Recent judgments of the Court contain a perceptible dilution of
legal principles such as the right of silence of the accused. The Supreme
Court has, in several cases, departed from this rule in enunciating, inter alia,
that the accused are duty bound to give a valid explanation of facts within
their specific and personal knowledge in order to dispel doubts on their
complicity. Even half a century ago this would have been a jural anathema.
Given the woeful success rate of the prosecution, if even the relatively
niggard number of convicts are permitted to circumvent their sentences,
crime is certain to envelop society.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1680 OF 2013
[Arising out of S.L.P (Crl.) No.9816 of 2009]
Surya Baksh Singh
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh
JUDGMENT
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J
Dated; October 07, 2013.
Citation;AIR 2013 SC(CRI) 238
This appeal brings to the fore the rampant manipulation and misuse of
the statutory right to appeal by an ever increasing number of convicts who
take recourse to this remedy with the objective of defeating the ends of
justice by obtaining orders of bail or exemption from surrender, and
thereupon escape beyond the reach of the law. Jural compulsions now
dictate that this species of appeals should be consciously dismissed on the
ground of occasioning a gross abuse of the judicial process and an
annihilation of justice. The need to punish every transgressor of the law is
ubiquitously accepted in all legal persuasions throughout the ages.
Kautilya’s Arthasastra opines that - “By not punishing the guilty and
punishing those not deserving to be punished, by arresting those who ought
not to be arrested and not arresting those who ought to be arrested; and by
failing to protect subjects from thieves etc. through these causes - decline,
greed and dis-affection are produced among the subjects. It is punishment
alone which maintains both this world and the next.” In similar antiquity it
has been observed by Plato in his celebrated treatise Laws “....not that he is
punished because he did wrong, for that which is done can never be undone,
but in order that in future times, he, and those who see him corrected, may
utterly hate injustice, or at any rate abate much of their evil-doing”. In the
present time, and from another segment of the globe the necessity of
punishment has been articulated thus - “By enforcing a public system of
penalties government removes the grounds for thinking that others are not
complying with the rules. For this reason alone, a coercive sovereign is
presumably always necessary, even though in a well-ordered society
sanctions are not severe and may never need to be imposed. Rather, the
existence of effective penal machinery serves as men's security to one
another” - A Theory of Justice by Rawls.
2.
It is necessary to distinguish dismissal of appeals in instances where
steps have been taken by the Court for securing the presence of the
Appellant by coercive means, including the issuance of non-bailable
warrants or initiation of proceedings for declaring the Appellant a
proclaimed offender by recourse to Part C of Chapter VI of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC for short) on the one hand, and those
where the Appellant may incidentally and unwittingly be absent when his
appeal is called on for hearing. The malaise which we are perturbed about is
the wilful withdrawal of the convict from the appellate proceedings initiated
by him after he has succeeded in gaining his enlargement on bail or
exemption from surrender.
3.
The legal provisions on this subject are to be found principally in
Chapter XXIX of the CrPC. Section 372 reiterates the general principle of
law that an appeal is not a right unless it is granted by a statute. This Section
states that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal Court
except as provided for by the CrPC or by any other law for the time being in
force. Section 374(2) thereafter stipulates that any person convicted in a
trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or in a trial
held by any other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than
seven years has been passed against him or against any other person
convicted at the same trial, may appeal to the High Court. These provisions
must immediately be compared with the preceding Chapter XXVIII
containing a fasciculus dealing with a Death Sentence which becomes
efficacious only on its being confirmed by the High Court. The proviso to
Section 368 enjoins that an order of confirmation shall not be made until the
period allowed for preferring an appeal has expired, or, if an appeal is
presented within such period, until such appeal is disposed of. The presence
or absence of the accused/convict in the cases of Death References, makes
little difference since High Courts are duty-bound to give the matter its
utmost and undivided attention. Indubitably, the assistance of Counsel is
very important and helpful to the Court in coming to its conclusion. Since it
is conceivable that an appeal may not be filed in the High Court by a convict
who is to undergo more than seven years imprisonment, the efficacy, legal
correctness and propriety of such a sentence is not always dependent on
receiving the imprimatur of the High Court.
