Submitted by shri P. G. Jagdale Advocate H C Fountain Mumbai.
It is well settled that the doctrine of equal
pay for equal work can be invoked only when
the
employees
are
similarly
situated.
Similarity in the designation or nature or
quantum of work is not determinative of
equality in the matter of pay scales. The court
has to consider the factors like the source and
mode
of
recruitment/appointment,
qualifications, the nature of work, the value
(2009) 13 Supreme Court Cases 635
thereof, responsibilities, reliability, experience,
confidentiality, functional need, etc. In other
words, the equality clause can be invoked in
the matter of pay scales only when there is
wholesale identity between the holders of two
posts.”
Thus, even on the principle of “equal pay for
equal work” the petitioners would be entitled to the relief
sought. It is well settled that if there is a complete
identity between a group of employees claiming identical
benefits with regard to a group getting such benefits,
then there is no reason to deny the former group of such
benefits.
It is therefore clear that the petitioners have
been discriminated against without there being any
The Family Court not
being
intelligible criterion.
subordinate to the District Court cannot be said to be a
reasonable and valid ground to deny similar benefits to
the employees of the Family Courts. It is therefore clear
that the Government Resolution dated 20.10.2011 to the
extent it excludes employees of the Family Courts from
the benefits of the recommendations of “Justice Shetty
Commission” is concerned, the same is discriminatory in
The petitioners being similarly situated are
nature.
entitled to said benefits of the recommendations of
“Justice Shetty Commission”.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
WRIT PETITION NO.6297 OF 2014
Pralhad Bhaurao Ghule
and others.
Versus
Government of Maharashtra
Mr. P
.G. Jagdale, for the Petitioners.
CORAM : A. S. OKA, AND
A. S. CHANDURKAR, JJ.
PRONOUNCED ON : 14th AUGUST, 2014
ORAL JUDGMENT: [ PER A.S. CHANDURKAR,J.]
1.
By this Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, the petitioners who are
members of the staff serving in the Family Courts at
Aurangabad and Nagpur seek extension of benefits as
made available by “Justice Shetty Commission” to the
staff of the Family Courts in the entire State.
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The proceedings were initially filed in public
However, as the petitioners were seeking
interest.
2.
reliefs for their own benefits, by order dated 17.6.2014
the petitioners were permitted to convert the Public
Interest Litigation into a regular Writ Petition. After the
proceedings were duly converted, the Writ Petition has
ig
been heard finally with consent of the parties. Hence,
3.
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally.
The petitioners were initially appointed after
following the due process of recruitment at the District
Court in Aurangabad and Nagpur.
Under the Family
Courts Act, 1984 (for short, “the said Act”), Family
Courts were constituted at Aurangabad and Nagpupr as
per Government Resolution dated 21.5.1992. With a view
to facilitate the functioning of said Family Courts the
petitioners who were regular employees in the District
Court at Aurangabad and Nagpur were appointed by way
of adhoc arrangement on temporary basis to officiate on
various posts in said Family Courts. Necessary orders
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Since then the petitioners have been discharging
their duties in said Family Courts.
4.
The
State
of
Maharashtra
93.
were issued to each of the petitioners in the year, 1992-
by
Government
Resolution dated 20.10.2011 resolved to extend benefits
recommended by “Justice Shetty Commission”
to the
ig
employees working on the establishments of the District
Court, subordinate Civil and Criminal Courts, Small
Cause Court and City Civil and Sessions Court at
Mumbai. The aforesaid benefits were held admissible
from 1.4.2003.
The staff of the Family Courts in the
State of Maharashtra were however not extended said
benefit. It is in that background that the petitioners have
approached this Court after making due representations
to the State of Maharashtra and are therefore praying for
grant of benefits as recommended by “Justice Shetty
Commission”.
5.
In the Writ Petition it has been averred that all
the petitioners after their regular appointments were
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serving in the District Courts at Aurangabad and Nagpur.
On
Their appointments there were on regular basis.
formation of the Family Courts at Aurangabad and
Nagpur, the High Court Administration issued orders to
petitioners appointing them on the
of
arrangement
Family
on
Courts
by
establishment
temporary
basis
ig
each of the
way
to
of
adhoc
officiate
on
equivalent posts held by them in the District Courts. It is
averred
that
though
further
the
services
of
the
petitioners have been assigned to said Family Courts,
that is
maintained by the District and Sessions Court. In this
their names appeared in the Gradation List
regard, the Gradation List as on 1.4.2012 has been
referred to, which includes the names of the petitioners.
