U.P (AIR 1964 SC 1625) held thus;
"A writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a
man to obtain possession of a woman alleged
to be his wife does not issue as a matter of
course. Though a writ of right, it is not a writ of
course especially when a man seeks the
assistance of the Court to regain the custody of
a woman. Before a Court accedes to this
request it must satisfy itself at least prima
facie that the person claiming the writ is in fact
the husband and further whether valid
marriage between him and the woman could at
all have taken place."
It was ignoring the above principles that the Division Bench in
para 13 of the judgment held that the question in the petition is
not about the validity of the marriage and proceeded to grant
relief on the erroneous reasoning that in petitions for habeas
corpus, strict doctrine of the rule of locus standi can be ignored.
This approach, in our view, is unacceptable. Even apart from all
these, unlike this case, in Rajmohan's case (supra), since the
parent had removed the ward out of the jurisdiction of this Court,
in such a case, as held by the Full Bench in Sadanandan's case
(supra), interference with parental authority was justified.
We agree that like in any other sphere of life, there has
been changes in the social and moral values. Ours is a society
which has recognised freedom to every citizen. But then, these
changes that we proudly talk about, and the liberties that are
guaranteed to our citizens, cannot be stretched beyond limits nor
can such freedom be made weapons to destroy our fundamental
values or social establishments like families, which, undoubtedly,
concede authority on parents to advise and guide their children.
We cannot accept as a general principle that the parents are in all
circumstances, bound to concede absolute decisional autonomy
to their children, even if they have attained majority and remain
helpless even in situations where their wards have taken wrong
and immature decisions, which will be disastrous not only to the
wards themselves but also to the family itself.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANTONY DOMINIC
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
FRIDAY,THE 28TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2014/9TH PHALGUNA, 1935
WP(Crl.).No. 39 of 2014 (S)
----------------------------
DR.LAL PARAMESWAR,AGED 28,
Vs
ULLAS.N.N,NADUPURAKKAL
Dated this the 28th day of February, 2014
Citation; 2014 CRLJ 1921 Kerala
Petitioner is a doctor by profession, who is now working as
medical officer in the District Hospital, Wadakkanchery. According
to him, while working in the Elite Mission Hospital, Koorkancherry,
he got acquainted with Ms. Greeshma Ullas (hereinafter referred
to as the detenue for short) a doctor, who was then working in
the hospital as a Resident Medical Officer. The relationship
developed into a love affair and they decided to get married.
However, this was not approved by the first respondent, the
father of the detenue and that thereupon, the first respondent
kept her in illegal detention, without even allowing her to report
for work or to appear for the post graduate entrance
examinations. It is stated that finally he received Ext.P1 letter
from the detenue informing him about the illegal confinement and
that her life is in peril. Thereupon this writ petition was filed
seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the production of the detenue
and to set her at liberty.
2. This Court admitted the writ petition and notice was
issued to the respondents. In response, the first respondent, the
father of the detenue, produced her before us on 31/1/2014. We
interacted with her in detail and were prima facie satisfied that
there is truth in the allegations of the petitioner. The outcome of
our interaction with her was recorded in our order dated
31/1/2014, and the relevant part of it is extracted for easy
reference;
"By order dated 27/1/14, this Court issued notice
to the parties and also directed production of the
detenue. Accordingly, the detenue was produced
before us and we interacted with the detenue. In
answer to our questions, she confirmed her love
affair with the petitioner and also told us that it is
her firm decision to get married to the petitioner.
She also told us that in order to force her to
withdraw from the relationship, for the last three
months, she was kept in confinement without
allowing her to continue the employment and
even refusing to give the mobile phone, which she
had. She also told us that all these facilities will be
restored only if she agrees for a marriage with
somebody else, which was not acceptable to her.
3. Accordingly, on the order of this Court, she was
accommodated in a hostel, where she is continuing to stay.
