In a case, where the petitioner alleged his dismissal from service during probation period as stigmatic and in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution, a bench of Deepak Gupta, CJ and S.C Das, J held, that an order for termination on account of unsuitability in service is a termination simpliciter and is not stigmatic or punitive in any manner.
In the present case, the petitioner contended that his termination order made was on account of misconduct as the authorities found him to be linked with coal mafias, hence stigmatic. Rejecting the contention, the Court held that the inquiry about his link with coal mafias as alleged was an inquiry to assess his work regarding his overall performance, character, conduct, ability, capacity and suitability and thereafter the termination order was passed. Hence it could not be termed as termination with stigma or punitive nature.
The principle of "tearing off the veil" and/or "lift the veil" may fairly be applied to see whether there was anything on record to show or to arrive at a conclusion that the termination order was passed on certain inquiry made behind the back of the petitioner which was really the foundation of the order and not simply the formation of motive for the passing of the order.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AT AGARTALA
Decided On: 11.06.2014
Appellants: Ravinder Pal
Vs.
Respondent: The Union of India
Vs.
Respondent: The Union of India
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Deepak Gupta and S.C. Das , JJ.
2. Heard learned counsel Ms. Y. Taneja Bhattacharjee for the appellant-writ petitioner (hereinafter mentioned as petitioner) and learned counsel Mr. A. Lodh for the respondents.
3. It is an admitted position that the petitioner was selected for the post of Assistant Commandant, CISF in a duly conducted selection process and he joined the post on 08.01.1996. He was placed on probation for a period of 2 years from the date of his joining and such probation period was extended twice firstly upto 07.01.1999 and thereafter upto 07.01.2000 and his service was terminated by impugned order dated 07.01.2000 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) which reads as follows:-
No. E-15014/4/98-Pers.II/4,Directorate GeneralCentral Industrial Security Force(Ministry of Home Affairs)Block No. 13, CGO Complex,Lodhi Road, New Delhi-03.ORDERIn pursuance of the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule-5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules-1965 and para-I (viii) of offer of appointment, the President, hereby terminates forthwith the services of Shri Ravinder Pal, Assistant Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force and directs that he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice at the same rates at which he was drawing immediately before the termination of his service, or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month.By order and in the name of the PresidentDEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL (PERS)Station: New DelhiDated: 7 Jan' 2000Shri Ravinder Pal,Assistant Commandant,CISF Unit, ONGC Tripura.
4. The above order of termination has been challenged on the ground that it was not a termination simpliciter but in all practical sense and meaning, it was an order of termination with stigma as a matter of punishment since the respondents taken into consideration certain allegation against the petitioner that he was with hands in gloves with coal mafias and he facilitated the theft of coal by the illegal coal mafias while posted at Sheetapur unit of CISF in the eastern coal fields and so the impugned order of termination cannot be termed simply as a termination simpliciter but the foundation of termination was the inquiry made against him in respect of his link with coal mafias behind his back and therefore, the impugned termination order cannot stand since no opportunity was afforded to him as required under Article 311 of the Constitution of India.
5. The issue that the allegation of the petitioner's connection with coal mafias as the foundation of the impugned order of termination was raised before the learned single Judge but the learned single Judge decided the issue against the petitioner and hence having felt aggrieved, inter alia, the present writ appeal is filed.
6. The details of the fact brought on record by the petitioner in the writ petition and reply affidavit and the facts brought on record by the respondents by filing counter affidavit have been substantially narrated by the learned single Judge in the impugned judgment dated 25.07.2008. Therefore, we find no justification at all to reiterate those facts except what is materially raised on behalf of the petitioner at the time of hearing of writ appeal.
