High Court was justified in holding that as the
seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the
appellant could not maintain the writ petition
before it. The High Court did not examine
whether any part of cause of action arose in
Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226
makes it clear that the High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action arises wholly or in
part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean
that even if a small fraction of the cause of
action (that bundle of facts which gives a
petitioner, a right to sue) accrued within the
territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of
that State will have jurisdiction.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7414 OF 2014
(arising out of SLP (C) No.19549 of 2013)
Nawal
Kishore
Sharma
Versus
Union of India and Others
JUDGMENT
M.Y. EQBAL, J.
Citation; (2014) 9 SCC 329
1.
2.
Leave granted.
Aggrieved
by
the
judgment
and
order
dated
16.4.2013 passed by learned Single Judge of Patna High
Court dismissing appellant’s writ petition for want of
territorial jurisdiction, this appeal by special leave has
been preferred by the appellant, who in November, 1988
had joined the off-shore Department of the Shipping
1
Page 1
Corporation of India (in short, “the Corporation”) and after
about eight years he was transferred from the off-shore
duty to a main fleet in the Foreign Going Department.
3.
It is the case of the appellant that he was found
medically fit in the medical test conducted by the Marine
Medical Services in February, 2009 and thereafter, on
29.9.2009, an agreement known as the articles of
agreement for employment of seafarers was executed for
appellant’s off-shore duty.
On 18.6.2010, when the
appellant reported sickness i.e. cough, abdominal pain,
swelling in leg and difficulty in breathing, he was sent for
medical treatment ashore at Adani, Mundra Port.
The
Medical Officer ashore advised him for admission in the
Hospital and accordingly he was signed off for further
medical treatment.
permanently
unfit
Thereafter,
for
sea
he was considered
service
due
to
dilated
cardiomyopathy (heart muscle disease) as per certificate
dated 18.3.2011 issued by Corporation’s Assistant Medical
2
Page 2
Officer.
Consequently, the Shipping Department of the
Government
of
India,
Mumbai
issued
order
dated
12.4.2011 cancelling registration of the appellant as a
Seaman.
4.
It is contended by the appellant that after he settled
at his native place Gaya, Bihar, he sent several letters/
representations from there to the respondents for his
financial claims as per statutory provisions and terms of
contract.
On
the
disability
compensation
claim,
Respondent no.2-Corporation communicated vide letter
dated 7.10.2011 that since the appellant was declared
unfit for sea service due to heart problem (organic
ailment)
he
compensation
will
of
be
entitled
Rs.2,75,000/-,
to
receive
which
severance
was
offered, but not accepted by the appellant.
although
It was also
informed that he is not entitled to receive disability
compensation, which becomes payable only in case a
seaman becomes incapacitated as a result of the injury.
5.
By filing a writ petition, the appellant approached
Patna High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India for grant of various reliefs including 100% disability
compensation and pecuniary damages. However, at the
time of hearing, respondents raised the question of
maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that no
cause of action or even a fraction of cause of action arose
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Patna High Court
and contended that the appellant was appointed by the
Corporation on the post of Seaman for off-shore services
and he discharged his duty outside the territory of the
State of Bihar. It is the case of the respondent that the
order declaring the appellant permanently unfit as well as
the letter/order dated 7.10.2011 was passed by an
authority of the respondent Corporation at Mumbai. Per
contra, it is the case of the appellant that he is a
permanent resident of Bihar and he asserted his rights in
the State of Bihar and all communications with respect to
rejection of his claims were made at his residential
address in the State of Bihar.
6.
After hearing learned counsel appearing for the
parties and
considering entire materials on
record,
learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court dismissed
the writ petition of the appellant holding that no cause of
action, not even a fraction of cause of action, arose within
its territorial jurisdiction.
Hence, the present appeal by
special leave.
7.
We have heard learned counsel appearing for the
parties.
8.
The short question that falls for consideration in the
facts of the present case is that as to whether the Patna
High Court is correct in taking the view that it has no
jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
For answering
the said question we would like to consider the provision
of Article 226 of the Constitution as it stood prior to
5
Page 5
amendment.
Originally, Article 226 of the Constitution
read as under:-
“Art.226. Power of High Courts to
issue
certain
writs.
–
(1)
Notwithstanding anything in article 32,
every High Court shall have power,
throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to
any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases any Government, within
those territories directions, orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus,
mandamus,
prohibition,
quo
warranto and certiorari, or any of them or
the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other
purpose.
(2) The power conferred on a High Court
by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of
the power conferred on the Supreme Court
by clause (2) of article 32”.
9.
While
interpreting
the
aforesaid
provision
the
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Election
Commission, India vs. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953
SC 210, held that the writ court would not run beyond the
territories subject to its jurisdiction and that the person or
the authority affected by the writ must be amenable to
6
Page 6
court’s jurisdiction either by residence or location within
those territories.