Parties also were allowed to give notice under the Special
Marriage Act for getting their marriage registered.
4. Subsequently, the first respondent filed his counter
affidavit, denying the allegation that he was illegally detaining the
detenue and pleading that whatever he has done was for the
welfare and well-being of his daughter and in exercise of his
parental authority. He has averred in the affidavit thus;
Furthermore, I have found that, she was having
more than three mobile phones out of which one
mobile phone we could trace out from her room.
On tracing the said mobile phone and seeing the
continuous messages sent by my daughter on
19/11/13 to the petitioner I apprehend danger to
her life if she is let free and the petitioner gets
her custody. The messages sent by the alleged
detenue reveals the antecedent character of the
petitioner and his relationships with other girls.
This was confirmed by the nature of replies sent
by the petitioner on 19/11/2013."
5. Further the messages exchanged between the
petitioner and the detenue on 19/11/2013 from their mobile
phones, have been annexed to the affidavit as Exts. R1(a) and R1
(b) and these messages read thus;
Ext.R1(a) (messages delivered to the petitioner
by the detenue)
Njan onnumalla. Oru potti.big big fool..njan poyal
lal parameswarinu nooru pere kittum. Continue ur
old happy life..njoy..chathikkapettavarude listil
oru penninte per kude.greeshma..its
nothing.nthng new to u..as simple as tht.adutha
penninod parayan oru silly kadha kude...
How can I trust one like u. Who cheated me even
after getting that attached to me.even after
realizing my love n me.howww.nthng s papam for
u. in ur world.
What validity I have ? How long would u b able to
continue with greeshma alone. Can u live a life
with one woman.ever?
This answer has no value wen its frm a person
like u. U need me.true. But ninak oru penninte
kude oru life pattilya.u r moulded in separate
mould.not a human.
How can I believe a dirty man like u.
U dnt need a wife like me.lifetime vedhana
ayirikkum ennepoloru barya anengil.y r u spoiling
my life for u.enth theta njan cheythath...
I cnt observe u al d time. Veetil lock cheyth
jeevipichal polum one like u vl cheat. Bcz ur mind
W.P.(Crl.) No.39/14
: 5 :
s diseasd. That dirty.arappu thonnunnu for
touching u.
Now u knw very well that v wont unite unless u
remain ths pure..bcz endless pardonles sins u
have done even to me..even cheating our gods.
So u need to.bt once u get me u again bcm free n
then u vl go bk.ur mind s that that impure n bad.
U dnt knw sincerity.ne anganeya.i'm afraid of u.
U want me to suffer n cry lifelong for a husband
lik eu? Tel me
U love only u to the maximum.ur happiess.ur
enjoyment alone.ask urself.can u remain pure ths
lifetime as a single woman man.both by body
mind n thots
Ask urself in front of all gods u beliv.never give
selfish reply.if u had evr loved me.
Only a man who s that cruel can cheat one like
me who loves n consider u as god..only lal could.
Ext.R1(b) (petitioner's reply)
I had done orupaadu paapangal. Not doing it.And
won't do it ever.
Life long.For you and only for u. Trust.Truth.
You want to leave me?
Cannot convince you.saralya.Ellam nte
theta..Molutti I love you.And ini oru pennum
ettante lifeil varilla. Angane onnum undavilya.I
love you.Want to see you.
I need you. And I am trying to be perfect husband
for you. Understand..I need our life.
I can remain pure as as a onewoman man.Trust
me.
This life is over if you're not there.
Greeshma I'll be good forever.Believe me.
I won't disappoint you. Living as pure as I can
be..i'll live like this for the rest of my llife."
