When jurisdiction of civil court is not ousted in dispute relating to unauthorised construction against municipal corporation?

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition (L) No. 2237 of 2013

Decided On: 13.09.2013

Appellants: Abdul Karim Ahmed Mansoori
Vs.
Respondent: The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Another

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:S.C. Dharmadhikari and G.S. Patel, JJ.

Civil - Jurisdiction - Sections 351, 354A and 515A of Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 - Respondent No.l had issued notice in relation to structure, alleging that Petitioner had carried out unauthorized construction of structure in open space - Petitioner had filed a Suit challenging above notice - Suit was opposed on ground of jurisdiction of Civil Court and thus, ad-interim order was refused - In Appeal, Court allowed to withdraw Appeal with permission to Petitioner to withdraw Suit in City Civil Court - However that was still not withdrawn - Hence, this Petition - Whether, Suit filed by Petitioner before Civil Court was maintainable - Held, if there was express provision in any special Act barring jurisdiction of Civil Court to deal with matters specified thereunder, jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Court should stand excluded - However, Court would nonetheless retain its jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate suit, provided order complained of was nullity - Section 515A of Act stated that any notice issued, order passed or direction issued by Designated Officer, under Section 351 or 354A of Act should not be questioned in any Suit or other legal proceedings did not mean that Suit before Civil Court was per se not tenable - For considering bar to apply, Civil Court was obliged to consider facts and circumstances in each Suit and then apply Section 515A of Act - Unless plea of ouster of jurisdiction was considered in each case, Civil Court's jurisdiction could not be said to be ousted - Judge would have to decide issue of jurisdiction by considering averments in plaint - Civil Court was obliged to take note of provision and statutory bar whenever that plea was raised by Corporation before it - It was observed that Petitioner had not withdrawn Civil Suit - Therefore, he would not be prevented in law from pursuing it and satisfying Trial Court that jurisdiction of Trial Court was still intact and subject matter of Suit was within competence of Civil Court/Trial Court - Petition is disposed of.

"For considering bar on jurisdiction of Civil Court, facts and circumstances of each case have to be considered minutely."

 Citation: 2013(6)ABR141, 2013(6)ALLMR323, 2014(1)MhLj227

1. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner has challenged a notice issued by the Respondent-Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai by invoking Section 354A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. It is stated that the Respondent No. 1-Municipal Corporation has issued this notice dated 1st August 2013 in relation to a structure, more particularly described in para 1 of this Petition. The Petitioner submits that the notice issued under Section 354A alleges that the Petitioner has carried out unauthorized construction of a structure in open space by using I-Section, bricks masonry wall ad-measuring 16' x 16' x 8'. This allegation is denied and it is submitted that the structure has been in existence for number of years. The notice was replied and the Petitioner has then stated that the Petitioner had no opportunity to satisfy the Municipal Corporation that the notice was bad in law as on 5th August 2013 the Officer of Respondent No. 1 came to the premises and damaged the first floor of the structure. Therefore, a suit was filed being L.C. Suit No. 2426 of 2013 in the City Civil Court, Dindoshi, Mumbai but, a bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was raised and that is how the ad-interim order was refused. The Appeal from Order challenging that order was filed in this Court but, as set out in para 13, a legal advice was given to withdraw the said Appeal from Order and the Suit and that is how the Appeal from Order came to be withdrawn. The Petitioners counsel states, on instructions, that though the order passed by this Court allows the Petitioner to withdraw the Suit in the City Civil Court, that is still not withdrawn. On the earlier occasion, we have heard Mrs. Castelino and placed this matter at her request today because the apprehension of the Petitioner was that the entire structure consisting of ground and one upper floor would be demolished. We granted protection on 5th September 2013 and posted the matter today along with other cases.

2. As far as the legal position is concerned, it is already clarified in several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court and what we have noted is that Section 515A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 states that save as otherwise provided in this Act, any notice issued, order passed or direction issued by the Designated Officer, under Section 351 or 354A shall not be questioned in any Suit or other legal proceedings does not mean that a Suit before a Civil Court is per se not tenable. In other words, a Civil Court's power to take on file a Civil Suit inasmuch as scrutinize and verify the plaint, register it, is not taken away by such a bar. The clause ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court may be in the terms noted above but, for that bar to apply the Civil Court is obliged to consider the facts and circumstances in each Suit and then apply Section 515A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. Unless the plea of ouster of jurisdiction based on this Section is considered in each case, the Civil Court's jurisdiction cannot be said to be ousted. The principle is too well settled to require any reiteration.

