appeal by special leave are whether the Family Court
while deciding an application under Section 7 of the
Family Court Act, 1984 (for brevity, “the Act”) which
includes determination of grant of maintenance to the
persons as entitled under that provision, should allow
adjournments in an extremely liberal manner remaining
oblivious of objects and reasons of the Act and also
keeping the windows of wisdom closed and the sense of
judicial responsiveness suspended to the manifest
perceptibility of vagrancy, destitution, impecuniosity,
struggle for survival and the emotional fracture, a wife
likely to face under these circumstances and further
exhibiting absolute insensitivity to her condition, who,
after loosing support of the husband who has failed to
husband the marital status denies the wife to have
maintenance for almost nine years as that much time is
consumed to decide the lis and, in addition, to restrict the
grant of maintenance to the date of order on some kind of
individual notion. Both the approaches, as we perceive,
not only defeat the command of the legislature but also
frustrate the hope of wife and children who are deprived
of adequate livelihood and whose aspirations perish like
mushroom and possibly the brief candle of sustenance
joins the marathon race of extinction. This delay in
adjudication by the Family Court is not only against
human rights but also against the basic embodiment of
dignity of an individual.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1331 OF 2014
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 1565 of 2013)
Bhuwan Mohan Singh … Appellant
Versus
Meena & Ors. …Respondent
Dated;July 15, 2014.
Dipak Misra, J.
Leave granted.
2. The two issues that pronouncedly emanate in this
appeal by special leave are whether the Family Court
while deciding an application under Section 7 of the
Family Court Act, 1984 (for brevity, “the Act”) which
includes determination of grant of maintenance to the
persons as entitled under that provision, should allow
adjournments in an extremely liberal manner remaining
oblivious of objects and reasons of the Act and also
keeping the windows of wisdom closed and the sense of
judicial responsiveness suspended to the manifest
perceptibility of vagrancy, destitution, impecuniosity,
struggle for survival and the emotional fracture, a wife
likely to face under these circumstances and further
exhibiting absolute insensitivity to her condition, who,
after loosing support of the husband who has failed to
husband the marital status denies the wife to have
maintenance for almost nine years as that much time is
consumed to decide the lis and, in addition, to restrict the
grant of maintenance to the date of order on some kind of
individual notion. Both the approaches, as we perceive,
not only defeat the command of the legislature but also
frustrate the hope of wife and children who are deprived
of adequate livelihood and whose aspirations perish like
mushroom and possibly the brief candle of sustenance
joins the marathon race of extinction. This delay in
adjudication by the Family Court is not only against
human rights but also against the basic embodiment of
dignity of an individual.
3. Be it ingeminated that Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”) was conceived
to ameliorate the agony, anguish, financial suffering of a
woman who left her matrimonial home for the reasons
provided in the provision so that some suitable
arrangements can be made by the Court and she can
sustain herself and also her children if they are with her.
The concept of sustenance does not necessarily mean to
lead the life of an animal, feel like an unperson to be
thrown away from grace and roam for her basic
maintenance somewhere else. She is entitled in law to
lead a life in the similar manner as she would have lived in
the house of her husband. That is where the status and
strata come into play, and that is where the obligations of
the husband, in case of a wife, become a prominent one.
In a proceeding of this nature, the husband cannot take
subterfuges to deprive her of the benefit of living with
dignity. Regard being had to the solemn pledge at the
time of marriage and also in consonance with the
statutory law that governs the field, it is the obligation of
the husband to see that the wife does not become a
destitute, a beggar. A situation is not to be maladroitly
created whereunder she is compelled to resign to her fate
and think of life “dust unto dust”. It is totally
impermissible. In fact, it is the sacrosanct duty to render
the financial support even if the husband is required to
earn money with physical labour, if he is able bodied.
There is no escape route unless there is an order from the
Court that the wife is not entitled to get maintenance from
the husband on any legally permissible grounds.
4. Presently to the facts which lie in an extremely
small compass. The marriage between the appellant and
the husband was solemnized on 27.11.1997 as per Hindu
rites and ritual, and in the wedlock a son was born on
16.12.1998. The respondent, under certain
circumstances, had to leave the marital home and
thereafter filed an application on 28.8.2002 under Section
125 of the Code in the Family Court, Jaipur, Rajasthan,
claiming Rs.6000/- per month towards maintenance. The
Family Court finally decided the matter on 24.8.2011
awarding monthly maintenance of Rs.2500/- to the
respondent-wife and Rs.1500/- to the second respondentson.