6. It is also stated that based on the information gathered
by his son from one Dr. George N.D., further enquiries were made
and that he has found out that the contents of the messages are
true. It is alleged that his son has also found out that the
petitioner had relationship with at least 6 other women. He has
also alleged that the petitioner had even attempted to assault not
only himself but also the detenue and that too, in the premises of
this Court. He has also contended that the detenue was working
in the hospital only occasionally and that he did not prevent her
either from reporting for work or appearing for the post graduate
entrance examinations. According to him, he did not keep the
detenue in illegal detention, but has in order to ensure her safety,
removed the internal locks of her room and that she was always
at liberty to move inside the house. In substance, what the first
respondent contends is that he did not illegally detain his
daughter, but has acted in her welfare, exercising his natural right
as the parent of his only daughter.
7. All the allegations against him, including the veracity
of the SMS messages extracted above, were denied by the
petitioner in the reply affidavit filed by him. He has also reiterated
his love and affection towards the detenue and their firm resolve
to get married and live together as husband and wife. According
to him, apart from the fact that he belongs to a different caste,
there cannot be any other reason why their decision to get
married should be opposed by the first respondent.
8. In the light of the above pleadings, materials and the
submissions made by the counsel for both sides, who have
reiterated their respective contentions, we have considered the
matter.
9. The most important thing to be said about habeas
corpus, sought for in this petition, is that the entitlement to the
issue of the writ comes as a matter of right. Thus, if detention
cannot be legally justified, entitlement for release of the detenue
cannot be denied on other considerations, however important
they may appear to be. Therefore, if the detention cannot be
shown to be lawful, the detenue is entitled, without anything
more, to have that unlawful detention brought to an end by
obtaining a writ of habeas corpus and a feature of entitlement to
the writ is the right to require the person who detains to give an
account of the basis on which he says the detention is legally
justified.( See in this context Rahamtullah v. Secretary of
State (2013)1 All ER 574).
10. From what is pleaded by the first respondent, it is clear
that though he has placed restraints on the absolute freedom of
his daughter, according to him, he was justified in doing so, on
account of his concern for her future welfare and well-being. His
apprehensions in this behalf are on various grounds. But, to
substantiate these, all that is made available to this Court are the
text of the SMS messages that were exchanged between the
parties on 19/11/2013. While in this context, we should also
clarify that in the reply affidavit filed, the petitioner has disputed
the authenticity of these messages. But, on 31/1/2014, when she
appeared in Court, the detenue herself had confirmed the
genuineness of the messages and according to her, these were
their prankish acts, which were not to be taken seriously.
Therefore in the light of the aforesaid statement made to us by
none other than the detenue herself, we proceed on the basis that
the messages in question were exchanged between the parties
and that the petitioner's dispute regarding its authenticity has no
substance.
11. In the light of these facts and the basic principles that
govern writ of habeas corpus, the primary question that is to be
considered is, whether the facts of this case disclose an illegal
detention of the detenue. As we have already stated, the 1st
respondent, the father of the detenue, has put restraints on the
freedom of his daughter, which, according to him, was
necessitated for her welfare. According to him, the attempt of the
petitioner is only to somehow or other get custody of the detenue
and that having regard to his character and antecedents, he is
apprehensive of her future welfare and well-being.
12. The first issue to be considered is whether having
regard to the facts disclosed, it can be said that the apprehension
expressed by the 1st respondent is a totally unfounded one to
render the restraints put by him on the freedom of his daughter to
be a detention which is illegal justifying the issue of a writ of
habeas corpus.
13. We have already extracted the messages that were
exchanged between the petitioner and the detenue. Reading of
the messages sent by the detenue to the petitioner contained in
Ext.R1(a) indicates that according to the detenue, despite the
relationship that the petitioner has with her, simultaneously, he
had relationships with other ladies as well. As a result, the
detenue felt that he was a perfidious character who could not be
faithful to her and that therefore, she could not trust him. In his
replies, the petitioner did not deny the allegations made by the
detenue and on the other hand, he was apologetic and promised
to be loyal to her and not to repeat the past mistakes. In other
words, these messages cannot be brushed aside as prankish acts,
and instead prima facie show the anguish of the detenue, who felt
of having been let down by someone dear to her. For the purpose
of this case, it is not necessary for us to probe any more into the
accuracy or otherwise of the allegations, for our enquiry is only on
the limited question whether there is any basis for the
apprehension entertained by the 1st respondent that his
daughter's future will not be safe in the hands of the petitioner. In
our view, having regard to the contents of Ext.R1(a) and (b), it
cannot be said that the apprehensions of the 1st respondent, the
father of a grown up daughter, is totally baseless.
