The expression "civil consequence" is of wider import. When an order passed by an authority involves a serious civil consequence, then such an authority is required to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. A fair hearing provided under the enactment should be reflected in the decision made. When such an exercise is required to be done by an authority who has been conferred with the power under the statute, the same has to be exercised in the manner known to law.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated : 11.09.2014
Coram
The Honourable Mr.Justice SATISH K. AGNIHOTRI
and
The Honourable Mr.Justice M.M.SUNDRESH
W.A.Nos.1130, 1152, 1159 and 1163 of 2014
Sri Muthukumaran Educational Trust
Vs.
The Secretary to Government,
Citation;AIR2015(NOC)188 MAD
Challenging the orders of disapproval passed by the Government of India on the schemed submitted for the renewal of permission to admit students for the academic year 2014-15, the appellants filed writ petitions before the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge dismissed all the writ petitions upholding the orders passed by the Government of India under Section 10-A(4) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act'') basing reliance upon the recommendations of the Medical Council of India, (in short, "MCI"). Aggrieved over the decision rendered by the learned single Judge, the appellants are before us.
2. For the sake of brevity, the submissions made by all the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants are summarised, as the issues of law are one and the same between the parties.
Submissions of Appellants:-
3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the deficiencies as found in the recommendations made by the MCI are not traceable to any Regulations and therefore they cannot be the basis upon which an order of disapproval can be passed. The findings of fact rendered by the MCI are not borne out by records. The MCI ought to have taken into consideration the records maintained by the Institutes. For the inordinate delay caused by the respondents, the appellants cannot be made to suffer. A surprise inspection alone cannot be the basis for the recommendation and the order passed in exercise of powers granted under Section 10-A of the Act. The Orders impugned disclose total non-application of mind. The procedure followed is an empty formality and no reasons have been assigned by taking note of the explanation given by the appellants. The opportunity of rectifying the defects as mandated under Section 10-A(3)(a) has not been followed. The learned single Judge has taken into consideration of the irrelevant materials without affording sufficient opportunities to the appellants. The appellants have complied with the primary requirements. Inspite of the adverse recommendations made by the MCI, the Government Medical Colleges have been given the approval of their schemes. The Orders passed are contrary to the Wednesbury's principle of reasonableness and the doctrine of proportionality. The orders are also tainted with legal malice. The deficiencies cannot be sustained on a combined reading of Minimum Requirements for 150 M.B.B.S. Admissions annually Regulations, 1999 read with the Act. When the delay is on the part of the respondents, the time limit given by the Supreme Court cannot be put against the appellants. The learned single Judge has not taken into consideration of the relevant materials while holding the approval pertaining to the building. The Government of India has abdicated its duty as enshrined under Section 10-A(4) of the Act and the orders passed have civil consequence. The MCI cannot take a stand that they were unable to re-assess the compliance report. Accordingly, it is submitted that the writ appeals will have to be allowed. In support of the contentions, the learned counsel made reliance upon the following decisions:
''(1) Priyadarshini Dental College and Hospital Vs. Union of India and others, ((2011) 4 SCC 623);
(2) Al - Karim Educational Trust Vs. State of Bihar, ((1996) 8 SCC 330);
(3) Mriduldhar Vs. Union of India, ((2005) 2 SCC 65);
(4) Priya Gupta Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, ((2012) 7 SCC 433);
(5) Lipika Gupta Vs. Union of India, (Order dated 19.5.2014 made in W.P.(C) No.737 of 2013)
(6) Shree Chhatrapati Shivaji Education Society Vs. Medical Council of India and others, (Interim Order dated 10.6.2011 made in L.P.A.NO.544 of 2011 on the file of Delhi High Court);
(7) Board of Governors in supression of M.C.I Vs. Shree Chhatrapati Shivaji Education Society and others, (Order dated 17.06.2011 made in S.L.P(c) No.16233 of 2011 against Delhi High Court Order dated 10.06.2011 made in L.P.A.No.544 of 2011);
(8) The Board of Governors, MCI Vs. Tagore Medical College, (Division Bench Judgment of Madras High Court in W.A.No.1638 of 2013 dated 7.8.2013);
(9) Madha Medical College & Hospital, rep.by its Chairperson Vs. Union of India and others, (Order dated 14.08.2013 made in S.L.P (C) No.25812 of 2013 against the Division Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court dated 7.8.2013 in W.A.No.1638 of 2013);
(10) Madha Medical College & Hospital Vs. Union of India, (Division Bench Judgment dated 14.08.2013 made in W.A.No.1600 of 2013 of Madras High Court);
(11) Board of Governors of MCI Vs. Madha Medical College and Hospital, (Order dated 4.10.2013 made in S.L.P(C) No.28011 of 2013 against Judgment dated 14.8.2013 made in W.A.No.1600 of 2013 on the file of Madras High Court);
(12) Royal Medical Trust Vs. Union of India, (2013(12) Scale 145);
(13) Om Kumar and Others Vs. Union of India ((2001) 2 SCC 386);
(14) Maharashtra Land Development Corporation and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, ((2011) 15 SCC 616);
(15) Smt.S.R.Venkataraman Vs. Union of India, ((1979) 2 SCC 491) and
(16) Kalabharati Advertising Vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and others, ((2010) 9 SCC 437).
