Apex Court observed that Section 116 of the Evidence Act deals with estoppel against tenants and of licensees or persons in possession. Estoppel under this provision falls in the category of estoppel by contract. The rule embodied in Section 116 of Act simply prevents the tenant in occupation of the premises from denying the title of the landlord who let him into possession, just as it applies to a mortgagor or a mortgagee, vendor or a vendee, bailer or a bailee and licensor or a licensee.
We must before parting remind ourselves that Section
13-B is a beneficial provision intended to provide a speedy
remedy to NRIs who return to their native places and need
property let out by them for their own requirement or the
requirement of those who are living with and economically
dependent upon them. Their position cannot, therefore, be
worse off than what it would have been if they were not
Non-Resident Indians. If ordinarily a landlord cannot be
asked to prove his title before getting his tenant evicted on
any one of the grounds stipulated for such eviction, we see
no reason why he should be asked to do so only because he
happens to be a Non-Resident Indian. The general principles
of Evidence Act including the doctrine of estoppel enshrined
in Section 116 are applicable even to the tenants occupying
properties of the Non-Resident Indians referred to in the Act.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8410 OF 2014
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.19532 of 2011)
Kamaljit Singh …Appellant
Vs.
Sarabjit Singh …Respondent
T.S. THAKUR, J.
Dated;September 2, 2014
Read original judgment here; click here
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of an order dated 9th July, 2010
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh whereby Civil Revision Petition No.580 of 2005
filed by the appellant has been dismissed and order dated 5th
November, 2004 passed by the Rent Controller, Phagwara,
dismissing a petition under Section 13-B of the East Punjab
Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949 upheld.
3. The suit premises comprise a shop in a building bearing
No.XVI/258/1 situate at Banga Road, Phagwara. It was let
out to the respondent-tenant by the appellant who was born
and brought up in India but having spent over 30 years in
U.K. has returned in the year 2000 with the intention to
settle down and establish a hotel at Phagwara his home
town. An eviction petition under Section 13-B of the East
Punjab Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949 was filed by the
appellant on the ground that as a Non Resident Indian in
need of the shop for his own use, he was entitled to have
the same vacated from the respondent-tenant.
4. The eviction petition was contested by the respondent
on several grounds including the ground that the appellant
was not a NRI and that the eviction petition was barred by
the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. It was also contended
by the respondent-tenant that although he was a tenant in
occupation of the premises under the appellant, the saledeeds
relied upon by the respondent did not relate to the
land underlying the shop in question.
5. By an order dated 5th November, 2004, the Rent
Controller dismissed the eviction petition filed by the
appellant holding that the appellant had failed to prove his
ownership over the demised premises for a period of five
years before the filing of the eviction petition. The Rent
Controller held that the deposition of the witnesses
appearing on behalf of the appellant did not satisfactorily
prove that the building comprising the shops one of which
happened to be the suit shop was constructed on the land
purchased by the appellant in terms of the two sale-deeds
set up by him. The Rent Controller was of the view that
although the sale-deeds in question had been proved by the
appellant, he had failed to co-relate the same to the suit
shop or other shops over which he claimed ownership. The
Rent Controller, therefore, dismissed the eviction petition no
matter the appellant's case that he was an NRI and had
returned home to set up his own business was accepted.
6. Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the
Rent Controller, the appellant filed revision petition No.580
of 2005 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh. An application for permission to lead additional
evidence filed by the appellant in the said revision petition to
establish that the sale-deeds proved by the appellant at the
trial, indeed related to the land comprising the shop in
dispute was dismissed by the High Court by its order dated
9th July, 2010 and so also the revision petition. The High
Court concurred with the view that the appellant had failed
to prove that he was the owner of the suit shop for more
than five years prior to the filing of the petition, a condition
essential for invoking the provisions of Section 13-B of the
Act. The High Court also held that the additional evidence
sought to be adduced was very much within the knowledge
of the appellant and could have been adduced by him if only
he was diligent in doing so. Additional evidence, could not,
observed the High Court, be allowed to fill up the lacunae in
the appellants’ case.
7. Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Land Restriction
Act, 1949 reads as under:
“13-B. Right to recover immediate possession
of residential building or scheduled and/or
non-residential building to accrue to Nonresident
Indian – (1) Where an owner is a Non-
Resident Indian and returns to India and the
residential building or scheduled building and/or
non-residential building, as the case may be, let out
by him or her, is required for his or her use, or for
the use of any one ordinarily living with and
dependent on him or her, he or she, may apply to
the Controller for immediate possession of such
building or buildings, as the case may be:
Provided that a right to apply in respect of
such a building under this section, shall be available
only after a period of five years from the date of
becoming the owner of such a building and shall be
available only once during the life time of such an
owner.
(2) Where the owner referred to in sub-section (1),
has let out more than one residential building or
scheduled building and/or non-residential building, it
shall be open to him or her to make an application
under that sub-section in respect of only one
residential building or one scheduled building and/or
one non-residential building, each chosen by him or
her;
(3) Where an owner recovers possession of a
building under this section, he or she shall not
transfer it through sale or any other means or let it
out before the expiry of a period of five years from
the date of taking possession of the said building,
failing which, the evicted tenant may apply to the
Controller for an order directing that he shall be
restored the possession of the said building and the
Controller shall make an order accordingly.”
8. A careful reading of the above would show that the
same entitles a Non-Resident Indian who returns to India to
demand eviction of any residential or non-residential
building, as the case may be, let out by him or her, if the
same is required by such non-resident Indian for his or her
use or for the use of any one ordinarily living and dependant
on him or her. In terms of the proviso, however, the right to
seek eviction of the tenant is available only after a period of
five years from the date of such Non-Resident Indian
becoming owner of any such building. It is further subject to
the condition that any such right shall be available to a Non-
Resident Indian owner of the premises only once during his
life time.
9. In terms of sub-section (2) the Non-Resident Indian
owner of the demised premises is entitled to apply for
eviction from only one residential or one scheduled building
or one non-residential building chosen by him or her. Subsection
(3) postulates that if the owner recovers possession
of the building under Section 13-B but transfers it through
sale or any other means or lets the same out before the
expiry of a period of five years from the date of taking
possession of the said building, the evicted tenant may
apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be
restored the possession of the said building and the
Controller shall make an order accordingly. There is,
therefore, no gainsaying that Section 13-B is a code by itself
for the special category of cases where the landlord happens
to be a non-resident Indian who returns to India and needs
the demised premises for his or her own use or for the use
of anyone ordinarily living with and dependant on him or
her. The only limitation on the exercise of the right vested
under Section 13-B (supra) is that the NRI owner must
apply for eviction of the tenant only after a period of five
years from the date he becomes the owner of such a
building and that any such right shall be exercisable by him
only once during his life time and in respect of one of the
several buildings that he may be owning. The short question
that arises in the above backdrop is whether the appellant
had satisfied the above conditions in the case at hand.
10. In support of his claim of ownership over the suit
premises, the appellant places reliance upon two sale-deeds
one dated 10th April, 1985 and the other dated 19th April,
1985. These sale-deeds have been satisfactorily proved and
accepted at the trial before the Rent Controller. The findings
recorded by the Rent Controller to that effect are clear and
specific. What is according to the Rent Controller and the
High Court, not established is that the sale-deeds relied
upon by the appellant relate to the land underlying the
shops. That view is not, in our opinion, sound. The reasons
are not far to seek. The appellant has, in para 1 of the
amended eviction petition, made a specific averment to the
effect that the appellant is the owner of the building bearing
No.XVI/258/1, situate at Banga Road, Phagwara, comprising
15 shops and open courtyard, as described in the plan
attached with the eviction petition. In reply, the respondenttenant
has denied the ownership of the appellant over the
shop in dispute. It is also denied that there are 15 shops in
the building in dispute. It is, however, admitted by the
respondent that 6 out of the several shops that comprise the
building, are in the possession of the appellant-landlord
while the remaining are in possession of the tenants each
one of them having a separate provision for ingress and
egress. More importantly, the appellant has in para 2
asserted that the respondent is a tenant in shop no.4 under
the appellant since the same was demised in 1989 on a
monthly rent of Rs.400/-. The respondent in reply to the
said averment admits that he is in occupation of the shop in
dispute but denies that his possession relates back to the
year 1989. The respondent’s case is that he is in possession
of the suit shop since the year 1992 only. Para 2 of the
reply to the eviction petition reads:
“2. That para no.2 of the application is correct only
to the extent that the respondent is in possession of
the shop in dispute. The rest of the para is wrong
and incorrect. The respondent is in possession of
the shop in dispute since 1992 not from 1989, the
answering respondents is not the subletee of the
shop in dispute. The respondent took the shop in
dispute on rent and since the day of creation of
tenancy the respondent works in the shop in
dispute.”
