Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiff refuted the arguments and submitted that at the stage of hearing of this suit, the plaintiff would place before the Court appropriate material and this contention should not be entertained by this Court. I am inclined to accept the stand taken by defendant no.1. If it was the stand of the plaintiff that said person was the subject of defendant no.1 and that said person was appointed under the bilateral trade agreement between India and defendant no.1, it was absolutely necessary for the plaintiff to place before the Court, certain documents in support of the aforesaid averments. A bare averment in the plaint by itself would not go in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, the plaintiff has not been able to establish link between said person and defendant no.1. By now, it is well settled that it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead facts necessary to set out a specific cause of action against a party which cause of action can be ascertained on the basis of material produced before the Court in the nature of documents as well as the averments in the plaint.
Looking to the plaint from this angle, the plaint is devoid of necessary particulars and averments and documents to show that said person was the subject of the defendant no.1 and that he was appointed under a bilateral trade agreement between India and Holland. The particulars of the said agreement and whether defendant no.1 had issued specific orders appointing the said person for the purposes of doing a particular job are not produced along with plaint. In the absence of this relevant material, I am inclined to observe that there is no cause of action against defendant no.1. This is one more ground to reject the plaint.
In K.S. Dhondy Vs Her Majesty Queen of Netherlands reported in 2011(3) Bom. C.R. 231 similarly, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court was pleased to reject the plaint under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 1 of the CPC on the basis that a bare averment was not enough without the document on which the averment was based. It held that
"a bare averment in the plaint by itself would not go in favour of the Plaintiff. By now, it is well settled that it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead facts necessary to set out a specific cause of action against a party which cause of action can be ascertained on the basis of material produced before the court in the nature of documents as well as averment in the plaint “
I feel there is enough material in the law to proceed vigorously in detecting a cause of action at the inception, and if the Plaintiff fraudulently or otherwise does not plead the necessary facts or produce the primary docuemnts, there is no reason why the Court should not proceed with the rejection of the matter under Order 7 Rule 11.
As far as Mr Arunachala's comment is concerned, I respectfully beg to disagree. Admissions are only a form of proof, and if there are no pleadings in the plaint in the first place, submitted that under the law of pleadings and under the law that there can be no proof beyond the pleadings, the Plaintiff cannot prove the same even by admissions of the other side.
"a bare averment in the plaint by itself would not go in favour of the Plaintiff. By now, it is well settled that it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead facts necessary to set out a specific cause of action against a party which cause of action can be ascertained on the basis of material produced before the court in the nature of documents as well as averment in the plaint “
I feel there is enough material in the law to proceed vigorously in detecting a cause of action at the inception, and if the Plaintiff fraudulently or otherwise does not plead the necessary facts or produce the primary docuemnts, there is no reason why the Court should not proceed with the rejection of the matter under Order 7 Rule 11.
As far as Mr Arunachala's comment is concerned, I respectfully beg to disagree. Admissions are only a form of proof, and if there are no pleadings in the plaint in the first place, submitted that under the law of pleadings and under the law that there can be no proof beyond the pleadings, the Plaintiff cannot prove the same even by admissions of the other side.
Bombay High Court
K.S. Dhondy Carrying On Business ... vs Her Majesty The Queen Of ... on 20 January, 2011
Bench: R.Y. Ganoo
Citation; 2011(3) Bom. C.R. 231
1. Defendant no.1 has taken out this notice of motion for following reliefs. By prayer clause (a) defendant wants that the plaint be rejected :2: nms-2651-04-Judgment=.doc under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC on the basis of various clauses set out in prayer clause (a). By prayer clause (b), defendant no.1 wants a declaration that the suit is an abuse of the process of this Hon'ble Court and has attempted to implicate a Sovereign on frivolous grounds and by prayer clause (c), costs are sought. The plaintiff has filed affidavit in reply. Affidavit in reply not found on record. Copy of the same is made available to the Court by learned Counsel for the plaintiff. Defendant no.2 has not filed any affidavit-in-reply. Motion is not directed against defendant no.2. It is to be noted that no relief is sought against defendant no.2.
2. Few facts necessary for the disposal of this notice of motion are required to be mentioned. The original plaintiff Mr. S.K. Dhondy was carrying on business as a proprietor of M/s. S.K. Dhondy & Company.