4.
Section 378 of the CrPC inter alia declares that no appeal to the High
Court against an order of acquittal shall be entertained except with its
express leave. Accordingly, appeals against acquittal are distinct from all
others. Section 383 prescribes that if the Appellant is in jail he may present
his appeal to the officer in-charge of the jail who shall thereupon forward it
to the appropriate Appellate Court. Section 384 enables the dismissal of
appeals summarily or in limine provided the Appellant or his pleader has
received a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Where appeals are not
dismissed summarily, Section 385 prescribes the issuance of notice to the
Appellant or his pleader by the State Government indicating the time and
place when the appeal has been scheduled to be heard. While the Appellate
Court has the option to call for the records of the case at the stage of the
initial hearing of an appeal under Section 384 by virtue of use of the word
“may”, it becomes mandatory for it to do so at the time of the final hearing.
5.
Section 386 of the CrPC is of importance for the purposes before us.
It requires the Appellate Court to peruse the records, and hear the Appellant
or his pleader if he appears; thereafter it may dismiss the appeal if it
considers that there is insufficient ground for interference. In the case of an
appeal from an order of acquittal (State Appeals in curial parlance) it may
reverse the order and direct that further inquiry be carried out or that the
accused be retried or committed for trial. Even in the case of an appeal from
an order of acquittal the Appellate Court is competent to find him guilty and
pass sentence on him according to law. The proviso to this Section
prescribes that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had
an opportunity of showing cause against such a proposal, thereby mandating
that an accused must be present and must be heard if an order of acquittal is
to be upturned and reversed. It is thus significant, and so we reiterate, that
the Legislature has cast an obligation on the Appellate Court to decide an
appeal on its merits only in the case of Death References, regardless of
whether or not an appeal has been preferred by the convict.
6.
Last, but not least in our appreciation of the law, Section 482 of the
CrPC stands in solitary splendour. It preserves the inherent power of the
High Court. It enunciates that nothing in the CrPC shall be deemed to limit
or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may
be necessary, firstly, to ‘give effect to any order under the CrPC’, words
which are not to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereafter
referred to as ‘CPC’). Ergo, the High Court can, while exercising inherent
powers in its criminal jurisdiction, take all necessary steps for enforcing
compliance of its orders. For salutary reason Section 482 makes the criminal
Court much more effective and all pervasive than the civil Court insofar as
ensuring obedience of its orders is concerned. Secondly, Section 482
clarifies that the CrPC does not circumscribe the actions available to the
High Court to prevent abuse of its process, from the inception of
proceedings till their culmination. Judicial process includes compelling a
respondent to appear before it. When the Court encounters a recalcitrant
Appellant/convict who shows negligible interest in prosecuting his appeal,
none of the Sections in Chapter XXIX of the CrPC dealing with appeals,
precludes or dissuades it from dismissing the appeals. It seems to us that
passing such orders would eventually make it clear to all that intentional and
repeated failure to prosecute the appeal would inexorably lead not merely to
incarceration but more importantly to the confirmation of the conviction and
sentence consequent on the dismissal of the appeal. Thirdly, none of the
provisions of the CrPC can possibly limit the power of the High Court to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. While it is not possible to define the
concept of ‘justice’, suffice it to say that it encompasses not just the rights of
the convict, but also of victims of crime as well as of the law abiding section
of society who look towards the Courts as vital instruments for preservation
of peace and the curtailment or containment of crime by punishing those
who transgress the law. If convicts can circumvent the consequence of their
conviction, peace, tranquility and harmony in society will be reduced to a
chimera. Section 482 emblazons the difference between preventing the
abuse of the jural process on the one hand and securing of the ends of justice
on the other. It appears to us that Section 482 of the CrPC has not been
given due importance in combating the rampant malpractice of filing appeals
only for scotching sentences imposed by criminal Courts.
