The fourth ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is with regard to lending loan without having any licence to do business under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F. Placing reliance on a judgment of this Court reported in Mrs. K.Sudersanam V. S.Venkata Rao and as there was no licence to do money lending business, he submits that a complaint under Section 138 of the Act is not maintainable. Since the complainant is a company established for a business other than money lending, he submits that the second respondent could not have lent money without obtaining licence under the provisions of the Act. He thus contends that any default in payment of money is not enforceable under law and the present complaint under Section 138 of the Act is not maintainable. As stated above, the petitioners are strangers to the second respondent and they came into contact with the complainant only through one T.Sateesh Kumar, who is the friend of accused No.2.
Keeping in view the facts in issue, the said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners needs to be tested with the judgment relied upon by him.
A reading of the judgment of this Court referred to above (K.Sudersanam (10 Supra) would disclose that in order to fall within the definition of money lender it is not enough merely to show that a man had on several occasions lent money at remunerative rates of interest but that there must be a certain degree of system and continuity about the transactions and that the definition of money lender in the Act does not include those who advanced money casually. In case on hand, there is no material to show that there was a certain degree of system and continuity in doing money lending business. On the other hand, the complaint refers to only one transaction.
Apart from that the word money lender is defined in Section 2 (7) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F which reads as under.
Money lender means a person including a pawn broker, who, within the meaning of this Act, only advances loan in the ordinary course of his business or does so along with other business, and shall also include the legal representative of such person, and the person claiming to be his representative on the ground of succession or assignment or otherwise.
The word loan mentioned in Section 2 (7) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F is defined in Section 2 (4) of the Act which is as under: -
loan means a loan secured or unsecured, advanced on interest in cash or in kind, and shall include every transaction which is in substance a loan, but shall not include the following. Section 2 (4) (d) of the Act reads as under:
a loan advanced by a bank, a co-operative society or a company A conjoint reading of Section 2 (4) (d) and 2 (7) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F would clearly indicate that the money advanced by a company in the form of loan is excluded from the purview of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F. Viewed from any angle, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners does not stand to merit.
Andhra High Court
M/S. Vasundhara Projects Pvt. vs State of andhra pradesh on 28 January, 2014
The petitioners, who are accused Nos.1 to 4 filed the present Criminal Petition under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short the code), seeking quashing of all further proceedings in C.C.No.425 of 2013 on the file of the XIII Special Magistrate, Erramanzil, Hyderabad. A private complaint was filed by the second respondent against the petitioners for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short the Act).
The allegations in the complaint are as under: Accused No.1 is the company engaged in Real Estate business rep. by its Chairman and Managing Director, who is shown as accused No.2. Accused Nos.3 and 4 are the directors of accused No.1 company. It is alleged in the complaint that when one Mr.T.Sateesh Kumar was unable to lend the required amount in cash, accused No.2 requested Sateesh Kumar to arrange the funds through any of his friends. As such, both of them approached the complainant, who is known to Mr.Sateesh Kumar, seeking loan of Rs.1.5 crores. The complainant is said to have verified cash balance and informed accused No.2 that he would lend an amount of Rs.1,02,50,000/- only. Accused No.2 accepted the offer and promised to repay the same before August, 2012. A promissory note was executed by accused No.2 agreeing to repay the said amount with interest at 24% p.a. Accused Nos.3 and 4 also assured the complainant that they being active directors of accused No.1 company would take personal responsibility for ensuring repayment of the debt. As the accused failed to repay the same within the time prescribed, the complainant started demanding the accused for repayment of the amount. Thereupon, accused No.2 gave pre- dated cheques bearing Nos.709926, 709927, 709928, 709929 and 709930 dated 25.06.2012 for Rs.5,00,000/- each drawn on A/c No.30745446921 maintained by accused No.1 company with the State Bank of India, New Nagole Branch, Alkapuri Cross Road, Hyderabad towards part payment of the loan with an understanding to present the said cheques in the first week of September, 2012.
On 10.09.2012 the said cheques when presented at Bank of Baorda, Abids Branch were returned on 11.09.2012 with the remark payment stopped by drawyer. The complainant got issued a notice, dated 09.10.2012 intimating the accused about the dishonour of cheques and also demanding payment of the cheque amounts within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. Though the accused received the notice they failed to make payment of the cheque amount but however got issued a reply on 25.10.2012 making frivolous and baseless allegations against the complainant. Accused Nos.3 and 4 failed to give any reply. Thereafter, the present complaint came to be filed.
