It is relevant here to state that the expression "relative of the husband" has been used in Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code While interpreting the said expression, this Court in the case of U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector of Police and Anr. MANU/SC/0774/2009 : (2009) 6 SCC 787 held it to mean a person related by blood, marriage or adoption. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:
10. In the absence of any statutory definition, the term "relative" must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or granddaughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word "relative" would depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or adoption.
8. The expression relative of the husband further came up for consideration in the case of Vijeta Gajra v. State of NCT of Delhi MANU/SC/0456/2010 : (2010) 11 SCC 618 and while approving the decision of this Court in U. Suvetha (Supra), it was held that the word relative would be limited only to the blood relations or the relations by marriage. It is appropriate to reproduce the following passage from the said judgment:
12. Relying on the dictionary meaning of the word "relative" and further relying on Ramanatha Aiyar's, Advance Law Lexicon (Vol. 4, 3rd Edn.), the Court went on to hold that Section 498-A Indian Penal Code being a penal provision would deserve strict construction and unless a contextual meaning is required to be given to the statute, the said statute has to be construed strictly. On that behalf the Court relied on the judgment in T. Ashok Pai v. CIT MANU/SC/7720/2007 : (2007) 7 SCC 162. A reference was made to the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of M.P. MANU/SC/0466/2002 : (2007) 15 SCC 369. After quoting from various decisions of this Court, it was held that reference to the word "relative" in Section 498-A Indian Penal Code would be limited only to the blood relations or the relations by marriage.
9. It is well known rule of construction that when the Legislature uses same words in different part of the statute, the presumption is that those words have been used in the same sense, unless displaced by the context. We do not find anything in context to deviate from the general rule of interpretation. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that the word "relative of the husband" in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code would mean such persons, who are related by blood, marriage or adoption. When we apply this principle the Respondent herein is not related to the husband of the deceased either by blood or marriage or adoption. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court did not err in passing the impugned order. We hasten to add that a person, not a relative of the husband, may not be prosecuted for offence Under Section 304B Indian Penal Code but this does not mean that such a person cannot be prosecuted for any other offence viz. Section 306 Indian Penal Code, in case the allegations constitute offence other than Section 304B Indian Penal Code.
REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1278 OF 2014
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.1696 of 2006)
STATE OF PUNJAB
VERSUS
GURMIT SINGH
Chandramauli Kr. Prasad
Citation;AIR2014SC2561,2014CriLJ3586, 2014(3)Crimes203(SC),(2014) 9 SCC 632
State
of Punjab
aggrieved by
the order
dated 7th of September, 2005, passed by the
Punjab
and
Haryana
High
Court
in
Criminal
Revision No. 320 of 2000 whereby it has set
aside the order of the trial court dated 24th
of
January,
2000
summoning
the
respondent
Gurmit Singh to face trial under Section 319
Page 1
2
of
the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,
has
preferred this special leave petition.
Leave granted.
Facts lie in a very short compass.
On the
basis of a report a case under Section 304B of
the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) was
registered at Police Station, Kharar.
In the
first information report, the names of various
accused
persons
figured
including
Gurmit
Singh, the respondent herein. Police after
usual the
investigation,
submitted
charge-
sheet in which the respondent did not figure
as an accused.
However, the respondent along
with some other accused persons who were not
charge-sheeted
trial.
were
summoned
to
face
the
They challenged the said order before
the High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 1584-M of
1999 and the High Court by its order dated 25 th
of
February,
1999
set
aside
the
order
Page 2
3
summoning those accused persons including the
respondent but while doing so gave liberty to
take recourse to the provisions of Section 319
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Code’, at an appropriate
stage of the trial.
During the course of
trial, evidence of one Shakuntla Rani, PW-1
was recorded, who averred that the respondent
herein was also responsible for the death of
Gurjit
Kaur,
the
wife
of
Paramjit
Singh.
Thereafter, an application was filed by the
prosecution
Singh
and
for
other
summoning
accused
aforesaid
persons
Gurmit
before
the
trial court in exercise of the power under
Section 319 of the Code.
The trial court by
its order dated 24th of January, 2000, summoned
the respondent besides other accused persons
to face trial, for commission of offence under
Section 304B IPC, inter alia, observing that
the names of those persons figured in the FIR,
statement
of
the
witnesses
recorded
under
Page 3
4
Section 161 of the Code and the evidence of
Shakuntla Rani, PW-1.
Respondent challenged the aforesaid order
in
a
revision
application
filed
before
the
High Court inter alia on the ground that he
cannot be tried for offence under Section 304B
of the Code because he is not a relative of
the husband of the deceased.
It was pointed
out that Paramjit Singh happened to be the
husband of the deceased whereas the respondent
is
the
brother
of
his
aunt
(chachi)
and,
therefore, cannot be said to be a relative of
the deceased’s husband.
found
favour
with
the
Aforesaid submission
High
Court
and,
accordingly, it quashed the order summoning
the respondent to face the trial.
While
doing so, the High Court observed as follows:
“Even the dictionary meaning of a
relative is one who is related by
blood or marriage. Gurmit Singh
is
certainly
not
related
to
Paramjit Singh either by blood or
by marriage. Gurmit Singh would
not fall in the category of
Page 4
5
relative
of
the
husband.
Therefore, Gurmit Singh must be
excluded from the array of the
accused. It is not necessary to
try him under Section 304B I.P.C.
for the dowry death of Paramjit
Singh’s wife.
Mr.
V.