7
Page 7
7.
This Court was called upon to construe Section 423 of the old CrPC
(which corresponds to Section 386 of the current CrPC) in the wake of the
dismissal by the High Court of an Appeal on the very next date of hearing
after the issuance of notice. In Shyam Deo Pandey v. State of Bihar, (1971)
1 SCC 855 : AIR 1971 SC 1606, the High Court had recorded – “No one
appears to press the appeal. On perusal of the judgment under appeal, I find
no merit in the case. It is accordingly dismissed”.
An application for
restoration of the appeal filed on the same day was also rejected for not
disclosing sufficient grounds for recalling the dismissal orders. The ratio
decidendi of this decision is that the records of the lower Court must be
available with the Appellate Court if the condition of ‘perusal’ is to stand
complied with, and therefore the High Court was found to have erred.
8.
This conundrum thereafter engaged the attention of a Three Judge
Bench in Kishan Singh v. State of U.P. [1992] Supp. 2 SCR 305 : 1993 (3)
SCALE 312 : (1996) 9 SCC 372 decided on November 2, 1992. The Bench
overruled the observations in the dismissal order passed in Ram Naresh
Yadav v. State of Bihar AIR 1987 SC 1500 and approved Shyam Deo
Pandey; it also adverted to similar opinions expressed in Emperor v.
Balumal Hotchand AIR 1938 Sind 171. It noted the disparate language in
Section 384 of the CrPC and Order 41 Rule 17 of the CPC before quoting
8
Page 8
that it is the duty of the Appellate Court to consider the appeal as well as the
judgment under challenge on its merits. However, it pithily observed that
“where the Appellant has been sentenced to imprisonment and he is not in
custody when the appeal is taken up for preliminary hearing, the Appellate
Court can require him to surrender, and if he fails to obey the direction,
other considerations may arise, which may render the appeal liable to be
dismissed without consideration of the merits.....” It is of significance that
the other Three Judge Bench in Bani Singh v. State of U.P. 1996 (4) SCC
720 : AIR 1996 SC 2439 adopted this very dialectic and approach, without
reference to Kishan Singh. It is unfortunate that Law Journals have now
adopted the practice of reporting almost every order passed by this Court
without
caring
to
consider
its
precedential
value.
Orders,
in
contradistinction to Judgments, contain only the decision of the Court. The
pronouncements of the Apex Court command adherence essentially when it
is clear that the law has been considered in detail and that its articulation is,
therefore, an elucidation and exposition of the law. Faciously, Ram Naresh
Yadav does not fall in this category; in any event, it has been stoutly
overruled by Three Judge Bench. The words in Kishan Singh quoted by us
above are encouragement for applying Section 482 of the CrPC to cases
9
Page 9
where the Appellant/convict chooses not to prosecute the appeal after being
enlarged on bail or being exempted from surrender.
9.
Bani Singh, a Three Judge Bench decision, posits that if an appeal is
not dismissed summarily, then the Appellate Court should, after perusing the
records, hear the Appellant or his pleader. This Court clarified that “the law
does not enjoin that the court shall adjourn the case if both the Appellant and
his lawyer are absent. ..... It can dispose of the appeal after perusing the
record and judgment of the Trial Court. ..... if the accused is in jail and
cannot, on his own, come to Court, it would be advisable to hear the case
and fix another date to facilitate the appearance of the accused/Appellant if
his lawyer is not present. If the lawyer is absent, and the Court deems it
appropriate to appoint a lawyer at State expense to assist it, there is nothing
in the law to preclude it from doing so”. Indeed, the Court was not
confronted by the wilful abscondence of the concerned Appellant. It is
noteworthy that the High Court had not taken steps calculated to secure the
presence of the Appellant before it. On the contrary it had palpably adopted
the less tedious course of simply dismissing the appeal. Bani Singh
overruled the Order in Ram Naresh Yadav which had prescribed that a
criminal appeal could be disposed of on merits only after hearing the
Appellant or his counsel. Signally, the Court had observed that in order to
10
Page 10
enforce discipline the appeal could be dismissed for non-prosecution. In both
these cases it is apparent that the High Court had not taken any steps to
secure the presence of the Appellant; in other words, that there was no
material to manifest that the Appellant had abandoned his appeal or had no
intention to prosecute it. In Bani Singh attention of the Court was not drawn
to the views of a Coordinate Bench in Kishan Singh decided four years
previously on 2.11.1992. Having carefully read through both the opinions
we think it important to clarify that Bani Singh does not cogitate or reflect
upon the options available to the Court which is faced with a recalcitrant
Appellant who is not prosecuting his appeal, in flagrant violation and abuse
of the bail orders granted in his favour. Kishan Singh deals precisely with
the options open to the Appellate Court at the preliminary hearing of an
appeal.