The rule that cause of action attracts
jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and
cannot apply to writs issued under Article 226 of the
Constitution which makes no reference to any cause of
action or where it arises but insist on the presence of the
person or authority within the territories in relation to
which High Court exercises jurisdiction.
In another
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in K.S. Rashid
and Son vs. Income tax Investigation Commission
Etc., AIR 1954 SC 207, this Court took the similar view
and held that the writ court cannot exercise its power
under Article 226 beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
The
Court was of the view that the exercise of power conferred
by Article 226 was subject to a two-fold limitation viz.,
firstly, the power is to be exercised in relation to which it
exercises
jurisdiction
and
secondly,
the
person
or
authority on whom the High Court is empowered to issue
writ must be within
those territories.
These two
7
Page 7
Constitution Bench judgments came for consideration
before a larger Bench of seven Judges of this Court in the
case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. Union of India and
another, AIR 1961 SC 532.
The Bench approved the
aforementioned two Constitution Bench judgments and
opined that unless there are clear and compelling
reasons, which cannot be denied, writ court cannot
exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
10. The
interpretation
given
by
this
Court
in
the
aforesaid decisions resulted in undue hardship and
inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction.
As a result, Clause 1(A) was inserted in Article 226 by the
Constitution (15th)
subsequently renumbered
Amendment
as
Act,
Clause
1963
(2)
by
and
the
Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended
Clause (2) now reads as under:-
8
Page 8
“226. Power of the High Courts to
issue certain writs – (1) Notwithstanding
anything in article 32, every High Court
shall
have
power,
throughout
the
territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction, to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases,
any Government, within those territories
directions, orders or writs, including writs
in
the
nature
of
habeas
corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, or any of them, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred
by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to
issue directions, orders or writs to any
Government, authority or person may also
be exercised by any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action, wholly or
in part, arises for the exercise of such
power, notwithstanding that the seat of
such Government or authority or the
residence of such person is not within
those territories.
(3) xxxxx
(4) xxxxx”
11. On a plain reading of the amended provisions in
Clause (2), it is clear that now High Court can issue a writ
when the person or the authority against whom the writ is
issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the
9
Page 9
cause of action wholly or partially arises within the court’s
territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of
Article 226 (2) of the Constitution, for all intent and
purpose
must
be
assigned
the
same
meaning
as
envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been
defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the
Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is
necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he
can succeed.
12. The term ‘cause of action’ as appearing in Clause (2)
came for consideration time and again before this Court.
13.
In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others vs.
M/s Swaika Properties and Another, (1985) 3 SCC
217, the fact was that the respondent-Company having its
registered office in Calcutta owned certain land on the
outskirts of Jaipur City was served with notice for
10
Page 10
acquisition of land under Rajasthan Urban Improvement
Act, 1959. Notice was duly served on the Company at its
registered
office
at
Calcutta.
The
Company,
first
appeared before the Special Court and finally the Calcutta
High Court by filing a writ petition challenging the
notification of acquisition.
The matter ultimately came
before this Court to answer a question as to whether the
service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act at the
registered office of the Respondent in Calcutta was an
integral part of cause of action and was it sufficient to
invest the Calcutta High Court with a jurisdiction to
entertain
the
petition
challenging
the
impugned
notification. Answering the question this Court held:-
“7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that
the cause of action neither wholly nor in part
arose within the territorial limits of the
Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned
Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a
rule nisi on the petition filed by the
respondents under Article 226 of the
Constitution or to make the ad interim ex
parte prohibitory order restraining the
appellants from taking any steps to take
possession of the land acquired. Under sub-
11
Page 11
section (5) of Section 52 of the Act the
appellants were entitled to require the
respondents
to
surrender
or
deliver
possession of the lands acquired forthwith
and upon their failure to do so, take
immediate steps to secure such possession
under sub-section (6) thereof.
8. The expression “cause of action” is
tersely defined in Mulla’s Code of Civil
Procedure:
“The ‘cause of action’ means every fact
which, if traversed, it would be necessary for
the plaintiff to prove in order to support his
right to a judgment of the court.”
In other words, it is a bundle of facts which
taken with the law applicable to them gives
the plaintiff a right to relief against the
defendant. The mere service of notice under
Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents
at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne
Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits
of the State of West Bengal, could not give
rise to a cause of action within that territory
unless the service of such notice was an
integral part of the cause of action. The
entire cause of action culminating in the
acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of
the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan
i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The
answer to the question whether service of
notice is an integral part of the cause of
action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of
the Constitution must depend upon the
nature of the impugned order giving rise to a
cause of action. The notification dated
February 8, 1984 issued by the State
12
Page 12
Government under Section 52(1) of the Act
became effective the moment it was
published in the Official Gazette as thereupon
the notified land became vested in the State
Government free from all encumbrances. It
was not necessary for the respondents to
plead the service of notice on them by the
Special Officer, Town Planning Department,
Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an
appropriate writ, direction or order under
Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing
the notification issued by the State
Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If
the respondents felt aggrieved by the
acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and
wanted to challenge the validity of the
notification issued by the State Government
of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act
by a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the remedy of the respondents
for the grant of such relief had to be sought
by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan
High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of
action wholly or in part arose.”