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the second respondent.
The first ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned Magistrate erred in taking cognizance of the matter basing on the affidavit of the complainant instead of recording the sworn statement of the complainant as contemplated under Section 200 Cr.P.C.
The said issue raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is no more res integra in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in A.C.Narayanan Vs. State of Maharashtra and another wherein the Apex Court has categorically held that it is open to the Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of affidavit filed by the complainant in support of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act and the Magistrate is neither mandatorily obliged to call upon the complainant to remain present before the Court, nor to examine the complainant on his witness upon oath for taking the decision as to whether or not to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
In Mandvi Co-operative Bank Limited Vs. M/s. V.Nimesh B.Thakore the Apex Court after considering Sections 143 to 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 held that there is nothing illegal or wrong in accepting the affidavits filed by the complainant. The Court held that it is always open to the accused to summon the person who gave the affidavit for cross examination.
However, the learned counsel for the second respondent strenuously contends that the Magistrate has recorded the sworn statement before issuing summons to the petitioners.
Viewed from any angle there is no merit in the said argument of the learned counsel for the second respondent and the same is accordingly rejected.
The second ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Court of XIII Special Magistrate at Erramanzil has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter as the offence took place within the jurisdiction of Cyberabad Court at L.B.Nagar.
The said issue is squarely covered by the recent judgments of the Apex Court in Nishant Aggarwal Vs. Kailash Kumar Sharma and M/s. Escorts Limited Vs. Rama Mukherjee . The above two judgments have reaffirmed the law declared by the Apex Court in K.Bhaskaran Vs. Shankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Another . The Apex Court held that the offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. The following are the acts which are components of the said offence.
i) drawing of the cheque
ii) presentation of the cheque to the bank
iii) returning the cheque unpaid by the draweee bank
iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque
demanding payment of the cheque amount
v) failure of the drawer to make payment within
15 days of the receipt of the notice
Therefore, the Apex Court held that if five different acts were done in five different localities, any one of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for an offence under Section 138 of the Act.
A perusal of the averments in the complaint and the material filed along with the complaint would clearly indicate that more than one act fell within the jurisdiction of the Court at Erramanzil. The said aspect, though agitated, was not seriously contested by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
The third ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that filing of a single complaint in respect of dishonour of five cheques is barred under Section 219 Cr.P.C. Since bouncing of each cheque amount to one offence and as all the five cheques are said to have been returned within a period of one year, he submits that a single complaint could not have been filed in respect of dishonour of five cheques in view of Section 219 Cr.P.C.
The said aspect came up for consideration before this Court in N.Laxman and others Vs. Sri Shanukha Cotton Traders . It was a case where accused No.1 company, which fell due to the respondent therein, issued eight cheques towards part payment of the amount, which were presented on different dates. All the cheques were returned un-paid. Thereafter, the complainant therein got issued a notice on 15.03.1997 demanding accused No.1 company to pay the due amount. A reply came to be issued seeking time for payment of money. As no amount was paid a single complaint was filed in respect of the dishonour of all the cheques.
This Court after referring to Section 219 Cr.P.C. and judgment of Madras High Court in K.Govindaraj V. Aswhin Barat held that though the different cheques issued by the accused were dishonoured, one notice was issued to the accused which was replied by the accused through only one reply notice. As there was only one demand made by the first respondent/complainant and one reply from the accused company and all the cheques were returned on only one day, the Court held that the case falls under Section 220 Cr.P.C. In view of the above, the learned single Judge rejected the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners therein as to the maintainability of one complaint.
Similar question came for consideration before this Court in E.Madhu and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another . This Court dealt with the situation where a single complaint was filed in respect of dishonour of 20 cheques. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner therein was that separate complaints ought to have been filed in respect of 20 dishonoured cheques. This Court held that it is desirable as per the requirements of Sections 218 and 219 of Cr.P.C. to file separate complaints but it is not a mandatory requirement under law in view of the Judgment of the Apex Court in Ranchood Lal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh .
In an identical case this Court in City Automobiles and another Vs. J.K.Industries Limited and another (Criminal Petition No.2666 of 2001 and Batch) held that issuing cheques in discharge of a separate debts constitutes a separate offence although they are all offences of the same kind. Since the facts do not warrant to conclude that series of offences have been committed in the course of same transaction one complaint can be filed adverting to the provisions of Sections 218, 219 and 220 of Cr.P.C., inasmuch as those provisions incorporate a general rule and are not mandatory. The Court held that there is nothing illegal in filing a single complaint nor the trial would be vitiated on account of the same.
In view of the judgments of this Court and that of the Madras High Court, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that a single complaint is not maintainable cannot be accepted, since all the cheques were dishonoured on one day ie. 10.09.2012, a single notice was issued demanding the petitioners to repay the due amount and a single reply was given on 25.10.2012.
The fourth ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is with regard to lending loan without having any licence to do business under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F. Placing reliance on a judgment of this Court reported in Mrs. K.Sudersanam V. S.Venkata Rao and as there was no licence to do money lending business, he submits that a complaint under Section 138 of the Act is not maintainable. Since the complainant is a company established for a business other than money lending, he submits that the second respondent could not have lent money without obtaining licence under the provisions of the Act. He thus contends that any default in payment of money is not enforceable under law and the present complaint under Section 138 of the Act is not maintainable. As stated above, the petitioners are strangers to the second respondent and they came into contact with the complainant only through one T.Sateesh Kumar, who is the friend of accused No.2.
Keeping in view the facts in issue, the said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners needs to be tested with the judgment relied upon by him.
A reading of the judgment of this Court referred to above (K.Sudersanam (10 Supra) would disclose that in order to fall within the definition of money lender it is not enough merely to show that a man had on several occasions lent money at remunerative rates of interest but that there must be a certain degree of system and continuity about the transactions and that the definition of money lender in the Act does not include those who advanced money casually. In case on hand, there is no material to show that there was a certain degree of system and continuity in doing money lending business. On the other hand, the complaint refers to only one transaction.
Apart from that the word money lender is defined in Section 2 (7) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F which reads as under.
Money lender means a person including a pawn broker, who, within the meaning of this Act, only advances loan in the ordinary course of his business or does so along with other business, and shall also include the legal representative of such person, and the person claiming to be his representative on the ground of succession or assignment or otherwise.
The word loan mentioned in Section 2 (7) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F is defined in Section 2 (4) of the Act which is as under: -
loan means a loan secured or unsecured, advanced on interest in cash or in kind, and shall include every transaction which is in substance a loan, but shall not include the following. Section 2 (4) (d) of the Act reads as under:
a loan advanced by a bank, a co-operative society or a company A conjoint reading of Section 2 (4) (d) and 2 (7) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F would clearly indicate that the money advanced by a company in the form of loan is excluded from the purview of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F. Viewed from any angle, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners does not stand to merit.
The next point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since the loan was obtained by accused No.2 in his individual capacity and as the cheque was issued on an account maintained by the company, none of the accused are liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
A reading of the complaint and the sworn statement would clearly show that accused No.2 along with one T.Sateesh Kumar approached the complainant seeking loan as he was in urgent need of money. After verification of the amounts, the complainant lent a sum of Rs.1,02,50,000/- to accused No.2. After receiving money, accused No.2 executed promissory notes infavour of the complainant promising to repay the same with interest @ 24% p.a. on or before August, 2012. The averments in the complaint and the sworn statement of the complainant also show that accused No.2 gave cheques bearing Nos.709926, 709927, 709928, 709929 and 709930 dated 25.06.2012 each for Rs.5,00,000/- drawn on account No.30745446921 maintained by accused No.1 company with the State Bank of India, New Nagole Branch, Alkapuri Cross Road, Hyderabad, towards part payment of the debt. In view of the above, the learned counsel for the petitioner mainly contends that accused No.1 company and accused Nos.3 and 4, who are directors of accused No.1 company are no way liable for the loan taken by accused No.2 in his individual capacity. He further submits that issuing of cheques on an account maintained by accused No.1 company does not, in any way, fasten the company and all its directors with any liability as the transaction was never between accused No.1 company and the complainant company. In support of his argument he relied upon a judgment of this Court reported in Othiappan V. State of Andhra Pradesh and another .
