The Petitioner is entangled in a matrimonial dispute with his
wife/Complainant. Even before the CAW Cell , the Parties entered into a
settlement on 04.10.2013 to give their marriage another trial which
unfortunately remained unsuccessful.
The Complainant, who is a lady,
involved in a litigation with husband is unemployed and dependent on her
parents for her every need as well as of her child. In such type of disputes,
possibility of living together is never ruled out especially when even during
course of arguments, the Petitioner has expressed his desire to take back the
Complainant and child but due to her own apprehensions presently she is not
willing to live with her husband.
In the given facts and circumstances, the Petitioner is granted
anticipatory bail subject to the condition that he shall pay Rs.50,000/- in
cash or through pay order to the Complainant for meeting day to day
requirements of the child within 15 days from the date of this order and for
two weeks, no coercive steps shall be taken against the Petitioner to enable
him to comply with the above condition.
Thereafter, subject to the
fulfilment of above condition, in the event of arrest, the Petitioner be
released on bail on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.20,000/-
with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of IO/SHO concerned.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision : 25th July, 2014
BAIL APPLN. 35/2014
AVINASH
versus
STATE
PRATIBHA RANI, J.
Citation;2014(2) crimes 26 Delhi
The Petitioner is husband of the Complainant and seeking anticipatory
bail in case FIR No.554/2013 under Sections 498-A/406/34 IPC, PS New
Ashok Nagar.
2.
The Petitioner got married to the Complainant on 13.02.2012. A baby
girl was born on 09.01.2013 out of this wedlock who is now under care and
custody of the Complainant. Within 2-3 months of the marriage, rude and
arrogant attitude of the Complainant towards the Petitioner and his family as
well the Complainant insisting the Petitioner to get his share in the family
property, led to problem in their matrimonial life.
The father of the
Petitioner made them to live separately but the problem persisted. The
Complainant filed a false complaint before CAW Cell on 06.08.2013 but a
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 1 of 15
compromise was arrived at before CAW Cell on 04.10.2013. The Petitioner
left for her parent’s home on 16.10.2013. Thereafter notice was received by
the Petitioner and his family from CAW Cell and ultimately the complaint
culminated into registration of case FIR No.554/2013 under Sections 498-
A/406/34 IPC at PS New Ashok Nagar.
3. The Petitioner is seeking bail on the following grounds :-
(i) All the allegations in the FIR even if taken to be true, do not disclose
the commission of offence under Section 406/498-A IPC and there is no
legal evidence to connect the Petitioner with the alleged offence.
(ii)
The Complaint has been filed with ulterior motives on failure of the
Petitioner to agree to her (complainant’s) terms. The Petitioner is ready and
willing to keep the Complainant and the child with him.
(iii)
A bare reading of the complaint would reveal that it has been drafted
and vetted by a legal person.
(iv)
The Petitioner is ready and willing to join the investigation and no
purpose will be served if the Petitioner is sent to Jail and face humiliation.
4.
Prayer for grant of anticipatory bail has been rejected by learned
Addl. Session Judge on 20.12.2013 for the reason that the marriage between
the parties took place on 13.02.2012 and a daughter had also been born out
of the said wedlock. There are clear and specific allegations of harassment
and demand of Rs.10 lacs from the Complainant and jewellery articles of the
Complainant are also stated to be lying with the Applicant and his family.
Learned Addl. Session Judge was of the opinion that in view of the gravity
of the allegations, Applicant was not entitled to be released on anticipatory
bail.
5.
When the Present bail application came up for hearing before this
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 2 of 15
Court, noticing the Complainant to be with a child in her lap, the Petitioner
was asked to make some provision for the infant child at least for her food.
This was felt desirable by the Court for the reason that mediation had failed.
The Complainant and her daughter were not getting any maintenance from
the Petitioner either voluntarily or under any order of the Court. Since it is a
matrimonial dispute, leaned Counsel for the Petitioner Mr.Satish Tamta,
Advocate was requested to explore the possibility as to what the Petitioner
could do for the child during this matrimonial litigation so that at least the
child does not suffer because of warring parents and being father he is able
to perform at least some obligation towards the child. Since in matrimonial
disputes, possibility of the parties reuniting is always there, even after filing
of divorce petition, an effort was made by the Court to convince the
Petitioner to make some provision for the child so that child can be looked
after properly by the Complainant.