It is further averred that some of the petitioners were
held
eligible for grant of benefits under the
Assured
Career Progression scheme. However, as said petitioners
refused
the
promotional
posts,
said
benefits
were
subsequently withdrawn. It is further averred that two of
the petitioners had sought voluntary retirement from
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service and the request in that regard was accepted by
the learned District and Sessions Judge, Aurangabad. It
is further stated that by Government Resolution dated
20.10.2011 the State of Maharashtra
implemented the
recommendations of “Justice Shetty Commission” in
respect of all District Courts and all Civil, Criminal, Small
ig
Cause Court employees working under all District Courts
as well as the City Civil and Sessions Court, Small Cause
Court, the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and
other Courts of Magistrates functioning thereunder in
the City of Mumbai.
admissible from 1.4.2003.
These benefits were made
It is further stated that the
Registrar (Legal and Research) of the High Court had
called
for
proposals
regarding
conversion
and
reorganization of certain posts in terms of aforesaid
recommendations and the Principal Judge, Family Court,
Aurangabad had duly forwarded such information. The
petitioners
sought
information
under
the
Right
to
Information Act, 2005 as regards implementation of
aforesaid recommendations to the members of the staff
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of Family Courts as they were also erstwhile members of
the District and Sessions Court staff. It was replied by
the State Government that only those categories of
employees referred to in the Government Resolution
dated 20.10.2011
were entitled to benefits of the
The
recommendations of “Justice Shetty Commission”.
ig
petitioners have also relied upon certain instances with
regard to the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and
Madhya Pradesh to indicate that similarly situated staff
members of the Family Courts in said States were held
entitled to the benefits of said recommendations.
The
petitioners have therefore prayed that Government
Resolution
dated
20.10.2011
itself
be
declared
as
arbitrary and discriminatory with a further prayer to
direct the State Government to extend aforesaid benefits
to employees of the Family Courts at Mumbai, Nagpur,
Aurangabad and Pune.
6.
The respondent No.2 – Legal Advisor-cum-Joint
Secretary, Law and Judiciary Department, State of
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Maharashtra has filed an affidavit of Shri Shamsundar
Dadaji Darne dated 19.7.2014 in which it is stated that
the recommendations by “Justice Shetty Commission”
were made available for sub-ordinate staff of the District
Court Judiciary after examining structure of the Court
It is
administration, classification, work load etc..
ig
therefore stated that such recommendations cannot be
made applicable to the staff of the Family Courts. It is
further stated that the petitioners though were working
in the District Courts were deputed with their consent to
work on establishments of the Family Courts and were
absorbed as regular employees of said establishment.
Hence it is stated that they being on establishment of
Family Courts were not entitled to claim benefits of
aforesaid recommendations.
7.
Shri P
.G. Jagdale, learned Counsel appearing for
the petitioners has submitted that the petitioners have
been discriminated against in the matter of grant of
benefits of the recommendations made by “Justice Shetty
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It is submitted that all the petitioners
Commission”.
were regularly employed with the District Courts at
Aurangabad and Nagpur and they had been deputed by
way of adhoc arrangement initially to work in the Family
Courts.
The posts on which they were appointed were
District
and
Sessions
Judge,
Aurangabad
by
ig
The
identical to the posts held by them in the District Courts.
accepting the request for voluntary retirement of two of
the petitioners clearly established that the petitioners
continued to be employees of the District Courts.
Similarly the names of the petitioners continued in the
Gradation List along with all other employees of the
District Court.
Considering the nature of duties being
done by petitioners which were identical to such duties
being done by similarly situated employees, there was no
justifiable basis for excluding grant of benefits of “Justice
Shetty Commission” to the petitioners. It was urged that
the Government Resolution dated 20.10.2011 to the
extent it excluded the employees of the Family Court
from being entitled to such benefits was arbitrary.
It
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petitioners were
was therefore submitted that the
entitled to grant of all such benefits w.e.f. 1.4.2003 as
was granted to all employees of the District Courts and
other subordinate Courts functioning under it.
8.
Shri A.B. Vagyani, learned Government Pleader
for respondent Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5 has opposed the Writ
ig
Petition. He submitted that the petitioners ceased to be
the employees of the District Court after they were sent
to the Family Courts by way of adhoc arrangement. The
under
the
Government
Resolution
dated
benefits
20.10.2011 were admissible only to employees of the
District Courts and other courts subordinate thereto. As
the Family Court was subordinate to the High Court, the
petitioners were not entitled to aforesaid benefits. It was
submitted
that
merely
because
the
names
of
the
petitioners were shown in the Gradation list as on
1.4.2012, the same by itself would not indicate that the
petitioners continued to be employees of the District
Courts.
