Though, the Act empowers a Magistrate to entertain the complaint of an aggrieved person under Section 12 of the Act and makes it incumbent on the Magistrate to make enquiry of the same under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act are in the nature of civil reliefs only. It is only violation of order of the Magistrate which becomes an offence under Section 31 of the Act and which attracts penalty for breach of protection order by any of the respondents. Similarly Section 33 of the Act provides for penalty for discharging duty by Protection Officer. Except under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which occur in Chapter V, all the reliefs claimed under Chapter IV of the Act are not offences and enquiry of rights of the aggrieved person under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act cannot be termed as trial of a criminal case. Therefore, it is only in respect of allegations under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which are penal provisions, the Act has no retrospective operation. Even if it is held that reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act have no retrospective operation, the Magistrate can grant the reliefs in prospective manner and cannot grant the said reliefs with reference to a date anterior to the date of commencement of the Act. The 2nd respondent/aggrieved person is also not claiming reliefs in retrospective manner inasmuch as she is claiming all the reliefs prospectively, in the sense, subsequent to date of filing of the case in the lower Court and not with effect from any back date retrospectively. Further, this Court in Sikakollu Chandra Mohan v Sikakollu Saraswati Devi by order dated 06.07.2010 in Crl. R.C. No. 1093 of 2010 held that it cannot be said that provisions of the Act cannot be invoked in case separation between the parties was prior to the Act coming into force. Therefore, contention of the petitioners fails.
Gundu Chandrasekhar and Others Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by its Public Prosecutor and Another
Court : Andhra Pradesh
Judge : SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU
Decided On : Aug-13-2012
Case Number : Crl.P.No.5921 of 2012
(Petition under Section 482 of the Crl.P.C. praying that in the circumstances stated in the Petition/Affidavit/Memorandum of grounds filed therewith, the High Court will be pleased to quash the DVC.No.8 of 2011 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ramannapet, Nalgonda District.)
The petitioners 1 to 3 are husband and parents-in-law of the 2nd respondent/aggrieved person in D.V.C.No.8 of 2011 of the lower Court. The 2nd respondent filed D.V.C. claiming several reliefs including reliefs of protection order under Section 18, residence order under Section 19, monetary relief under Section 20 and compensation under Section 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short, the Act). The petitioners’ counsel contended that even as per allegations in the complaint, disputes for the aggrieved person with the petitioners were in the year 2002 and there was separation between the parties in the year 2003 and that since all the said incidents happened prior to passing of the Act in the year 2005 and coming into force of the Act in the year 2006, D.V.C. filed in the lower Court in the year 2011 is not maintainable under the Act. He placed reliance on U.U.Thimmannav U.U.Santhya (2009(1) ALT (Cri)-285)of this in this regard. This Court observed:“There is no dispute that the Act came into effect when the Central Government appoints 26.10.2006 as the date on which the Act was came into force. For acts of violence, certain penal provisions are incorporated. Therefore, it is a fundamental principle of law that any penal provision has no retrospective operation, only prospective. There is no allegation either in the report or in the statement or in the complaint of the 1st respondent with regard to the acts of domestic violence that took place on or after 26.10.2006. Therefore, continuation of proceedings against the petitioners is nothing but abuse of process of Court.”
2. None of the reliefs claimed in D.V.C. No.8 of 2011 by the 2nd respondent can be called crimes. Though, the Act empowers a Magistrate to entertain the complaint of an aggrieved person under Section 12 of the Act and makes it incumbent on the Magistrate to make enquiry of the same under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act are in the nature of civil reliefs only. It is only violation of order of the Magistrate which becomes an offence under Section 31 of the Act and which attracts penalty for breach of protection order by any of the respondents. Similarly Section 33 of the Act provides for penalty for discharging duty by Protection Officer. Except under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which occur in Chapter V, all the reliefs claimed under Chapter IV of the Act are not offences and enquiry of rights of the aggrieved person under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act cannot be termed as trial of a criminal case. Therefore, it is only in respect of allegations under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which are penal provisions, the Act has no retrospective operation. Even if it is held that reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act have no retrospective operation, the Magistrate can grant the reliefs in prospective manner and cannot grant the said reliefs with reference to a date anterior to the date of commencement of the Act. The 2nd respondent/aggrieved person is also not claiming reliefs in retrospective manner inasmuch as she is claiming all the reliefs prospectively, in the sense, subsequent to date of filing of the case in the lower Court and not with effect from any back date retrospectively. Further, this Court in SikakolluChandra Mohan v Sikakollu Saraswati Devi by order dated 06.07.2010 in Crl.R.C.No.1093 of 2010 held that it cannot be said that provisions of the Act cannot be invoked in case separation between the parties was prior to the Act coming into force. Therefore, contention of the petitioners fails.
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