Madhukar,
learned
Additional
Advocate General appearing on behalf of the
State submits that the High Court erred in
holding that the respondent is not a relative
of the husband of the deceased.
that
Balbir
Singh’s
Kaur
is
father’s
the
He points out
wife
brother
and
of
Paramjit
Gurmit
Singh
respondent herein happens to be Balbir Kaur’s
brother, hence, a relative of Paramjit Singh.
According
to
him,
is
High
holding that husband of the deceased.
learned counsel appearing
respondent,
he
the
not
however,
a
Court
erred
relative
Mr.
on
C.D.
behalf
submits
of
in
the
Singh,
of
that
the
the
respondent cannot be said to be related to the
husband of the deceased in any manner and,
therefore, cannot be prosecuted for offence
Page 5
6
under Section 304B of the IPC.
submission
Section
necessitates
304B
of
the
the
IPC,
The rival
examination of
same as
reads
follows:
”304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the
death of a woman is caused by any
burns or bodily injury or occurs
otherwise
than
under
normal
circumstances within seven years
of her marriage and it is shown
that soon before her death she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or any relative of
her husband for, or in connection
with, any demand for dowry, such
death
shall
be
called
“dowry
death”,
and
such
husband
or
relative shall be deemed to have
caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of
this sub-section, “dowry” shall
have the same meaning as in
section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death
shall be punished with imprison-
ment for a term which shall not be
less than seven years but which
may extend to imprisonment for
life.”
(underlining ours)
Page 6
7
From
a
plain
reading
of
the
aforesaid
provision it is evident that when a woman dies
by any burns or bodily injury or otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven
years
of
the
marriage,
her
husband
or
any
relative of her husband shall be deemed to
have committed the offence of dowry death if
it is shown that soon before the death the
woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband, or by any relative of her
husband.
This section therefore, exposes the
husband of the woman or any relative of her
husband for the commission of offence of the
dowry death.
Admittedly, the respondent is
not the husband of the woman who died and,
therefore,
the
question
which
falls
for
determination is as to whether he comes within
the ambit of “any relative of her husband”.
The expression “relative” has not been defined
in the IPC. The provision with which we are
concerned is a penal provision which deserves
Page 7
8
strict construction. It is well settled that
when the words of a statute are not defined,
it
has
to
be
understood
in
ordinary or popular sense.
it
shall
be
their
natural,
For this purpose,
permissible
to
refer
to
dictionaries to find out the general sense in
which
the
parlance.
word
is
understood
in
common
In Ramanatha Aiyar’s, Advance Law
Lexicon (Vol.4, 3rd Edn.), the word relative
means any person related by blood, marriage or
adoption.
A large number of dictionaries give
this word relative, in context, same meaning.
It
is
relevant
here
to
state
that
the
expression “relative of the husband” has been
used in Section 498-A of the I.P.C.
While
interpreting the said expression, this Court
in
the
case
of
U.
Suvetha
vs.
State
by
Inspector of Police and Anr.(2009) 6 SCC 787
held it to mean a person related by blood,
marriage or adoption.
Relevant portion of the
judgment reads as follows:
Page 8
9
“10.
In
the
absence
of
any
statutory definition, the term
“relative” must be assigned a
meaning as is commonly understood.
Ordinarily
it
would
include
father, mother, husband or wife,
son, daughter, brother, sister,
nephew
or
niece,
grandson
or
granddaughter of an individual or
the spouse of any person.
The
meaning of the word “relative”
would depend upon the nature of
the
statute.
It
principally
includes
a
person
related
by
blood, marriage or adoption.”
The
expression
relative
of
the
husband
further came up for consideration in the case of
Vijeta Gajra vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2010)11
SCC 618 and while approving the decision of this
Court in U. Suvetha (Supra), it was held that
the word relative would be limited only to the
blood relations or the relations by marriage.
It
is
appropriate
to
reproduce
the
following
passage from the said judgment:
“12. Relying on the dictionary
meaning of the word “relative” and
further
relying
on
Ramanatha
Aiyar’s,
Advance
Law
Lexicon
rd
(Vol.4, 3
Edn.), the Court went
on to hold that Section 498-A IPC
being a penal provision would
Page 9
10
deserve strict construction and
unless a contextual meaning is
required to be given to the
statute, the said statute has to
be construed strictly.
On that
behalf the Court relied on the
judgment in T. Ashok Pai vs. CIT
(2007) 7 SCC 162. A reference was
made to the decision in Shivcharan
Lal Verma vs. State of M.P. (2007)
15 SCC 369.
After quoting from
various decisions of this Court,
it was held that reference to the
word “relative” in Section 498-A
IPC would be limited only to the
blood relations or the relations
by marriage.”
It
is
well
known
rule
of
construction
that when the Legislature uses same words in
different part of the statute, the presumption
is that those words have been used in the same
sense, unless displaced by the context.
We do
not find anything in context to deviate from
the general rule of interpretation. Hence, we
have the
no
manner
of
doubt
that
word
“relative of the husband” in Section 304 B of
the
IPC
would
mean
such
persons,
who
related by blood, marriage or adoption.
are
When
we apply this principle the respondent herein
Page 10
11
is not related to the husband of the deceased
either
by
blood
or
marriage
or
adoption.
Hence, in our opinion, the High Court did not
err in passing the impugned order.
We hasten
to add that a person, not a relative of the
husband,
may not
be prosecuted
for offence
under Section 304B IPC but this does not mean
that such a person cannot be prosecuted for
any other offence viz. Section 306 IPC, in
case the allegations constitute offence other
than Section 304B IPC.
In the result, we do not find any merit in
the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly.
........................................................................J
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
........................................................................J
(PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)
Page 11
12
NEW DELHI,
July 2, 2014.
Page 12
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