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Shri
S.R.
Nargolkar,
the
learned
Counsel
9.
appearing for the Registrar General, Bombay High Court
has submitted that it was for the State Government to
take necessary decision in the matter of grant of benefits
of the recommendations of “Justice Shetty Commission”
Relying upon the decision of the
to the petitioners.
ig
Supreme Court of India in the case of S.D. Joshi and
ors. Vs. High Court of Judicature at Bombay1, it was
submitted that insofar as the judicial members of the
Family Courts were concerned, they were treated as not
to
“Judicial
belonging
Maharashtra.
Services”
of
the
State
of
The learned Counsel for the respondent
No.3 also placed on record relevant extracts of the report
of
“Justice
Shetty
Commission”
wherein
certain
reference was made to the constitution of Family Courts.
The learned Counsel did not dispute the fact that the
data had been sought by the High Court Administration
in the matter of conversion and reorganization of certain
posts as per aforesaid recommendations.
1 (2011) 1 SCC 252
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We have carefully considered the submissions
10.
made by the respective Counsel appearing for the
parties.
We have also carefully gone through the
averments made in the Writ Petition and the documents
annexed thereto as well as the reply filed on behalf of
The basis on which the petitioners seek relief is
ig
11.
respondent No.2.
employees
of
principally on the ground of discrimination between the
the
District
Courts
and
the
Courts
subordinate to it on one hand and the employees of the
Family Courts on the other. The further basis for seeking
relief is non-inclusion of employees of the Family Courts
in the category of employees held admissible for grant of
benefits to the recommendations made by “Justice Shetty
Commission”
as
per
Government
Resolution
dated
20.10.2011. In the aforesaid background, the respective
cases of the parties will have to be examined.
12.
It it not in dispute that the petitioners were
regular employees of the District Court at Aurangabad
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By way of adhoc arrangement, the petitioners
there.
and Nagpur prior to formation of the Family Courts
were sent to the respective Family Courts from the
District Courts on equivalent post. It is further not in
dispute that for various purposes the Principal District
and Sessions Judge continued to exercise administrative
ig
control with regard to matters pertaining to acceptance
of resignation etc. even in the year, 2011. This is clear
Principal
from office order dated 30.06.2011 issued by the
District
and
Sessions
Judge,
Aurangabad
accepting the voluntary retirement of one Smt. Malti
Chintaman
Aurangabad.
Rahalkar,
Junior
Clerk,
Family
Court,
Similarly on 3.10.2011 the request for
voluntary retirement of another Junior Clerk of the
Family Court from Aurangabad was accepted by the
Principal District and Sessions Judge, Aurangabad. It is
further not in dispute that the names of the petitioners
continued to be maintained in the Gradation list.
The
Gradation list as on 1.4.2012 includes the names of all
the petitioners and their respective entries have been
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13
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made in accordance with seniority in their respective
cadres. It is thus obvious that even after lapse of about
20 years after being sent to the Family Courts by way of
adhoc
arrangement,
the
names
of
the
petitioners
continued to find place in the Gradation list along with
other employees on the roll of the District Court. It is
ig
further not in dispute that the posts held by the
petitioners in the Family Courts were the same posts that
they were holding in the District Court before being sent
by way of adhoc arrangement.
There is therefore
nothing to distinguish the cases of the petitioners who
are employed with the Family Courts and those employed
with the District Courts.
13.
By Government Resolution dated 20.10.2011,
employees of the District Courts,
Civil and Criminal
Courts and Small Cause Courts, subordinate to the
District Court were held entitled to the benefits of the
recommendations made by “Justice Shetty Commission”
w.e.f. 1.4.2003.
In subsequent Government Circular
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14
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dated 8.3.2013, certain clarifications were issued by the
State Government pursuant to various issues raised by
the organizations of Court employees in the State. One of
the issues raised was that as employees of the Family
Courts were employees of the District and Sessions
Court, the aforesaid recommendations should also be
ig
made applicable to them. However, no clarification has
been issued by the State Government in this regard. In
communication dated 11.3.2013, it has merely been
stated that only those category of employees who are
in
20.10.2011 are
the
mentioned
Government
entitled
for
Resolution
benefits
of
dated
aforesaid
recommendations. It is thus clear that though aforesaid
issue as regards employees working with the Family
Courts being entitled to aforesaid benefits was raised
before the State Government, no clarification in that
regard has been issued.