On the otherhand, the learned counsel for the second respondent submits that since the cheques were issued by a company, every person who is incharge of the day today affairs of the company are liable under the provisions of Sections 138 and 141 of the Act. In view of the averments in the complaint and sworn statement, he submits that issue involves disputed question of fact which needs to be agitated only during trial and cannot be decided in an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
As seen from the averments in the complaint, sworn statement and the rival arguments advanced by both the learned counsel, it was accused No.2 alone, who took loan from the complainant as he was in urgent need of money and it was he who issued the cheque belongs to accused No.1 company. The averments in the complaint does not any where indicate that accused No.2 took the amount for the business of accused No.1 company.
Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to refer Sections 138 and 141 of the Act which are as under:
138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.
Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for (a term which may be extended to two years), or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this Section shall apply unless:-
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
7(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, (within thirty days) of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice Section 141(1) in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (1) Offences by companies. If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub- section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence Was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence Section 141(2) in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly, Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,-
(a) " company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) " director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm From a reading of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is very clear that in order to attract the provisions thereof, a cheque which is dishonoured will have to be drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with the banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part of any debt or other liability. It is only such a cheque which is dishonoured, would attract the provisions of Section 138 of the above Act against the drawer of the cheque.
Section 141 of the Act refers to an offence committed by a company. A reading of Section 141 of the Act would show that when a person committing an offence under Section 138 of Act is a company, every person, who at the time of committing the offence was incharge of and responsible for the affairs of the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence.
A perusal of the averments in all the five complaints would show that the amount involved in each of the complaint is Rs.1,02,50,000/-. Two complaints were filed making accused No.2 alone liable and three complaints were filed making the company as well as other directors of the company including accused No.2 liable for the offence.
As stated above, the averments in the complaint does not any where indicate amount being borrowed by the company.
The question is whether the company and its directors can be made liable for the cheques issued by its Managing Director, who took loan in his individual capacity but issued cheques of accused No.1 company.
In Anil Sachar and another Vs. Shree Nath Spinners Private Limited and others , the Apex Court dealt with a situation where one Munish Jain, a Director of M/s. AT Overseas Limited, a sister concern of M/s. Shree Nath Spinners (P) Limited, issued four cheques to M/s Rati Woollen Mills towards consideration for supply of goods to M/s. Shree Nath Spinners (P) Limited. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court held that M/s. AT Overseas Limited has no reason to give cheques to the complainant. The Apex Court reversed the said finding after referring Section 138 of the Act and taking into consideration the understanding arrived at among the complainant and accused, held that the cheques signed by Munish Jain has been issued by M/s. AT Overseas Limited to the complainant in discharge of a debt or liability which had been incurred by M/s. Shree Nath Spinners (P) Limited.
In P.J.Agro Tech. Ltd. And others Vs. Water Base Limited the Apex Court dealt with a situation where an employee of a company gave a cheque discharging the dues of the company and its directors. The said cheque was returned due to insufficiency of funds. The question before the Apex Court was whether the company and its directors can be made liable for dishonour of cheque issued by an employee in discharge of a debt of a company and its directors. After referring to the provisions of the Act, the Apex Court held as under:
The cheque which had been dishonoured may have been issued by the respondent No.1 for discharging the dues of the Appellant No.1 company and its Directors to the respondent No.1 Company and the respondent company may have a good case against the appellant No.1 company for recovery of its dues before other for a, but it would not be sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 138 of the Act. The appellant company and its Directors cannot be made liable under Section 138 of the Act for a default committed by the respondent No.11. An action in respect of a criminal or a quasi-criminal provision has to be strictly construed in keeping with the provisions alleged to have been violated. The proceedings in such matters are in personam and cannot be used to foist an offence on some other person, who under the statute was not liable for the commission of such offence.
In Gummadi Industries Limited and another Vs. Khushroo F. Engineer a learned single Judge of Madras High Court dealt with a situation where the cheques in question were issued by the second petitioner therein from his personal account and not from the account of the first petitioner company and those cheques have been signed by the second petitioner in his individual capacity and not as an authorized signatory of the first petitioner. In the circumstances, an application was filed seeking quashing of proceedings against the first petitioner. The Madras High Court held that the liability or debt though legally enforceable against the first accused company but the cheques were issued by the second petitioner in his individual capacity and as such, he alone is the drawer. Accordingly, the proceedings against the first petitioner therein were quashed while rejecting the plea of the second petitioner therein holding that he alone can be held liable for the offence.
