary/
permanent lease was
barred by law? ... Yes.
[b] Whether the Civil Court
could issue a direction
to the Govt. to grant
fresh leases or
permanent leases to
to the plaintiff,
when admittedly,
the original leases
which were granted
to the plaintiffs,
had already expired? ... No.
05. Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue
Jurisdiction Act, 1876 reads thus:-
11. Except as otherwise expressly
provided in the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code, 1966, no Civil Court
shall entertain any suit against the
Government, on account of any act or
omission of any Revenue Officer unless
the plaintiff first proves that
previously to bringing his suit, he has
presented all such appeals allowed by
the law for the time being in force as,
within the period of limitation allowed
for bringing such suit, it was possible
to present.
06. Upon reading of the above provisions, it is
amply clear that if the act or omission on the part
of a Revenue Officer of the Govt., is alleged in a
civil suit, unless the remedies provided by the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code are exhausted,
jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred. In the
present case, it was the case of the respondentplaintiff
throughout that initially he got lease
for a temporary period and he applied for renewal
thereof or continuation, and not only that he also
applied for grant of permanent lease. It is an
admitted position that the period of lease had
already expired, and the applications made by the
plaintiff before the Collector of the district for
renewal of lease or for grant of permanent lease
remained pending, and were not decided. Thus, the
respondent-plaintiff alleged omission on the part
of Revenue Officer in not deciding his applications
for renewal of lease or grant of leases. Such
matter squarely falls within the ambit of Section
11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act and,
therefore, the Civil Court could not have
entertained the suits. Hence the first Substantial
Question of Law will have to be answered in
affirmative.
07. As to the second Substantial Question of
Law, I find that grant of temporary or permanent
lease is clearly regulated by the provisions of the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and the Maharashtra
Land Revenue (Disposal of Govt. Lands) Rules, 1971.
These provisions are self-contained code by
themselves. Merely because the Revenue Officer did
not decide the applications filed by the
respondent-plaintiff for grant of temporary or
permanent leases, as the case may be, the
respondent-Plaintiff could not have approached the
Civil Court to ask for a direction, since he could
have easily approached the authorities provided
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue
Code, or the High Court having extraordinary writ
jurisdiction. The jurisdictions of the Civil Court
cannot be widened to enable it to issue directions
to the Govt. to grant temporary or permanent
leases. That is purely a governmental function
governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code and the Rules thereunder. Civil Court
could not have directed that the Collector should
grant temporary leases or permanent leases to the
respondent-plaintiff even on the ground that others
were granted. Therefore, in my opinion, the Civil
Court could not have issued a direction to grant
permanent or temporary leases, which had already
expired by efflux of time and the period of leases
did not exist at the time when the judgment was
delivered by the Civil Court. That being so,
second Substantial Question of Law will have to be
answered in negative.
08. The matter should not end here. In my
opinion, since the plaintiff had made applications
to the Collector for renewal of his leases, either
temporarily or permanently, the concerned officer
ought to have decided the said applications or
representations in accordance with law. The heirs
of original plaintiff, who are respondents herein,
are occupying the sites for several years, as
submitted by learned Adv. Mr. Mehadia for the
respondents and, therefore, in my opinion, the
concerned Collector of the district should decide
the applications for grant of temporary or
permanent leases made by the respondent strictly in
accordance with law. If the applications are not
found on record of the Collector, the respondents
may be given liberty to file copies thereof, or
fresh applications. That being so, it is expected
of the Collector of the district to dispose of the
applications of the respondents-plaintiff in
accordance with law. With the above observations,
the following order will have to be passed :-
O R D E R
[a] Second Appeal Nos.344, 345 and 346 all
of 1997 are allowed.
[b] The impugned Judgments and Decree
passed by the Courts below are set
aside.
[c] The direction given by this Court in
foregoing para 8 to decide the
applications made by the respondentplaintiff
shall be followed by the
Collector of the district, as
expeditiously as possible, if
necessary, after hearing the concerned
parties and strictly in accordance with
law, within a period of six months from
the date of receipt of Writ of this
Court.