11. It is evident from the above that the respondent does
not dispute either the jural relationship of landlord and
tenant between the parties or the rate of rent settled
between them. All that the respondent has asserted is that
he has been in possession of the shop since the year 1992
and not since 1989 as asserted by the appellant. It is also
not the case of the respondent that he is the owner of the
suit shop or that he had taken the same on rent from
anyone other than the appellant. Such being the position,
the question is whether the respondent can dispute the title
of the appellant over the shop assuming that he was let in
possession by the appellant in the year 1992 as asserted by
him and not in the year 1989. Our answer is in the negative.
We say so because once the respondent admits that he has
been let in possession as a tenant by the appellant in the
year 1992 i.e. more than 10 years before the filing of the
eviction Petition, the requirement of appellant being owner
of the property for more than five years within the meaning
of Section 13-B (supra) would stand satisfied. The
respondent would then be estopped from denying the title of
the appellant during the continuance of the benefit that he is
drawing under the transaction, between him and the
appellant. It is trite that the doctrine of estoppel is steeped
in the principles of equity and good conscience. Equity will
not allow a person to say one thing at one time and the
opposite of it another time. It would estop him from
denying his previous assertion, act, conduct or
representation to say something contrary to what was
implied in the transaction under which he obtained the
benefit of being let in possession of the property to be
enjoyed by him as a tenant.
12. Lord Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Kings Bench and
17th Century English Jurist explains estoppel thus:
“Cometh of the French Word ‘estoupe’, from where
the English word stopped; and it is called an
estoppels or conclusion, because a man’s own act or
acceptance stoppeth or closet up his mouth to allege
or plead the truth.” [Co. Litt. 352a]
13. Law Lexicon (Second Edition, Page 656) defines
estoppel in the following words:
“An Estoppel is an admission, or something which
the law treats as an equivalent to an admission, of
so high and conclusive a nature that any one who is
affected by it is not permitted to contradict it.” [11th
Edn p. 744 in the note to the Dutchess of Kingston’s
case]
“An admission or determination under circumstances
of such solemnity that the law will not allow the fact
so admitted to be questioned by the parties or their
privies.”
“The preclusion of a person from asserting a fact, by
previous conduct inconsistent therewith, on his own
part, or on the part of those under whom he claims.”
14. Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Edn., page 629) describes
Estoppel as :
“A bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or
right that contradicts what one has said or done
before or what has been legally established as true.”
15. Section 116 of the Evidence Act deals with estoppel
against tenants and of licensees or persons in possession.
Estoppel under this provision falls in the category of estoppel
by contract and is relatively a recent development. The rule
embodied in Section 116 simply prevents the tenant in
occupation of the premises from denying the title of the
landlord who let him into possession, just as it applies to a
mortgagor or a mortgagee, vendor or a vendee, bailer or a
bailee and licensor or a licensee. The rationale underlying
the doctrine of estoppel against the tenant’s denial of title of
his landlord was stated by Jessel. M.R. in Re: Stringer’s
Estate, LR Ch 9 as under:
“Where a man having no title obtains possession of
land under a demise by a man in possession who
assumes to give him a title as tenant, he cannot
deny his landlord’s title. This is perfectly intelligible
doctrine. He took possession under a contract to
pay rent so long as he held possession under the
landlord, and to give it up at the end of the term to
the landlord, and having taken it in that way he is
not allowed to say that the man whose title he
admits and under whose title he took possession has
not a title. That is a well-established doctrine. That is
estoppel by contract.”