14. This provision was again considered by this Court in
the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission
vs.
Utpal Kumar Basu and others, (1994) 4 SCC 711. In
this case the petitioner Oil and Natural Gas Commission
(ONGC) through its consultant Engineers India Limited
13
Page 13
(EIL) issued an advertisement in the newspaper inviting
tenders for setting up of Kerosene Recovery Processing
Unit in Gujarat mentioning that the tenders containing
offers were to be communicated to EIL, New Delhi. After
the final decision was taken by the Steering Committee at
New Delhi, the respondent NICCO moved the Calcutta
High Court praying that ONGC be restrained from
awarding the contract to any other party. It was pleaded
in the petition that NICCO came to know of the tender
from the publication in the “Times of India” within the
jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
This Court by
setting aside the order passed by the Calcutta High Court
came to the following conclusion :-
“6. Therefore, in determining the
objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction
the court must take all the facts pleaded in
support of the cause of action into
consideration albeit without embarking
upon an enquiry as to the correctness or
otherwise of the said facts. In other words
the question whether a High Court has
territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ
petition must be answered on the basis of
the averments made in the petition, the
14
Page 14
truth
or
otherwise
whereof
being
immaterial. To put it differently, the
question of territorial jurisdiction must be
decided on the facts pleaded in the
petition. Therefore, the question whether
in the instant case the Calcutta High Court
had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
writ petition in question even on the facts
alleged must depend upon whether the
averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18,
22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to
establish that a part of the cause of action
had arisen within the jurisdiction of the
Calcutta High Court.”
15. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India
and Another, (2004) 6 SCC 254, this Court elaborately
discussed Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution,
particularly the meaning of the word ‘cause of action’
with reference to Section 20(c) and Section 141 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and observed:-
“9. Although in view of Section 141 of the
Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof
would not apply to writ proceedings, the
phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the
Code of Civil Procedure and clause (2) of
Article 226, being in pari materia, the
decisions of this Court rendered on
interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall
15
Page 15
apply to the writ proceedings also. Before
proceeding to discuss the matter further it
may be pointed out that the entire bundle of
facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of
action as what is necessary to be proved
before the petitioner can obtain a decree is
the material facts. The expression material
facts is also known as integral facts.
10. Keeping in view the expressions used
in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, indisputably even if a small fraction
of cause of action accrues within the
jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have
jurisdiction in the matter.”
Their Lordships further observed as under:-
“29. In view of clause (2) of Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, now if a part of
cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction
of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to
issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh
has, thus, no application.
30. We must, however, remind ourselves
that even if a small part of cause of action
arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the
High Court, the same by itself may not be
considered to be a determinative factor
compelling the High Court to decide the
matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the
Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum
conveniens.”
16
Page 16
16. In the case of Union of India and others vs.
Adani Exports Ltd. and another, (2002) 1 SCC 567,
this Court held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a
High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose that
the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action
do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to
decide the dispute and the entire or a part of it arose
within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact pleaded by the
respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead
to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of
action within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction unless
those facts are such which have a nexus or relevance with
the lis i.e. involved in the case. This Court observed:
“17. It is seen from the above that in order to
confer jurisdiction on a High Court to
entertain a writ petition or a special civil
application as in this case, the High Court
must be satisfied from the entire facts
pleaded in support of the cause of action that
those facts do constitute a cause so as to
empower the court to decide a dispute which
has, at least in part, arisen within its
jurisdiction. It is clear from the above
judgment that each and every fact pleaded
by the respondents in their application does
not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that
those facts give rise to a cause of action
within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless
those facts pleaded are such which have a
nexus or relevance with the lis that is
involved in the case. Facts which have no
bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in
the case, do not give rise to a cause of action
so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the
court concerned. If we apply this principle
then we see that none of the facts pleaded in
para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls
into the category of bundle of facts which
would constitute a cause of action giving rise
to a dispute which could confer territorial
jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.”
17. In Om Prakash Srivastava
and Another
(2006) 6 SCC 207,
vs.
Union of India
answering a similar
question this Court observed that on a plain reading of
Clause(2) of Article 226 it is manifestly clear that the High
Court can exercise power to issue direction, order or writs
for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or
for any other purpose if the cause of action in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction notwithstanding that the
seat of the Government or authority or the residence of
18
Page 18
the person against whom the direction, order or writ is
issued is not within the said territory. In para 7 this Court
observed:-
“7. The question whether or not cause of action
wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has
arisen within the territorial limits of any High
Court has to be decided in the light of the
nature and character of the proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to
maintain a writ petition, a writ petitioner has to
establish that a legal right claimed by him has
prima facie either been infringed or is
threatened to be infringed by the respondent
within the territorial limits of the Court’s
jurisdiction and such infringement may take
place by causing him actual injury or threat
thereof.”