3. In the case of Secretary of State V/s. Mask & Company, reported in MANU/PR/0022/1940 : AIR 1943 P.C. 105, the Privy Council has held that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred. Such exclusion must be either explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine whether the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

4. This principle was applied and followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court considering somewhat identical provision in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. In Shiv Kumar Chadha V/s. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported in MANU/SC/0522/1993 : 1993 (3) SCC 161, a three Judge's Bench of the Supreme Court, speaking through His Lordship Hon'ble Shri Justice N.P. Singh, as His Lordship then was held thus:

9. In spite of several pronouncements of this Court during the last four decades, the question as to whether the jurisdiction of the Court has been statutorily barred in respect of suits in connection with the orders passed or proceedings initiated for demolition of constructions, which have been made without sanction or by deviating from the sanctioned plans, has to be answered.

10. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") says that Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature "except suits of which their cognizance is either express Iyor impliedly barred". According to the Corporation once the jurisdiction of the Court to try a suit in which the validity of any order passed under the provisions of the Corporation Act or the notice issued thereunder has been specifically barred and an internal remedy has been provided for redressal of the grievances of the persons concerned, there is no scope for Court to entertain a suit.

11. In the olden days the source of most of the rights and liabilities could be traced to the common law. Then statutory enactments were few. Even such enactments only created rights or liabilities but seldom provided forums for remedies. The result was that any person having a grievance that he had been wronged or his right was being affected, could approach the ordinary Civil Court on the principle of law that where there is a right there is a remedy-ubi jus ibi remedium. As no internal remedy had been provided in the different statutes creating rights or liabilities, the ordinary Civil Courts had to examine the grievances in the light of different statutes. With the concept of the Welfare State, it was realised that enactments creating liabilities in respect of payment of taxes obligations after vesting of estates and conferring rights on a class of citizens, should be complete codes by themselves. With that object in view, forums were created under the Acts themselves where grievances could be entertained on behalf of the persons aggrieved. Provisions were also made for appeals and revision to higher authorities.

12. Then a question arose as to where a particular Act had created a right or liability and had also provided a forum for enforcement of such right or for protection from enforcement of a liability without any authority in law, whether a citizen could approach a Court. It may be pointed out that many statutes have created certain rights or liabilities and have also provided the remedial measures in respect thereof. But such statutes have not touched the common law rights of the citizen. But there are some statutes, which in public interest affect even the common law rights or liabilities of toe citizen, which were in the nature of existing rights. The distinction between the two types of rights or liabilities is subtle in nature but at the same time very vital.

13. In one of the earliest case of Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford, Willes, J, said:-

There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. One is, where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law: there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common-law remedy, and the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy: there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. The present case falls within this latter class, if any liability at all exists. The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.

14. The same view was reiterated by the House of Lords in Neville v. London "Express" Newspaper Ltd. In Barraclough v. Brown, it was said:-

I do not think the appellant can claim to recover by virtue of the statute, and at the same time insist upon doing so by means other than those prescribed by the statute which alone confers the right.

15. It was further pointed out "The right and the remedy are given uno flatu, and the one cannot be dissociated from the other."

16. In the well-known case of Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. this question was considered in connection with Sea Customs Act (1878). It was said:-

It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principle of judicial procedure.

But having enunciated the general principle in respect of ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court it was said:-

But, in their Lordships' opinion, neither Sec. 32 nor the principle involved in the decision in the case of Secretary of State for Indian Legislature which creates an obligation and provides an exclusive Code for its determination such an obligation is not covered by sub s. (2) of Section 32.

23. With the increase in the number of taxing statutes, welfare legislations and enactments to protect a class of citizens, a trend can be noticed that most of such legislations confer decision making powers on various authorities and they seeks to limit or exclude Court's power to review those decisions. The result is that the power of the Court under section 9 of the Code is being denuded and curtailed by such special enactments, in respect of liabilities created or rights conferred. This Court in the judgments referred to above has upheld the ouster of the jurisdiction of the Court on examination of two questions-(1) Whether the right or liability in respect whereof grievance has been made, had been created under an enactment and it did not relate to a pre-existing common law right? (2) Whether the machinery provided for redressal of the grievance in respect of infringement of such right or imposition of a liability under such enactment, was adequate and complete? The ouster of the jurisdiction of the Court was upheld on the finding that the rights or liabilities in question had been created by the Act in question and remedy provided therein was adequate.