Said plaintiff was the owner of a vessel called as m.v. "SKD-I". This vessel was handed over to M/s. Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. for a period of 35 days by the original plaintiff vide charter party dated 10th November, 1989. The said vessel was carrying on operations at the port of Old Mangalore and the vessel had some defect and repairs were required to be carried out and as such one Mr. Van Heerde (hereinafter referred to as the said person) who according to original plaintiff was a subject of the defendant no.1 was appointed under a Bilateral Trade :3: nms-2651-04-Judgment=.doc Agreement between India and Holland to attend to repairs concerning the said vessel. According to the original plaintiff, the said repairs were not carried out in the proper manner and the said vessel capsized on 28th November, 1989. According to the original plaintiff on account of negligence in carrying out the work, the vessel got capsized and that is how defendant no.1 of which said person is the subject was answerable to the original plaintiff in terms of damages. On this facts, the original plaintiff filed this suit against defendant no.1. At a later point of time, defendant no.2 Union of India was added as a party defendant.
3. During the pendency of this suit, the original plaintiff Mr. S.K.
Dhondy expired and that is now his son Mr. K.S. Dhondy stepped into the shoes of Mr. S.K. Dhondy and Mr. K.S. Dhondy now styles himself as a proprietor of M/s. S.K. Dhondy and Company and is prosecuting the suit. Mr. K.S. Dhondy has been brought on record as plaintiff.
4. This motion is taken out by defendant no.1. The motion is not taken out by defendant no.2. However, looking to the various points which were required to be determined by this Court, I wish to deal with the case of defendant no.1 as well as defendant no.2 and decide whether the plaint is required to be rejected so far as defendant no.1 as well as defendant no. 2 or only so far as defendant no.1. If after :4: nms-2651-04-Judgment=.doc considering the entire case on merit, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the defendant no.1 as well as defendant no.2 are entitled to an order of rejection of the plaint, then such an order can be passed in the interest of justice.
5. Defendant no.1 has raised points so as to pray for rejection of the plaint. I shall deal with the motion point by point. The defendant no.1 is Her Majesty the Queen of Netherlands. Learned Counsel for defendant no.1 submitted that if at all the suit was to be instituted against defendant no.1, before institution of a suit sanction / permission from the Union of India was required to be obtained in accordance with the provisions of Section 86 of the Civil Procedure Code. She submitted that it is only after the Union of India gives consent for institution of a suit, such suit could have been instituted as defendant no.1 is entitled to claim diplomatic immunity. She took me through the provisions of Section 86 of the CPC and submitted that the facts covered by the present suit fall within the parameters of Section 86 and because the plaintiff has not placed on record sanction / consent issued by defendant no.2-Union of India, the suit is not maintainable. In support of this contention, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants had relied upon the the judgment in the case of Veb Deautfracht Seereederei Rostock (D.S.P. Lines) a Department of :5: nms-2651-04-Judgment=.doc the German Democratic Republic V/s. New Central Jute Mills Co.
Ltd. and Anr. reported in AIR 1994, SC 516 and had submitted that the requirements of Section 86 of CPC are mandatory. She also submitted that defendant no.1 is well covered by the provisions of Section 86 as defendant no.1 is the ruler of the country by name Netherland. In reply to this argument, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff relied upon judgment in the case of Kenya Airways Vs. Jinibai B. Kheshwala, AIR 1998 Bom. 287 and submitted that though the suit was filed in the year 1994, defendant no.1 has taken out this notice of motion in the year 2004 and according to him the conduct of defendant no.1 clearly goes to show that defendant no.1 had submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court without there being any permission from the Union of India and, therefore, the provisions of Section 86 would not be attracted in the present case.
6. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiff took me through paragraph 24 of the plaint and had submitted that plaintiff had before institution of the present suit sent notice dated 15th October, 1993 calling upon Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India to accord sanction within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of the notice for the purposes of institution of the present suit. He pointed out that though such notice was received by Union of India, no reply was :6: nms-2651-04-Judgment=.doc received by the plaintiff and, therefore, the Union of India is deemed to have granted permission to institute the suit and that is why the Court should look to the facts of this case.