6.
Unfortunately, instead of making some offer for the child, learned
counsel for the Petitioner submitted that there is an increasing tendency
now-a-days wherein under such directions, the Petitioner is made to pay
which has the effect of buying the bail. Mr.Satish Tamta, Advocate for the
Petitioner has submitted that the Petitioner is ready and willing to take back
the Complainant and child, if she so desires but not willing to buy bail by
making payment to the Complainant.
7.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that in a proceeding
under Section 438 CrPC, the Court cannot award maintenance to the wife
and child or subject the accused to such conditions which would be beyond
the jurisdiction of the Court. Mr.Satish Tamta, Advocate further submitted
that the conditions to which the accused can be subjected while granting
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 3 of 15
anticipatory bail are enumerated in Section 438 CrPC and any order by the
Court by putting condition on him to pay the money would be beyond the
powers conferred on the Court under Section 438 CrPC.
8.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon Jagmohan Singh
Kataria & Anr. v. State of NCT of Delhi 2002 (3) JCC 1721, Munish
Bhasin & Ors. v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (2009) 4
SCC 45 and M.R.Narayanan v. State 2002 (3) JCC 1674 submitting that
this Court cannot impose any condition on the Petitioner by directing him to
make some deposit as a pre-condition to seek anticipatory bail.
The
Petitioner has applied for anticipatory bail and the Court is required to
consider the provisions under Section 438 CrPC while dealing with the
prayer of the Petitioner and grant or reject the prayer in accordance with the
above provisions.
9.
The basic question that arises for consideration now is whether a
gesture which should have been volunteered by the Petitioner, but suggested
by the Court, can be termed as unreasonable condition which can have the
effect of terming such condition as buying the bail.
10.
On behalf of State and Complainant, it has been submitted that
Complainant had not been awarded any maintenance till date though she has
filed a petition claiming maintenance.
It is further submitted that the
Complainant and her child is dependent on the family of the Complainant.
The Complainant is not even employed.
11.
In the case Jagmohan Singh Kataria & Anr. v. State of NCT of
Delhi (Supra) relied upon by learned Counsel for the Petitioner, in a
matrimonial dispute while granting anticipatory bail, vide order dated
19.10.2001 the learned ASJ directed the Accused/Petitioner to file an FDR
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 4 of 15
for a sum of Rs.5 lacs in the name of District & Sessions Judge, Delhi within
two days. Subsequently, the anticipatory bail was confirmed vide order
dated 01.11.2001 subject to the condition that the Petitioner will further
deposit Rs.5 lacs within seven days. Both the orders were challenged by
filing separate Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions and the conditions imposed
in the bail order were set aside by the Court observing as under :
‘Under Section 437 (3) and 438 (2) Criminal Procedure Code shows
that conditions which can be imposed are primarily with a view to
ensure availability of the accused during investigation, enquiry or
trial and his non-interference with the course of justice. Other
conditions which Court may think fit can also be imposed but idea
should be to ensure his presence as and when required and his non-
interference with the investigation, enquiry or trial. It is obvious that
other conditions should be ‘ejusdem generis’ to the conditions which
are already enumerated under Sections 437(3) or 438(2) Criminal
Procedure Code.’
12.
In the case Munish Bhasin & Ors. v. State (Government of NCT of
Delhi) & Anr. (supra) the Appellant (A-1) assailed the conditions imposed
by the High Court while granting anticipatory bail to the Appellant/A-1 and
his parents in a case under Section 406/498-A read with Section 34 IPC
requiring him to pay Rs.12500/- per month as maintenance to his wife
and child. In the facts and circumstances that the wife of the Appellant
(A-1) was employed and receiving a handsome salary and not entitled to
maintenance and further the question of maintenance should be left to be
decided by the Court in appropriate proceedings, the Apex Court held that in
proceeding under Section 438 CrPC, the Court would not be justified in
awarding maintenance to the wife and child.
13.
In another case M.R.Narayanan v. State (Supra) relied upon by
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 5 of 15
learned counsel for the Petitioner, a reference was made to the Division
Bench pursuant to the conflicting views in judgments dated 26.11.2001 in
Cr.R. 638/2001 titled as Mrs.Rajeshwari Verma & Anr. vs. State, Sarkar
Saheb vs. State 93 (2001) DLT 585 and Vansh Bahadur Singh vs. State
1998 (2) JCC (Delhi) 39.
