“A disciplinary authority is not
expected to dispense with a disciplinary
inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of
ulterior motives or merely in order to
avoid the holding of an inquiry or
because the department's case against
the government servant is weak and
must fail.”
The
decision
to
dispense
with
the
departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be
rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned
authority.
When the satisfaction of the
concerned authority is questioned in a court of
law, it is incumbent on those who support the
order to show that the satisfaction is based on
certain objective facts and is not the outcome
of the whim or caprice of the concerned
officer.”
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2839 OF 2011
Risal Singh
Appellant
VERSUS
State of Haryana & Ors.
MAY 13, 2014
Citation;AIR 2014 SC 2922
Dipak Misra, J.
In this appeal, by special leave, the assail is to
the defensibility of the judgment and order dated
21.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. No. 19816/2008
whereby the Division Bench has concurred with the
order of dismissal of the appellant passed by the
Government after dispensing with the inquiry as
provided under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution.
Page 1
2
2.
The broad essential facts which need to be
adumbrated for the decision of the present appeal are
that the appellant, an Assistant Sub-Inspector (Ad hoc
Sub-Inspector) serving in the Department of Police in
the State of Haryana, as alleged, was involved in a
corruption sting operation in a television channel.
Because of the said alleged sting operation, the
Superintendent of Police, Mewat at Nuh, vide order
dated 19.06.2008, after referring to the news item in
the television channel, proceeded to pass the following
order:
“.....
2. The above said act on the part of above
official shows his criminal activities. He being
a member of a disciplined force is responsible
for protecting the life and property of the
citizen of this country, but instead of
discharging his duty honestly and sincerely he
himself has indulged in criminal activities. As
such he has not only tarnished the image of
the Haryana Police but also has rudely shaken
faith of the citizens of Haryana in the entire
Police force, who is supposed to be their
protectors.
He has acted in a most
reprehensible manner. Which is unexpected
from a member of disciplined force and
undoubtedly extremely prejudicial to the
person safety and security of citizen.
Page 2
3
3. The involvement of said police official in
such a shameful criminal activity has eroded
the faith of common people and his
continuance in the force is likely to cause
further irreparable loss to the functioning and
credibility of Haryana Police. The defaulter has
acted in a manner highly unbecoming of police
official. After such act of serious misconduct.
If he is allowed to continue in the Police force,
it would be detrimental to public interest.
4. Keeping in view the overall circumstances
of above operation, I K.K. Rao, IPS,
Superintendent of Police, Mewat at Nuh, in
exercise of the powers conferred under Article
311(2)(b) of Constitution of India I hereby
order the dismissal of SI Rishal Singh No.
133/GGN with immediate effect. A copy of this
order be delivered to him free of cost.”
3.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the
appellant preferred a civil writ petition and the High
Court without adverting to the essential contention
that no reason had been ascribed for dispensing with
the inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) opined that prompt
action was required to be taken to avoid spreading of
trouble and, therefore, the order passed by the
authority was justified.
4.
Ms. S. Janani, learned counsel for the appellant
has submitted that the power with the employer rests
Page 3
4
to dispense with the inquiry invoking the constitutional
provision, yet appropriate reasons have to be ascribed
and in absence of ascription of reasons, the order is
vitiated in law and the eventual consequence would be
quashment of the order of dismissal.
5.
Mr. Manjit Singh, learned counsel for the State
submitted that regard being had to the nature of
allegations, the Superintendent of Police, who is the
competent
authority,
thought
it
appropriate
to
dispense with the inquiry and, hence, the order of
dismissal cannot be flawed.
6.
We have already reproduced the order passed
by the competent authority. On a bare perusal of the
same, it is clear as day that it is bereft of reason. Non-
ascribing of reason while passing an order dispensing
with enquiry, which otherwise is a must, definitely
invalidates such an action. In this context, reference
to the authority in Union of India and Anr. v.