18.
In the case of
Rajendran Chingaravelu vs.
R.K. Mishra, Additional Commissioner of Income
Tax and Others,
(2010) 1 SCC 457, this Court while
considering the scope of Article 226(2) of the Constitution,
particularly the
cause
of
action in maintaining a writ
petition, held as under:
“9. The first question that arises for
consideration is whether the Andhra Pradesh
19
Page 19
High Court was justified in holding that as the
seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the
appellant could not maintain the writ petition
before it. The High Court did not examine
whether any part of cause of action arose in
Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226
makes it clear that the High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action arises wholly or in
part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean
that even if a small fraction of the cause of
action (that bundle of facts which gives a
petitioner, a right to sue) accrued within the
territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of
that State will have jurisdiction.
xxxxxx
11. Normally, we would have set aside the
order and remitted the matter to the High
Court for decision on merits. But from the
persuasive submissions of the appellant, who
appeared in person on various dates of
hearing, two things stood out. Firstly, it was
clear that the main object of the petition was to
ensure that at least in future, passengers like
him are not put to unnecessary harassment or
undue hardship at the airports. He wants a
direction for issuance of clear guidelines and
instructions to the inspecting officers, and
introduction
of
definite
and
efficient
verification/investigation procedures. He wants
changes in the present protocol where the
officers are uncertain of what to do and seek
instructions and indefinitely wait for clearances
from higher-ups for each and every routine
step, resulting in the detention of passengers
20
Page 20
for hours and hours. In short, he wants the
enquiries, verifications and investigations to be
efficient, passenger-friendly and courteous.
Secondly, he wants the Department/officers
concerned to acknowledge that he was
unnecessarily harassed.”
19. Regard
being
had
to
the
discussion
made
hereinabove, there cannot be any doubt that the question
whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a
writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any
High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and
character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
In order to maintain a writ petition, the
petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by
him has been infringed by the respondents within the
territorial limit of the Court’s jurisdiction.
20. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ
petition and the documents relied upon by the appellant.
Indisputably, the appellant reported sickness on account
21
Page 21
of various ailments including difficulty in breathing.
He
was referred to hospital. Consequently, he was signed off
for further medical treatment.
Finally, the respondent
permanently declared the appellant unfit for sea service
due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscles disease).
As a result, the Shipping Department of the Government
of India issued an order on 12.4.2011 cancelling the
registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the
letter was sent to the appellant at his native place in Bihar
where he was staying after he was found medically unfit.
It further appears that the appellant sent a representation
from his home in the State of Bihar to the respondent
claiming disability compensation. The said representation
was replied by the respondent, which was addressed to
him on his home address in Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim
for disability compensation. It is further evident that when
the appellant was signed off and declared medically unfit,
he returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar
and,
thereafter,
he
made
all
claims
and
filed
22
Page 22
representation from his home address at Gaya and those
letters and representations were entertained by the
respondents
and
replied
and
a
decision
on
those
representations were communicated to him on his home
address in Bihar. Admittedly, appellant was suffering from
serious heart muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy)
and breathing problem which forced him to stay in native
place, wherefrom he had been making all correspondence
with regard to his disability compensation.
Prima facie,
therefore, considering all the facts together, a part or
fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of
the Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal
disentitling him from disability compensation.
21. Apart from that, from the counter affidavit of the
respondents and the documents annexed therewith, it
reveals that after the writ petition was filed in the Patna
High Court, the same was entertained and notices were
23
Page 23
issued.
Pursuant to the said notice, the respondents
appeared and participated in the proceedings in the High
Court.
It further reveals that after hearing the counsel
appearing for both the parties, the High Court passed an
interim order on 18.9.2012 directing the authorities of
Shipping Corporation of India to pay at least a sum of
Rs.2.75 lakhs, which shall be subject to the result of the
writ
petition.
respondent
Pursuant
Shipping
to
the
Corporation
interim
of
order,
India
the
remitted
Rs.2,67,270/- (after deduction of income tax) to the bank
account of the appellant. However, when the writ petition
was taken up for hearing, the High Court took the view
that no cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of
action, has arisen within its territorial jurisdiction.
22. Considering the entire facts of the case narrated
hereinbefore including the interim order passed by the
High Court, in our considered opinion, the writ petition
ought not to have been dismissed for want of territorial
jurisdiction. As noticed above, at the time when the writ
petition was heard for the purpose of grant of interim
relief, the respondents instead of raising any objection
with regard to territorial jurisdiction opposed the prayer
on the ground that the writ petitioner-appellant was
offered an amount of Rs.2.75 lakhs, but he refused to
accept the same and challenged the order granting
severance compensation by filing the writ petition.
The
impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
23.
In the aforesaid, the appeal is allowed and the
impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and
the matter is remitted to the High Court for deciding the
writ petition on merits.
..................................J.
(Ranjan Gogoi)
25
Page 25
..................................J.
(M.Y. Eqbal)
New Delhi,
August 7, 2014.
