In the present case, on going through the papers on
record we find that the High Court has given too much
emphasis to the affidavit filed by the witness Vijay Pratap
Singh that the appellant attempted to sell disputed shop to
him. It is relevant to mention here that the said fact was
denied by the appellant. In our opinion, merely for the
reason that some witness has stated that the landlord
attempted to sell the property his statement cannot be said
to be reliable, as has been believed by the High Court or the
Appellate Court, unless such fact is supported with
documentary proof. There appears no document on record
to support the bald statement of the witness Vijay Kumar
Singh to dislodge the case of bonafide requirement of the
shop claimed by the appellant for his son who was
unemployed.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.7796-7797 of 2014
(Arising out of S.L.P(c) Nos.34694-34695 of 2013)
KRISHNA KUMAR RASTOGI ….APPELLANT
VERSUS
SUMITRA DEVI ….RESPONDENT
Citation;2014(5) ALLMR 917 SC
PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.
Read original judgment;click here
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against the judgment and
order dated 12th October, 2006 passed by the High Court of
judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.34997
of 2000 whereby the writ petition filed by the landlord has
Page 2
2
been dismissed, and the order dated 13th February, 2012
passed on Review Application No.225618 of 2006, whereby
the said application has also been rejected.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the present appellant
(landlord) filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of Uttar
Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred as U.P. Act No.13 of
1972) against the respondent Sumitra Devi (tenant) for
release of the shop in question situated in Shivaji Market
(Chhota Bazar), Shyohara, District Bijnor, before the
Prescribed Authority/Addl. Civil Judge(Senior Division),
Nagina. It is pleaded on behalf of the appellant that the
respondent was tenant of the appellant in the shop on rent
@ Rs.125/- per month. The appellant further pleaded that
he needed the shop in question to establish his son Amit
Kumar in the business by opening a General Merchant Shop
in it. It is also alleged by the appellant that vide notice dated
11th March, 1985, the appellant asked the respondent to
vacate the premises occupied by her as the same was
required by the landlord/appellant as above, and since the
Page 3
3
respondent did not vacate the shop, the application for
release of the shop was moved by the appellant before the
Prescribed Authority/Addl. Civil Judge (S.D.), Nagina.
4. The respondent/tenant contested the application for
release of the accommodation and denied the allegations
contained in it. It is pleaded by her that she has three sons
and four daughters apart from her husband in the family, and
her hardship is more than that of the appellant. It is further
stated by her that the need of the appellant is not genuine. It
is further stated by her that the respondent through her son
sells shoes in the shop, and does not use the shop as store,
as alleged by the appellant. It is also alleged that the
appellant actually wants enhancement of rent, and the
answering respondent is ready to pay Rs.300/- per month
instead of Rs.125/- per month as rent. It is also pointed out
by the respondent in her pleading that earlier suit No. 198 of
1980 (Krishna Kumar vs. Sumitra Devi) was instituted by the
appellant for vacation of the shop, and when he failed in it,
the present proceeding has been drawn.
Page 4
4
5. By way of amendment on 11th August, 1995 respondent
further took the plea that during the pendency of the
proceedings, Jayanti Prasad, brother of the appellant had
filed proceedings No.6 of 1987 against Chaturpal Gupta –
husband of the respondent on personal ground of necessity
and said application has been allowed against which the
appeal is pending. Lastly, it is pleaded by the respondent
that the respondent has attempted to search another shop
but the same was not available near the disputed shop.
6. In reply to the amended plea of the respondent, the
appellant pleaded that even if the application of his brother
Jayanti Prasad is allowed, it does not fulfill the necessity of
the appellant and his son for the shop in question. It is also
pleaded by the appellant that actually husband of the
respondent is running the business in another shop of shoes
belonging to one of his relatives.
7. The affidavits were exchanged and after recording
evidence and hearing the parties, the Prescribed Authority
Page 5
5
accepted the case of the appellant/landlord and allowed the
application for release of shop in his favour vide order dated
21st September, 1999 against which the tenant (present
respondent) Sumitra Devi filed Rent Control Appeal No. 9 of
1999 before Additional District Judge, Bijnor, and said
Authority after hearing the parties vide its order dated 23rd
April, 2000 allowed the appeal and set aside the order
passed by the Prescribed Authority/Addl. Civil Judge(S.D),
Nagina. Aggrieved by the said order dated 23rd April, 2000,
the appellant filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34997 of 2000
before the High Court of judicature at Allahabad, and said
petition, after hearing the parties, was dismissed. Hence
these appeals are before us.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
considered their submissions.