Print Page
Law, I find that grant of temporary or permanent
lease is clearly regulated by the provisions of the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and the Maharashtra
Land Revenue (Disposal of Govt. Lands) Rules, 1971.
These provisions are self-contained code by
themselves. Merely because the Revenue Officer did
not decide the applications filed by the
respondent-plaintiff for grant of temporary or
permanent leases, as the case may be, the
respondent-Plaintiff could not have approached the
Civil Court to ask for a direction, since he could
have easily approached the authorities provided
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue
Code, or the High Court having extraordinary writ
jurisdiction. The jurisdictions of the Civil Court
cannot be widened to enable it to issue directions
to the Govt. to grant temporary or permanent
leases. That is purely a governmental function
governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code and the Rules thereunder. Civil Court
could not have directed that the Collector should
grant temporary leases or permanent leases to the
respondent-plaintiff even on the ground that others
were granted. Therefore, in my opinion, the Civil
Court could not have issued a direction to grant
permanent or temporary leases, which had already
expired by efflux of time and the period of leases
did not exist at the time when the judgment was
delivered by the Civil Court. That being so,
second Substantial Question of Law will have to be
answered in negative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
Second Appeal No. 344 of 1997
With
Second Appeal No. 345 of 1997
With
Second Appeal No. 346 of 1997
[A] Second Appeal No. 344 of 1997
State of Maharashtra, Vs Bhikulal Mahadeo Agrawal,
CORAM : A.B.CHAUDHARI, J.
Date : 13th March, 2014.
Citation;2015(2) ALLMR282
three Second Appeals against the respective
respondents, who are the heirs of original
plaintiff late Shri Bhikulal Mahadeo Agrawal
being aggrieved by the common Judgment and Decree
dated 2nd May, 1997 passed by learned Second
Additional District Judge, Buldana, in Regular
Civil Appeal Nos. 105, 126 and 127 all of 1990,
arising out the common Judgment and Decree dated
17th August, 1990 passed by learned Second Joint
Civil Judge [Senior Division], Buldana, in Regular
Civil Suit Nos. 134 and 135 both of 1987, so also
the order allowing the Cross-Objection filed by the
Plaintiff in Regular Civil Appeal No. 127 of 1990.
02. In support of the Second Appeals, learned
Asstt. Govt. Pleader for the appellant-State
vehemently argued that the suits filed by the
respondent-original plaintiff in all these cases
were barred in the light of Section 11 of the
Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. The learned
Asstt. Govt. Pleader further contended that the
Civil Court did not have the power to give a
direction to the Govt. to grant fresh leases or
permanent leases of lands after expiry of the
original periods of leases by efflux of time and,
therefore, the suits ought to have been dismissed.
03. Per contra, learned Adv. Mr. Mehadia for
the respondents in all these appeals supported the
impugned Judgments and Decree. He argued that the
subject-matter of the suits does not at all fall
within the parameters of Section 11 of the Bombay
Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, and at any rate,
the said issue about the jurisdiction was not
raised by the Appellant-State. In the alternative,
he argued that the respondent-plaintiff had applied
for renewal of lease of land which was in his
possession and also for grant of permanent lease,
as was done in the cases of other land holders and,
therefore, there was a hostile discrimination by
adopting a different yardstick by the appellant-
State, in which case the Civil Court was also
entitled to make the order directing issuance of
temporary or permanent leases. He, therefore,
contended that at any rate, it was obligatory on
the part of the Collector of the district to decide
the applications which were admittedly pending and
having failed to do so, even now a direction can be
issued to the Collector of the district to decide
those applications in accordance with law.
04. Upon hearing learned counsel for the rival
parties and upon perusal of the impugned Judgments,
so also relevant provisions of law, what this Court
finds is that the issue about jurisdiction can be
raised before this Court if there is a basic lack
of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. That being so,
I proceed to frame the following two Substantial
Questions of Law:-
[a] Whether the jurisdiction of
Civil Court by virtue of
Section 11 of the Bombay
Revenue Jurisdiction
Act, 1876, to entertain
a suit in the facts
of the case in the subject-matter
of grant of temporary/
permanent lease was
barred by law? ... Yes.