14. Having found so, the further question to be examined
is what is the extent of a parent's authority over a major daughter
and whether the restraints put by a father on a major daughter,
would in the circumstances, amount to an illegal detention, which
is a pre-requisite for a writ of habeas corpus. The extent of
parental authority over a major daughter came up for
consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Sadanandan v.
Raghava Kurup (1974 KLT 650). That was a case where the
petitioner therein claimed to have married the 3rd respondent, a
21 year old lady. According to him, his wife was illegally detained
by her parents and with that allegation, he filed the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. In the judgment, referring to In re Agar-
ellis v. Lascelles (1883 (24) Law Reports Chancery 317), their
lordships held that the three classes of cases in which
interference with a father's rights would be justified were
summarised by the Chancery Division broadly as; (1) where the
father has forfeited the right by his moral turpitude (2) where he
has abdicated his authority, and (3) where he removes the ward
out of jurisdiction. Thereafter finding that the case was one which
revealed the picture of a woman subjected to the pulls and
pressures of marital (or, may be extra-marital), attachment on the
one side and parental affection or guidance on the other and
taking into due account the rights and responsibilities which
nature has entrusted to parents in regard to their children, their
lordships held that they were not satisfied that any case of illegal
detention or custody which calls for redress under Article 226 of
the Constitution was made out. On that basis, the writ petition
was dismissed.
15. A similar issue came up for the consideration of a
Division Bench of this Court in Prasadhkumar v. Ravindran
(1992 (1) KLT 729), where the prayer was for the production of
the daughter of the 1st respondent therein. It was alleged that
they had entered into a registered marriage agreement and were
living together. It was alleged that subsequently, with the
intention to separate his wife from him, the 1st respondent had
removed his wife and was keeping her in illegal detention against
her will. In that judgment, the Division Bench considered the
question whether custody of a parent in the circumstances
pointed out, can be said to be unlawful warranting interference by
this Court. This question was answered by the Division Bench in
para 6 of its judgment thus;
The question involved in the case is regarding
the custody of a girl, though, no doubt, according
to the petitioner, she is a major. Even assuming
that she is a major, the question is whether in
such circumstances, the petitioner is entitled to
maintain an application for the issue of a writ of
habeas corpus for the production of her body and
also as to whether the custody of the father in
such circumstances can be said to be unlawful.
We do not think that having control and
supervision of an aged girl by the parents will
amount to illegal custody warranting the issue of
a writ by this court. Parents will naturally be
interested in the welfare of their children and
unless there are extraordinary circumstances,
normally they will be the proper persons to take
decisions concerning the career and future of
their children. Parents will be entitled to have
control over the children, especially if they are
daughters, to protect them from the vagaries of
adolescence.
16. Similar issue again came up for consideration before
another Division Bench of this Court in Sreekesh v. Mohammed
Asharaf (2003(1) KLT 397). Here also, it was alleged that the
petitioner and the major daughter of respondents 1 and 2 therein
had entered into an agreement of marriage and were living
together as husband and wife. According to him, while so, the
parents and the relatives forcefully took away their daughter and
admitted her in a counselling centre in order to compel her to
change her attitude towards him. That was informed to the
petitioner and she eloped with him from the counselling centre.