10.
Any discourse on this aspect of the law would be incomplete without
appreciating and assimilating Dharam Pal v. State of U.P. 2008 I AD (SC)
597 : AIR 2008 SC 920 : JT 2008 (1) SC 172. The contention canvassed on
behalf of the accused was that a miscarriage of justice had occurred since the
Appellant had not been served with notice of the appeal by the High Court,
which nevertheless decided the appeal ex parte. Reference was made to Bani
Singh as also to CrPC’s Chapter XXIX in general, and Sections 385 and 386
11
Page 11
in particular; conspicuously Section 482 of the CrPC was not even
mentioned. The learned counsel for Dharam Pal had expressed his inability
to argue the case before the High Court. As in the case in hand, this Court
had perused the impugned Judgment of the High Court and found it to be
well-merited and duly predicated on a careful consideration of the material
on record. It was observed that – “The position, of course, would have been
different if the High Court had simply dismissed the appeal without going
into the merits...... That being the position, it cannot be said that the High
Court had ignored the basic principles of criminal justice while disposing of
the appeal ex parte”. Dharam Pal and for that matter Bani Singh or Shyam
Deo Pandey neither proscribe the invocation of Section 482 of the CrPC nor
opine that dismissal of an appeal under Section 482, for good reasons which
are lucidly spelt out, is improper. It has not hithertofore even been
considered that Section 482 of the CrPC should be applied in circumstances
of the wilful abscondence of the Appellant/convict in contumacious and
deliberate disregard and disobedience of the terms and conditions on which
he was enlarged on bail or exempted from surrender.
11.
The discussion would not be complete without noticing the Orders in
Parasuram Patel v. State of Orissa, (1994) 4 SCC 664 and Madan Lal
Kapoor v. Rajiv Thapar, (2007) 7 SCC 623. In neither of these cases had
12
Page 12
the Appellate Court taken steps available to it to ensure the attendance of the
Appellant. Instead, it appears that the concerned High Court had adopted the
obviously less tedious approach of dismissing the appeals only because
neither the Appellant nor his counsel were present when the case was called
on for hearing. The Court did not ruminate upon the curial malpractice
which has now become endemic, viz. the filing of appeals by convicts with
the obvious intent to frustrate and circumvent sentences passed by criminal
Courts. We cannot close our eyes to the reality that less than twenty per cent
of prosecutions are successful; the rest are futile largely because of inept,
shoddy or substandard investigation and prosecution. Even in cases where
the prosecution succeeds in proving the guilt of the accused, punishment is
emasculated by convicts not because of their succeeding in having their
conviction overturned and reversed by the Appellate Court, but by going
underground and disappearing from society after receiving reprieve from
incarceration from the Appellate Court. We are convinced that the interests
of society at large are being repeatedly sacrificed for the exaggerated, if not
misplaced concern for what is fashionably termed as ‘human rights’ of
convicts. Recent judgments of the Court contain a perceptible dilution of
legal principles such as the right of silence of the accused. The Supreme
Court has, in several cases, departed from this rule in enunciating, inter alia,
that the accused are duty bound to give a valid explanation of facts within
their specific and personal knowledge in order to dispel doubts on their
complicity. Even half a century ago this would have been a jural anathema.