It may be noted that in very
same circular where other benefits as sought were found
not admissible, the same has been clearly mentioned
against such issues. It can thus be taken that the State
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15
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with
the
Family
Courts
continued
to
be
working
Government has not disputed the fact that the employees
employees of the District and Sessions Court. The only
justification given is that as there was no mention of
employees
working
with
the
Family
Courts
in
Government Resolution dated 20.10.2011, they were
At this stage a reference to certain provisions of
14.
ig
being denied aforesaid benefits.
the said Act would be necessary. Section 7 of the said
Act reads as under :
“7. Jurisdiction.- (1) Subject to the other
provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall--
(a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction
exercisable by any district Court or any
subordinate civil Court under any law for the
time being in force in respect of suits and
proceedings of the nature referred to in the
Explanation; and
(b) be deemed, for the purposes of
exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to
be a district Court or, as the case may be, such
subordinate civil Court for the area to which
the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends.
Explanation.-- The suits and proceedings
referred to in this sub-section are suits and
proceedings of the following nature, namely:-
(a) a suit or proceeding between the
parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of
marriage (declaring the marriage to be null
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16
ig
and void or, as the case may be, annulling the
marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or
judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;
(b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration
as to the validity of a marriage or as to the
matrimonial status of any person;
(c) a suit or proceeding between the
parties to a marriage with respect to the
property of the parties or of either of them;
(d) a suit or proceeding for an order or
injunction in circumstances arising out of a
marital relationship;
(e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration
as to the legitimacy of any person;
(f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance;
(g) a suit or proceeding in relation to
the guardianship of the person or the custody
of, or access to, any minor.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of
this Act, a Family Court shall also have and
exercise--
(a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a
Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX
(relating to order for maintenance of wife,
children and parents) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and
(b) such other jurisdiction as may be
conferred on it by any other enactment.”
wp.6297-14.doc
.
It is, therefore, clear that the Family Court
exercises
jurisdiction
with
regard
to
suits
and
proceedings of various nature which otherwise a Civil
Court or District Court in
the State would have
exercised. Similarly it also exercises jurisdiction that is
exercisable by a Magistrate of First Class under Chapter
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IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as well as
other enactment.
Family
Court
such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any
Jurisdiction is also exercised by the
where
constituted
with
regard
to
proceedings under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 which
matters were earlier being entertained by the District
ig
Court.
Section 8 of the said Act reads as under :
.
“8. Exclusion of jurisdiction and pending
proceedings.- Where a Family Court has been
established for any area,-
(a) no district Court or any subordinate
civil Court referred to in sub-section (1) of
section 7 shall, in relation to such area, have
or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any
suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in
the Explanation to that sub-section;
(b) no Magistrate shall, in relation to
such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction or
power under Chapter IX of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974);
(c) every suit or proceeding of the nature
referred to in the Explanation to sub-section
(1) of section 7 and every proceeding under
Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974),-
(i) which is pending immediately before
the establishment of such Family Court before
any district court or subordinate Court
referred to in that sub-section or, as the case
may be, before any Magistrate under the said
Code; and
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(ii) which would have been required to
be instituted or taken before or by such Family
Court if, before the date on which such suit or
proceeding was instituted or taken, this Act
had come into force and such Family Court
had been established,
shall stand transferred to such Family Court
on the date on which it is established."
wp.6297-14.doc
Thus, on establishment of the Family Court, even
.
ig
proceedings pending before any District Court or a
subordinate Court or before any Magistrate in relation to
proceedings pertaining to Section 7 of the said Act stand
.
transferred to the Family Court.
It is therefore clear that in matters specified, the
Family Court exercises jurisdiction that was
earlier
exercised by the District Court or a Court subordinate to
it or by the Magistrate in relation to jurisdiction or
powers under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
15.
In this background, it would now be necessary to
examine as to whether exclusion of the employees
working with the Family Courts to benefits of aforesaid
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recommendation is discriminatory in nature or whether
the same is based on an intelligible criterion having some
nexus with the differentiation. In this regard, it may be
noted that there is no clear stand on the part of the State
Government as regards exclusion of employees working
the
Commission”.
gathered
recommendations
ig
per
of
“Justice
Shetty
The only discernible reason that can be
from
the
Government
as
with the Family Courts from being entitled to the benefits
Resolution
dated
20.10.2011 and circular dated 8.3.2013 is that as the
Family Court is not a Court subordinate to the District
Court, the employees working with the Family Courts are
held ineligible for such benefits.