Subsequently, on a complaint made by the father, the petitioner
and his wife were arrested by the police. She was produced
before the Magistrate and after recording her statement, she was
allowed to live with the petitioner and they were living together. It
was stated that subsequently with the consent of the petitioner,
her father took his wife away from him and later refused to
release her. When the complaints to the police did not yield any
result, the writ petition was filed. The girl was produced before
this Court and she was given time to think over the matter.
Thereafter, when she was questioned, she said that she wanted to
live with the petitioner.
17. In the above background, the case was considered and
the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition holding thus;
7. It is seen that what has been produced as a
proof of marriage is Annexure C, which is only an
unregistered document. This document is titled
as an agreement of marriage. According to us,
there is no valid marriage between the petitioner
and the third respondent. Can we say that the
custody of the girl with the parents is illegal. The
parents are entitled to have the custody of their
children and in no circumstances, it can be said
to be illegal, especially in the case of a girl. The
parents have a duty to put their children in a
correct pathway in their life. True that the third
respondent has become major. But that does not
mean that no duty is cast upon the parents to
advise her on important matters. No doubt, the
third respondent says that she legally lived with
the petitioner. It is the case of the parents that
the petitioner would not be able to look after her.
Here, we find that there is no valid marriage.
There is only an agreement in writing. That has
no legal validity. It is the responsibility of the
parents to see that the daughter is not cheated.
8. In the decision reported in Prasadhkumar v.
Ravindran (1992 (1) KLT 729) it was stated thus:
"It cannot be said that having control and
supervision of an aged girl by the parents will
amount to illegal custody warranting the issue of
a writ by this Court. Parents will naturally be
interested in the welfare of their children and
unless there are extraordinary circumstances,
normally they will be the proper persons to take
decisions concerning the career and future of
their children. Parents will be entitled to have
control over the children, especially if they are
daughters, to protect them from the vagaries of
adolescence". In this case, a subsequent affidavit
has been filed by respondents 1 and 2 saying
that after the third respondent's education is
over within three years, they will marry her to the
petitioner, if she then wishes so at that time.
9. On a review of the entire facts and the law on
this point, we don't find any ground to release
the third respondent from the custody of the
parents and to handover her to the petitioner.
Except a bald unregistered document, there is
nothing to show that the petitioner has validly
married the third respondent. The parents are
allowed to take the third respondent with them to
their house. The Police is directed to accompany
the parents and daughter till they reach their
house. We make it clear that we have never said
that there can be no marriage between the
petitioner and the third respondent. That decision
to be taken by the appropriate parties. We have
only said that the custody of the parents is not
illegal.
18. These judgments certainly support the contention of
the learned counsel for the 1st respondent that he was well within
his parental authority to put restraints on the freedom of his
daughter even if she has attained majority.
19. Counsel for the petitioner relied on another judgment
of a Division Bench of this Court in Rajmohan v. State of
Kerala (2009(4) KLT 466). That was a case where a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus was filed alleging that the petitioner's wife
was illegally detained by her parents. The Court found that there
was no legal marriage. In spite of it, holding that the validity or
otherwise of the marriage was not a matter of much relevance,
the Division Bench held thus;
14. It is next contended that the 6th respondent
being the father of the alleged detenu, has an
unbridled right to keep her "in custody". The
keeping of an adult major woman in the custody of
her parent even against her will and desire will not
amount to improper restraint or detention/
confinement as to justify invocation of the
jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution,
contends the learned counsel for the 6th
respondent strenuously. The contention of the
learned counsel for the 6th respondent virtually is
that parental authority is sufficient to justify such
"custody" even against the will and wishes of the
detenu.