Print Page
seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the
appellant could not maintain the writ petition
before it. The High Court did not examine
whether any part of cause of action arose in
Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226
makes it clear that the High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action arises wholly or in
part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean
that even if a small fraction of the cause of
action (that bundle of facts which gives a
petitioner, a right to sue) accrued within the
territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of
that State will have jurisdiction.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7414 OF 2014
(arising out of SLP (C) No.19549 of 2013)
Nawal
Kishore
Sharma
Versus
Union of India and Others
JUDGMENT
M.Y. EQBAL, J.
Citation; (2014) 9 SCC 329
1.
2.
Leave granted.
Aggrieved
by
the
judgment
and
order
dated
16.4.2013 passed by learned Single Judge of Patna High
Court dismissing appellant’s writ petition for want of
territorial jurisdiction, this appeal by special leave has
been preferred by the appellant, who in November, 1988
had joined the off-shore Department of the Shipping
1
Page 1
Corporation of India (in short, “the Corporation”) and after
about eight years he was transferred from the off-shore
duty to a main fleet in the Foreign Going Department.
3.
It is the case of the appellant that he was found
medically fit in the medical test conducted by the Marine
Medical Services in February, 2009 and thereafter, on
29.9.2009, an agreement known as the articles of
agreement for employment of seafarers was executed for
appellant’s off-shore duty.
On 18.6.2010, when the
appellant reported sickness i.e. cough, abdominal pain,
swelling in leg and difficulty in breathing, he was sent for
medical treatment ashore at Adani, Mundra Port.
The
Medical Officer ashore advised him for admission in the
Hospital and accordingly he was signed off for further
medical treatment.
permanently
unfit
Thereafter,
for
sea
he was considered
service
due
to
dilated
cardiomyopathy (heart muscle disease) as per certificate
dated 18.3.2011 issued by Corporation’s Assistant Medical
2
Page 2
Officer.
Consequently, the Shipping Department of the
Government
of
India,
Mumbai
issued
order
dated
12.4.2011 cancelling registration of the appellant as a
Seaman.
4.
It is contended by the appellant that after he settled
at his native place Gaya, Bihar, he sent several letters/
representations from there to the respondents for his
financial claims as per statutory provisions and terms of
contract.
On
the
disability
compensation
claim,
Respondent no.2-Corporation communicated vide letter
dated 7.10.2011 that since the appellant was declared
unfit for sea service due to heart problem (organic
ailment)
he
compensation
will
of
be
entitled
Rs.2,75,000/-,
to
receive
which
severance
was
offered, but not accepted by the appellant.
although
It was also
informed that he is not entitled to receive disability
compensation, which becomes payable only in case a
seaman becomes incapacitated as a result of the injury.
5.
By filing a writ petition, the appellant approached
Patna High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India for grant of various reliefs including 100% disability
compensation and pecuniary damages. However, at the
time of hearing, respondents raised the question of
maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that no
cause of action or even a fraction of cause of action arose
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Patna High Court
and contended that the appellant was appointed by the
Corporation on the post of Seaman for off-shore services
and he discharged his duty outside the territory of the
State of Bihar. It is the case of the respondent that the
order declaring the appellant permanently unfit as well as
the letter/order dated 7.10.2011 was passed by an
authority of the respondent Corporation at Mumbai. Per
contra, it is the case of the appellant that he is a
permanent resident of Bihar and he asserted his rights in
the State of Bihar and all communications with respect to
rejection of his claims were made at his residential
address in the State of Bihar.
6.
After hearing learned counsel appearing for the
parties and
considering entire materials on
record,
learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court dismissed
the writ petition of the appellant holding that no cause of
action, not even a fraction of cause of action, arose within
its territorial jurisdiction.
Hence, the present appeal by
special leave.
7.
We have heard learned counsel appearing for the
parties.
8.
The short question that falls for consideration in the
facts of the present case is that as to whether the Patna
High Court is correct in taking the view that it has no
jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
For answering
the said question we would like to consider the provision
of Article 226 of the Constitution as it stood prior to
5
Page 5
amendment.
Originally, Article 226 of the Constitution
read as under:-
“Art.226. Power of High Courts to
issue
certain
writs.
–
(1)
Notwithstanding anything in article 32,
every High Court shall have power,
throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to
any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases any Government, within
those territories directions, orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus,
mandamus,
prohibition,
quo
warranto and certiorari, or any of them or
the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other
purpose.
(2) The power conferred on a High Court
by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of
the power conferred on the Supreme Court
by clause (2) of article 32”.
9.
While
interpreting
the
aforesaid
provision
the
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Election
Commission, India vs. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953
SC 210, held that the writ court would not run beyond the
territories subject to its jurisdiction and that the person or
the authority affected by the writ must be amenable to
6
Page 6
court’s jurisdiction either by residence or location within
those territories.