Be it stated, during the continuance of the Family
Court proceedings, number of adjournments were granted,
some taken by the husband and some by the wife. The
learned Family Judge being dissatisfied with the material
brought on record came to hold that the respondent-wife
was entitled to maintenance and, accordingly, fixed the
quantum and directed that the maintenance to be paid
from the date of the order.
5. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order the
respondent-wife preferred S.B. Criminal Revision Petition
No. 1526 of 2011 before the High Court of Judicature at
Rajasthan and the learned single Judge, vide order dated
28.5.2012, noted the contention of the wife that the
maintenance should have been granted from the date of
application, and that she had received nothing during the
proceedings and suffered immensely and, eventually,
directed that the maintenance should be granted from the
date of filing of the application.
6. Criticizing the aforesaid order, it is submitted Mr.
Jay Kishor Singh learned counsel for the appellant that
when number of adjournments were sought by the wife,
grant of maintenance from the date of filing of the
application by the High Court is absolutely illegal and
unjustified. It is his submission that the wife cannot take
advantage of her own wrong.
7. Ms. Ruchi Kohli, learned counsel for the
respondents would submit that the Family Court adjourned
the matter sometimes on its own and the enormous delay
took place because of non-cooperation of the husband in
the proceedings and, therefore, the wife who was
compelled to sustain herself and her son with immense
difficulty should not be allowed to suffer. It is proponed by
her that the High Court by modifying the order and
directing that the maintenance should be granted from
the date of filing of the application has not committed any
legal infirmity and hence, the order is inexceptionable.
8. At the outset, we are obliged to reiterate the
principle of law how a proceeding under Section 125 of the
Code has to be dealt with by the court, and what is the
duty of a Family Court after establishment of such courts
by the Family Courts Act, 1984. In Smt. Dukhtar Jahan
v. Mohammed Farooq1, the Court opined that
proceedings under Section 125 of the Code, it must be
remembered, are of a summary nature and are intended
to enable destitute wives and children, the latter whether
they are legitimate or illegitimate, to get maintenance in a
speedy manner.
9. A three-Judge Bench in Vimla (K.) v.
Veeraswamy (K.)2, while discussing about the basic
purpose under Section 125 of the Code, opined that
Section 125 of the Code is meant to achieve a social
purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and
destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of
food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife.
10. A two-Judge Bench in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v.
State of Gujarat and another3, while adverting to the
dominant purpose behind Section 125 of the Code, ruled
that:
1 (1987) 1 SCC 624
2 (1991) 2 SCC 375
3 (1996) 4 SCC 479
“While dealing with the ambit and scope of the
provision contained in Section 125 of the Code,
it has to be borne in mind that the dominant
and primary object is to give social justice to
the woman, child and infirm parents etc. and to
prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling
those who can support those who are unable to
support themselves but have a moral claim for
support. The provisions in Section 125 provide a
speedy remedy to those women, children and
destitute parents who are in distress. The
provisions in Section 125 are intended to
achieve this special purpose. The dominant
purpose behind the benevolent provisions
contained in Section 125 clearly is that the wife,
child and parents should not be left in a helpless
state of distress, destitution and starvation.”
11. In Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai4, reiterating the legal
position the Court held: -
“Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice
and is specially enacted to protect women and
children and as noted by this Court in Captain
Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal5
falls within constitutional sweep of Article 15(3)
reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of
India. It is meant to achieve a social purpose.
The object is to prevent vagrancy and
destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the
supply of food, clothing and shelter to the
deserted wife. It gives effect to fundamental
rights and natural duties of a man to maintain
his wife, children and parents when they are
unable to maintain themselves. The aforesaid
position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai
Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat6.”
4 (2008) 2 SCC 316
5 (1978) 4 SCC 70
6 (2005) 3 SCC 636
12. Recently in Nagendrappa Natikar v.
Neelamma7, it has been stated that it is a piece of social
legislation which provides for a summary and speedy relief
by way of maintenance to a wife who is unable to maintain
herself and her children.
13. The Family Courts have been established for
adopting and facilitating the conciliation procedure and to
deal with family disputes in a speedy and expeditious
manner. A three-Judge Bench in K.A. Abdul Jaleel v.
T.A. Shahida8, while highlighting on the purpose of
bringing in the Family Courts Act by the legislature, opined
thus: -
“The Family Courts Act was enacted to provide
for the establishment of Family Courts with a
view to promote conciliation in, and secure
speedy settlement of, disputes relating to
marriage and family affairs and for matters
connected therewith.”