15. We are afraid that such a general principle of
law cannot be accepted. A person who has
attained majority, is in the eye of law, a person
and a citizen entitled to all rights and privileges
under the Constitution. There can be no question
of an adult major woman being kept in the
"custody" of anyone else against her wishes,
desire and volition. Even if it be the parents, such
custody cannot in the absence of better reasons
be justified. There is no contention that she suffers
from any debility which obliges her to be in the
"custody" of any other. An adult major woman
residing with parents or husband cannot be held to
be in the "custody" of such parent or husband as
to deny to her, her rights to decisional autonomy
and to decide what is best for her. Parental
authority would certainly extend until a child
attains majority. But, thereafter, though the
parent and the child may be residing together, it
can never be held that such child is in the
"custody" of the parent. An adult major woman is
not a chattel. The theory that until marriage a
woman must be under the custody and
confinement of her father and thereafter in the
custody and confinement of her husband cannot
possibly be accepted in this era. Such an adult
person is certainly entitled to take decisions which
affect her. Parental authority or matrimonial
authority will not at any rate give right to such
parent or husband to keep such woman under
restraint, confinement or detention against her
will. The parent may feel that he has the
monopoly for taking correct decisions which
concern his daughter, but that impression of a
doting patriarchal parent cannot blindly be
accepted and swallowed by a Court. The parental
authority may extend to advice, counsel and
guidance. But certainly, it cannot extend to
confinement, detention or improper restraint
against the wishes and volition of the adult major
daughter. Right to take decisions affecting her will
certainly have to be conceded to her even
assuming that, decisions taken may at times or in
the long run prove to be not wise or prudent.
16. In this context, the learned counsel for the 6th
respondent places reliance on two decisions of the
earlier Division Benches of this Court in
Prasadhkumar v. Ravindran (1992 (1) KLT 729)
and Sreekesh v. Mohammed Asharaf (2003 (1) KLT
397).
17. We have been taken through the decisions in
detail. We are unable to agree that they lay down
a proposition that under no circumstances, when
there is an allegation that parental authority is
invoked to justify improper restraint or
confinement/detention powers under Art. 226
cannot be invoked. It depends on the facts of each
case. Merely because beneficent parental
authority is exercised over an adult child, this
Court will not invoke its jurisdiction under Art.226
of the Constitution. Sagacity and judicial wisdom
are required to identify the fit cases in which such
jurisdiction can, need or need not be invoked. The
observations in those decisions will have to be
understood carefully and cautiously. It would be
myopic and obscurantist to understand those
observations as sufficient to concede to the parent
a right to deny liberty and freedom to his adult
daughter and to move her out of the country
against her will keep her away from the Court
before which proceedings are initiated. We are
unable to so understand those observations. Home
and parental authority are not out of bounds for a
constitutional court while performing its duty to
translate the constitutional promise of freedom
and liberty and while responding to the prayer of a
citizen who has come to court complaining about
negation of such rights, in exercise of his
fundamental constitutional right to move the court
for enforcement of such right.
18. This Court comes across many such cases of
alleged detentions/ confinement/ compulsive
restraint placed on adult daughters by parents.
We have taken a consistent stand that the
decisional autonomy of such an adult daughter will
have to be respected. An adult woman cannot be
treated as chattel by this Court. Her rights as an
equal citizen will have to be respected and cannot
be denied. In cases where we feel that the
decision of such alleged detenue does not appear
to be voluntary and genuine, we resort to the
course of granting them time to reflect,
contemplate and ponder. We give them
opportunity to be accommodated in neutral
venues for some period to facilitate rational and
dispassionate evaluation - sometimes for long
periods. We give parents opportunity to counsel
their children during such period. But ultimately,
we do respect the decisional autonomy of such
adult children. We are convinced that, that is the
proper course to be followed in all cases. To do
otherwise would simply be denial of human rights
of an adult woman to take decisions affecting her
future. That would certainly be denial of the right
to life guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution
of India. The mere fact that the decision may turn
out to be incorrect, or bad does not justify the
denial of the right to take a decision. We do not
permit our concepts of what is right and good for
them to override their own assessment of what is
right and good for them. We do not permit the
concept of others (including parents) of what is
right and good for them to override their own
concepts. Concept of right and good may vary
with the times. This generation's concept of right
and wrong may not find acceptance with the next.