16. There is considerable authority for the proposition both
in India as well as in U.K. that a tenant in possession of the
property cannot deny the title of the landlord. But if he
wishes to do so he must first surrender the possession of the
property back to him. He cannot, while enjoying the benefit
conferred upon him by the benefactor, question latter’s title
to the property. Section 116 clearly lends itself to that
interpretation when it says:
“116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person
in possession.—No tenant of immovable property, or
person claiming through such tenant, shall, during
the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to
deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the
beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable
property; and no person who came upon any
immovable property by the licence of the person in
possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that
such person had a title to such possession at the
time when such licence was given.”
17. A three-Judge of this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v.
Jagannath and Ors. (1976) 4 SCC 184 reiterated the
principle that a tenant in a suit for possession was estopped
from questioning the title of the landlord under Section 116
of the Evidence Act. The title of the landlord, declared this
Court, even otherwise irrelevant in a suit for eviction of the
tenant. The only exception to the rule of estoppel as stated
in Section 116 (supra) may be where the tenant is validly
attorned to the paramount title holder of the property or
where that the plaintiff-landlord had, during the intervening
period, lost his title to the property. We are not, however,
dealing with a case where the respondent-tenant claims that
the property is vested in anyone else who could be described
as the paramount title holder or there was any extinction of
the title of the appellant on any count whatsoever since the
induction of the respondent as a tenant into the premises.
We need not, therefore, be detained by any one of those
considerations. What is important is that so long as a jural
relationship exists between the respondent-tenant and the
appellant and so long as he has not surrendered the
possession of the premises in his occupation, he cannot
question the title of the appellant to the property. The
inevitable inference flowing from the above proposition
would be that (viz-a-viz the respondent) the appellant was
and continues to be the owner of the premises in question
since the year 1992 when the respondent was inducted as a
tenant. Reckoned from the year 1992 the appellant has
established his ownership of the premises for a period of five
years before the filing of the eviction petition thereby
entitling him to invoke the provisions of Section 13-B of the
East Punjab Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949.
18. We must before parting remind ourselves that Section
13-B is a beneficial provision intended to provide a speedy
remedy to NRIs who return to their native places and need
property let out by them for their own requirement or the
requirement of those who are living with and economically
dependent upon them. Their position cannot, therefore, be
worse off than what it would have been if they were not
Non-Resident Indians. If ordinarily a landlord cannot be
asked to prove his title before getting his tenant evicted on
any one of the grounds stipulated for such eviction, we see
no reason why he should be asked to do so only because he
happens to be a Non-Resident Indian. The general principles
of Evidence Act including the doctrine of estoppel enshrined
in Section 116 are applicable even to the tenants occupying
properties of the Non-Resident Indians referred to in the Act.
19. The upshot of the above discussion is that the Courts
below fell in manifest error in holding that the appellant landlord
was obliged to prove his title to the property, no
matter the tenant clearly admits the existence of jural
relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the
appellant. We have, in the circumstances no hesitation in
reversing the view taken by the Courts below and in
decreeing the eviction petition.
20. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the
judgment and order passed by the Courts below and direct
eviction of the respondent from the suit premises. Since the
respondent has been in possession of the suit property for a
considerable length of time, we are inclined to grant him
reasonable time to do so. We accordingly direct that the
respondent shall have time till 31st March, 2015 to vacate
the premises in question and handover the peaceful
possession of the same to the appellant subject to the
following conditions:
(1) The respondent files an undertaking in this Court on
usual terms within four weeks.
(2) The respondent deposits arrears of rent, if any, with
the Rent Controller within six weeks from today.
(3) The respondent pays/deposits with Rent Controller
compensation for use and occupation of the premises
@Rs.2000/- per month w.e.f. 1st September, 2014
onwards till the date of vacation.