The rule that cause of action attracts
jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and
cannot apply to writs issued under Article 226 of the
Constitution which makes no reference to any cause of
action or where it arises but insist on the presence of the
person or authority within the territories in relation to
which High Court exercises jurisdiction.
In another
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in K.S. Rashid
and Son vs. Income tax Investigation Commission
Etc., AIR 1954 SC 207, this Court took the similar view
and held that the writ court cannot exercise its power
under Article 226 beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
The
Court was of the view that the exercise of power conferred
by Article 226 was subject to a two-fold limitation viz.,
firstly, the power is to be exercised in relation to which it
exercises
jurisdiction
and
secondly,
the
person
or
authority on whom the High Court is empowered to issue
writ must be within
those territories.
These two
7
Page 7
Constitution Bench judgments came for consideration
before a larger Bench of seven Judges of this Court in the
case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. Union of India and
another, AIR 1961 SC 532.
The Bench approved the
aforementioned two Constitution Bench judgments and
opined that unless there are clear and compelling
reasons, which cannot be denied, writ court cannot
exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
10. The
interpretation
given
by
this
Court
in
the
aforesaid decisions resulted in undue hardship and
inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction.
As a result, Clause 1(A) was inserted in Article 226 by the
Constitution (15th)
subsequently renumbered
Amendment
as
Act,
Clause
1963
(2)
by
and
the
Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended
Clause (2) now reads as under:-
8
Page 8
“226. Power of the High Courts to
issue certain writs – (1) Notwithstanding
anything in article 32, every High Court
shall
have
power,
throughout
the
territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction, to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases,
any Government, within those territories
directions, orders or writs, including writs
in
the
nature
of
habeas
corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, or any of them, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred
by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to
issue directions, orders or writs to any
Government, authority or person may also
be exercised by any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action, wholly or
in part, arises for the exercise of such
power, notwithstanding that the seat of
such Government or authority or the
residence of such person is not within
those territories.
(3) xxxxx
(4) xxxxx”
11. On a plain reading of the amended provisions in
Clause (2), it is clear that now High Court can issue a writ
when the person or the authority against whom the writ is
issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the
9
Page 9
cause of action wholly or partially arises within the court’s
territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of
Article 226 (2) of the Constitution, for all intent and
purpose
must
be
assigned
the
same
meaning
as
envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been
defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the
Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is
necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he
can succeed.
12. The term ‘cause of action’ as appearing in Clause (2)
came for consideration time and again before this Court.
13.
In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others vs.
M/s Swaika Properties and Another, (1985) 3 SCC
217, the fact was that the respondent-Company having its
registered office in Calcutta owned certain land on the
outskirts of Jaipur City was served with notice for
10
Page 10
acquisition of land under Rajasthan Urban Improvement
Act, 1959. Notice was duly served on the Company at its
registered
office
at
Calcutta.
The
Company,
first
appeared before the Special Court and finally the Calcutta
High Court by filing a writ petition challenging the
notification of acquisition.
The matter ultimately came
before this Court to answer a question as to whether the
service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act at the
registered office of the Respondent in Calcutta was an
integral part of cause of action and was it sufficient to
invest the Calcutta High Court with a jurisdiction to
entertain
the
petition
challenging
the
impugned
notification. Answering the question this Court held:-
“7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that
the cause of action neither wholly nor in part
arose within the territorial limits of the
Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned
Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a
rule nisi on the petition filed by the
respondents under Article 226 of the
Constitution or to make the ad interim ex
parte prohibitory order restraining the
appellants from taking any steps to take
possession of the land acquired. Under sub-
11
Page 11
section (5) of Section 52 of the Act the
appellants were entitled to require the
respondents
to
surrender
or
deliver
possession of the lands acquired forthwith
and upon their failure to do so, take
immediate steps to secure such possession
under sub-section (6) thereof.
8. The expression “cause of action” is
tersely defined in Mulla’s Code of Civil
Procedure:
“The ‘cause of action’ means every fact
which, if traversed, it would be necessary for
the plaintiff to prove in order to support his
right to a judgment of the court.”
In other words, it is a bundle of facts which
taken with the law applicable to them gives
the plaintiff a right to relief against the
defendant. The mere service of notice under
Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents
at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne
Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits
of the State of West Bengal, could not give
rise to a cause of action within that territory
unless the service of such notice was an
integral part of the cause of action. The
entire cause of action culminating in the
acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of
the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan
i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The
answer to the question whether service of
notice is an integral part of the cause of
action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of
the Constitution must depend upon the
nature of the impugned order giving rise to a
cause of action. The notification dated
February 8, 1984 issued by the State
12
Page 12
Government under Section 52(1) of the Act
became effective the moment it was
published in the Official Gazette as thereupon
the notified land became vested in the State
Government free from all encumbrances. It
was not necessary for the respondents to
plead the service of notice on them by the
Special Officer, Town Planning Department,
Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an
appropriate writ, direction or order under
Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing
the notification issued by the State
Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If
the respondents felt aggrieved by the
acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and
wanted to challenge the validity of the
notification issued by the State Government
of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act
by a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the remedy of the respondents
for the grant of such relief had to be sought
by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan
High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of
action wholly or in part arose.”