7. Learned counsel Ms. Taneja Bhattacharjee submitted that the petitioner joined the post of Assistant Commandant of CISF with a brilliant academic career and was selected through civil service examination. He joined the post on 08.01.1996 and thereafter he was deputed to National Industrial Security Academy in Hyderabad for indoor and outdoor training and he successfully cleared first part of the training but could not clear the second half of the training in all subjects because of his having a fracture injury in his right leg for which he had to remain on leave. He was thereafter posted at Rajmahal camp of CISF where an incident occurred between the villagers and CISF personnel and on that issue a show cause notice dated 14.01.1998 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) was issued to him alleging that he was lackadaisical and irresponsible but he resisted the allegation submitting his show cause reply and further assuring his commitment of sense of responsibility in future. It is also submitted by learned counsel Ms. Bhattacharjee that respondent No. 4 was not satisfied with the explanation and it was found by the petitioner that respondent No. 4 was all along ill-disposed towards the petitioner and the said respondent expressed displeasure against the petitioner on several occasions and was trying to do all possible harm to the petitioner. While he was posted in the eastern coal field in West Bengal, he performed his duties effectively and therefrom he was posted in the ONGC Unit of Tripura where his service was appreciated. He went on casual leave for 3(three) days w.e.f. 22.07.1999 but could not join his duties till 14.12.1999 for his illness and for other allied reasons which he explained by submitting his representation on 17.12.1999. The respondents expressed displeasure by issuing a Memo dated 02.10.1999 (Annexure-11 to the writ petition) and directed the petitioner to improve his shortcomings. He gave his reply to that Memo dated 02.10.1999 on 01.12.1999 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition). Thereafter his service was terminated by issuing the impugned Order dated 07.01.2000. It is contended by learned counsel Ms. Taneja Bhattacharjee that the respondents by filing counter affidavit brought on record a fact that the petitioner while was posted in the eastern coal field, had mafia links and that he was found with hand in gloves with coal mafias is simply a imputation made against him and an inquiry was made by DIG, North-East Zone who was hostile to the petitioner and based on that inquiry report the petitioner was terminated from the job, which is the foundation of the impugned Order dated 07.01.2000. Since that inquiry was made behind the back of the petitioner and since the petitioner had no scope to defend himself in the said inquiry, Article 311 of the Constitution has been violated and therefore, the order is liable to be scrapped. She relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Mahaveer C. Singhvi, reported in MANU/SC/0546/2010 : (2010) 8 SCC 220 and the case of Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., reported in MANU/SC/0329/2000 : (2000) 5 SCC 152.
8. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondents, learned counsel Mr. Lodh has submitted that the probation period of the petitioner was extended twice and he was repeatedly warned for his unsatisfactory services by the authority but even thereafter he could not improve his performance. When his services was found not at all satisfactory, the termination order was issued on 07.01.2000 during the period of his probation under Rule 5(1) of Central Civil Cervices (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965 and in terms of the condition No. (viii) of the letter of appointment issued to the petitioner. It is contended by Mr. Lodh, learned counsel, that it has been brought on record in details that after appointment the petitioner was sent to Hyderabad in the National Industrial Security Academy for his training but he failed in paper VI and Paper X of the training course and also he did not attend outdoor test and Pistal firing etc. as well as the commando training. So at the first instance he could not complete his training to qualify himself for his retention and regularization in the post of Assistant Commandant. While was posted at Rajmahal camp the superior authority observed that he was in the habit of shirking his responsibilities and for his lackadaisical and irresponsible approach there was an incident occurred between CISF jawans and villagers for which a show cause notice against him was issued and ultimately he was cautioned. He was given repeated chance to clear his papers and outdoor training but he could not succeed and he failed again and again. He was malingering illness when he was detailed in Panchayat election of West Bengal in the year 1998. He feigned of sickness when he was detailed to undergo commando training course. He was found hand in gloves with illegal coal mafias while he was posted in eastern coal fields, West Bengal. He went on casual leave for 3(three) days and thereafter he remained unauthorized absent for 140 days and even he was defying the notices sent by the authority and ultimately on 6th call when the notice was served by a Sub-Officer, he joined on 15.12.1999. A screening committee headed by head of the department namely Director General of CISF assessed the suitability of the petitioner and the committee found him of unsatisfactory services and therefore, he was found not suitable for the post of Assistant Commandant of CISF and accordingly the termination order dated 07.01.2000 was passed which was purely a termination simpliciter and can no way be termed as a termination with stigma or punishment. It is submitted by Mr. Lodh that the discreet inquiry about his mafia link while posted in eastern coal field can in no way be termed as the foundation of the termination order since it was made only to assist his performance, character, conduct and suitability and the termination order was not simply passed on that inquiry. It was not inquired in the form of misconduct, no evidence was recorded, no inquiry officer was appointed and so it can no way be termed as a termination with stigma.