Submissions of respondents:
4. Learned counsel appearing for the MCI submitted that the recommendations have been made after thorough analysis. A surprise inspection is a part of the scheme. The power of the MCI to make inspection and give its recommendations has not been questioned. The MCI is constituted with the persons, who are experts in the field of medical science. The factual findings rendered by the MCI cannot be put into challenge. Except the appellant in W.A.No.1159 of 2014, all the others were found lacking in filling up of adequate beds, which deficiency is fundamental in nature. There is no necessity under Section 10-A(3)(a) to give notice to the persons concerned before making recommendations to the Central Government. The language employed is ''may'''. The said procedure is also required only when a scheme is defective and does not contain any necessary particulars. The Honourable Supreme Court has refused to extend the time limit fixed as per the earlier judgments rendered in Mriduldhar Vs. Union of India, ((2005) 2 SCC 65), Priya Gupta Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, ((2012) 7 SCC 433) and Lipika Gupta Vs. Union of India, (Order dated 19.5.2014 made in W.P.(C) No.737 of 2013) referred supra, when an application was filed in I.A.Nos.11, 12-13, 14-17 in Civil Appeal No(s) 4318 of 2012 and I.A.Nos, 4 to 7 and 9 in C.A.No.4319 of 2012, as per the order dated 1.8.2014. There is no conflict between the provisions contained in the Act, 1956 vis-a-vis Minimum Requirements for 150 M.B.B.S Admissions annually Regulations, 1999 - amended upto November 2010 and the Establishment of Medical College Regulation 1999 with 2010 Amendments. The Scheme pertaining to the admission of students is different from opening a new college and recognition for awarding M.B.B.S.Degree. When the basic requirements are not available, the appellants cannot seek approval as a matter of right. When it is the case of the appellants that they have complied with the deficiencies pointed out, they cannot question the recommendations made based upon spot inspection. The recommendation based upon surprise inspection is for the purpose of verifying the records maintained by the appellants and the appellants cannot insist that the recommendations should only be made based upon random records, which are solely maintained by them. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has made reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in PRADIP KUMAR MAITY VS. CHINMOY KUMAR BHUNIA AND OTHERS, (2013) 11 SCC 122) and the Order passed by the Honourable Supreme Court in I.A.Nos.11, 12-13, 14-17 in Civil Appeal No(s) 4318 of 2012 and I.A.Nos, 4 to 7 and 9 in C.A.No.4319 of 2012.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the Central Government submitted that the orders have been passed in exercise of the power conferred under Section 10-A(4) of the Act. The appellants have been given an opportunity of being heard. It is not correct to state that the appellant in W.A.No.1163 of 2014 has not been given an opportunity. As the MCI is a body constituted to make inspection comprising experts its recommendations have been taken into consideration while disapproving the scheme of the appellants. Since a strict scrutiny is required in public interest, the schemes of the appellants were disapproved. Therefore, no interference is required to the order passed by the learned single Judge.