9. Before further discussion, we think it just and proper to
quote the relevant provisions of law under which the release
application was moved:
Page 6
6
“21. Proceedings for release of building
under occupation of tenant. –(1) The
prescribed authority may, on an application of
the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of
a tenant from the building under tenancy or any
specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of
the following grounds exists, namely, –
(a) that the building is bona fide required either in its
existing form or after demolition and new
construction by the landlord for occupation by
himself or any member of his family, or any person
for whose benefit it is held by him, either for
residential purposes or for purposes of any
profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is
the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the
objects of the trust;
(b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is
required for purposes of demolition and new
construction:
Provided that where the building was in the
occupation of a tenant since before its purchase
by the landlord, such purchase being made after
the commencement of this Act, no application
shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in
clause (a), unless a period of three years has
elapsed since the date of such purchase and the
landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the
tenant not less than six months before such
application, and such notice may be given even
before the expiration of the aforesaid period of
three years:
Page 7
7
Provided further that if any application under
clause (a) is made in respect of [ any building let
out exclusively for non-residential purposes] (subs
by U.P. Act 28 of 1976 (w.e.f.5.7.1976) ) the prescribed
authority while making the order of eviction shall,
after considering all relevant facts of the case,
award against the landlord to the tenant [an
amount not exceeding two years’ rent ] (subs by U.P.
Act 28 of 1976 (w.e.f.5.7.1976) ) as compensation and may,
subject to rules, impose such other conditions as it
thinks fit:
xx xx xx xx
Provided also that the prescribed authority shall,
except in cases provided for in the Explanation,
take into account the likely hardship to the tenant
from the grant of the application as against the
likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of
the application and for that purpose shall have
regard to such factors as may be prescribed] Ins.
by U.P. Act 28 of 1976 and shall be deemed always to have
been inserted.
Explanation – In the case of a residential building:-
(i) Where the tenant or any member of his family
[who has been normally residing with or is wholly
dependant on him] has built or has otherwise
acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after
acquisition a residential building in the same city,
municipality, notified area or town area, no
objection by the tenant against an application
under this sub-section shall be entertained;
xx xx xx xx
Page 8
8
(4) An order under [sub-section(I) or sub-section(I-A) or
sub section (2)], may be made notwithstanding that the
tenancy has not been determined:
Provided that no such order shall be made in the case of
a tenancy created for a fixed term by a registered lease
before the expiry of such term.
(5) On an order being made under [sub-section(I), or subsection(
I-A) or sub section (2)], the building or part or
appurtenant land, as the case may be, shall stand
released in favour of the landlord:
Provided that on the occurrence of any of the
circumstances mentioned in Section 24, any building or
part thereof (but not appurtenant land alone) released as
above, shall, without prejudice to the provisions of
Section 24, be deemed to become again subject to
allotment in accordance with Chapter III.
(6) On the expiration of a period of thirty days from an
order under [sub-section(I) or sub-section(I-A) or sub
section (2)], the tenancy of the tenant shall stand
determined in its entirety or, as the case may be, in
respect of any part of appurtenant land released in
favour of the landlord, and in the latter case, the rent
payable for the remainder of the building under tenancy
shall be such as may be agreed upon between the
parties and in the absence of such agreement as may
be determined under Section 8.”
10. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 16 of Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules,
1972 framed under U.P. Act 13 of 1972 reads as under:
“16. Application for release on the ground of
personal requirement [Sections 21(1)(a) and 34(8)]. –
Page 9
9
xx xx xx
(2) While considering an application for release
under clause (a) of sub-section(1) of Section 21 in
respect of a building let out for purposes of any
business, the prescribed authority shall also have
regard to such facts as the following:-
(a) The greater the period since when the
tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose
heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on
his business in that building, the less the
justification for allowing the application;
(b) where the tenant has available with him
suitable accommodation to which he can shift his
business without substantial loss there shall be
greater justification for allowing the application;
(c) the greater the existing business of the
landlord’s own, apart from the business proposed
to be set up in the leased premises, the less the
justification for allowing the application, and even if
an application is allowed in such a case, the
prescribed authority may on the application of the
tenant impose the condition where the landlord has
available with him other accommodation (whether
subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for
his own proposed business but may serve the
purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall let out
that accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to
be fixed by the prescribed authority;
(d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or
divorced or judicially separated daughter or
daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord
Page 10
10
has, after the building was originally let out,
completed his or her technical education and is not
employed in Government service, and wants to
engage in self-employment, his or her need shall be
given due consideration.”
11. In Mohd. Ayub and Another vs Mukesh Chand
(2012) 2 SCC 155, while interpreting the above provisions of
law, this Court has observed in para 15 as under:
“ 15. It is well settled the landlord’s
requirement need not be a dire necessity.
The court cannot direct the landlord to do a
particular business or imagine that he could
profitably do a particular business rather than
the business he proposes to start. It was
wrong on the part of the District Court to hold
that the appellants’ case that their sons want
to start the general merchant business is a
pretence because they are dealing in eggs
……………Similarly, length of tenancy of the
respondent in the circumstances of the case
ought not to have weighed with the courts
below.”
12. In para 17 of the case of Ayub Khan (supra), this Court
further observed:
“17. It is also important to note that there is
nothing on record to show that during the
pendency of this litigation the respondent
made any genuine efforts to find out any
alternative accommodation”.
Page 11
11
13. In Rishi Kumar Govil vs. Maqsoodan and Ors (2007)
4 SCC 465, on the plea and evidence relating to bona fide
need of landlord, this Court in para 19 observed as under:
“19. In Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem
Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679 : AIR
2000 SC 534, it was held that it is the
choice of the landlord to choose the place
for the business which is most suitable for
him. He has complete freedom in the
matter. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep
Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604: AIR 2001 SC
803, it was held that the need of the
landlord is to be seen on the date of
application for release. In Prativa Devi vs
T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353 it was held
that the landlord is the best judge of his
requirement and courts have no concern to
dictate the landlord as to how and in what
manner he should live.”
14. In the present case, on going through the papers on
record we find that the High Court has given too much
emphasis to the affidavit filed by the witness Vijay Pratap
Singh that the appellant attempted to sell disputed shop to
him. It is relevant to mention here that the said fact was
denied by the appellant. In our opinion, merely for the
Page 12
12
reason that some witness has stated that the landlord
attempted to sell the property his statement cannot be said
to be reliable, as has been believed by the High Court or the
Appellate Court, unless such fact is supported with
documentary proof. There appears no document on record
to support the bald statement of the witness Vijay Kumar
Singh to dislodge the case of bonafide requirement of the
shop claimed by the appellant for his son who was
unemployed.
15. Another fact relied by the High Court pertains to the
fact that elder son of the appellant was running a business
as a tenant in a shop opposite to the disputed shop. Had it
been found that the son for whom the landlord needed the
shop had already got his own shop, it could have been said
that the need for the landlord is not genuine, but in the
present case if one of the sons was running his business
that too in a rented accommodation, it cannot be said that
the need of the landlord was not bonafide. The sons of the
appellant are not supposed to starve on street till the shop is
actually vacated for them.
Page 13
13
16. For the reasons as discussed above, we are of the
view that the High Court has erred in law in dismissing the
petition of the appellant. We further find that the Appellate
Court has allowed the appeal of the tenant against the
weight of the evidence on record. We concur the view taken
by the trial court /Prescribed Authority. Accordingly, we allow
these appeals and set aside the orders challenged before
us. However, considering the facts and circumstances of
the case, we allow the respondent / tenant to vacate
the premises by 31st December, 2014 whereafter the
landlord/appellant shall be at liberty to get executed the
order dated 21st September, 1999 passed by the Prescribed
Authority/Addl. Civil Judge (S.D), Nagina. However, there
is no order as to costs.