In support of his contention he has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Radhe Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. & Anr., reported in MANU/SC/0788/1998 : (1999) 2 SCC 21.
9. The impugned termination order dated 07.01.2000 do not reflect any allegation or imputation. The order has been issued in terms of Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, and in terms of condition No. (viii) of the order of appointment. Rule 5(1) reads as follows:-
5. Termination of temporary service-(1) (a) the services of a temporary government servant shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the government servant;(b) the period of such notice shall be one month;Provided that the services of any such government servant may be terminated forthwith by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services, or, as the case may be, for the period of which such notice falls short of one month...
10. Condition No. (viii) of the appointment letter (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) reads as follows:-
(viii) During the period of probation you will be required to undergo such training and take such Departmental tests as the Central Government may prescribe. Failure to complete the period of probation to the satisfaction of the competent authority or to pass the prescribed tests will render you liable to discharge from service or reversion to your substantive post on which you may be retaining a lien.
11. The impugned termination order shows that it was issued by order and in the name of the President signed by the Deputy Inspector General (pers.). As already stated earlier, the order was issued while the petitioner was on probation and so, the authority was competent enough to issue the order terminating the job of the petitioner without formally making any inquiry of any misconduct as otherwise required by law.
12. Probation is meant for watching the performance of an employee during a particular period in which the performance of the employee put on probation is observed and it is the prerogative of the employer. It is a settled law that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his service can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability in the post in question.
13. The Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission & Ors. Vs. Dr. Md. S. Iskender Ali, reported in MANU/SC/0435/1980 : (1980) 3 SCC 428 has highlighted on the issue of appointment to a temporary post on probation and the Court has held thus:-
A temporary employee is appointed on probation for a particular period only in order to test whether his conduct is good and satisfactory so that he may be retained. In the case of the probationer or a temporary employee, who has no right to the post, termination of his service, finding him unsuitable for the post is valid and does not attract Article 311. In the present case the order impugned is prima facie an order of termination simpliciter without involving any stigma on the respondent probationer who had no right to the service. Even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influenced the employer to terminate the services of the employee, a power which the appellants undoubtedly possessed, as under the terms of appointment such a power flowed from the contract of service it could not be termed as penalty or Punishment. The institution of the departmental enquiry, which was subsequently dropped, was, therefore, inconsequential. Nor the assessment roll went to show that the intention of the appointing authority was to proceed against the respondent by way of punishment. The remarks, in the assessment roll, merely indicate the nature of the performance put in by the officer for the limited purpose of determining whether or not his probation should be extended. These remarks were not intended to cast any stigma. The respondent could not make out a strong case for the Supreme Court to delve into the documents, materials in order to determine a case of victimization or one of punishment. If the appellant found that the respondent was not suitable for being retained in service that will not vitiate the order impugned. The order thus did not attract Article 311.
14. The impugned termination order of the petitioner ex facie seems to be a termination simpliciter since the order do not reflect any stigma or imputation against the petitioner. The order has been issued in terms of the provision and the condition of appointment as stated hereinabove and so it is to be presumed that the order has been issued on the ground of general unsuitability of the petitioner in the post.
15. The principle of "tearing off the veil" and/or "lift the veil" may fairly be applied to see whether there was anything on record to show or to arrive at a conclusion that the termination order was passed on certain inquiry made behind the back of the petitioner which was really the foundation of the order and not simply the formation of motive for the passing of the order.
16. In the case of Mahaveer C. Singhvi (supra) the three Judges Bench of the Apex Court has considered the issue of discharge during probation whether it is discharge simpliciter or punitive. In para 46 of the judgment, the Court has observed thus:-
46. As has also been held in some of the cases cited before us, if a finding against a probationer is arrived at behind his back on the basis of the enquiry conducted into the allegations made against him/her and if the same formed the foundation of the order of discharge, the same would be bad and liable to be set aside. On the other hand, if no enquiry was held or contemplated and the allegations were merely a motive for the passing of an order of discharge of a probationer without giving him a hearing, the same would be valid. However, the latter view is not attracted to the facts of this case.