Decision of the learned single Judge:-
6. As submissions have been made on merit, the learned single Judge went into the details in extenso, while confirming the findings rendered by the MCI. Insofar as the submissions made on the non-application of mind on the part of the Central Government, it was rejected by the learned single Judge in the following manner:
''It is true, that the impugned order reflects only the letter of the Medical Council dated 12.07.2014 expressing inability to reassess/verify the compliance report. But it is a matter of fact that the Medical Council and the Central Government were actually racing against a time schedule fixed by the Supreme Court. Even the attempt made by the Central Government to take an extension of time from the Supreme Court failed when the Supreme Court rejected the request by an order dated 31.07.2014. The inability of the MCI to reassess/verify the compliance report, arose out of judicial orders and hence they cannot be found fault with. In any case, the Medical Council had applied its mind to the compliance report dated 02.06.2014 filed by the petitioner and hence the finding of fact recorded therein, could not have been belittled by the Central Government. Theretofore, the 5th contention is also rejected.''
7. Scope of Section 10-A of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956:-
7.1. Section 10-A of the Act speaks about a permission required for establishment of a new medical College, new course of study, etc., The said Section has contained eight sub-sections. Sub-section (1) starts with a non-obstante clause making it clear that no person shall establish a medical college or no medical college shall (i) open a new or higher course of study or training (including a post-graduate course of study or training) which would enable a student of such course or training to qualify himself for the award of any recognised medical qualification; or increase its admission capacity in any course of study or training (including a post- graduate course of study or training), except with the previous permission of the Central Government obtained as per the said provision. Under Explanation 2, the phrase ''admission capacity" has been defined as 'the 'maximum number of students that may be fixed by the Council from time to time for being admitted to such course or training. Therefore, the question of admission capacity will have to be decided by the authorities based upon a consideration of the relevant materials placed before them.
7.2. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 10-A, every person or medical college is required to submit to the Central Government a scheme in accordance with the provisions of Clause (b). When it is done, the Central Government shall refer the scheme to the Council for its recommendations. Sub-section (2) is followed by Sub-section (3) by which the Council on receipt of the scheme under sub-section (2) may obtain such other particulars as may be considered necessary by it. If the Council is of the view that the scheme is defective and does not contain necessary particulars, it may give a reasonable opportunity to the person or the College concerned for making a written representation and it shall be open to them to rectify the defects if any specified by the Council. Under Sub-section 10-A(3)(b), the Council is required to consider the scheme having regard to the factors referred to in sub-section (7) and submit the Scheme along with its recommendations to the Central Government. Therefore, Section 10-A(3) speaks about the role of the Council in making its recommendations to the Central Government. In that process, it may hear the person or the College concerned if the scheme is defective and does not contain any necessary particulars. If it is done, then liberty is given to the said person or College concerned to rectify the defects specified by the Council.
7.3. Under Sub-section (4), the Central Government is required to either approve or disapprove the scheme submitted before it. While doing so, it has to consider the scheme and the recommendations of the Council made under sub-section (3). After doing so, it can also obtain such necessary particulars as it deems fit from the person or College concerned while exercising power either to approve or disapprove the scheme.
7.4. While exercising power under sub-section (3), by sending the recommendations to the Central Government, the Council is required to keep in mind the factors as enunciated under sub-section (7) of Section 10-A. Similarly, while exercising the power under Section 10-A(4) the Central Government will have to keep in mind the factors as delineated in Sub-section (7). The proviso to sub-clause (4) mandates a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person or College concerned before disapproving the scheme. Sub-section (7) of Section 10-A stipulates factors which are to be borne in mind by the Council while making its recommendations under clause (b) of sub-section 3 of Section 10-A and the Central Government, while passing orders, either approve or disapprove the scheme under sub-section (4) of Section 10-A, as the case may be. Therefore, the factors as adumbrated under sub-clause (7) to Section 10-A are the guiding principles, which are to be borne in mind by the Council as well as the Central Government.