7. After having looked into the relevant provisions of Section 86 of the CPC and submissions advanced across the bar and the judgments cited in the Court, in the first place, I hold that defendant no.1 is entitled to claim diplomatic immunity as understood in Section 86 of the CPC. The very fact that the plaintiff had applied for a permission from Union of India to institute the present suit also indicates that original plaintiff was aware of the fact that there is exists a bar under Section 86 of CPC for the purposes of institution of the suit and that without the consent of Union of India such suit could not have been filed. Hence, I hold that defendant no.1 was entitled to diplomatic immunity. The contention is raised by the plaintiff that on account of not replying to the letter dated 15th October 1993, the Union of India is deemed to have granted permission to institute the suit. Such a contention cannot be accepted as there is no such provision of deemed consent set out in Section 86 of CPC. Plaintiff has not been able to place before the Court any such provision of law by which the concept of 'deemed permission' can be introduced.
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8. So far as the contention raised by the plaintiff as regards submission of defendant no.1 to the jurisdiction of this Court and consequent reliance placed on judgment in the case of Kenya Airways Vs. Jinibai B. Kheshwala, AIR 1998 Bom.287, I hold that facts of present case do not indicate that defendant no.1 had submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court. After filing vakalatnama on receipt of writ of summons, defendant no.1 has done nothing. No written statement is filed. Matter remained pending as it is and in the year 2004, defendant no.1 has filed this notice of motion. This will go to show that no positive step is taken by defendant no.1 to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court.
9. The judgment cited by the learned Counsel for defendant no.1 in the case of Veb Deautfracht Seereederei Rostock (D.S.P. Lines) a Department of the German Democratic Republic V/s. New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr, AIR 1994 SC 516. is applicable to the facts of this case and I hold that defendant no.1 is entitled to plead diplomatic immunity as understood in Section 86 of CPC and the stand of defendant no.1 that plaint deserves to be rejected on the grounds of non-compliance of provisions under Section 86 is required to be accepted.
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10. The next contention raised by defendant no.1 is as regards the absence of cause of action as against defendant no.1. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant no.1 had taken me through the facts of this case and had submitted that in order to file a suit against defendant no.1 for the alleged negligence on the part of the said person, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish relation between defendant no.1 and the said person. She submitted that apart from the bare averments in the plaint in para 2 whereby it is alleged that said person is a subject of defendant no.1 and that he was appointed under a Bilateral Trade Agreement between India and defendant no.1, there is nothing on record. She, therefore, submitted that mere averments in para 2 as indicated above are not sufficient as plaintiff has not produced the text of the bilateral treaty on the basis of which the said person was appointed by defendant no.1 to carry out the job concerning the said vessel. She further submitted that plaintiff has not produced prima facie material to show that said person was a subject of defendant no.1.
11. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiff refuted the arguments and submitted that at the stage of hearing of this suit, the plaintiff would place before the Court appropriate material and this contention should not be entertained by this Court. I am inclined to :9: nms-2651-04-Judgment=.doc accept the stand taken by defendant no.1. If it was the stand of the plaintiff that said person was the subject of defendant no.1 and that said person was appointed under the bilateral trade agreement between India and defendant no.1, it was absolutely necessary for the plaintiff to place before the Court, certain documents in support of the aforesaid averments. A bare averment in the plaint by itself would not go in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, the plaintiff has not been able to establish link between said person and defendant no.1. By now, it is well settled that it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead facts necessary to set out a specific cause of action against a party which cause of action can be ascertained on the basis of material produced before the Court in the nature of documents as well as the averments in the plaint.
Looking to the plaint from this angle, the plaint is devoid of necessary particulars and averments and documents to show that said person was the subject of the defendant no.1 and that he was appointed under a bilateral trade agreement between India and Holland. The particulars of the said agreement and whether defendant no.1 had issued specific orders appointing the said person for the purposes of doing a particular job are not produced along with plaint. In the absence of this relevant material, I am inclined to observe that there is no cause of action against defendant no.1. This is one more ground to reject the plaint.
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12. The next point raised by defendant no.1 pertains to the question of limitation. The plaintiff has admitted that for the purposes of recovering damages in regard to the loss of the said vessel, the original plaintiff had lodged the claim against M/s. Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. in terms of damages and arbitration proceedings were conducted between original plaintiff and said M/s. Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. and an award was passed against M/s. Dredging Corporation of India Ltd to the extent of 14,50,000/- being award dated 29th March, 1993. The plaintiff in the plaint claims that the period of limitation so far as this suit is concerned is to be computed from 29th March, 1993 and that is how the institution of the suit in the year 1994 is within the period of limitation.
13. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant no.1 drew my attention to the fact that the plaintiff claims that the vessel capsized on 28th November, 1989 and, therefore, if at all, the plaintiff had a cause of action against defendant no.1, the said cause of action commenced on 28th November, 1989 and the period of limitation would be 3 years from 28th November, 1989 as the provisions of Article 113 of the Limitation Act would be applicable. She submitted that the institution of the present suit in the year 1994 is patently beyond the period of limitation.