Given the woeful success rate of the prosecution, if even the relatively
niggard number of convicts are permitted to circumvent their sentences,
crime is certain to envelop society. Law is dynamic and not immutable or
static. It constantly adapts itself to critically changing compulsions of
society. (See State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. (2004) 11
SCC 26). The criminal justice delivery system is being held to ransom by
convicts who have developed the devious and dishonest practice of escaping
punishment or sentence by filing appeals, obtaining bail or suspension of
sentence and thereafter disappearing beyond the reach of the arms of the
law. The inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, which the
Supreme Court has on several occasions expounded to have existed from
time immemorial, predating the present as well as the previous CrPC, must
be pressed into action lest the already fragile policing and prosecuting
branches of governance are rendered redundant. Since Section 482 of the
CrPC was not considered by either of the Three Judge Benches of this Court,
we have not found it necessary to resort to recommending the matter for
being laid before a Larger Bench. The facts and pronouncement in Bani
14
Page 14
Singh cannot be extrapolated to the factual matrix before us. On the contrary
the opinion in Ram Naresh Yadav as well as in Kishan Singh are available
to us to ensure that preventive action is devised to combat the abuse of Court
process so that facilitative steps are taken to secure the ends of justice.
12.
Section 482 of the CrPC is of singular and seminal significance. The
statutory provision which immediately comes to mind is Section 151 of the
CPC because to a great extent the language is identical. We are juxtaposing
the two Sections for the facility of reference:-
Section 482 of CrPC
Saving of inherent power of High
Court. – Nothing in this Code shall
be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court
to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any
order under this Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any
Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice.
13.
Section 151 of CPC
Saving of inherent powers of Court.
– Nothing in this Code shall be
deemed to limit or otherwise affect
the inherent power of the Court to
make such order as may be
necessary for the ends of justice or
to prevent abuse of the process of
the Court.
It is at once obvious that whereas Section 482 of the CrPC is available
only to the High Courts, Section 151 can be resorted to at any stage of civil
judicial proceedings in any of the hierarchical tiers. Secondly, the use of the
word ‘otherwise’ in Section 482 has the avowed effect of boundlessly
broadening the boundaries of inherent powers of the High Court in exercise
of its criminal jurisdiction. Thirdly, Section 482 can be employed to ensure
15
Page 15
obedience of any order passed by the Court because of the phrase “to give
effect to any order under this Code”. State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy,
(1977) 2 SCC 699 enunciates that in exercise of its inherent powers in
criminal matters “the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it
comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be
an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that
the proceeding ought to be quashed.....The ends of justice are higher than the
ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws
made by the Legislature. The compelling necessity for making these
observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of
the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to
do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to
appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction”. A Three-
Judge Bench clarified in Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241 that
although a second Revision before the High Court after dismissal of the first
one by the Court of Sessions is barred by Section 397(3), the inherent
powers of the High Court under Section 482 are nevertheless available albeit
with restraint so as to avoid needless multiplicity of the proceedings. This
Court had opined that “when the High Court notices that there has been
failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or
16
Page 16
order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent
the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct
irregularities ..... The inherent power of the High Court is not one conferred
by the Code but one which the High Court already has in it and it is
preserved by the Court”. Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR
1980 SC 258 considered the question whether the inherent power of the
High Court under Section 482 stand repelled when the revisional power
under Section 397 overlaps. The view was that- “Section 482 contradicts this
contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397 can affect the
amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language
of Section 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law;
when a specific provision is made, easy resort to inherent power is not right
except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of
jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for
specific power under the same Code”. In State of Punjab v. Kasturi Lal,
(2004) 12 SCC 195 : 2004 Crl. L.J. 3866, after cautioning against reckless
use of Section 482 this Court has observed– “Inherent jurisdiction under the
section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution
and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in
the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
17
Page 17
substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exists.