24. But the situation will be different where a statute purports to curb and curtail a pre-existing common law right and purports to oust the jurisdiction of the Court so far remedy against the orders passed under such statute are concerned. In such cases, the courts have to be more vigilant, while examining the question as to whether an adequate redressal machinery has been provided, before which the, person aggrieved may agitate his grievance. In the case of Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guatreddi Annamanaidu, this Court after referring to the case of Desika Charyulu v. State of A.P. observed: (SCC p. 579, para 35)

It was pertinently added that this exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be subject to two limitations. First, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. The question as to whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute and its general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal set up and other relevant factors.

It was held that a suit for declaration that "the decision of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal holding certain properties to be an 'estate' under section 3(2)(d) of the 1908 Act was void, was maintainable on the ground that the suit property was not an'inam village'. In Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government, the appellants sought a declaration of their common law right to quarry their land without the need to obtain planning permission under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947. In that connection it was said:-

The appellant company are given no new right of quarrying by the Act of 1947. Their right is a common law right and the only question is how far it has been taken away. They do not uno flatu claim under the Act and seek a remedy elsewhere. On the contrary, they deny that they come within its purview and seek a declaration to that effect.

25. In spite of the bar placed on the power of the Court. orders passed under such statutes can be examined on "jurisdictional question". To illustrate-, a special machinery has been provided for removal of the encroachments from public land' under different enactments in different states and the jurisdiction of the Court has been barred in respect of the orders passed by such special tribunals or authorities constituted under such Acts. Still a suit will be maintainable before a Court on a plea that the land in question shall not be deemed to be public land within the meaning of the definition of public land given in the Act in question, and as such provisions thereof shall not be applicable.

26. In the case of Anisminic Lid. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, a wide interpretation has been given to the word 'jurisdiction' by the House of Lords. It was pointed out that in many cases where although the Tribunal has jurisdiction to enter upon an enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of such enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision becomes a nullity.

27. By mere reference to different provisions of the Corporation Act it shall appear that the Act does not create any right or liability. Chapter XVI of the Act only purports to regulate the erection of the buildings within the Corporation area, so that erections of the buildings within the Corporation area are systematic, planned and do not adopt the character of mushroom growth. In view of the Provisions of the Act, whenever it is discovered that erection of any building or execution of any work has been commenced or is being carried or has been completed, either without sanction or contrary to the sanction or in contravention of any condition subject to which such sanction had been accorded, the Commissioner can make an order directing that such erection or work shall be demolished. Any person aggrieved by an order has been given a right to prefer an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and thereafter to the Administrator. Subject to any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal and the Administrator, the order for demolition shall be deemed to be final and conclusive.

28. According to us, it cannot be urged that the provisions of the Act have created any right or liability and for enforcement thereof remedy has been provided under the Act itself. The Act purports to regulate the common law right of the citizens to erect or construct buildings of their choice. This right existed since time immemorial. But with the urbanisation and development of the concept of planned city, regulations, restrictions, on such common law right have been imposed. But as the provisions of the Act intend to regulate and restrict a common law right, and not any right liability created under the Act itself, it cannot be said that the right and the remedy have become given uno flatu e.g. "in the same breath". Most of the cases of this Court referred to above related to statutes creating rights or liabilities and providing remedies at the same time. As such the principles enunciated therein, shall not be fully applicable in the present case. In spite of the bar prescribed under sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 343 and section 347E of the Corporation Act over the power of the Courts, under certain special circumstances, the Court can examine, whether the dispute falls within the ambit of the Act. But once the Court is satisfied that either the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the building in question or the basic procedural requirements which are vital in nature, have not been followed, it shall have jurisdiction, to enquire and investigate while protecting the common law rights of the citizens. Can a Court hold a suit to be not maintainable, although along with the plaint materials are produced to show that the building in question is not within the Corporation limits, or that the constructions were made prior to coming into force of the relevant provisions of the Act? We are conscious of the fact that persons who make unauthorised constructions by contravening and violating the building bye-laws or regulations often run to Courts, with pleas mentioned above, specially that no notice was issued or served on them, before the Corporation has ordered the demolition of the construction.