: 11 : nms-2651-04-Judgment=.doc She submitted that securing of the award dated 29th March, 1989 has no connection with the cause of action which is sought to be put up by the plaintiff against defendant no.1. She submitted that from the reading of the plaint, it appears to be the stand of plaintiff that defendant no.1 was responsible for the acts of the said person and, therefore, if the said stand is correct, it provided to the plaintiff an independent cause of action qua M/s. Dredging Corporation of India Ltd.
and the said cause of action commenced on 28th February, 1989 because according to the plaintiff on account of negligence of said person the vessel capsized on 28th November, 1989.
14. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff reiterated the stand of the plaintiff that the 29th March, 1993 is the relevant date for the purposes of computing the period of limitation and, therefore, submitted that the suit is within the period of limitation.
15. I have considered the rival contentions and I am inclined to accept the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for defendant no.1 If the vessel capsized on 28th February, 1989 and if according to plaintiff it had a cause of action against defendant no.1, said cause of action commenced on 28th November, 1989 and the period of limitation would be of 3 years in accordance with the provisions of Article 113 of the : 12 : nms-2651-04-Judgment=.doc Limitation Act. This would mean that the period of limitation would come to an end on or about 28th November, 1992. Hence, institution of the present suit in the year 1994 is patently beyond the period of limitation. The stand of the plaintiff that the day on which arbitration award was passed would be relevant, cannot be accepted. The plaintiff ought to have filed the suit prior to 28th November, 1992. That has not been done, so this suit is beyond the period of limitation. This is one more ground on the basis of which the plaint is required to be rejected.
16. The aforesaid discussion pertains to defendant no.1. I have already indicated that on merits if the plaint is required to be rejected as against defendant no.2 the same can be done. It is to be noted that defendant no.2 came to be impleaded on the basis of amendment which was granted by order dated 2nd July, 2004. Since there is no specific reference in the order that the said amendment would be applicable on prospective basis. It will relate to the date of filing of suit.
Defendant no.2 is sought to be joined on the basis of a clause in the bilateral treaty purported to have been entered into between defendant no1. and defendant no.2. Said clause is reproduced in paragraph 23A of the plaint. It is as follows.
"23(A). ..... The Government of India shall bear the liability arising, if any in respect of damages, including damage to a third part, caused by an expert in the performance of the : 13 : nms-2651-04-Judgment=.doc task assigned to such expert. Any claim against the said expert or the Government of the Netherland shall to that extent be precluded".
17. Even if this stand of the plaintiff is accepted and if it is accepted for a moment that defendant no.2 was liable to pay to plaintiff damages on account of what transpired at the hands of the said person, still the period of limitation qua defendant no.2 would also commence on 28th November, 1989 and would end on 28th November, 1992. For the reasons mentioned aforesaid the question of limitation as between the plaintiff and defendant no.2 can be decided on the same principles as is discussed with reference to plaintiff and defendant no.1. There is no reason as to why the Court should take a different view on the question of limitation as between the plaintiff and defendant no.2. Hence, it would be proper to hold that the institution of the suit against defendant no.2 is also beyond the period of limitation.
18. It was contended by learned Counsel for defendant no.1. as well as defendant no.2 that the provisions of section 80 of the CPC i.e. to say issuance of notice before institution of the suit against Union of India are not complied with. Provisions of Section 80 of CPC are not applicable to facts of this case. I am not inclined to accept the said contention.
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19. For the reasons mentioned aforesaid I hold that the plaint is required to be rejected so far as defendant no.1 and defendant no.2.
It is noted that by prayer clause (b), the plaintiff has come out with the peculiar prayer that as the notice dated 15th October, 1993 was not replied to by the Union of India, it should be treated as deemed to be sanctioned / consented by Union of India as contemplated under the provisions of CPC. This stand is required to be rejected. In the absence of any specific provision of "deemed sanction", there is no question of such a declaration being granted to the plaintiff. In view of the above, following order is passed to dispose of the notice of motion.
ORDER
(i) The plaint is rejected so far as defendant no. 1 and defendant no.
2 are concerned.
(ii) In the normal course, it was possible for the Court to saddle the plaintiff with the costs of this motion, however, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
(R.Y.GANOO, J.)
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