(4) In the event of the failure of the respondent to comply
with any one of the above conditions, the order of
eviction shall become executable, forthwith.
……………………………..…….…..…J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
…………………………..……………..J.
(C. NAGAPPAN)
New Delhi,
September 2, 2014
17
Print Page
We must before parting remind ourselves that Section
13-B is a beneficial provision intended to provide a speedy
remedy to NRIs who return to their native places and need
property let out by them for their own requirement or the
requirement of those who are living with and economically
dependent upon them. Their position cannot, therefore, be
worse off than what it would have been if they were not
Non-Resident Indians. If ordinarily a landlord cannot be
asked to prove his title before getting his tenant evicted on
any one of the grounds stipulated for such eviction, we see
no reason why he should be asked to do so only because he
happens to be a Non-Resident Indian. The general principles
of Evidence Act including the doctrine of estoppel enshrined
in Section 116 are applicable even to the tenants occupying
properties of the Non-Resident Indians referred to in the Act.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8410 OF 2014
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.19532 of 2011)
Kamaljit Singh …Appellant
Vs.
Sarabjit Singh …Respondent
T.S. THAKUR, J.
Dated;September 2, 2014
Read original judgment here; click here
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of an order dated 9th July, 2010
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh whereby Civil Revision Petition No.580 of 2005
filed by the appellant has been dismissed and order dated 5th
November, 2004 passed by the Rent Controller, Phagwara,
dismissing a petition under Section 13-B of the East Punjab
Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949 upheld.
3. The suit premises comprise a shop in a building bearing
No.XVI/258/1 situate at Banga Road, Phagwara. It was let
out to the respondent-tenant by the appellant who was born
and brought up in India but having spent over 30 years in
U.K. has returned in the year 2000 with the intention to
settle down and establish a hotel at Phagwara his home
town. An eviction petition under Section 13-B of the East
Punjab Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949 was filed by the
appellant on the ground that as a Non Resident Indian in
need of the shop for his own use, he was entitled to have
the same vacated from the respondent-tenant.
4. The eviction petition was contested by the respondent
on several grounds including the ground that the appellant
was not a NRI and that the eviction petition was barred by
the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. It was also contended
by the respondent-tenant that although he was a tenant in
occupation of the premises under the appellant, the saledeeds
relied upon by the respondent did not relate to the
land underlying the shop in question.
5. By an order dated 5th November, 2004, the Rent
Controller dismissed the eviction petition filed by the
appellant holding that the appellant had failed to prove his
ownership over the demised premises for a period of five
years before the filing of the eviction petition. The Rent
Controller held that the deposition of the witnesses
appearing on behalf of the appellant did not satisfactorily
prove that the building comprising the shops one of which
happened to be the suit shop was constructed on the land
purchased by the appellant in terms of the two sale-deeds
set up by him. The Rent Controller was of the view that
although the sale-deeds in question had been proved by the
appellant, he had failed to co-relate the same to the suit
shop or other shops over which he claimed ownership. The
Rent Controller, therefore, dismissed the eviction petition no
matter the appellant's case that he was an NRI and had
returned home to set up his own business was accepted.
6. Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the
Rent Controller, the appellant filed revision petition No.580
of 2005 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh. An application for permission to lead additional
evidence filed by the appellant in the said revision petition to
establish that the sale-deeds proved by the appellant at the
trial, indeed related to the land comprising the shop in
dispute was dismissed by the High Court by its order dated
9th July, 2010 and so also the revision petition. The High
Court concurred with the view that the appellant had failed
to prove that he was the owner of the suit shop for more
than five years prior to the filing of the petition, a condition
essential for invoking the provisions of Section 13-B of the
Act. The High Court also held that the additional evidence
sought to be adduced was very much within the knowledge
of the appellant and could have been adduced by him if only
he was diligent in doing so. Additional evidence, could not,
observed the High Court, be allowed to fill up the lacunae in
the appellants’ case.
7. Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Land Restriction
Act, 1949 reads as under:
“13-B. Right to recover immediate possession
of residential building or scheduled and/or
non-residential building to accrue to Nonresident
Indian – (1) Where an owner is a Non-
Resident Indian and returns to India and the
residential building or scheduled building and/or
non-residential building, as the case may be, let out
by him or her, is required for his or her use, or for
the use of any one ordinarily living with and
dependent on him or her, he or she, may apply to
the Controller for immediate possession of such
building or buildings, as the case may be:
Provided that a right to apply in respect of
such a building under this section, shall be available
only after a period of five years from the date of
becoming the owner of such a building and shall be
available only once during the life time of such an
owner.
(2) Where the owner referred to in sub-section (1),
has let out more than one residential building or
scheduled building and/or non-residential building, it
shall be open to him or her to make an application
under that sub-section in respect of only one
residential building or one scheduled building and/or
one non-residential building, each chosen by him or
her;
(3) Where an owner recovers possession of a
building under this section, he or she shall not
transfer it through sale or any other means or let it
out before the expiry of a period of five years from
the date of taking possession of the said building,
failing which, the evicted tenant may apply to the
Controller for an order directing that he shall be
restored the possession of the said building and the
Controller shall make an order accordingly.”
8. A careful reading of the above would show that the
same entitles a Non-Resident Indian who returns to India to
demand eviction of any residential or non-residential
building, as the case may be, let out by him or her, if the
same is required by such non-resident Indian for his or her
use or for the use of any one ordinarily living and dependant
on him or her. In terms of the proviso, however, the right to
seek eviction of the tenant is available only after a period of
five years from the date of such Non-Resident Indian
becoming owner of any such building. It is further subject to
the condition that any such right shall be available to a Non-
Resident Indian owner of the premises only once during his
life time.
9. In terms of sub-section (2) the Non-Resident Indian
owner of the demised premises is entitled to apply for
eviction from only one residential or one scheduled building
or one non-residential building chosen by him or her. Subsection
(3) postulates that if the owner recovers possession
of the building under Section 13-B but transfers it through
sale or any other means or lets the same out before the
expiry of a period of five years from the date of taking
possession of the said building, the evicted tenant may
apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be
restored the possession of the said building and the
Controller shall make an order accordingly. There is,
therefore, no gainsaying that Section 13-B is a code by itself
for the special category of cases where the landlord happens
to be a non-resident Indian who returns to India and needs
the demised premises for his or her own use or for the use
of anyone ordinarily living with and dependant on him or
her. The only limitation on the exercise of the right vested
under Section 13-B (supra) is that the NRI owner must
apply for eviction of the tenant only after a period of five
years from the date he becomes the owner of such a
building and that any such right shall be exercisable by him
only once during his life time and in respect of one of the
several buildings that he may be owning. The short question
that arises in the above backdrop is whether the appellant
had satisfied the above conditions in the case at hand.
10. In support of his claim of ownership over the suit
premises, the appellant places reliance upon two sale-deeds
one dated 10th April, 1985 and the other dated 19th April,
1985. These sale-deeds have been satisfactorily proved and
accepted at the trial before the Rent Controller. The findings
recorded by the Rent Controller to that effect are clear and
specific. What is according to the Rent Controller and the
High Court, not established is that the sale-deeds relied
upon by the appellant relate to the land underlying the
shops. That view is not, in our opinion, sound. The reasons
are not far to seek. The appellant has, in para 1 of the
amended eviction petition, made a specific averment to the
effect that the appellant is the owner of the building bearing
No.XVI/258/1, situate at Banga Road, Phagwara, comprising
15 shops and open courtyard, as described in the plan
attached with the eviction petition. In reply, the respondenttenant
has denied the ownership of the appellant over the
shop in dispute. It is also denied that there are 15 shops in
the building in dispute. It is, however, admitted by the
respondent that 6 out of the several shops that comprise the
building, are in the possession of the appellant-landlord
while the remaining are in possession of the tenants each
one of them having a separate provision for ingress and
egress. More importantly, the appellant has in para 2
asserted that the respondent is a tenant in shop no.4 under
the appellant since the same was demised in 1989 on a
monthly rent of Rs.400/-. The respondent in reply to the
said averment admits that he is in occupation of the shop in
dispute but denies that his possession relates back to the
year 1989. The respondent’s case is that he is in possession
of the suit shop since the year 1992 only. Para 2 of the
reply to the eviction petition reads:
“2. That para no.2 of the application is correct only
to the extent that the respondent is in possession of
the shop in dispute. The rest of the para is wrong
and incorrect. The respondent is in possession of
the shop in dispute since 1992 not from 1989, the
answering respondents is not the subletee of the
shop in dispute. The respondent took the shop in
dispute on rent and since the day of creation of
tenancy the respondent works in the shop in
dispute.”