14.
It may be noted here that in Sarkar Saheb’s case (Supra), while
considering an application for grant of anticipatory bail in a case under
Section 498-A/406 IPC, a condition was imposed on the accused to deposit
Rs.50,000/- in lieu of non-return of jewellery articles. Feeling aggrieved,
the accused/Petitioner filed Crl.R.156/2001 & Crl.M.301/2001 contending
that imposing a condition to deposit Rs.50,000/- was beyond the powers of
the Court under Section 438 CrPC and under Section 438 (2)(iv) CrPC, the
Court could have imposed only such condition that may be imposed under
Section 437(3)(c) CrPC while granting bail under Section 438 CrPC. While
rejecting the contention of the Petitioner, it was held as under :-
‘4. Section 437(3) of the Code, which deals with bails in non-bailable
offences, stipulates that when a person accused or suspected of
commission of offence punishable with imprisonment, which may
extend to seven years or more or an offence under Chapter VI,
Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of Indian Penal Code or abetment or
conspiracy thereof is released on bail, the Court may impose any
condition, which it considers necessary in the interests of justice. The
offence under Section 406 IPC falls in Chapter xviii of the Indian
Penal Code and as such, conditions as envisaged in sub-clause (3) of
Section 437 of the Code can be attached thereto. In the judgment,
referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner in Ashok Malhotra's
case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court had also clearly
held that attaching of a condition to an order of anticipatory bail is
permissible. However, Hon'ble Judge was of the view that the
discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily. It was held that an
unreasonable condition frustrates the very purpose of the bail. In the
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 6 of 15
Supreme Court judgment, referred to by learned counsel for the
petitioner, Their Lordships had emphasised the need for liberal
approach in the matter of orders relating to bail.
5. Coming to the facts of the case in hand, it is found that the
petitioner is being proceeded against under Section 498-A/406 IPC on
the complaint of his wife, who had alleged that soon after her
marriage, the petitioner and his family had started harassing and
torturing her in regard to the dowry demands. She had also alleged
that her jewellery as well as Istri Dhan was taken and retained by her
husband and his brother's wife on the assurance that it would be
returned as and when required. However, when the complainant
demanded her jewellery and other articles back, they flatly refused
and threw her out of the matrimonial home. In matrimonial disputes,
a tendency appears to be emerging to return only those articles of
dowry, which become worthless after use and retain the jewellery
which has a higher value. Therefore, under such circumstances the
condition attached by learned Additional Sessions Judge to merely
deposit a sum of Rs.50,00/- with the Trial Court in F.D.R. to be dealt
with at the final stage of the trial, was not an unreasonable, unjust or
arbitrary condition. It appears that this condition was imposed to
protect and safeguard the interests of the complainant and also make
the petitioner feel that law does not countenance harassment of newly
wed girls and deprivation of their jewellery and other valuables with
impunity.’
15.
In Sarkar Saheb’s case, the condition of depositing the amount,
equivalent to the amount of istridhan was held to be a reasonable and just
condition for grant of bail by the Division Bench of this Court.
16.
After considering the decision of Supreme Court in M.Sreenivasulu
Reddy vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2001(2) Crimes 230, the reference was
answered in following terms :
18. In the light of the decision of Supreme Court in M. Srinivasulu
Reddy the question posed before us has to be answered holding that
the purpose of imposing conditions, which are envisaged in Sub-
section (3) of Section 437 or Sub-section (2) of Section 438 or Sub-
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 7 of 15
section (1) of Section 439 cannot be such the object of which should
be to recover the alleged amount. In that sense neither it is
permissible nor appropriate either to buy bail by accused by offering
to pay the alleged amount or sell bail by the Additional Sessions
Judge in calling upon the accused to pay the amount. The conditions
imposed must be reasonable and just which may be considered by the
Court in the facts and circumstances of the case in order to secure the
presence of the accused for interrogation by the police officers, as and
when required; the ensure that the accused does not misuse liberty by
directly to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to
dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or to the police
officer; to ensure that the accused does not leave territorial limits of
the country without previous permission of the court; or that the
accused does not commit an offence similar to the offence for which
he is accused or suspected, during the period when he is on bail. The
court while imposing conditions has to exercise its discretion
considering the facts and circumstances of the case. Discretion has to
be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily and certainly the object of
imposing conditions should not be to recover the amount.