………..………………,,,,,………….……J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
…………………………………………..J
(PRAFULLA C. PANT)
New Delhi
August 20, 2014
Print Page
record we find that the High Court has given too much
emphasis to the affidavit filed by the witness Vijay Pratap
Singh that the appellant attempted to sell disputed shop to
him. It is relevant to mention here that the said fact was
denied by the appellant. In our opinion, merely for the
reason that some witness has stated that the landlord
attempted to sell the property his statement cannot be said
to be reliable, as has been believed by the High Court or the
Appellate Court, unless such fact is supported with
documentary proof. There appears no document on record
to support the bald statement of the witness Vijay Kumar
Singh to dislodge the case of bonafide requirement of the
shop claimed by the appellant for his son who was
unemployed.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.7796-7797 of 2014
(Arising out of S.L.P(c) Nos.34694-34695 of 2013)
KRISHNA KUMAR RASTOGI ….APPELLANT
VERSUS
SUMITRA DEVI ….RESPONDENT
Citation;2014(5) ALLMR 917 SC
PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.
Read original judgment;click here
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against the judgment and
order dated 12th October, 2006 passed by the High Court of
judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.34997
of 2000 whereby the writ petition filed by the landlord has
Page 2
2
been dismissed, and the order dated 13th February, 2012
passed on Review Application No.225618 of 2006, whereby
the said application has also been rejected.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the present appellant
(landlord) filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of Uttar
Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred as U.P. Act No.13 of
1972) against the respondent Sumitra Devi (tenant) for
release of the shop in question situated in Shivaji Market
(Chhota Bazar), Shyohara, District Bijnor, before the
Prescribed Authority/Addl. Civil Judge(Senior Division),
Nagina. It is pleaded on behalf of the appellant that the
respondent was tenant of the appellant in the shop on rent
@ Rs.125/- per month. The appellant further pleaded that
he needed the shop in question to establish his son Amit
Kumar in the business by opening a General Merchant Shop
in it. It is also alleged by the appellant that vide notice dated
11th March, 1985, the appellant asked the respondent to
vacate the premises occupied by her as the same was
required by the landlord/appellant as above, and since the
Page 3
3
respondent did not vacate the shop, the application for
release of the shop was moved by the appellant before the
Prescribed Authority/Addl. Civil Judge (S.D.), Nagina.
4. The respondent/tenant contested the application for
release of the accommodation and denied the allegations
contained in it. It is pleaded by her that she has three sons
and four daughters apart from her husband in the family, and
her hardship is more than that of the appellant. It is further
stated by her that the need of the appellant is not genuine. It
is further stated by her that the respondent through her son
sells shoes in the shop, and does not use the shop as store,
as alleged by the appellant. It is also alleged that the
appellant actually wants enhancement of rent, and the
answering respondent is ready to pay Rs.300/- per month
instead of Rs.125/- per month as rent. It is also pointed out
by the respondent in her pleading that earlier suit No. 198 of
1980 (Krishna Kumar vs. Sumitra Devi) was instituted by the
appellant for vacation of the shop, and when he failed in it,
the present proceeding has been drawn.
Page 4
4
5. By way of amendment on 11th August, 1995 respondent
further took the plea that during the pendency of the
proceedings, Jayanti Prasad, brother of the appellant had
filed proceedings No.6 of 1987 against Chaturpal Gupta –
husband of the respondent on personal ground of necessity
and said application has been allowed against which the
appeal is pending. Lastly, it is pleaded by the respondent
that the respondent has attempted to search another shop
but the same was not available near the disputed shop.
6. In reply to the amended plea of the respondent, the
appellant pleaded that even if the application of his brother
Jayanti Prasad is allowed, it does not fulfill the necessity of
the appellant and his son for the shop in question. It is also
pleaded by the appellant that actually husband of the
respondent is running the business in another shop of shoes
belonging to one of his relatives.
7. The affidavits were exchanged and after recording
evidence and hearing the parties, the Prescribed Authority
Page 5
5
accepted the case of the appellant/landlord and allowed the
application for release of shop in his favour vide order dated
21st September, 1999 against which the tenant (present
respondent) Sumitra Devi filed Rent Control Appeal No. 9 of
1999 before Additional District Judge, Bijnor, and said
Authority after hearing the parties vide its order dated 23rd
April, 2000 allowed the appeal and set aside the order
passed by the Prescribed Authority/Addl. Civil Judge(S.D),
Nagina. Aggrieved by the said order dated 23rd April, 2000,
the appellant filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34997 of 2000
before the High Court of judicature at Allahabad, and said
petition, after hearing the parties, was dismissed. Hence
these appeals are before us.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
considered their submissions.