11. It is evident from the above that the respondent does
not dispute either the jural relationship of landlord and
tenant between the parties or the rate of rent settled
between them. All that the respondent has asserted is that
he has been in possession of the shop since the year 1992
and not since 1989 as asserted by the appellant. It is also
not the case of the respondent that he is the owner of the
suit shop or that he had taken the same on rent from
anyone other than the appellant. Such being the position,
the question is whether the respondent can dispute the title
of the appellant over the shop assuming that he was let in
possession by the appellant in the year 1992 as asserted by
him and not in the year 1989. Our answer is in the negative.
We say so because once the respondent admits that he has
been let in possession as a tenant by the appellant in the
year 1992 i.e. more than 10 years before the filing of the
eviction Petition, the requirement of appellant being owner
of the property for more than five years within the meaning
of Section 13-B (supra) would stand satisfied. The
respondent would then be estopped from denying the title of
the appellant during the continuance of the benefit that he is
drawing under the transaction, between him and the
appellant. It is trite that the doctrine of estoppel is steeped
in the principles of equity and good conscience. Equity will
not allow a person to say one thing at one time and the
opposite of it another time. It would estop him from
denying his previous assertion, act, conduct or
representation to say something contrary to what was
implied in the transaction under which he obtained the
benefit of being let in possession of the property to be
enjoyed by him as a tenant.
12. Lord Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Kings Bench and
17th Century English Jurist explains estoppel thus:
“Cometh of the French Word ‘estoupe’, from where
the English word stopped; and it is called an
estoppels or conclusion, because a man’s own act or
acceptance stoppeth or closet up his mouth to allege
or plead the truth.” [Co. Litt. 352a]
13. Law Lexicon (Second Edition, Page 656) defines
estoppel in the following words:
“An Estoppel is an admission, or something which
the law treats as an equivalent to an admission, of
so high and conclusive a nature that any one who is
affected by it is not permitted to contradict it.” [11th
Edn p. 744 in the note to the Dutchess of Kingston’s
case]
“An admission or determination under circumstances
of such solemnity that the law will not allow the fact
so admitted to be questioned by the parties or their
privies.”
“The preclusion of a person from asserting a fact, by
previous conduct inconsistent therewith, on his own
part, or on the part of those under whom he claims.”
14. Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Edn., page 629) describes
Estoppel as :
“A bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or
right that contradicts what one has said or done
before or what has been legally established as true.”
15. Section 116 of the Evidence Act deals with estoppel
against tenants and of licensees or persons in possession.
Estoppel under this provision falls in the category of estoppel
by contract and is relatively a recent development. The rule
embodied in Section 116 simply prevents the tenant in
occupation of the premises from denying the title of the
landlord who let him into possession, just as it applies to a
mortgagor or a mortgagee, vendor or a vendee, bailer or a
bailee and licensor or a licensee. The rationale underlying
the doctrine of estoppel against the tenant’s denial of title of
his landlord was stated by Jessel. M.R. in Re: Stringer’s
Estate, LR Ch 9 as under:
“Where a man having no title obtains possession of
land under a demise by a man in possession who
assumes to give him a title as tenant, he cannot
deny his landlord’s title. This is perfectly intelligible
doctrine. He took possession under a contract to
pay rent so long as he held possession under the
landlord, and to give it up at the end of the term to
the landlord, and having taken it in that way he is
not allowed to say that the man whose title he
admits and under whose title he took possession has
not a title. That is a well-established doctrine. That is
estoppel by contract.”