14. This provision was again considered by this Court in
the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission
vs.
Utpal Kumar Basu and others, (1994) 4 SCC 711. In
this case the petitioner Oil and Natural Gas Commission
(ONGC) through its consultant Engineers India Limited
13
Page 13
(EIL) issued an advertisement in the newspaper inviting
tenders for setting up of Kerosene Recovery Processing
Unit in Gujarat mentioning that the tenders containing
offers were to be communicated to EIL, New Delhi. After
the final decision was taken by the Steering Committee at
New Delhi, the respondent NICCO moved the Calcutta
High Court praying that ONGC be restrained from
awarding the contract to any other party. It was pleaded
in the petition that NICCO came to know of the tender
from the publication in the “Times of India” within the
jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
This Court by
setting aside the order passed by the Calcutta High Court
came to the following conclusion :-
“6. Therefore, in determining the
objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction
the court must take all the facts pleaded in
support of the cause of action into
consideration albeit without embarking
upon an enquiry as to the correctness or
otherwise of the said facts. In other words
the question whether a High Court has
territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ
petition must be answered on the basis of
the averments made in the petition, the
14
Page 14
truth
or
otherwise
whereof
being
immaterial. To put it differently, the
question of territorial jurisdiction must be
decided on the facts pleaded in the
petition. Therefore, the question whether
in the instant case the Calcutta High Court
had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
writ petition in question even on the facts
alleged must depend upon whether the
averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18,
22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to
establish that a part of the cause of action
had arisen within the jurisdiction of the
Calcutta High Court.”
15. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India
and Another, (2004) 6 SCC 254, this Court elaborately
discussed Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution,
particularly the meaning of the word ‘cause of action’
with reference to Section 20(c) and Section 141 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and observed:-
“9. Although in view of Section 141 of the
Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof
would not apply to writ proceedings, the
phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the
Code of Civil Procedure and clause (2) of
Article 226, being in pari materia, the
decisions of this Court rendered on
interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall
15
Page 15
apply to the writ proceedings also. Before
proceeding to discuss the matter further it
may be pointed out that the entire bundle of
facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of
action as what is necessary to be proved
before the petitioner can obtain a decree is
the material facts. The expression material
facts is also known as integral facts.
10. Keeping in view the expressions used
in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, indisputably even if a small fraction
of cause of action accrues within the
jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have
jurisdiction in the matter.”
Their Lordships further observed as under:-
“29. In view of clause (2) of Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, now if a part of
cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction
of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to
issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh
has, thus, no application.
30. We must, however, remind ourselves
that even if a small part of cause of action
arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the
High Court, the same by itself may not be
considered to be a determinative factor
compelling the High Court to decide the
matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the
Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum
conveniens.”
16
Page 16
16. In the case of Union of India and others vs.
Adani Exports Ltd. and another, (2002) 1 SCC 567,
this Court held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a
High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose that
the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action
do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to
decide the dispute and the entire or a part of it arose
within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact pleaded by the
respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead
to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of
action within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction unless
those facts are such which have a nexus or relevance with
the lis i.e. involved in the case. This Court observed:
“17. It is seen from the above that in order to
confer jurisdiction on a High Court to
entertain a writ petition or a special civil
application as in this case, the High Court
must be satisfied from the entire facts
pleaded in support of the cause of action that
those facts do constitute a cause so as to
empower the court to decide a dispute which
has, at least in part, arisen within its
jurisdiction. It is clear from the above
judgment that each and every fact pleaded
by the respondents in their application does
not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that
those facts give rise to a cause of action
within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless
those facts pleaded are such which have a
nexus or relevance with the lis that is
involved in the case. Facts which have no
bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in
the case, do not give rise to a cause of action
so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the
court concerned. If we apply this principle
then we see that none of the facts pleaded in
para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls
into the category of bundle of facts which
would constitute a cause of action giving rise
to a dispute which could confer territorial
jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.”
17. In Om Prakash Srivastava
and Another
(2006) 6 SCC 207,
vs.
Union of India
answering a similar
question this Court observed that on a plain reading of
Clause(2) of Article 226 it is manifestly clear that the High
Court can exercise power to issue direction, order or writs
for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or
for any other purpose if the cause of action in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction notwithstanding that the
seat of the Government or authority or the residence of
18
Page 18
the person against whom the direction, order or writ is
issued is not within the said territory. In para 7 this Court
observed:-
“7. The question whether or not cause of action
wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has
arisen within the territorial limits of any High
Court has to be decided in the light of the
nature and character of the proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to
maintain a writ petition, a writ petitioner has to
establish that a legal right claimed by him has
prima facie either been infringed or is
threatened to be infringed by the respondent
within the territorial limits of the Court’s
jurisdiction and such infringement may take
place by causing him actual injury or threat
thereof.”
18.