9. Before further discussion, we think it just and proper to
quote the relevant provisions of law under which the release
application was moved:
Page 6
6
“21. Proceedings for release of building
under occupation of tenant. –(1) The
prescribed authority may, on an application of
the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of
a tenant from the building under tenancy or any
specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of
the following grounds exists, namely, –
(a) that the building is bona fide required either in its
existing form or after demolition and new
construction by the landlord for occupation by
himself or any member of his family, or any person
for whose benefit it is held by him, either for
residential purposes or for purposes of any
profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is
the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the
objects of the trust;
(b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is
required for purposes of demolition and new
construction:
Provided that where the building was in the
occupation of a tenant since before its purchase
by the landlord, such purchase being made after
the commencement of this Act, no application
shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in
clause (a), unless a period of three years has
elapsed since the date of such purchase and the
landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the
tenant not less than six months before such
application, and such notice may be given even
before the expiration of the aforesaid period of
three years:
Page 7
7
Provided further that if any application under
clause (a) is made in respect of [ any building let
out exclusively for non-residential purposes] (subs
by U.P. Act 28 of 1976 (w.e.f.5.7.1976) ) the prescribed
authority while making the order of eviction shall,
after considering all relevant facts of the case,
award against the landlord to the tenant [an
amount not exceeding two years’ rent ] (subs by U.P.
Act 28 of 1976 (w.e.f.5.7.1976) ) as compensation and may,
subject to rules, impose such other conditions as it
thinks fit:
xx xx xx xx
Provided also that the prescribed authority shall,
except in cases provided for in the Explanation,
take into account the likely hardship to the tenant
from the grant of the application as against the
likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of
the application and for that purpose shall have
regard to such factors as may be prescribed] Ins.
by U.P. Act 28 of 1976 and shall be deemed always to have
been inserted.
Explanation – In the case of a residential building:-
(i) Where the tenant or any member of his family
[who has been normally residing with or is wholly
dependant on him] has built or has otherwise
acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after
acquisition a residential building in the same city,
municipality, notified area or town area, no
objection by the tenant against an application
under this sub-section shall be entertained;
xx xx xx xx
Page 8
8
(4) An order under [sub-section(I) or sub-section(I-A) or
sub section (2)], may be made notwithstanding that the
tenancy has not been determined:
Provided that no such order shall be made in the case of
a tenancy created for a fixed term by a registered lease
before the expiry of such term.
(5) On an order being made under [sub-section(I), or subsection(
I-A) or sub section (2)], the building or part or
appurtenant land, as the case may be, shall stand
released in favour of the landlord:
Provided that on the occurrence of any of the
circumstances mentioned in Section 24, any building or
part thereof (but not appurtenant land alone) released as
above, shall, without prejudice to the provisions of
Section 24, be deemed to become again subject to
allotment in accordance with Chapter III.
(6) On the expiration of a period of thirty days from an
order under [sub-section(I) or sub-section(I-A) or sub
section (2)], the tenancy of the tenant shall stand
determined in its entirety or, as the case may be, in
respect of any part of appurtenant land released in
favour of the landlord, and in the latter case, the rent
payable for the remainder of the building under tenancy
shall be such as may be agreed upon between the
parties and in the absence of such agreement as may
be determined under Section 8.”
10. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 16 of Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules,
1972 framed under U.P. Act 13 of 1972 reads as under:
“16. Application for release on the ground of
personal requirement [Sections 21(1)(a) and 34(8)]. –
Page 9
9
xx xx xx
(2) While considering an application for release
under clause (a) of sub-section(1) of Section 21 in
respect of a building let out for purposes of any
business, the prescribed authority shall also have
regard to such facts as the following:-
(a) The greater the period since when the
tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose
heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on
his business in that building, the less the
justification for allowing the application;
(b) where the tenant has available with him
suitable accommodation to which he can shift his
business without substantial loss there shall be
greater justification for allowing the application;
(c) the greater the existing business of the
landlord’s own, apart from the business proposed
to be set up in the leased premises, the less the
justification for allowing the application, and even if
an application is allowed in such a case, the
prescribed authority may on the application of the
tenant impose the condition where the landlord has
available with him other accommodation (whether
subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for
his own proposed business but may serve the
purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall let out
that accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to
be fixed by the prescribed authority;
(d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or
divorced or judicially separated daughter or
daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord
Page 10
10
has, after the building was originally let out,
completed his or her technical education and is not
employed in Government service, and wants to
engage in self-employment, his or her need shall be
given due consideration.”
11. In Mohd. Ayub and Another vs Mukesh Chand
(2012) 2 SCC 155, while interpreting the above provisions of
law, this Court has observed in para 15 as under:
“ 15. It is well settled the landlord’s
requirement need not be a dire necessity.
The court cannot direct the landlord to do a
particular business or imagine that he could
profitably do a particular business rather than
the business he proposes to start. It was
wrong on the part of the District Court to hold
that the appellants’ case that their sons want
to start the general merchant business is a
pretence because they are dealing in eggs
……………Similarly, length of tenancy of the
respondent in the circumstances of the case
ought not to have weighed with the courts
below.”
12. In para 17 of the case of Ayub Khan (supra), this Court
further observed:
“17. It is also important to note that there is
nothing on record to show that during the
pendency of this litigation the respondent
made any genuine efforts to find out any
alternative accommodation”.
Page 11
11
13. In Rishi Kumar Govil vs. Maqsoodan and Ors (2007)
4 SCC 465, on the plea and evidence relating to bona fide
need of landlord, this Court in para 19 observed as under:
“19. In Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem
Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679 : AIR
2000 SC 534, it was held that it is the
choice of the landlord to choose the place
for the business which is most suitable for
him. He has complete freedom in the
matter. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep
Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604: AIR 2001 SC
803, it was held that the need of the
landlord is to be seen on the date of
application for release. In Prativa Devi vs
T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353 it was held
that the landlord is the best judge of his
requirement and courts have no concern to
dictate the landlord as to how and in what
manner he should live.”
14. In the present case, on going through the papers on
record we find that the High Court has given too much
emphasis to the affidavit filed by the witness Vijay Pratap
Singh that the appellant attempted to sell disputed shop to
him. It is relevant to mention here that the said fact was
denied by the appellant. In our opinion, merely for the
Page 12
12
reason that some witness has stated that the landlord
attempted to sell the property his statement cannot be said
to be reliable, as has been believed by the High Court or the
Appellate Court, unless such fact is supported with
documentary proof. There appears no document on record
to support the bald statement of the witness Vijay Kumar
Singh to dislodge the case of bonafide requirement of the
shop claimed by the appellant for his son who was
unemployed.
15. Another fact relied by the High Court pertains to the
fact that elder son of the appellant was running a business
as a tenant in a shop opposite to the disputed shop. Had it
been found that the son for whom the landlord needed the
shop had already got his own shop, it could have been said
that the need for the landlord is not genuine, but in the
present case if one of the sons was running his business
that too in a rented accommodation, it cannot be said that
the need of the landlord was not bonafide. The sons of the
appellant are not supposed to starve on street till the shop is
actually vacated for them.
Page 13
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16. For the reasons as discussed above, we are of the
view that the High Court has erred in law in dismissing the
petition of the appellant. We further find that the Appellate
Court has allowed the appeal of the tenant against the
weight of the evidence on record. We concur the view taken
by the trial court /Prescribed Authority. Accordingly, we allow
these appeals and set aside the orders challenged before
us. However, considering the facts and circumstances of
the case, we allow the respondent / tenant to vacate
the premises by 31st December, 2014 whereafter the
landlord/appellant shall be at liberty to get executed the
order dated 21st September, 1999 passed by the Prescribed
Authority/Addl. Civil Judge (S.D), Nagina. However, there
is no order as to costs.
………..………………,,,,,………….……J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
…………………………………………..J
(PRAFULLA C. PANT)
New Delhi
August 20, 2014
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