16. There is considerable authority for the proposition both
in India as well as in U.K. that a tenant in possession of the
property cannot deny the title of the landlord. But if he
wishes to do so he must first surrender the possession of the
property back to him. He cannot, while enjoying the benefit
conferred upon him by the benefactor, question latter’s title
to the property. Section 116 clearly lends itself to that
interpretation when it says:
“116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person
in possession.—No tenant of immovable property, or
person claiming through such tenant, shall, during
the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to
deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the
beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable
property; and no person who came upon any
immovable property by the licence of the person in
possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that
such person had a title to such possession at the
time when such licence was given.”
17. A three-Judge of this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v.
Jagannath and Ors. (1976) 4 SCC 184 reiterated the
principle that a tenant in a suit for possession was estopped
from questioning the title of the landlord under Section 116
of the Evidence Act. The title of the landlord, declared this
Court, even otherwise irrelevant in a suit for eviction of the
tenant. The only exception to the rule of estoppel as stated
in Section 116 (supra) may be where the tenant is validly
attorned to the paramount title holder of the property or
where that the plaintiff-landlord had, during the intervening
period, lost his title to the property. We are not, however,
dealing with a case where the respondent-tenant claims that
the property is vested in anyone else who could be described
as the paramount title holder or there was any extinction of
the title of the appellant on any count whatsoever since the
induction of the respondent as a tenant into the premises.
We need not, therefore, be detained by any one of those
considerations. What is important is that so long as a jural
relationship exists between the respondent-tenant and the
appellant and so long as he has not surrendered the
possession of the premises in his occupation, he cannot
question the title of the appellant to the property. The
inevitable inference flowing from the above proposition
would be that (viz-a-viz the respondent) the appellant was
and continues to be the owner of the premises in question
since the year 1992 when the respondent was inducted as a
tenant. Reckoned from the year 1992 the appellant has
established his ownership of the premises for a period of five
years before the filing of the eviction petition thereby
entitling him to invoke the provisions of Section 13-B of the
East Punjab Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949.
18. We must before parting remind ourselves that Section
13-B is a beneficial provision intended to provide a speedy
remedy to NRIs who return to their native places and need
property let out by them for their own requirement or the
requirement of those who are living with and economically
dependent upon them. Their position cannot, therefore, be
worse off than what it would have been if they were not
Non-Resident Indians. If ordinarily a landlord cannot be
asked to prove his title before getting his tenant evicted on
any one of the grounds stipulated for such eviction, we see
no reason why he should be asked to do so only because he
happens to be a Non-Resident Indian. The general principles
of Evidence Act including the doctrine of estoppel enshrined
in Section 116 are applicable even to the tenants occupying
properties of the Non-Resident Indians referred to in the Act.
19. The upshot of the above discussion is that the Courts
below fell in manifest error in holding that the appellant landlord
was obliged to prove his title to the property, no
matter the tenant clearly admits the existence of jural
relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the
appellant. We have, in the circumstances no hesitation in
reversing the view taken by the Courts below and in
decreeing the eviction petition.
20. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the
judgment and order passed by the Courts below and direct
eviction of the respondent from the suit premises. Since the
respondent has been in possession of the suit property for a
considerable length of time, we are inclined to grant him
reasonable time to do so. We accordingly direct that the
respondent shall have time till 31st March, 2015 to vacate
the premises in question and handover the peaceful
possession of the same to the appellant subject to the
following conditions:
(1) The respondent files an undertaking in this Court on
usual terms within four weeks.
(2) The respondent deposits arrears of rent, if any, with
the Rent Controller within six weeks from today.
(3) The respondent pays/deposits with Rent Controller
compensation for use and occupation of the premises
@Rs.2000/- per month w.e.f. 1st September, 2014
onwards till the date of vacation.
(4) In the event of the failure of the respondent to comply
with any one of the above conditions, the order of
eviction shall become executable, forthwith.
……………………………..…….…..…J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
…………………………..……………..J.
(C. NAGAPPAN)
New Delhi,
September 2, 2014
17
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