No generation or parent can claim infallibility and
enforce its/his concept of right and wrong on the
succeeding. Suffice it to say that we do not agree
with the learned counsel that Prasadhkumar and
Sreekesh (supra) concede to the parents any
unbridled rights to usurp the decisional autonomy
of their adult daughters and keep them in
"custody" against their desire in exercise of their
parental authority or duty. We do not agree that
the said decisions lay down that this Court cannot
exercise jurisdiction under Art.226 of the
Constitution of India in such a situation. We do not
agree that the mere fact that the petitioner's
marriage with the alleged detenu may not be
strictly legal is sufficient to deny relief. At least it
can be said that in the present era of social and
societal development in this State such
understanding of the dictum is impermissible. In
the peculiar facts of those cases and to cater to
the interests of justice in such situations, the
Courts had followed such courses while
considering invocation of the jurisdiction under
Art.226."
20. Having considered the Division Bench judgment in
Rajmohan's case (supra), we find ourselves unable to follow the
principles laid down therein. First of all, the facts of that case is
totally incomparable to the facts of this case. That apart, the
attention of the Division Bench was not drawn to the principles
laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Sadanandan's case
(supra). A judgment rendered in ignorance of a binding precedent
could be treated as per incuriam and is not a binding precedent.
Further, the Apex Court in Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of
U.P (AIR 1964 SC 1625) held thus;
"A writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a
man to obtain possession of a woman alleged
to be his wife does not issue as a matter of
course. Though a writ of right, it is not a writ of
course especially when a man seeks the
assistance of the Court to regain the custody of
a woman. Before a Court accedes to this
request it must satisfy itself at least prima
facie that the person claiming the writ is in fact
the husband and further whether valid
marriage between him and the woman could at
all have taken place."
It was ignoring the above principles that the Division Bench in
para 13 of the judgment held that the question in the petition is
not about the validity of the marriage and proceeded to grant
relief on the erroneous reasoning that in petitions for habeas
corpus, strict doctrine of the rule of locus standi can be ignored.
This approach, in our view, is unacceptable. Even apart from all
these, unlike this case, in Rajmohan's case (supra), since the
parent had removed the ward out of the jurisdiction of this Court,
in such a case, as held by the Full Bench in Sadanandan's case
(supra), interference with parental authority was justified.
21. We agree that like in any other sphere of life, there has
been changes in the social and moral values. Ours is a society
which has recognised freedom to every citizen. But then, these
changes that we proudly talk about, and the liberties that are
guaranteed to our citizens, cannot be stretched beyond limits nor
can such freedom be made weapons to destroy our fundamental
values or social establishments like families, which, undoubtedly,
concede authority on parents to advise and guide their children.
We cannot accept as a general principle that the parents are in all
circumstances, bound to concede absolute decisional autonomy
to their children, even if they have attained majority and remain
helpless even in situations where their wards have taken wrong
and immature decisions, which will be disastrous not only to the
wards themselves but also to the family itself. Such parental
authority, except in cases such as those pointed out by the
Chancery Division and approved in Sadanandan's case, should
be out of bounds for a writ court, because it is exercised for the
ultimate benefit of the ward. It may be to the dislike of the ward,
who may resist it and even turn hostile to the parents. But, such
immature reactions should not be allowed to influence our
judgment, since the ultimate aim and purpose of all these
exercise is the welfare of the ward. This Court therefore should,
except in extra ordinary situations, loathe interference in cases
where the natural parental authority is exercised to the dislike of
a lover or even the ward. For these reasons, we find ourselves
unable to follow the judgment in Rajmohan's case (supra) and
would follow the earlier judgments.
22. Having regard to the facts involved and the binding
legal principles discussed above, we hold that the facts of this
case do not disclose any illegal detention entitling the petitioner
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.
//True Copy//
PA TO JUDGE
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