14. The purpose of highlighting this aspect is that in
the case at hand the proceeding before the Family Court
was conducted without being alive to the objects and
reasons of the Act and the spirit of the provisions under
7 2013 (3) SCALE 561
8 (2003) 4 SCC 166
Section 125 of the Code. It is unfortunate that the case
continued for nine years before the Family Court. It has
come to the notice of the Court that on certain occasions
the Family Courts have been granting adjournments in a
routine manner as a consequence of which both the
parties suffer or, on certain occasions, the wife becomes
the worst victim. When such a situation occurs, the
purpose of the law gets totally atrophied. The Family
Judge is expected to be sensitive to the issues, for he is
dealing with extremely delicate and sensitive issues
pertaining to the marriage and issues ancillary thereto.
When we say this, we do not mean that the Family Courts
should show undue haste or impatience, but there is a
distinction between impatience and to be wisely anxious
and conscious about dealing with a situation. A Family
Court Judge should remember that the procrastination is
the greatest assassin of the lis before it. It not only gives
rise to more family problems but also gradually builds
unthinkable and Everestine bitterness. It leads to the cold
refrigeration of the hidden feelings, if still left. The
delineation of the lis by the Family Judge must reveal the
awareness and balance. Dilatory tactics by any of the
parties has to be sternly dealt with, for the Family Court
Judge has to be alive to the fact that the lis before him
pertains to emotional fragmentation and delay can feed it
to grow. We hope and trust that the Family Court Judges
shall remain alert to this and decide the matters as
expeditiously as possible keeping in view the objects and
reasons of the Act and the scheme of various provisions
pertaining to grant of maintenance, divorce, custody of
child, property disputes, etc.
15. While dealing with the relevant date of grant of
maintenance, in Shail Kumari Devi and another v.
Krishan Bhagwal Pathak alias Kishun B. Pathak9, the
Court referred to the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Amendment) Act, 2001 (Act 50 of 2001) and came to hold
that even after the amendment of 2001, an order for
payment of maintenance can be paid by a court either
from the date of order or when express order is made to
pay maintenance from the date of application, then the
amount of maintenance may be paid from that date, i.e.,
9 (2008) 9 SCC 632
from the date of application. The Court referred to the
decision in Krishna Jain v. Dharam Raj Jain10 wherein it
has been stated that to hold that, normally maintenance
should be made payable from the date of the order and
not from the date of the application unless such order is
backed by reasons would amount to inserting something
more in the sub-section which the legislature never
intended. The High Court had observed that it was unable
to read in sub-section (2) laying down any rule to award
maintenance from the date of the order or that the grant
from the date of the application is an exception. The High
Court had also opined that whether maintenance is
granted from the date of the order or from the date of
application, the Court is required to record reasons as
required under sub-section (6) of Section 354 of the Code.
After referring to the decision in Krishna Jain (supra), the
Court adverted to the decision of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh in K. Sivaram v. K. Mangalamba11 wherein it
has been ruled that the maintenance would be awarded
from the date of the order and such maintenance could be
10 1992 Cri LJ 1028 (MP)
11 1990 Cri LJ 1880 (AP)
granted from the date of the application only by recording
special reasons. The view of the learned single Judge of
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh stating that it is a
normal rule that the Magistrate should grant maintenance
only from the date of the order and not from the date of
the application for maintenance was not accepted by this
Court. Eventually, the Court ruled thus: -
“43. We, therefore, hold that while deciding an
application under Section 125 of the Code, a
Magistrate is required to record reasons for
granting or refusing to grant maintenance to
wives, children or parents. Such maintenance
can be awarded from the date of the order, or, if
so ordered, from the date of the application for
maintenance, as the case may be. For awarding
maintenance from the date of the application,
express order is necessary. No special reasons,
however, are required to be recorded by the
court. In our judgment, no such requirement can
be read in sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the
Code in absence of express provision to that
effect.”
16. In the present case, as we find, there was
enormous delay in disposal of the proceeding under
Section 125 of the Code and most of the time the husband
had taken adjournments and some times the court dealt
with the matter showing total laxity. The wife sustained
herself as far as she could in that state for a period of nine
years. The circumstances, in our considered opinion,
required grant of maintenance from the date of
application and by so granting the High Court has not
committed any legal infirmity. Hence, we concur with the
order of the High Court. However, we direct, as prayed by
the learned counsel for the respondent, that he may be
allowed to pay the arrears along with the maintenance
awarded at present in a phased manner. Learned counsel
for the appellant did not object to such an arrangement
being made. In view of the aforesaid, we direct that while
paying the maintenance as fixed by the learned Family
Court Judge per month by 5th of each succeeding month,
the arrears shall be paid in a proportionate manner within
a period of three years from today.
17. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merits,
stands dismissed.
.............................J.
[Dipak Misra]
.............................J.
[V. Gopala Gowda]
New Delhi;
July 15, 2014.
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