8. Exercise of Power under Section 10-A of the Act:-
Keeping in mind the scheme and the object enshrined under Section 10-A of the Act, let us have a look into the orders passed by the Central Government in disapproving the schemes submitted by the appellants. All the orders passed are more or less similar in nature. They have not expressly dealt with the reply given by the appellants as per the proviso to sub-section (4) to Section 10-A. On the contrary, they have been passed merely based upon the recommendations of the Council. It appears from the orders passed that the Central Government had asked for the response from the Council on the written representations made by the appellants in pursuant to the notices issued to them proposing to disapprove the scheme. However, the Council has informed the Central Government that it was unable to do so in view of the dead-line fixed by the Supreme Court having been crossed in the mean time. The Central Government has passed the impugned orders by merely accepting the recommendations of the Council. The Central Government is not mandated to hear the Council on the response given by the appellants. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the Central Government has abdicated its duty imposed under the Act, in not passing the orders on merit and on consideration of the available materials.
9. We do not find any discussion on merit in the orders impugned. No reasons have been assigned for accepting the recommendations made by the Council. It has not been indicated as to how the representations made by the appellants cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the orders impugned have got civil consequences. The mandate of Section 10-A(4) has not been followed in letter and spirit. The provision gives a power to the Central Government either to approve or disapprove the scheme on an analysis of the recommendations of the Council as against the materials produced by the appellants.
10. The records also would show that atleast in some cases of Government Institutions, the recommendations of the Council were not accepted by the Central Government. This fact would show that the recommendations are not binding on the Government, but should weigh while considering the question of approval or disapproval of a particular scheme. It is settled law that reasons are the heart-beat of an administrative order having civil consequences and they are required to be furnished in order to avoid arbitrariness, non-application of mind and discrimination.
11. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity apart from introducing an element of clarity. A non-application of mind is also a facet of arbitrariness. It has been held by the Supreme Court in East Coast Railway and another Vs. Mahadev Apparao and others, (((2010) 7 SCC 678) as under:
''Arbitrariness in the making of an order by an authority can manifest itself in different forms. Non-application of mind by the authority making the order is only one of them. Every order passed by a public authority must disclose due and proper application of mind by the person making the order. This may be evident from the order itself or the record contemporaneously maintained. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of mind by the authority making the order. And disclosure is best done by recording the reasons that led the authority to pass the order in question. Absence of reasons either in the order passed by the authority or in the record contemporaneously maintained is clearly suggestive of the order being arbitrary hence legally unsustainable.''
12. In the case of Secretary and Curator Victoria Memorial Hall Vs. Howra Ganatanrik Nagrik Samity and others, (2010) 3 SCC 732, the Supreme Court held as under:
''41. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, it becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. Absence of reasons renders the order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. [Vide Raj Kishore Jha Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. 10 AIR 2003 SC 4664; Vishnu Dev Sharma Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 11 (2008) 3 SCC 172; Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Rourkela I Circle & Ors. 12 (2008) 9 SCC 407; State of Uttaranchal & Anr. Vs. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi, 13 AIR 2008 SC 2026; U.P.S.R.T.C. Vs. Jagdish Prasad Gupta, 14 AIR 2009 SC 2328; Ram Phal Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. 15 (2009) 3 SCC 258; Mohammed Yusuf Vs. Faij Mohammad & Ors. 16 (2009) 3 SCC 513; and State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sada Ram & Anr. 17 (2009) 4 SCC 422].''
13. The Supreme Court in a recent pronouncement in Rashmi Metaliks Limited and another Vs. Kolkota Metropolitan Development Authority and others, ((2013) 10 SCC 95) after quoting with approval of the decision rendered in M.S.Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405), was pleased to hold as follows:
''15. The impugned Judgment is indubitably a cryptic one and does not contain the reasons on which the decision is predicated. Since reasons are not contained in the impugned Judgment itself, it must be set aside on the short ground that a party cannot be permitted to travel beyond the stand adopted and expressed by it in its earlier decision.
16. The following observations found in the celebrated decision in Mohinder Singh Gill vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR 1978 SC 851 are relevant to this question :
8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR 1952 SC 16) (at p.18):
Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his Supreme Today With All High Courts Page 6 of 7 mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow order.