[b] Whether the Civil Court
could issue a direction
to the Govt. to grant
fresh leases or
permanent leases to
to the plaintiff,
when admittedly,
the original leases
which were granted
to the plaintiffs,
had already expired? ... No.
05. Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue
Jurisdiction Act, 1876 reads thus:-
11. Except as otherwise expressly
provided in the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code, 1966, no Civil Court
shall entertain any suit against the
Government, on account of any act or
omission of any Revenue Officer unless
the plaintiff first proves that
previously to bringing his suit, he has
presented all such appeals allowed by
the law for the time being in force as,
within the period of limitation allowed
for bringing such suit, it was possible
to present.
06. Upon reading of the above provisions, it is
amply clear that if the act or omission on the part
of a Revenue Officer of the Govt., is alleged in a
civil suit, unless the remedies provided by the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code are exhausted,
jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred. In the
present case, it was the case of the respondentplaintiff
throughout that initially he got lease
for a temporary period and he applied for renewal
thereof or continuation, and not only that he also
applied for grant of permanent lease. It is an
admitted position that the period of lease had
already expired, and the applications made by the
plaintiff before the Collector of the district for
renewal of lease or for grant of permanent lease
remained pending, and were not decided. Thus, the
respondent-plaintiff alleged omission on the part
of Revenue Officer in not deciding his applications
for renewal of lease or grant of leases. Such
matter squarely falls within the ambit of Section
11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act and,
therefore, the Civil Court could not have
entertained the suits. Hence the first Substantial
Question of Law will have to be answered in
affirmative.
07. As to the second Substantial Question of
Law, I find that grant of temporary or permanent
lease is clearly regulated by the provisions of the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and the Maharashtra
Land Revenue (Disposal of Govt. Lands) Rules, 1971.
These provisions are self-contained code by
themselves. Merely because the Revenue Officer did
not decide the applications filed by the
respondent-plaintiff for grant of temporary or
permanent leases, as the case may be, the
respondent-Plaintiff could not have approached the
Civil Court to ask for a direction, since he could
have easily approached the authorities provided
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue
Code, or the High Court having extraordinary writ
jurisdiction. The jurisdictions of the Civil Court
cannot be widened to enable it to issue directions
to the Govt. to grant temporary or permanent
leases. That is purely a governmental function
governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code and the Rules thereunder. Civil Court
could not have directed that the Collector should
grant temporary leases or permanent leases to the
respondent-plaintiff even on the ground that others
were granted. Therefore, in my opinion, the Civil
Court could not have issued a direction to grant
permanent or temporary leases, which had already
expired by efflux of time and the period of leases
did not exist at the time when the judgment was
delivered by the Civil Court. That being so,
second Substantial Question of Law will have to be
answered in negative.
08. The matter should not end here. In my
opinion, since the plaintiff had made applications
to the Collector for renewal of his leases, either
temporarily or permanently, the concerned officer
ought to have decided the said applications or
representations in accordance with law. The heirs
of original plaintiff, who are respondents herein,
are occupying the sites for several years, as
submitted by learned Adv. Mr. Mehadia for the
respondents and, therefore, in my opinion, the
concerned Collector of the district should decide
the applications for grant of temporary or
permanent leases made by the respondent strictly in
accordance with law. If the applications are not
found on record of the Collector, the respondents
may be given liberty to file copies thereof, or
fresh applications. That being so, it is expected
of the Collector of the district to dispose of the
applications of the respondents-plaintiff in
accordance with law. With the above observations,
the following order will have to be passed :-
O R D E R
[a] Second Appeal Nos.344, 345 and 346 all
of 1997 are allowed.
[b] The impugned Judgments and Decree
passed by the Courts below are set
aside.
[c] The direction given by this Court in
foregoing para 8 to decide the
applications made by the respondentplaintiff
shall be followed by the
Collector of the district, as
expeditiously as possible, if
necessary, after hearing the concerned
parties and strictly in accordance with
law, within a period of six months from
the date of receipt of Writ of this
Court.
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