Tulsiram Patel1 is apposite. In the said case the
1 (1985) 3 SCC 398
Page 4
5
Constitution Bench, while dealing with the exercise of
power under Article 311(2)(b), has ruled thus:
“130. The condition precedent for the appli-
cation of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the
disciplinary authority that “it is not reason-
ably practicable to hold” the inquiry con-
templated by clause (2) of Article 311. What
is pertinent to note is that the words used
are “not reasonably practicable” and not
“impracticable”. According to the Oxford
English Dictionary “practicable” means “Ca-
pable of being put into practice, carried out
in action, effected, accomplished, or done;
feasible”. Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary defines the word “practicable” in-
ter alia as meaning “possible to practice or
perform : capable of being put into practice,
done or accomplished: feasible”. Further,
the words used are not “not practicable” but
“not reasonably practicable”. Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary defines
the word “reasonably” as “in a reasonable
manner: to a fairly sufficient extent”. Thus,
whether it was practicable to hold the in-
quiry or not must be judged in the context
of whether it was reasonably practicable to
do so. It is not a total or absolute impracti-
cability which is required by clause (b).
What is requisite is that the holding of the
inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a
reasonable man taking a reasonable view of
the prevailing situation.”
7.
In Jaswant Sing v. State of Punjab and
Others2 the Court, while dealing with the exercise of
2 (1991) 1 SCC 362
Page 5
6
power as conferred by way of exception under Article
311(2)(b) of the Constitution, opined as follows:
“Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article
311(2) can be invoked only when the authority
is satisfied from the material placed before
him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold
a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the
following observation at page 270 of Tulsiram
case: (SCC p.504, para 130)
“A disciplinary authority is not
expected to dispense with a disciplinary
inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of
ulterior motives or merely in order to
avoid the holding of an inquiry or
because the department's case against
the government servant is weak and
must fail.”
The
decision
to
dispense
with
the
departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be
rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned
authority.
When the satisfaction of the
concerned authority is questioned in a court of
law, it is incumbent on those who support the
order to show that the satisfaction is based on
certain objective facts and is not the outcome
of the whim or caprice of the concerned
officer.”
8.
After so stating, the two-Judge Bench quashed
the order of dismissal and directed the appellant to be
reinstated in service forthwith with the monetary
benefits. Be it noted, it was also observed therein that
Page 6
7
it would be open to the employer, if so advised,
notwithstanding the lapse of time, to proceed with the
disciplinary proceedings.
9.
Recently, in Reena Rani v. State of Haryana3,
after referring to the various authorities in the field,
the Court ruled that when reasons are not ascribed,
the order is vitiated and accordingly set aside the
order of dismissal which had been concurred with by
the Single Judge and directed for reinstatement in
service with all consequential benefits.
It has also
been observed therein that the order passed by this
Court would not preclude the competent authority
from taking action against the Appellant in accordance
with law.
10.
Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid
authorities, the irresistible conclusion is that the order
passed by the Superintendent of Police dispensing with
the inquiry is totally unsustainable and is hereby
annulled. As the foundation founders, the order of the
3 (2012) 10 SCC 215
High Court giving the stamp of approval to the
ultimate order without addressing the lis from a proper
perspective is also indefensible and resultantly, the
order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority
has to pave the path of extinction.
11.
Consequently, we allow the appeal and set aside
the order passed by the High Court and that of the
disciplinary authority. The appellant shall be deemed
to be in service till the date of superannuation. As he
has attained the age of superannuation in the
meantime, he shall be entitled to all consequential
benefits. The arrears shall be computed and paid to
the appellant within a period of three months hence.
Needless to say, the respondents are not precluded
from initiating any disciplinary proceedings, if advised
in law. As the lis has been pending before the Court,
the period that has been spent in Court shall be
excluded for the purpose of limitation for initiating the
disciplinary proceedings as per rules.
However, we
may hasten to clarify that our observations herein
Page 8
9
should not be construed as a mandate to the
authorities to initiate the proceeding against the
appellant.
We may further proceed to add that the
State Government shall conduct itself as a model
employer and
act with the objectivity which is
expected from it. There shall be no order as to costs.
...............................J.
(DIPAK MISRA)
...............................J.
(N.V. RAMANA)
NEW DELHI
MAY 13, 2014
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