A Supreme Court Bench comprising of Justice V. Gopala Gowda and Justice R. Banumathi, while quashing an FIR registered against the appellants, observed, “As far as the comments posted on the Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of appellants posting a comment on the Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.”
The Court was hearing a Special Leave Petition against karnataka High Court judgment which had dismissed a petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., holding that it was premature and was filed even before the completion of investigation.
The appellant had met with an accident with an auto rickshaw while she was driving. The passenger of the auto sustained injuries and was duly admitted in the hospital. The appellant had paid all the hospital expenses of the injured and the matter was amicably settled between them. No FIR was lodged. They were however called to the Police Station and were alleged threatened by the officers.
Being aggrieved with the manner with which they were treated, the appellants posted comments on the Bangalore Traffic Police Facebook page, accusing the respondent Police Officer of his and also forwarded an email complaining about the harassment meted out to them at the hands of the Respondent Police Inspector.
A Complaint was hence filed against them by the Police Inspector for posting of the comment on the Facebook by the appellants and FIR was registered against them under Sections 353 and 506 IPC.
It was submitted that such posting of derogatory comments on the Facebook page amounts to ‘threatening’ and ‘criminal intimidation’ within the meaning of Section 506 IPC affecting the complainant’s reputation and integrity
The appellants had contended that the Facebook page of the Bengaluru traffic police itself is a public forum meant for citizens to discuss and post their grievances and therefore, the comment of the appellants posted on the Facebook would not prima facie constitute an offence.
The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant.
The Court observed that there was nothing on record to show that force was used by the appellants or that the appellants assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the respondent from discharging his official duty.
With respect to section 503, it is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “Criminal intimidation”.
The Bench observed that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the respondent Police Inspector causing obstruction in discharge of his duty.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 141 OF 2015
[Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.6449 of 2014)
MANIK TANEJA vs. STATE OF KARNATKA & ANR.
Dated;January 20, 2015.
Citation: 2015(1)RCR(Criminal)765, 2015(1)SCALE484,2015 CRLJ 1483,(2015)7 SCC 423
R. BANUMATHI, J.
2.
This appeal by Special Leave arises out of the judgment
dated 24.04.2014 passed by the Karnataka High Court in Criminal
Petition No.252 of 2014, in and by which, the High Court, while
dismissing the petition, held that the petition is premature and
the same is filed even before the completion of the investigation.
3.
Brief facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as
under:- The appellant No.1 and his wife Sakshi Jawa met with an
accident with an auto rickshaw on 13.06.2013 at about 10.30 in
the morning, while Sakshi Jawa was driving Maruti SX4 KA-03-MM-
Page 1
2
8646.
One of the passengers, who was travelling by the auto,
namely Mrs. Laxmi Ganapati, sustained injuries and she was duly
admitted in the Santosh Hospital for treatment. Sakshi Jawa, the
appellant No.2, is said to have paid all the hospital expenses of the
injured and the matter is said to have been amicably
settled
between the injured and the appellants and no FIR was lodged.
The Constable, who was present at the time of incident, directed
the appellants to meet Mr. Kasim, Police Inspector, Pulakeshi
Nagar Traffic Police Station, Bangalore City. The appellants allege
that as soon as they entered the office of Mr. Kasim, he behaved in
a rude manner. Further, Mr. Kasim summoned the appellant No.2
to produce her driving licence and other documents. As at that
time no FIR was lodged, the appellant No. 2 questioned the Police
Inspector as to why she was being asked to produce those
documents.
Mr. Kasim, in reply,
is alleged to have threatened
appellant No.2 by saying that he would drag her to court if she
continued to argue and she was also thrown out of his office. On
the orders of
Mr. Kasim, his deputy told the appellants that they
are booking them on the charge of rash and negligent driving.
4.
Being aggrieved with the manner with which they were
treated, the appellants posted comments on the Bangalore Traffic
Police Facebook page,
accusing Mr. Kasim of his misbehaviour
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3
and also forwarded an email complaining about the harassment
meted out to them at the hands of the Respondent Police
Inspector. The Respondent No.2-Police Inspector filed a complaint
regarding the posting of the comment on the Facebook by the
appellants and subsequently FIR was registered against the
appellants for offences punishable under Sections 353 and 506
IPC on 14.06.2013.
5.
The appellants filed Criminal Petition No. 252 of 2014
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court seeking to quash
the FIR and the criminal proceedings initiated against them on
the ground that the complaint is an afterthought. The High court
vide its Order dated 24.04.2014 dismissed the petition stating
that the petition was filed at a premature stage. The appellants
by this special leave are seeking to assail the correctness of the
above Order.
6.
Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that
posting of a comment on the Facebook page of the traffic police
does not amount to an offence under Sections 353 and 506 IPC
and the FIR was not sustainable in law.
It was submitted that
Facebook page of the Bengaluru traffic police itself is a public
forum meant for citizens to discuss and post their grievances and
therefore, the comment of the appellants posted on the Facebook
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4
would not prima facie constitute the offence and the High Court
erred in not appreciating the matter in proper perspective.
7.
Per Contra, learned counsel for the Respondents
contended that by posting a comment on the Facebook of the
traffic police, the appellants obstructed the public duty of the
complainant and his staff by publicly making baseless allegations.
It was submitted that such posting of derogatory comments on
the Facebook page amounts to 'threatening' and ‘criminal
intimidation’ within the meaning of Section 506 IPC affecting the
complainant's reputation and integrity and the High Court rightly
declined to quash the FIR and the impugned order warrants no
interference.
8.
We have considered the rival contentions and perused
the impugned order and materials on record.
9.
The
legal
position
is
well-settled
that
when
a
prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to
be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted
allegations as made, prima facie, establish the offence. It is also
for the Court to take into consideration any special features which
appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient
and in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to
continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court, the chances of
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5
ultimate conviction is bleak and no useful purpose is likely to be
served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court
may quash the proceeding even though it may be at a
preliminary stage.
10.
In State of T.N. v. Thirukkural Perumal [(1995) 2 SCC 449]
considering the scope of Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the
FIR/criminal proceedings, this Court has held as under:-
“....The power of quashing an FIR and criminal proceeding
should be exercised sparingly by the courts. Indeed, the High
Court has the extraordinary or inherent power to reach out
injustice and quash the first information report and criminal
proceedings, keeping in view the guidelines laid down by this
Court in various judgments (reference in this connection may
be made with advantage to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) but the same has to be done with
circumspection. The normal process of the criminal trial
cannot be cut short in a rather casual manner....”
11.
So far as the issue regarding the registration of FIR
under Section 353 IPC is concerned, it has to be seen whether by
posting a comment on the Facebook of the traffic police, the
conviction under that Section could be maintainable.
Before
considering the materials on record, we may usefully refer to
Section 353 IPC which reads as follows:-
"353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant
from discharge of his duty.- Whoever assaults or uses
criminal force to any person being a public servant in the
execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to
prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as
such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or
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6
attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge
of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
12.
A reading of the above provision shows that the essential
ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are that the
person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public
servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or
deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public
servant. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears
that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an
offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the
appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal
force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his
official duty. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view,
that the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are not
made out.
13.
Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of
criminal intimidation. "Criminal intimidation" as defined in Section
503 IPC is as under:-
“503. Criminal Intimidation.- Whoever threatens another
with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the
person or reputation of any one in whom that person is
interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to
cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound
to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally
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7
entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such
threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.- A threat to injure the reputation of any
deceased person in whom the person threatened is
interested, is within this section.”
14.
A reading of the definition of “Criminal intimidation”
would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another
person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property
of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened
person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to
cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act
which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is
legally entitled to do.
15.
In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants
have abused the complainant and obstructed the second
respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the
integrity of the second respondent.
It is the intention of the
accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what
he
has
stated
comes
within
the
meaning
of
“Criminal
intimidation”. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm
to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any
work.
Mere expression of any words without any intention to
cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of
this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that
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8
the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts
and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no
intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the
minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge
of his duty. As far as the comments posted on the Facebook are
concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping
the public and the act of appellants posting a comment on the
Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in
Section 503 IPC.
16.
Of course, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section
482 Cr.P.C., the court should be extremely cautious to interfere
with the investigation or trial of a criminal case and should not
stall the investigation, save except when it is convinced beyond
any manner of doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission of
offence and that continuance of the criminal prosecution would
amount to abuse of process of the court.
As noted earlier, the
page created by the traffic police on the Facebook was a forum
for the public to put forth their grievances.
In our considered
view, the appellants might have posted the comment online
under the bona fide belief that it was within the permissible limits.
As
discussed
earlier,
even
going
by
the
uncontroverted
allegations in the FIR, in our view, none of the ingredients of the
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alleged offences are satisfied. We are of the view that in the facts
and circumstances of the case, it would be unjust to allow the
process of the court to be continued against the appellants and
consequently the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside.
17.
In the result, the impugned order of the High Court in
Criminal Petition No.252 of 2014 dated 24.4.2014 is set aside and
this appeal is allowed and the FIR in Crime No.174/2013 registered
against the appellants is quashed.
.................................J.
(V. Gopala Gowda)
................................J.
(R. Banumathi)
New Delhi,
January 20, 2015.
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