Authority of the Courts exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt
is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has
power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to
allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of
justice. In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the
ends of justice”. Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar defines
Justice as – “The exercise of authority or power in maintenance of right;
vindication of right by assignment of reward or punishment; the
administration of law or the form and processes attending it; the principle of
just dealing”.
14.
It seems to us that it is necessary for the Appellate Court which is
confronted with the absence of the convict as well as his counsel, to
immediately proceed against the persons who stood surety at the time when
the convict was granted bail, as this may lead to his discovery and
production in Court. If even this exercise fails to locate and bring forth the
convict, the Appellate Court is empowered to dismiss the appeal. We fully
and respectfully concur with the recent elucidation of the law, profound yet
18
Page 18
perspicuous, in K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka (2013) 3 SCC 721.
After a comprehensive analysis of previous decisions our learned Brother
had distilled the legal position into six propositions:- (a) That the High
Court cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution simpliciter without
examining the merits; (b) That the Court is not bound to adjourn the matter
if both the Appellant or his counsel/lawyer are absent; (c)
That the Court
may, as a matter of prudence or indulgence, adjourn the matter but it is not
bound to do so; (d) That it can dispose of the appeal after perusing the
record and judgment of the trial court. (e) That if the accused is in jail and
cannot, on his own, come to court, it would be advisable to adjourn the case
and fix another date to facilitate the appearance of the Appellant-accused if
his lawyer is not present, and if the lawyer is absent and the court deems it
appropriate to appoint a lawyer at the State expense to assist it, nothing in
law would preclude the court from doing so; and (f) That if the case is
decided on merits in the absence of the Appellant, the higher court can
remedy the situation.
15.
The enunciation of the inherent powers of the High Court in exercise
of its criminal jurisdiction already articulated by this Court on several
occasions motivates us to press Section 482 into operation. We reiterate that
there is an alarming and sinister increase in instances where convicts have
19
Page 19
filed appeals apparently with a view to circumvent and escape undergoing
the sentences awarded against them. The routine is to file an appeal, apply
and get enlarged on bail or get exempted from surrender, and thereafter
wilfully to become untraceable or unresponsive. It is the bounden duty cast
upon the Judge not merely to ensure that an innocent person is not punished
but equally not to become a mute spectator to the spectacle of convict
circumventing his conviction. (See Stirland v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, 1944 AC 315 quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J.
in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003) 11 SCC 271). If the Court is
derelict in doing its duty, the social fabric will be rent asunder and anarchy
will rule everywhere. It is, therefore, imperative to put an end to such
practice by the expeditious disposal of appeals. The inherent powers of the
High Court, poignantly preserved in Section 482 of the CrPC, can also be
pressed into service but with care, caution and circumspection.
16.
Reverting back to the facts of the present case a perusal of the
impugned order makes it abundantly evident that the High Court has
considered the case in all its complexities. The argument that the High
Court was duty-bound to appoint an amicus curiae is not legally sound.
Panduranga correctly considers Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State of Assam (1996)
4 SCC 729 as per incuriam, inasmuch as the latter mandates the
20
Page 20
appointment of an amicus curiae and is thus irreconcilable with Bani Singh.
In the case in hand the High Court has manifestly discussed the evidence
that have been led, and finding it of probative value, has come to the
conclusion that the conviction is above Appellate reproach correction and
interference. In view of the analysis of the law the contention raised before
us that it was essential for the High Court to have appointed an amicus
curiae is wholly untenable. The High Court has duly undertaken the curial
responsibility that fastens upon the Appellate Court, and cannot be faulted
on the approach adopted by it. In this respect, we find no error.
17.
So far as the present Appeal is concerned, since a request for remand
had been made which we stoutly reject, and since the convict was not
represented through counsel before the High Court, we think it proper to
permit the Appellant an opportunity to argue the Appeal on its merits. We
therefore grant Leave and direct that the case be listed for Final hearing.
...........................................J.
[T.S. THAKUR]
...........................................J.
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN]
New Delhi
October 07, 2013.
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