29. It is well-known that in most of the cities building regulations and bye-laws have been framed, still it has been discovered that constructions have been made without any sanction or in contravention of the sanctioned plan, and such constructions have continued without any intervention. There cannot be two opinions that the regulations and bye-laws in respect of buildings, are meant to serve the public interest. But at the same time it cannot be held that in all circumstances, the authorities entrusted with the demolition of unauthorised constructions, have exclusive power, to the absolute exclusion of the power of the Court. In some special cases where "jurisdictional error" on the part of the Corporation is established, a suit shall be maintainable. According to us,

(1) The Court should not ordinarily entertain a suit in connection with the proceedings initiated for demolition, by the Commissioner, in terms of section 343(1) of the Corporation Act. The Court should direct the persons aggrieved to pursue the remedy before the Appellate Tribunal and then before the Administrator in accordance with the provisions of the said Act.

(2) The Court should entertain a suit questioning the validity of an order passed under section 343 of the Act. only if the Court is of Prima facie opinion that the order is nullity in the eyes of law because of any "jurisdictional error" in exercise of the power by the commissioner or that the order is outside the Act.

The law laid down above still holds the field and in fact this decision has been followed in later cases as well.

5. In these circumstances and when the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred by us also considers the constitution bench judgment in the case of Dhulabhai and Others V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another reported in MANU/SC/0157/1968 : AIR 1969 S.C. 78, then, the Division Bench judgment of this Court upholding the constitutional validity of Section 515A does not hold that the ouster of the Civil Court's jurisdiction is so complete that a Civil Suit cannot be taken on file or the plaint cannot be registered at all. That is not the stand and which is rather extreme taken before us even by the Municipal Corporation. In fact, a learned Single Judge of this Court Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.K. Deshpande sitting at Nagpur in the case of Commissioner, Akola Municipal Corporation V/s. Bhalchandra S.P. Govind Mahashabde reported in MANU/MH/0442/2013 : 2013 (4) Mh.L.J. 45 considered the bar to suit carved out in identical terms by Section 433-A of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act. The learned Single Judge applied the same principle and held as under:-

4. The learned counsel appearing for the parties have relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dhruv Green Field Ltd. v/s. Hukam Singh and others, reported in MANU/SC/0643/2002 : (2002) 6 SCC 416, and the decision of this Court in Qari Mohammed Zakir Hussain and others v/s. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and others, reported in MANU/MH/0858/2001 : 2002 (2) Bom. C.R. 98.

5. In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dhruv Green Field Ltd., cited supra, the Apex Court has laid down that the question as to whether the jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred, must be answered on the basis of the following principles:

(1) if there is express provision in any special Act barring the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to deal with matters specified thereunder the jurisdiction of an ordinary Civil court shall stand excluded.

(2) If there is no express provision in the Act but an examination of the provisions contained therein leads to a conclusion in regard to exclusion of jurisdiction of a Civil Court, the Court would then inquire whether any adequate and efficacious alternative remedy is provided under the Act; if the answer is in the affirmative, it can safely be concluded that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. If however, no such adequate and effective alternative remedy is provided then exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be inferred.

(3) Even in cases where the jurisdiction of a civil Court is barred expressly or impliedly, the Court would nonetheless retain its jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the suit provided the order complained of is a nullity.

It is thus apparent that if there is express provision in any special Act barring the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the matters specified thereunder, the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Court shall stand excluded. It has been held that even in cases where the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred expressly or impliedly, the Court would nonetheless retain its jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the suit; provided the order complained of is a nullity.

6. In the decision of this Court in the case of Qari Mohammed Zakir Hussain, cited supra, it has been held that even if the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is specifically excluded, the Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to examine into the issues where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental judicial procedure. It has further been held that if the suit proceeds on the premises that the offending act has been done not in good faith, then there is no bar for such a suit. The suit complaining that the offending action is mala fide and in transgression of authority, would not be barred.

7. Now, section 433-A of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act creating a bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court, being relevant, is reproduced below:

433-A. Bar of jurisdiction.-Save as otherwise provided in this Act, any notice issued, order passed or direction issued by the Designated Officer, under sections 260, 261, 264, 167 or 478 shall not be questioned in any suit or other legal proceedings.

Undoubtedly, if the plaintiff comes before the Civil Court alleging that a notice issued under section 260 of the said Act is illegal in any manner and seeks a declaration to that effect, then the bar of jurisdiction to try such a suit under section433-A of the said Act shall operate. However, nonetheless, the inherent jurisdiction of a Civil Court in a suit challenging the notice under section 260 of the said Act, on the limited grounds, viz. That the act of issuance of such notice is nullity, or that while issuing such notice, the mandatory provisions of the said Act have not been complied with, or that the Authority issuing such a notice has not acted in conformity with the fundamental judicial procedure, or that it is an abuse of exercise of power, or that the offending act has not been done in good faith, remains intact, in view of the aforestated law laid down in judicial pronouncement. The Civil Court is not precluded of its inherent jurisdiction to entertain and decide such challenge to a notice under section 260 of the said Act, on such limited grounds, particularly when there is no forum available under the said Act to ventilate such grievances in respect of it. Hence, the question of law at Serial No. (i) is answered accordingly.

