In Karam Bibi v. Mehr Ali, AIR 1933 Lahore 876, the Lahore High Court dealing with a similar question held:
"Where a decree-holder who has given a power of attorney to execute the decree dies, it is not possible to prosecute the execution on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased decree holders without a power of attorney from legal representative himself."
7. In view of the above principle of law laid down by the Privy Council, as also by the Lahore High Court, it is clear that as soon as the principal dies the agency stands terminated unless the legal representatives or assignees of the principal authorise the power of attorney holders to continue as such. In this view of the matter, inasmuch as there is no question of authorisation involved in the instant case, the power of attorney stood terminated on the date of the death of the plaintiff and in any event by the date of filing of the L.R. application (I.A. (SR) 13 of 1986).
Andhra High Court
A.B. Ramulu (Died) Per Lrs. vs B. Yadigir Reddy (Died) Rep., By ... on 17 March, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1993 (2) ALT 425
1. This revision gives rise to an important question of law, namely, whether the power of attorney survives after the death of the principal so as to enable the attorney holder to continue the suit proceedings.
2. O.S.No. 895 of 1985 was filed for rendition of accounts and dissolution of partnership against the present revision petitioners. Pending that suit, the plaintiff died on 7th October, 1985. Thereafter, the respondents herein filed an application, I.A. (SR) 13 of 1986, for bringing the legal representatives on record along with a condone delay petition in filing that L.R. application. However, the delay condone application was dismissed by the trial Court on 23rd February, 1987 and even the revision petition preferred against that order to this Court resulted in dismissal. In spite of all this, the trial Court was calling the suit by adjourning it from time to time. The revision petitioners' application to dismiss the suit, as abated, was dismissed by the trial Court, holding that the power of attorney holders were on record and therefore, the suit cannot be said to have abated. Hence, this revision by the defendants.
3. Though notices were served on the respondents, nobody appeared on their behalf and they were called absent.
4. Now, adverting to the question framed in the opening paragraph, it is to be noticed that Sections 201, 208 and 209 of the Contract Act have relevance to the issue. Section 201 postulated that the agency stands terminated by the death of the principal, apart from other contingencies. As per Section 208, the moment the agent comes to know of the death of the principal, the agency comes to an end. Section 209 empowers the agent, on termination of the agency by virtue of the death of the principal, to take all reasonable steps to safeguard and protect the property involved in the matter. In the case on hand, the respondents herein came to know of the death of the principal in the year 1986 itself when the application to bring the legal representatives on record was filed. However, that revision could not be maintained inasmuch as the delay in filing that application was not condoned and the LA. therefore, stood dismissed. As noted supra, a reading of Sections 201 & 208 of Contract Act, together, makes it clear that the moment the agent (Power of Attorney) comes to know of the death of the principal, the agency (the power under the attorney) comes to an end. Consequently, once the agency stands terminated, the power of attorney holder (agent) has absolutely no locus standi to continue the suit proceedings.
5. This is not a case where the legal representatives or the assignees of the principal authorised the power of attorney holders to continue as such, in order to enable them to continue the suit proceedings. In the absence of such an authorisation, the power of attorney holders are incapable to continue the suit proceedings. More or less in a similar context, the Privy Council in Mujibunnissa v. Abdul Rahim, 28 (1900-01) I.A. 15 as cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, considered the question, whether the registration of the instrument effected at the instance of the power of attorney from a dead man is valid. The facts in that case show that the executant of the instrument (Principal) having completed the instrument in all respects, after its return for compliance, by 24th October, 1889, happened to die, and after his death the instrument was represented for registration on 4-11-1889 by the agent and that was registered. The Privy Council after referring to these facts, held that inasmuch as the principal was dead by the date of representation, the agent was incapable of acting on his behalf since the agency stood terminated. Accordingly, the registration effected was held to be invalid rendering the document to be inadmissible.
6. In Karam Bibi v. Mehr Ali, AIR 1933 Lahore 876, the Lahore High Court dealing with a similar question held:
"Where a decree-holder who has given a power of attorney to execute the decree dies, it is not possible to prosecute the execution on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased decree holders without a power of attorney from legal representative himself."
7. In view of the above principle of law laid down by the Privy Council, as also by the Lahore High Court, it is clear that as soon as the principal dies the agency stands terminated unless the legal representatives or assignees of the principal authorise the power of attorney holders to continue as such. In this view of the matter, inasmuch as there is no question of authorisation involved in the instant case, the power of attorney stood terminated on the date of the death of the plaintiff and in any event by the date of filing of the L.R. application (I.A. (SR) 13 of 1986).
8. Furthermore, it cannot be held that the power of attorney is a party to the suit independent of the principal. He stands only in the shoes of the principal and there is no competence for the power of attorney holder to continue the proceedings after the death of the principal inasmuch as the suit gets abated immediately on the death of the plaintiff. Contextually, it is useful to have a reference to a decision of the Madras High Court in Satyanarayana v. Anjareddi, (28) AIR 1941 Mad. 719. There the question arose was, whether the next friend of the minor plaintiff could be said to be a party to the suit. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court held:
"The word 'Plaintiff in Section 95 is confined to the plaintiff alone and does not include a next friend. Consequently, the court has no jurisdiction to order the next friend of the minor plaintiff to pay compensation under Section 95 but this does not prevent an injured party from instituting a suit to recover from the next friend compensation should he wish to do so."
Therefore, when the very next friend of the minor plaintiff cannot be construed to be a party to the suit, it is still worse a case where a power of attorney holder could be said to be a party to the suit inspite of the fact that the principal happended to die and there was no authorisation obtained by the attorney holder from the assignees or legal representatives of the deceased principal to continue himself as the power of attorney holder.
9. In view of the foregoing discussion, the revision is allowed by setting aside the order under revision I.A.No. 2914 of 1988. Consequently, the suit O.S.No. 895/85. stands dismissed, as abated.
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