In that reported case it was an admitted position that the discharge order of the probationer was issued on account of the respondents' misconduct which was inquired into before the order was passed and the order was issued based on the inquiry report whereas no opportunity of hearing to respondents was given though the report was punitive in nature and in the given fact of that case, the Supreme Court has held that the latter view was not attracted in the fact of that case.
17. In the case of Chandra Prakash Shahi (supra), the Supreme Court elaborately discussed termination whether a termination simpliciter or a punitive termination and the motive or foundation for such termination. In that reported case, the appellant's services was terminated 10 months after he had completed satisfactorily the normal probation period. Thereafter in a preliminary inquiry he was found involved in an incident of quarrel and based on that inquiry he was terminated from the services and in the given fact of that case, the Supreme Court has held that the termination order was punitive since it was founded on misconduct. In para 28 and 29 of the judgment, the Court has observed on the concept of 'motive' and 'foundation'. We may gainfully refer here para 28 and 29 of the judgment which read thus:-
28. The important principles which are deducible on the concept of "motive" and "foundation", concerning a probationer, are that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If for the determination of suitability of the probationer for the post in question or for his further retention in service or for confirmation, an inquiry is held and it is on the basis of that inquiry that a decision is taken to terminate his service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if there are allegations of misconduct and an inquiry is held to find out the truth of that misconduct and an order terminating the service is passed on the basis of that inquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the inquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability of the employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth of allegations of misconduct against that employee. In this situation, the order would be founded on misconduct and it will not be a mere matter of "motive".29. "Motive" is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, "motive" is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were found to be true in this preliminary inquiry.
18. In the facts of the present case, the termination order can in no way be said to have based on misconduct. The inquiry about link of the petitioner with coal mafias which was done by respondent No. 4 was simply to assess his conduct and performance in the discharge of his duties and it was at best may be said to form the motive for arriving at a conclusion regarding suitability of the petitioner and the termination order was not based on that inquiry made secretly. What is brought on record in the facts of the present case of the petitioner is that after his appointment he was sent for training but he could not complete his training and was certified to be "not qualified" by the National Industrial Security Academy. The petitioner taken plea that for his fracture injury he could not complete the second part of the training but it is brought on record that he was afforded chance subsequently also but he failed to qualify himself in the training course. It is, therefore, admitted position that during the period of his probation which was extended twice, till 07.01.2000 from 08.01.1996 (date of appointment) he could not qualify himself for his absorption/regularization in the post of Asstt. Commandant after going through the requisite training course. The next contention against him was that while was posted at Rajmahal camp there was an incident occurred between Jawans of CISF and the villagers and on an inquiry by the authority he was found to have lackadaisical and irresponsible and he was cautioned for his shortcomings in rendering of his services. While he was posted in eastern coal field in West Bengal, it was alleged that CISF raid party seized a truck load of illegal coal and reported to him but at that time he did not encourage the raid party rather threatened the raid party and a report was submitted in that connection which has been annexed as Annexure R/10 to the counter affidavit filed by the respondents wherein it has been further alleged that he was found to be hand in gloves with illegal coal mafias. Learned counsel of the appellant concentrated her argument only insisting on this point that taking into consideration that report, the petitioner has been terminated from the job. But in our considered opinion, it was not the foundation for arriving at a conclusion of general unsuitability of the petitioner rather there were bundle of other materials or facts based on which the decision of termination was taken which was simply a termination simpliciter and all the bundle of allegations simply communicated motive for arriving at a conclusion. Further admitted position what is brought on record is that he went on casual leave for 3(three) days from 22.07.1999 but after the leave was over he did not join and he remained on unauthorized leave till 14.12.1999 without giving any information to the authority and on 15.12.1999 he reported to his place of posting after several call up notices sent to him. The petitioner claimed that he has explained his absence by submitting a representation dated 17.12.1999 but the respondents-authority by writing Annexure-11 to the writ petition i.e. Memo dated 02.10.1999 expressed displeasure and asked him to improve his shortcomings. It is also brought on record that the petitioner did not participate in the commando training though he was asked to participate in the training and he did not perform duty in the Panchayat election of West Bengal and it was alleged that he was malingering illness on different occasions. All those bundle of facts simply makes it evident that the competent authority assessed the performance, character, conduct, suitability, ability and capacity of the petitioner and there is nothing to arrive at a conclusion that the allegation of his connection with coal mafias is the foundation of his termination.