10. A plea of bar to jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain and decide the challenge to a notice under section 260 of the said Act on the limited grounds, has to be considered having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint, the averments disclosing the cause of action, and the reliefs sought for therein. All such averments must be considered as a whole and not in isolation. The plaint must contain all such statements of material facts, as are necessary to invest such jurisdiction with the Civil Court. The statements of facts must be very clear and specific and not vague. The absence of a single material fact of jurisdiction, would entail the consequences of dismissal of suit, as barred by section 433-A of the said Act.

We respectfully agree with this view. Thus, the consistent trend and opinion in this Court leans in favour of entertaining a suit subject to such bar and then applying it as and when invoked. To non-suit somebody and prevent him from approaching a Civil Court merely because there is a statutory bar is not a correct understanding of the law.

6. In these circumstances, we do not find that we should entertain writ petitions under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India, merely because the understanding of an individual Petitioner is that a Civil Suit will not lie. That would not enable him to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court straight away or for this Court to exercise it. Ultimately everything depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

7. We have no doubt in our mind, therefore, that when the Petitioner in this petition has not withdrawn the Civil Suit, that he would be prevented in law from pursuing it and satisfying the Trial Court that the jurisdiction of the Trial Court is still intact and the subject matter of the Suit is within the competence of the Civil Court/Trial Court.

8. The Petitioner has come to this Court and invoked its writ jurisdiction because the Notice of Motion moved for interim relief in Short Cause Suit No. 2426 of 2013 has been dismissed on 22nd August 2013 at the ad-interim stage itself. The order has challenged in an Appeal from Order but under legal advice the Petitioner/Plaintiff withdrew the Appeal from Order. With a view not to non-suit the Petitioner and in peculiar facts and circumstances so also without laying down any general rule or principle, since the Civil Suit is still on the file of the Civil Court, we permit the Petitioner to move a application for interim relief in the above Suit which shall be moved within a period of two weeks from today. If such an application is moved for interim reliefs and a request is made to grant ad-interim reliefs in terms of the prayers of that application, the Trial Court shall consider it in accordance with law.

9. At this stage, we must take note of the apprehension expressed by Mr. Sakhare, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation. His submission is that if this process is permitted in all matters, parties like the Petitioner would request the Civil Court to brush aside the bar under Section515A or would not take any note of it. We do not think that the Civil Court would be influenced by our order and clarification given today to this extent and as apprehended by Mr. Sakhare. In every individual case depending upon the pleadings, the issue of jurisdiction would have to be decided by the Civil Court. The applicability of Section 515A and the issue of jurisdiction must be, therefore, gone into, dealt with and decided in each case depending on the pleas raised by parties. The law is well settled inasmuch as the learned Judge will have to decide the issue of jurisdiction by considering the averments in the plaint. If the averments in the plaint do not make out any case which would enable the Court to apply the legal principles set out above, he would then apply the provision in question, namely, Section 515A and return a appropriate finding on the point of jurisdiction depending on the materials placed before him. It is not as if by our clarification and enabling parties to file a Civil Suit, that we have observed that the bar should be ignored or should not be taken note of. The Civil Court is obliged to take note of the provision and the statutory bar whenever that plea is raised by the Corporation before it. In such circumstances, no further clarification is needed. All that we state and observe is that we have not expressed any opinion on the rival contentions including on the point of jurisdiction of the Civil Court in this matter. Even if the Petitioner seeks to revive the Suit as it is still pending and seek interim relief therein, the Corporation can raise the plea of jurisdiction and the learned Judge should consider and decide in accordance with law.

10. Needless to clarify that only for the purposes of enabling the Petitioner to apply for ad-interim/interim relief, that we have clarified the above position in law. The Writ Petition is disposed of. To enable the Petitioner to apply for interim relief, we continue our order dated 5th September 2013 only for a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. Needless to state and clarify that this continuation should not be construed as grant of any ad-interim relief in the Suit. Even for continuation of this order beyond a period of two weeks, the Trial Court would be free to pass such orders on the request of parties as made and in accordance with law, after hearing them. Needless to further clarify that the Trial Court should not be influenced by grant of ad-interim relief or continuation thereof by this Court.

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