In I.C.D.S. Ltd. Vs. Beema Shabeer and another the Apex Court considered the fact as to the maintainability of the proceedings under Section 138 of the Act vis--vis a guarantor. It may be relevant to refer the relevant paragraphs in the said judgment, which are as under:
Para No.9: As noticed hereinabove, the principal reason for quashing of the proceeding as also the complaint by the High Court was by reason of the fact that Section 138 of the Act provides for issuance of a cheque to another person towards the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or liability and on the factual context, the High Court came to a conclusion that issuance of the cheque cannot be co- related for the purpose of discharging any debt or liability and as such complaint under Section 138 cannot be maintainable.
Para No.10: The language, however, has been rather specific as regards the intent of the legislature. The commencement of the Section stands with the words where any cheque. The above noted three words are of extreme significance, in particular, by reason of the use of the word any the first three words suggest that in fact for whatever reason if a cheque is drawn on an account maintained by him with a banker in favour of another person for the discharge of any of debt or other liability, the highlighted words if read with the first three words at the commencement of Section 138, leave no manner of doubt that for whatever reason it may be, the liability under this provision cannot be avoided in the event the same stands returned by the banker unpaid. The legislature has been careful enough to record not only discharge in whole or in part of any debt but the same includes other liability as well. This aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the High Court, neither been dealt with or even referred to in the impugned judgment. Para No.11: The issue as regard the co-extensive liability of the guarantor and the principal debtor, in our view, is totally out of the purview of Section 138 of the Act, neither the same calls for any discussion therein. The language of the statute depicts the intent of the law-makers to the effect that wherever there is a default on the part of one in favour of another and in the event a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability there cannot be any restriction or embargo in the matter of application of the provisions of Section 138 of the Act. Any Cheque and other liability are the two key expressions which stands as clarifying the legislative intent so as to bring the factual context with the ambit of the provisions of the Statute. Any contra interpretation would defeat the intent of the legislature.
The judgments of the Apex Court as well as of this Court and Madras Court referred to above dealt with various situations. In P.J.Agro Tech. Ltd. Case (13 supra) the Apex Court held that the company and its directors cannot be made liable in respect of the cheque issued by its employee in discharge of the debt of the company. In Anil Sachars case (12 supra) the cheque issued by a Director of a sister concern of the accused company was dishonoured. After referring to ICDS Ltd. Case (15 supra), the Apex Court held that the accused is still liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Act. In ICDS Ltd. Case, the Apex Court, after considering the opening words of Section 138 of the Act namely wherever any cheque and the words debt or other liability, held that for whatever purpose the cheque is issued, the drawer is held liable for an offence under Section 138 of the Act.
Applying the principles of law enunciated in the judgments referred to above, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the complaint against all the accused is not maintainable cannot be accepted. At the same time the argument of the learned counsel for the second respondent that since the cheque of accused No.1 company was issued by accused No.2 in discharge of a debt incurred in his personal capacity, the company as well as its directors are liable for prosecution cannot also be accepted. The cheque which was issued was not on a account maintained in his individual capacity of accused No.2 but that of a company of which he is the Managing Director and also an authorized signatory to the cheques. Therefore, the circumstances under which the cheques signed by accused No.2 was issued to the complainant needs to be examined during the course of trial. Whether the cheque was issued pursuant to an agreement between the Directors or with a knowledge or understanding amongst its Directors or with the consent of all the Directors are disputed questions of facts, which needs to be established during trial. The complainant cannot be faulted with for having presented the cheque signed and issued by accused No.2 at this stage of the case. Therefore, it is to be held that accused No.2 alone is liable for prosecution as it was he, who took money for himself, signed the promissory notes and also issued the cheques belonging to the company in discharge of the said debt.
For the aforesaid reasons, the Criminal Petition is liable to be rejected against accused No.2.
Accordingly, the Criminal Petition insofar as accused No.2 is dismissed while the Criminal Petition insofar as accused No.1/company and accused Nos.3 and 4, who are the directors of accused No.1 company is allowed.
As a sequel to it, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this Criminal Petition, shall stand closed.
____________________ C.PRAVEEN KUMAR, J Date:28.01.2014
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