Considering the fact
that the employees of the Family Courts were all initially
appointed with the District Courts and were sent to the
Family Courts by way of adhoc arrangement coupled with
the fact that the District Court continued to exercise
administrative control over them in the matter of various
aspects pertaining to their services and continuation of
their names in the Gradation list for a period of more
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20 years,
it will be clear that employees of the
than
Family Courts have not been treated as a separate class
by themselves. They have been continued to be treated
as employees of the District Court.
Merely because
under the said Act, the Family Court is not a Court
justifiable
reason
to
deny
benefits
of
aforesaid
ig
a
subordinate to the District Court, the same would not be
recommendations to the employees of the Family Court.
Said employees continued on the same post doing the
same nature of work that they were earlier doing in the
Courts.
District
There
is
no
difference
in
the
educational qualifications of the employees of the District
Court and Courts subordinate to it and the employees
working in the Family Court. Hence, there does not
appear to be any justifiable reason to differentiate
between the employees working with the Family Courts
and those working with the District Courts to deny them
aforesaid benefits.
16.
Insofar as the judgment of the Supreme Court in
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the case of S.D. Joshi and others (supra) is concerned,
the issue involved therein was whether the Judges of the
Family Court were entitled to be considered as members
of
the
Higher
Judicial
Services
in
the
State
of
Maharashtra. It was held that Judges of the Family Court
did not form part of “Judicial Services” as contemplated
Rules,
2008.
ig
by Rule 3 of the Bombay Judicial Services Recruitment
However,
while
considering
various
provisions of the said Act, it was held that the Family
Court constituted under Section 3 of the said Act had all
the trappings of a Court. While holding so, the Supreme
Court in paras-28 and 30 observed as under:
“Various provisions of this Act, therefore,
clearly demonstrate that the Family Court, a
creature of statute, has been vested with
power to adjudicate and determine the
disputes between the parties which fall within
the scope and ambit of Explanation to Section
7(1) of the Act. The persons, who are
appointed as Judge of the Family Court,
perform all duties and functions which are
akin to the functions being performed by the
Presiding Officer of a Civil or a Criminal
Court, though to a very limited extent. .......”
“.... The statutory provisions of the Family
Court squarely satisfy these ingredients and
further Presiding Officers of Family Courts are
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22
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would
be
necessary
It
17.
performing
judicial
and
determinative
functions and, as such, are Judges.”
to
refer
to
the
observations of the Supreme Court of India in the case of
V. Markendeya and others Vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh and others2. In paras 9 and 10, it has been
“9.
ig
observed thus :
Article 39(d) contained in Part IV of the
Constitution, ordains the State to direct its
policy towards securing equal pay for equal
work for both men and women. Provisions
contained in the Chapter on Directive
Principles of State Policy cannot be enforced
by courts although the principles contained
therein are fundamental in nature for the
governance of our country. The Court has no
power to direct the Legislature to frame laws
to give effect to the Directive Principles as
contained in Part IV of the Constitution or to
injunct the legislature from making any such
law. But while considering the question of
enforcement of fundamental rights of a citizen
it is open to the court to be guided by the
Directive Principles to ensure that in doing
justice the principles contained therein are
maintained. The purpose of Article 39(d) is to
fix certain social and economic goals for
avoiding any discrimination amongst the
citizens doing similar work in matters relating
to pay. If the Court finds that discrimination is
practised amongst two sets of employees
2
(1989) 3 Supreme Court Cases 191
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ig
similarly situated in matters relating to pay,
the court must strike down discrimination, and
direct the State to adhere to the doctrine of
"equal pay for equal work" as enshrined under
Article 39(d) of the Constitution. Fundamental
rights, and the directive principles constitute
"conscience
of
the
Constitution".
The
Constitution aims at bringing about a
synthesis between 'Fundamental Rights' and
'Directive Principles of State Policy' by giving
to the former a place of pride and to the latter
a place of permanence, together they form
core of the Constitution. They constitute its
true conscience and without faithfully
implementing the Directive Principles it is not
possible to achieve the welfare State
contemplated by the Constitution, see
Keshavanand Bharti v.State of Kerala: (1973) 4
SCC 225.
10.