19. In the case of Chaitanya Prakash & Anr. Vs. H. Omkarappa, reported in MANU/SC/0034/2010 : (2010) 2 SCC 623 the services of respondent were terminated by the appellant company. During the period of probation, his services were not found to be satisfactory and he was also given letters for improving of his services and his period of service was also extended and ultimately company terminated him. The Court after referring to a series of cases held that the impugned order of termination of respondent was not stigmatic.
20. In the case of State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Bhagwan Singh, reported in (2002) 9 SCC 636 the Apex Court has observed-"in our view when a probationer is discharged during the period of probation and if for the purpose of discharge, a particular assessment of his work is to be made, and the authorities referred to such an assessment of his work, while passing the order of discharge, that cannot be held to amount to stigma.
21. Referring to the cases of Chaitanya Prakash & Bhagwan Singh (supra), the Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Kohli Vs. High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Anr., reported in MANU/SC/0751/2010 : (2010) 12 SCC 783 has declared that if a person is removed from service on the ground of unsatisfactory performance, the same cannot be contended as being stigma against the discharged employee. In that reported case the Supreme Court was dealing with the challenge to an administrative order of Jammu & Kashmir High Court in discharging (and thus not confirming) the services of a probationer judge in the lower courts where the High Court had discharged the probationer noting unsatisfactory conduct. In Para 21, 22 and 23 of the judgment the Apex Court observed thus:-
21. In the present case, two orders are challenged, one, which was the order of the High Court based on the basis of the resolution of the Full Court and the other one issued by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir on the ground that they were stigmatic orders.22. In our considered opinion, none of the aforesaid two orders could be said to be a stigmatic order as no stigma is attached. Of course, the aforesaid letters were issued in view of the resolution of the Full Court meeting where the Full Court of the High Court held that the service of the petitioner is unsatisfactory. Whether or not the probation period could be or should be extended or his service should be confirmed is required to be considered by the Full Court of the High Court and while doing so necessarily the service records of the petitioner are required to be considered and if from the service records it is disclosed that the service of the petitioner is not satisfactory it is open for the respondents to record such satisfaction regarding his unsatisfactory service and even mentioning the same in the order would not amount to casting any aspersion on the petitioner nor could it be said that stating in the order that his service is unsatisfactory amounts to a stigmatic order.23. This position is no longer res integra and it is well stated that even if an order of termination refers to unsatisfactory service of the person concerned, the same cannot be said to be stigmatic. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences MANU/SC/0705/2001 : (2002) 1 SCC 520 this Court has explained at length the tests that would apply to determine if an order terminating the services of a probationer is stigmatic. On the facts of that case it was held that the opinion expressed in the termination order that the probationer's "work and conduct has not been found satisfactory" was not ex facie stigmatic and in such circumstances the question of having to comply with the principles of natural justice does not arise.
