Whether provisions of S 5 of Limitation Act could be imported for extension of statutory outer limit provided U/S 34 (3) of Arbitration Act, 1996?

A Bench of three Hon'ble

Judges of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises

.Vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department

2009 (Supple) AIR S.C. 396 has dealt with the

question since holding as under:

10. A bare reading of the

Sub­Section (3) of

Section 34 read with the

proviso makes it

abundantly clear that the

application for setting

aside the award on the

grounds mentioned in

Sub­Section (2) of

Section 34 will have to

be made within three

months. The period can

further be extended, on

sufficient cause being

shown, by another

period of 30 days but not

thereafter. It means that

as far as application for

setting aside the award

is concerned, the period

of limitation prescribed is

three months which can

be extended by another

period of 30 days, on

sufficient cause being

shown to the satisfaction

of the Court.

Section

29(2) of the Limitation

Act, inter alia provides

that where any special or

local law prescribes for

any suit, appeal or

application a period of

limitation different from

the period of limitation

prescribed by the

schedule, the provisions

of Section 3 shall apply

as if such period was the

period prescribed by the

schedule and for the

purpose of determining

any period of limitation

prescribed for any suit,

appeal or application by

any special or local law,

the provisions contained

in Sections 4 to 24 shall

apply only insofar as,

and to the extent, they

are not expressly

excluded by such special

or local law. When any

special statute

prescribes certain period

of limitation as well as

provision for extension

up to specified time limit,

on sufficient cause being

shown, then the period

of limitation prescribed

under the special law

shall prevail and to that

extent the provisions of

the Limitation Act shall

stand excluded. As the

intention of the

legislature in enacting

sub­Section (3) of

Section 34 of the Act is

that the application for

setting aside the award

should be made within

three months and the

period can be further

extended on sufficient

cause being shown by

another period of 30

days but not thereafter,

this Court is of the

opinion that the

provisions of Section 5

of the Limitation Act

would not be applicable

because the applicability

of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act stands

excluded because of the

provisions of Section

29(2) of the Limitation

Act.

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