In Randhir Singh's case (1982)1
SCC 618 and later in Dhirendra Chamoli's
case (1986) 1 SCC 637, Surinjder Singh's case
(1986) 1 SCC 639, Bhagwan Dass's case
(1987)4 SCC 634, Jaipal's case: (1988) 3 SCC
354 and P Savita's case 1985 Supp SCC 94,
.
this Court implemented the principle of 'equal
pay for equal work'. The Court granted relief
on the principle of equal pay on the basis of
same or similar work performed by two
classes of employees under the same employer
even though the two classes of employees did
not constitute the same service. But in all the
aforesaid cases relief was granted only after it
was found that discrimination was practised in
giving different scales of pay in violation of the
equality clause enshrined under Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution. The principle of
equal pay for equal work was enforced on the
premise that discrimination was practised
between the two sets of employees performing
the same duties and functions, without there
being any rational classification. The principle
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Deshmane
24
.
ig
of 'equal pay for equal work' is not abstract
one, it is open to the State to prescribe
different scales of pay for different cadres
having
regard
to
nature,
duties,
responsibilities and educational qualifications.
Different grades are laid down in service with
varying qualification for entry into particular
grade. Higher qualification and experience
based on length of service are valid
considerations for prescribing different pay
scales for different cadres. The application of
doctrine arises where employees are equal in
every respect, in educational qualifications,
duties,
functions
and
measure
of
responsibilities and yet they are denied
equality in pay. If the classification for
prescribing different scales of pay is founded
on reasonable nexus the principle will not
apply. But if the classification is founded on
unreal and unreasonable basis it would violate
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the
principle of 'equal pay for equal work', must
have its way. ......”
wp.6297-14.doc
Similarly in State of Madhya Pradesh and
others Vs. Ramesh Chandra Bajpai 3, the Supreme
Court observed thus :
3
“It is well settled that the doctrine of equal
pay for equal work can be invoked only when
the
employees
are
similarly
situated.
Similarity in the designation or nature or
quantum of work is not determinative of
equality in the matter of pay scales. The court
has to consider the factors like the source and
mode
of
recruitment/appointment,
qualifications, the nature of work, the value
(2009) 13 Supreme Court Cases 635
18.
thereof, responsibilities, reliability, experience,
confidentiality, functional need, etc. In other
words, the equality clause can be invoked in
the matter of pay scales only when there is
wholesale identity between the holders of two
posts.”
wp.6297-14.doc
Thus, even on the principle of “equal pay for
equal work” the petitioners would be entitled to the relief
sought. It is well settled that if there is a complete
identity between a group of employees claiming identical
benefits with regard to a group getting such benefits,
then there is no reason to deny the former group of such
benefits.
It is therefore clear that the petitioners have
been discriminated against without there being any
The Family Court not
being
intelligible criterion.
subordinate to the District Court cannot be said to be a
reasonable and valid ground to deny similar benefits to
the employees of the Family Courts. It is therefore clear
that the Government Resolution dated 20.10.2011 to the
extent it excludes employees of the Family Courts from
the benefits of the recommendations of “Justice Shetty
Commission” is concerned, the same is discriminatory in
The petitioners being similarly situated are
nature.
entitled to said benefits of the recommendations of
“Justice Shetty Commission”.
19.
As per Government Resolution dated 20.10.2011
aforesaid benefits have been made admissible to the
employees
mentioned
1.4.2003.
of
therein
from
The petitioners have been agitating against
ig
categories
their wrongful exclusion immediately after issuance of
aforesaid Government Resolution. However, it is to be
noted that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court in the case of State of Haryana and others vs.
Charanjit Singh and others4, the petitioners would be
entitled to the benefit of aforesaid recommendations
from the date they have filed the present Writ Petition,
which is 13.8.2013.
20.
In view of aforesaid, it is declared that the
employees of all the Family Courts in the State of
Maharashtra
are
entitled
to
the
benefits
of
the
recommendations made by “Justice Shetty Commission”
4 (2006) 9 Supreme Court Cases 321
The respondent Nos.1 and 2 are
the District Courts.
in terms similar to those applicable to the employees of
therefore directed to take all necessary steps in this
regard
and
make
available
the
benefits
of
the
recommendations of “Justice Shetty Commission” to the
employees of aforesaid Family Courts from 13.8.2013
Petition.
onwards being the date they have filed the present Writ
The effect of aforesaid recommendations be
made available to the petitioners and other employees of
the Family Courts within a period of six months from
Rule is accordingly made absolute in aforesaid
today.
terms with no order as to costs.
(A. S. OKA, J.)
(A. S. CHANDURKAR, J.)
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