22. In the case of Radheshyam Gupta (supra), the Supreme Court has held that termination order cannot be termed as stigmatic or punitive where the motive behind the preliminary inquiry is not to determine the misconduct but merely to decide the question of retention in service, the termination order cannot be held punitive. The Court has held that if the purpose of inquiry is not to find out the truth of the allegation of misconduct but to decide whether to retain the employee against whom a cloud is raised on his conduct such inquiry only serves as a motive for the termination. But where the inquiry is held wherein on the basis of the evidence a definite finding is reached at the back of the employee about his misconduct and such finding forms the basis or foundation of the order of termination, such order would be punitive. We may gainfully refer here para 33 of the judgment which reads as follows:-
33. It will be noticed from the above decisions that the termination of the services of a temporary servant or one on probation, on the basis of adverse entries or on the basis of an assessment that his work is not satisfactory will not be punitive inasmuch as the above facts are merely the motive and not the foundation. The reason why they are the motive is that the assessment is not done with the object of finding out any misconduct on the part of the officer, as stated by Shah, J. (as he then was) in Ram Narayan Das case MANU/SC/0311/1960 : (AIR 1961 SC 177). It is done only with a view to decide whether he is to be retained or continued in service. The position is not different even if a preliminary enquiry is held because the purpose of a preliminary enquiry is to find out if there is prima facie evidence or material to initiate a regular departmental enquiry. It has been so decided in Champaklal case MANU/SC/0274/1963 : (AIR 1964 SC 1854). The purpose of the preliminary enquiry is not to find out misconduct on the part of the officer and if a termination follows without giving an opportunity, it will not be bad. Even in a case where a regular departmental enquiry is started, a charge-memo issued, reply obtained, and an enquiry officer is appointed--if at that point of time, the enquiry is dropped and a simple notice of termination is passed, the same will not be punitive because the enquiry officer has not recorded evidence nor given any findings on the charges. That is what is held in Sukh Raj Bahadur case MANU/SC/0182/1968 : (AIR 1968 SC 1089) and in Benjamin case(1967) 1 LLJ 718 (SC) . In the latter case, the departmental enquiry was stopped because the employer was not sure of establishing the guilt of the employee. In all these cases, the allegations against the employee merely raised a cloud on his conduct and as pointed by Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes case (MANU/SC/0369/1979 : 1980) 2 SCC 593 the employer was entitled to say that he would not continue an employee against whom allegations were made the truth of which the employer was not interested to ascertain. In fact, the employer by opting to pass a simple order of termination as permitted by the terms of appointment or as permitted by the rules was conferring a benefit on the employee by passing a simple order of termination so that the employee would not suffer from any stigma which would attach to the rest of his career if a dismissal or other punitive order was passed. The above are all examples where the allegations whose truth has not been found, and were merely the motive.
23. In the facts of the present case there was no departmental inquiry with a view to determine any misconduct on the part of the petitioner. The inquiry about his link with coal mafias as alleged was an inquiry to assess his work regarding his performance and character while discharging his duties and that may at best be a motive for the impugned order of termination and not the foundation of the same. Unless an inquiry is made to assess the work of a probationer employee, no opinion can be formed in respect of a probationer. The authority as it appears from the time of training till the date of his unauthorized absence taken into account the over all performance, character, conduct, ability, capacity and suitability of the petitioner and thereafter passed the impugned order of termination which is surely a termination simpliciter and not a termination with stigma or a termination punitive in nature.
24. In the case of Kazia Mohammed Muzzammil Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr., reported in MANU/SC/0470/2010 : (2010) 8 SCC 155, the Supreme Court has held that until and unless the appellant is able to show circumstances supported by cogent material on record that the termination order is stigmatic and intended to overreach process of law provided under the rules, there is no occasion for the Court to interfere on facts. The termination order passed in that reported case was almost similar to that of the present case at hand. Quoting the termination order, the Supreme Court in para 9 of the judgment observed thus:-
9. A bare reading of the above impugned notification shows that it is ex facie not stigmatic. It simply discharges the appellant from service as having been found unsuitable to hold the post of District Judge. Until and unless, the appellant is able to show circumstances supported by cogent material on record that this order is stigmatic and is intended to overreach the process of law provided under the Rules, there is no occasion for this Court to interfere on facts. As far as law is concerned, the question raised is with regard to the applicability of the concept of "deemed confirmation", to the present case under the service jurisprudence.
25. In similar another case between the Union of India & Ors. Vs. Sukhen Ch. Das, reported in MANU/SC/8530/2008 : (2008) 17 SCC 125, the Supreme Court observed that the language of order clearly and plainly shows that it is termination simpliciter, rightly based under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965 during the period when the respondent was a temporary employee of CRPF and it does not cast any stigma on the conduct of the respondent.
26. In the case at hand taking into account the material facts pleaded by the parties we are of considered opinion that the impugned order of termination is a termination simpliciter and is not stigmatic or punitive in any manner as alleged by the appellant-petitioner.
27. Learned counsel Ms. Taneja Bhattacharjee in course of her argument also has submitted that the respondent No. 4 was hostile to the causes of the petitioner and he has spoiled the service career of the petitioner with a malafide attitude. This issue has been meaningfully dealt by the learned single Judge in para 13 and 14 of the impugned judgment and we find nothing but to endorse the said findings of the learned single Judge on the issue.
28. In view of the discussions made above, we find no merit in the appeal and accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed.
29. Parties to bear their costs.
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