In the case of
Rajendran Chingaravelu vs.
R.K. Mishra, Additional Commissioner of Income
Tax and Others,
(2010) 1 SCC 457, this Court while
considering the scope of Article 226(2) of the Constitution,
particularly the
cause
of
action in maintaining a writ
petition, held as under:
“9. The first question that arises for
consideration is whether the Andhra Pradesh
19
Page 19
High Court was justified in holding that as the
seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the
appellant could not maintain the writ petition
before it. The High Court did not examine
whether any part of cause of action arose in
Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226
makes it clear that the High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action arises wholly or in
part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean
that even if a small fraction of the cause of
action (that bundle of facts which gives a
petitioner, a right to sue) accrued within the
territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of
that State will have jurisdiction.
xxxxxx
11. Normally, we would have set aside the
order and remitted the matter to the High
Court for decision on merits. But from the
persuasive submissions of the appellant, who
appeared in person on various dates of
hearing, two things stood out. Firstly, it was
clear that the main object of the petition was to
ensure that at least in future, passengers like
him are not put to unnecessary harassment or
undue hardship at the airports. He wants a
direction for issuance of clear guidelines and
instructions to the inspecting officers, and
introduction
of
definite
and
efficient
verification/investigation procedures. He wants
changes in the present protocol where the
officers are uncertain of what to do and seek
instructions and indefinitely wait for clearances
from higher-ups for each and every routine
step, resulting in the detention of passengers
20
Page 20
for hours and hours. In short, he wants the
enquiries, verifications and investigations to be
efficient, passenger-friendly and courteous.
Secondly, he wants the Department/officers
concerned to acknowledge that he was
unnecessarily harassed.”
19. Regard
being
had
to
the
discussion
made
hereinabove, there cannot be any doubt that the question
whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a
writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any
High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and
character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
In order to maintain a writ petition, the
petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by
him has been infringed by the respondents within the
territorial limit of the Court’s jurisdiction.
20. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ
petition and the documents relied upon by the appellant.
Indisputably, the appellant reported sickness on account
21
Page 21
of various ailments including difficulty in breathing.
He
was referred to hospital. Consequently, he was signed off
for further medical treatment.
Finally, the respondent
permanently declared the appellant unfit for sea service
due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscles disease).
As a result, the Shipping Department of the Government
of India issued an order on 12.4.2011 cancelling the
registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the
letter was sent to the appellant at his native place in Bihar
where he was staying after he was found medically unfit.
It further appears that the appellant sent a representation
from his home in the State of Bihar to the respondent
claiming disability compensation. The said representation
was replied by the respondent, which was addressed to
him on his home address in Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim
for disability compensation. It is further evident that when
the appellant was signed off and declared medically unfit,
he returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar
and,
thereafter,
he
made
all
claims
and
filed
22
Page 22
representation from his home address at Gaya and those
letters and representations were entertained by the
respondents
and
replied
and
a
decision
on
those
representations were communicated to him on his home
address in Bihar. Admittedly, appellant was suffering from
serious heart muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy)
and breathing problem which forced him to stay in native
place, wherefrom he had been making all correspondence
with regard to his disability compensation.
Prima facie,
therefore, considering all the facts together, a part or
fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of
the Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal
disentitling him from disability compensation.
21. Apart from that, from the counter affidavit of the
respondents and the documents annexed therewith, it
reveals that after the writ petition was filed in the Patna
High Court, the same was entertained and notices were
23
Page 23
issued.
Pursuant to the said notice, the respondents
appeared and participated in the proceedings in the High
Court.
It further reveals that after hearing the counsel
appearing for both the parties, the High Court passed an
interim order on 18.9.2012 directing the authorities of
Shipping Corporation of India to pay at least a sum of
Rs.2.75 lakhs, which shall be subject to the result of the
writ
petition.
respondent
Pursuant
Shipping
to
the
Corporation
interim
of
order,
India
the
remitted
Rs.2,67,270/- (after deduction of income tax) to the bank
account of the appellant. However, when the writ petition
was taken up for hearing, the High Court took the view
that no cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of
action, has arisen within its territorial jurisdiction.
22. Considering the entire facts of the case narrated
hereinbefore including the interim order passed by the
High Court, in our considered opinion, the writ petition
ought not to have been dismissed for want of territorial
jurisdiction. As noticed above, at the time when the writ
petition was heard for the purpose of grant of interim
relief, the respondents instead of raising any objection
with regard to territorial jurisdiction opposed the prayer
on the ground that the writ petitioner-appellant was
offered an amount of Rs.2.75 lakhs, but he refused to
accept the same and challenged the order granting
severance compensation by filing the writ petition.
The
impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
23.
In the aforesaid, the appeal is allowed and the
impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and
the matter is remitted to the High Court for deciding the
writ petition on merits.
..................................J.
(Ranjan Gogoi)
25
Page 25
..................................J.
(M.Y. Eqbal)
New Delhi,
August 7, 2014.
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