19. In the light of the position in law aforementioned, a view
expressed by the learned Single Judge in Sarkar Saheb's case (supra)
is not in conflict with the decisions rendered in Rajeshwari Varma's
case (supra) since in Sarkar Saheb's case the court considered the
condition to be just, fair and reasonable, in the facts and
circumstances of the case and not a harsh condition. However, in
Sarkar Saheb's case the court did not examine the question as to
whether the object of imposing condition was the one which is
provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 438 of Cr.P.C. The learned
Single Judge in Rajeshwari Varma's case found the condition imposed
to be in consonance with the purposes laid down in Sub-section (2) of
Section 438 or Sub-section (3) of Section 437 of Cr.P.C. In Vansh
Bahadur Singh's case (supra) learned Single Judge adopted the same
approach as was adopted by the Supreme Court in M. Sreenivasulu
Reddy's case that when an accused has undertaken to deposit the
amount and acting on that undertaking an interim order of bail was
granted, the order did not require any interference thereafter since
the accused was bound to pay and since the balance amount which he
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 8 of 15
had undertaken to pay and since the balance amount was not paid,
rightly the court had declined to grant indulgence to the accused.
20. There is a valid reason for taking this view of the matter and the
reason being the doctrine of estoppel, which was duly approved by the
Supreme Court in Sajan K. Varghese and Ors. v. State of Kerala and
Ors. 1989 SCC (Cri) 339. In nutshell it was held that when a court in
persuaded to accept the terms and conditions for grant of indulgence,
it will not be permissible for the party later on to resile from those
terms and conditions. It is permissible, when an undertaking is given
on behalf of the accused to deposit the amount, that indulgence can be
granted to him, if considered reasonable and proper. Reference may
be made in this regard to the decisions of Supreme Court in
Chakrawarti Prasad v. State of Bihar 1(2001) CCR 249 and Amarjit
Singh v. State (NCT) of Delhi 2002 (61) DRJ 670 . In the later
decision, the Supreme Court observed that imposition of a condition
to deposit a sum of Rs. fifteen lakhs in the form of FDR was
unreasonable since as per Sub-section (2) of Section 438 Cr.P.C.
conditions which can be imposed should not be unreasonable. A
condition, which would be difficult to comply with would amount to
imposition of an unreasonable condition and would tantamount to
refusal; of invoking the discretion under Sub-section (1) of Section
438 Cr.P.C. In Sandeep Jain v. State of Delhi JT 2000 (1) SC 166 :
2000 (2) JCC 639 condition of deposit of amount of Rs. two lakhs
apart from furnishing a bond of Rs. 50,000/- with two solvent sureties,
while granting bail was held by the Supreme Court to be
unreasonable one.
17.
Even at the cost of repetition, it may be noted here that in the case
M.R.Narayanan v. State (Supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the
Petitioner, the condition of depositing the amount, equivalent to the amount
of istridhan was held to be a reasonable and just condition for grant of bail
by the Division Bench of this Court.
18.
The provisions of Section 437, 438 and 439 CrPC and the power of
Court to impose conditions came up for consideration before the
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 9 of 15
Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia
& Ors. vs. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 1632. For purpose of dealing with
this bail application and the contentions of learned counsel for the Petitioner,
it would be appropriate to refer to paras 1, 14 to 17 of the report, which are
extracted as under :
‘1. These appeals by Special Leave involve a question of great public
importance bearing, at once, on personal liberty and the
investigational powers of the police. The society has a vital stake in
both of these interests, though their relative importance at any given
time depends upon the complexion and restraints of political
conditions. Our task in these appeals is how best to balance these
interests while determining the scope of Section 438 of the CrPC,
1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974).
xxx xxx xxx
14. The provisions of Section 437 and 439 furnished a convenient
model for the legislature to copy while enacting Section 438. If it has
not done so and has departed from a pattern which could easily be
adopted with the necessary modifications, it would be wrong to refuse
to give to the departure its full effect by assuming that it was not
intended to serve any particular or specific purpose. The departure, in
our opinion, was made advisedly arid purposefully : Advisedly, at
least in part, because of the 41st Report of the Law Commission
which, while pointing out the necessity of introducing a provision in
the Code enabling the High Court and the Court of Session to grant
anticipatory bail, said in paragraph 29.9 that it had "considered"
carefully the question of laying down in the statute certain conditions
under which alone anticipatory bail could be granted" but had come
to the conclusion that the question of granting such bail should be left
"to the discretion of the court" and ought not to be fettered by the
statutory provision itself, since the discretion was being conferred
upon superior courts which were expected to exercise it judicially.