Accordingly, we hold that, in the absence of any reasons assigned, while disapproving the scheme submitted by the appellants, the orders impugned cannot be sustained. The expression "civil consequence" is of wider import. When an order passed by an authority involves a serious civil consequence, then such an authority is required to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. A fair hearing provided under the enactment should be reflected in the decision made. When such an exercise is required to be done by an authority who has been conferred with the power under the statute, the same has to be exercised in the manner known to law. Accordingly, we are of the view that the Central Government has not exercised its power as entrusted to it under Section 10-A(4) of the Act.
14. In a writ of certiorari, we are concerned with the decision making process of an administrative authority rather than the decision itself. While exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being discretionary and extraordinary, the Court is not required to go into the field occupied by the experts. The Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and another Vs. Man Mohan Nath Sinha, ((2009) 8 SCC 310), while considering the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was pleased to hold that a judicial review is directed against a decision, but confined to the decision making process. The following paragraphs are apposite:
''14. The scope of judicial review in dealing with departmental enquiries came up for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh And Ors. vs. Chitra Ventaka Rao ((1975) 2 SCC 557) and this Court held:
"21. ......... The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 .................................................
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishna, AIR 1964 SC 477. 2.24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do."
15. The legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. The Court does not sit in judgment on merits of the decision. It is not open to the High Court to re-appreciate and reappraise the evidence led before the Inquiry Officer and examine the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer as a court of appeal and reach Supreme Today With All High Courts Page 4 of 5 its own conclusions. In the instant case, the High Court fell into grave error in scanning the evidence as if it was a court of appeal. The approach of the High Court in consideration of the matter suffers from manifest error and, in our thoughtful consideration, the matter requires fresh consideration by the High Court in accordance with law. On this short ground, we send the matter back to the High Court.
Writ of Certiorari:-
15. A similar view has also been reiterated by a subsequent decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Divisional Controller Vs. M.G.Vittal Rao, ((2012) 1 SCC 442), wherein it has been held as follows:
''31. The instant case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition and keeping in view that judicial review is concerned primarily with the decision making process and not the decision itself. More so, it is a settled legal proposition that in a case of misconduct of grave nature like corruption, theft, no punishment other than the dismissal may be appropriate. (Vide: Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. (supra); and U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Suresh Chand Sharma,38 (2010) 6 SCC 555)."
Therefore, testing the impugned orders passed by the Central Government in the light of the pronouncements referred to above, we are of the view that they cannot be sustained in the eye of law.
Conclusion:
16. In view of the above discussion, we are not willing to go into the merits of the case, though the learned single Judge has taken enormous pains to analyse the same, which was obviously volunteered by the appellants. Similarly, we are not inclined to go into the other questions on the scope of Section 10-A(3)(b) for the reason that two of the appellants have raised the said plea for the first time before us. Moreover, the appellants themselves have filed their compliance report. Thereafter, the Central Government has passed an order while exercising power under Section 10-A(4). The question of time-limit as fixed by the Supreme Court and the applicability of the same to the cases on hand, is also left open to be decided by the Central Government.
17. Though the arguments have been made attributing the legal malice on the part of the Central Government, we are not inclined to accept the same for a simple reason that we do not find any intention or a conscious violation of law by it, while exercising its power under Section 10-A(4) of the Act. However, coming to the Doctrine of Proportionality and Wednesbury's principle of reasonableness, we are again of the view that the question as to whether the appellants are entitled for a reduced intake of students, based upon the deficiencies pointed out by the Council in its recommendations is also left open to be decided by the Central Government. As we have not decided anything on merits, the appellants are at liberty to raise all their contentions before the Central Government, who, in turn is required to pass a reasoned order, on a proper consideration. While leaving the issues of fact and law open, we direct the Central Government to pass appropriate orders within a period of one week from the date of receipt of copy of the order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellants without being influenced by any of the observations made by the learned single Judge, on merits. Accordingly, the impugned orders passed by the Secretary to Government, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Department, as well as by the learned single Judge stand set aside.
18. In the result, the writ appeals stand allowed as indicated above. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.
(S.K.A.,J.) (M.M.S.,J.)
11.09.2014
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