The legislature conferred a wide discretion of the High Court and the
Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail because it evidently felt,
firstly, that it would be difficult to enumerate the conditions under
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 10 of 15
which anticipatory bail should or should not be granted and secondly,
because the intention was to allow the higher courts in the echelon a
somewhat free hand in the grant of relief in the nature of anticipatory,
bail. That is why, departing from the terms of Sections 437 and 439,
Section 438(1) uses the language that the High Court or the Court of
Session "may, if it thinks fit" direct that the applicant be released on
bail. Sub-section (2) of Section 438 is a further and clearer
manifestation of the same legislative intent to confer a wide
discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail. It provided that the
High Court or the Court of Session, while issuing a direction for the
grant of anticipatory bail, "may include such conditions in such
directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may
think fit", including the conditions which are set out in Clauses (i) to
(iv) of Sub-section (2). The proof of legislative intent can best be
found in the language which the legislature uses. Ambiguities can
undoubtedly be resolved by resort to extraneous aids but words, as
wide and explicit as have been used in Section 438, must be given
their full effect, especially when to refuse to do so will result in undue
impairment of the freedom of the individual and the presumption of
innocence. It has to be borne in mind that anticipatory bail is sought
when there is a mere apprehension of arrest on the accusation that the
applicant has committed a non-bailable offence. A person who has yet
to lose his freedom by being arrested asks for freedom in the event of
arrest. That is the stage at which it is imperative to protect his
freedom, in so far as one may, and to give full play to the presumption
that he is innocent. In fact, the stage at which anticipatory bail is
generally sought brings about its striking dissimilarity with the
situation in which a person who is arrested for the commission of a
non-bailable offence asks for bail. In the latter situation, adequate
data is available to the Court, or can be called for by it, in the light of
which it can grant or refuse relief and while granting it, modify it by
the imposition of all or any of the conditions mentioned in Section
437.
15. This is not to say that anticipatory bail, if granted, must be
granted without the imposition of any conditions. That will be plainly
contrary to the very terms of Section 438. Though Sub-section (1) of
that section says that the Court "may, if it thinks fit" issue the
necessary direction for bail, sub-section (2) confers on the Court the
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 11 of 15
power to include such conditions in the direction as, it may think fit in
the light of the facts of the particular case, including the conditions
mentioned in Clauses (i) to (iv) of that sub-section. The controversy
therefore is not whether the Court has the power to impose conditions
while granting anticipatory bail. It clearly and expressly has that
power. The true question is whether by a process of construction, the
amplitude of judicial discretion which is given to the High Court and
the Court of Session, to impose such conditions as they may think fit
while granting anticipatory bail, should be cut down by reading into
the statute conditions which are not to be found therein, like those
evolved by the High Court or canvassed by the learned Additional
Solicitor General. Our answer, clearly and emphatically, is in the
negative. The High Court and the Court of Session to whom the
application for anticipatory bail is made ought to be left free in the
exercise of their judicial discretion to grant bail if they consider it fit
so to do on the particular facts and circumstances of the case and on
such conditions as the case may warrant. Similarly, they must be left
free to refuse bail if the circumstances of the case so warrant, on
considerations similar to those mentioned in Section 437 or which are
generally considered to be relevant Under Section 439 of the Code.
16. Generalisations on matters which rest on discretion and the
attempt to discover formulae of universal application when facts are
bound to differ from case to case frustrate the very purpose of
conferring discretion. No two cases are alike on facts and therefore,
Courts have to be allowed a little free play in the joints if the
conferment of discretionary power is to be meaningful. There is no
risk involved in entrusting a wide discretion to the Court of Session
and the High Court in granting anticipatory bail because, firstly,
these are higher courts manned by experienced persons, secondly,
their orders are not final but are open to appellate or revisional
scrutiny and above all because, discretion has always to be exercised
by courts judicially and not according to whim, caprice or fancy. On
the other hand, there is a risk in foreclosing categories of cases in
which anticipatory bail may be allowed because life throws up
unforeseen possibilities and offers new challenges. Judicial discretion
has to be free enough to be able to take these possibilities in its stride
and to meet these challenges. While dealing with the necessity for
preserving judicial discretion unhampered by rules of general
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 12 of 15
application, Earl Loreburn L.C. said in Hyman and Anr. v. Rose
[1912] A. C 623 :
I desire in the first instance to point out that the discretion given by
the section is very wide.... Now it seems to me that when the Act is so
express to provide a wide discretion... it is not advisable to lay down
any rigid rules for guiding that discretion. I do not doubt that the
rules enunciated by the Master of the Rolls in the present case are
useful maxims in general, and that in general they reflect the point of
view from which judges would, regard an application for relief. But I
think it ought to be distinctly understood that there may be cases in
which any or all of them may be disregarded. If it were otherwise, the
free discretion given by the statute would be fettered by limitations
which have nowhere been enacted. It is one thing to decide what is the
true meaning of the language contained in an Act of Parliament. It is
quite a different thing to place conditions upon a free discretion
entrusted by statute to the Court where the conditions are not based
upon statutory enactment at all. It is not safe, I think, to say that the
Court must and will always insist upon certain things when the Act
does not require them, and the facts of some unforeseen case may
make the Court wish it had kept a free hand.
17. Judges have to decide cases as they come before them, mindful of
the need to keep passions and prejudices out of their decisions. And it
will be strange if, by employing judicial artifices and techniques, we
cut down the discretion so wisely conferred upon the Courts, by
devising a formula which will confine the power to grant anticipatory
bail within a strait-jacket. While laying down cast-iron rules in a
matter like granting anticipatory bail, as the High Court has done, it
is apt to be overlooked that even Judges can have but an imperfect
awareness of the needs of new situations. Life is never static and
every situation has to be assessed in the context of emerging concerns
as and when it arises. Therefore, even if We were to frame a 'Code for
the grant of anticipatory bail', which really is the business of the
legislature, it can at best furnish broad guide-lines and cannot compel
blind adhere'nce. In which case to grant bail and in which to refuse it
is, in the very nature of things, a matter of discretion. But apart from
the fact that the question is inherently of a kind which calls for the use
of discretion from case to case, the legislature has, in terms express,
Bail Appln. No.35/2014
Page 13 of 15
relegated the decision of that question to the discretion of the court,
by providing that it may grant bail "if it thinks fit". The concern of the
courts generally is to preserve their discretion without meaning to
abuse it. It will be strange if we exhibit concern to stultify the
discretion conferred upon the Courts by law.
19.
In view of the above decision of Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the
suggestion by the Court to make some provisions for the immediate need of
the child cannot be described as buying the bail or awarding maintenance.
20.
The Petitioner is entangled in a matrimonial dispute with his
wife/Complainant. Even before the CAW Cell , the Parties entered into a
settlement on 04.10.2013 to give their marriage another trial which
unfortunately remained unsuccessful.
The Complainant, who is a lady,
involved in a litigation with husband is unemployed and dependent on her
parents for her every need as well as of her child. In such type of disputes,
possibility of living together is never ruled out especially when even during
course of arguments, the Petitioner has expressed his desire to take back the
Complainant and child but due to her own apprehensions presently she is not
willing to live with her husband.
21.
In the given facts and circumstances, the Petitioner is granted
anticipatory bail subject to the condition that he shall pay Rs.50,000/- in
cash or through pay order to the Complainant for meeting day to day
requirements of the child within 15 days from the date of this order and for
two weeks, no coercive steps shall be taken against the Petitioner to enable
him to comply with the above condition.
Thereafter, subject to the
fulfilment of above condition, in the event of arrest, the Petitioner be
released on bail on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.20,000/-
with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of IO/SHO concerned.
22. Application stands disposed of in above terms.
23. Any observations made hereinabove for the purpose of dealing with
the contentions of counsel for the petitioner shall not be deemed to be an
expression on merits of the case.
24.
As prayed, copy of the order be given dasti to learned counsel for the
parties.
PRATIBHA RANI, J
July 25, 2014
No comments:
Post a Comment