Whether Indian law is applicable when arbitrability is challenged?

The conclusion of the High Court that in the event, the award is sought to be enforced outside India, it would leave the Indian party remediless is without any basis as the parties have consensually provided that the arbitration agreement will be governed by the English law. Therefore, the remedy against the award will have to be sought in England, where the juridical seat is located. However, we accept the submission of the appellant that since substantive law governing the contract is Indian Law, even the Courts in England, in case the arbitrability is challenged, will have to decide the issue by applying Indian Law viz. the principle of public policy etc. as it prevails in Indian Law.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5765 OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 20041 of 2013)

Reliance Industries Limited & Anr.

...Appellant

VERSUS

Union of India

Dated;May 28, 2014.

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High

Court of Delhi at New Delhi rendered in OMP No.46 of 2013

dated 22nd March, 2013. By the aforesaid judgment, the

Delhi High Court has allowed the petition filed by the

respondent under Section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the

Arbitration Act, 1996’), challenging the Final Partial Award

dated 12th September, 2012. By the aforesaid Award, the

objection raised by the Union of India relating to the

2

arbitrability of the claims made by the petitioner in respect of

Royalties, Cess, Service Tax and CAG Audit have been

rejected.

3. Before we discuss the legal issues, it would be pertinent to

make a very brief note of the relevant facts.

4. The parties had entered into Two Production Sharing

Contracts dated 22nd December, 1994 (as amended by

Amendment Agreement No.1 and Amendment Agreement

No.2) (hereinafter referred to as “PSC” or “PSCs”) as and

when appropriate. These two PSCs provide for the

exploration and production of petroleum from the Mid and

South Tapti Fields (hereinafter referred to as “Tapti” or “Tapri

Field”) and for the exploration and production of petroleum

from Panna and Mukta Fields which shall be hereinafter

referred to either as “Panna Mukta” or “Panna Mukta fields”.

The two PSCs shall be referred to “Tapti PSC” and “Panna

Mukta PSC,” respectively.

5. One of the PSCs was entered into with Reliance Industries

3

Limited (RIL), the appellant, a body corporate established

under the laws of India. It is a major Indian multinational and

the largest private sector company in India, with interests in

activities including exploration and production of oil and gas,

petroleum refining and marketing petrochemicals, textiles,

retail and special economic zones. The other PSC was

entered into with BG Exploration and Production India

Limited (“BG”), a body corporate established under the laws

of the Cayman Islands. It is a company forming part of BG

Group, an international energy group headquartered in the

United Kingdom with business operations in numerous

countries. In 2002, BG Group acquired the share capital of

Enron Oil and Gas India Limited (EOGIL, a company

formerly part of the Enron group of companies). Upon its

acquisition on 15th February, 2003, the name of EOGIL was

changed to BG Exploration and Production India Limited.

6. ONGC is a state-owned oil and gas company in India in

which the Government of India holds a 74.14 % equity stake.

It produces various petroleum products including crude oil,

natural gas and LPG. These three companies are together

4

defined as the “Contractor” (in the PSCs Clause 1.23).

7. The two PSCs provide a detailed procedure for Alternative

Dispute Redressal Mechanisms. Articles 32 and 33 of the

PSCs are relevant for this purpose. These Articles provide

as under :

“Article 32 – Applicable Law and Language of

the Contract –

32.1 Subject to the provisions of Article 33.12, this

Contract shall be governed and interpreted in

accordance with the laws of India.

32.2 Nothing in this Contract shall entitle the

Government or the Contractor to exercise the rights,

privileges and powers conferred upon it by this

Contract in a manner which will contravene the laws

of India.

32.3 The English language shall be the language of

this Contract and shall be used in arbitral

proceedings. All communication, hearings or visual

materials or documents relating to this Contract

shall be in English.

Article 33 – Sole Expert, Conciliation and

Arbitration :

33.1 The Parties shall use their best efforts to settle

amicably all disputes, differences or claims arising

out of or in connection with any of the terms and

conditions of this Contract or concerning the

interpretation or performance thereof.

5

33.2 Except for matters which, by the terms of this

Contract, the Parties have agreed to refer to a sole

expert and any other matters which the Parties may

agree to so refer, any dispute, difference or claim

arising between the Parties hereunder which cannot

be settled amicably may be submitted by any Party

to arbitration pursuant to Article 33.3. Such sole

expert shall be an independent and impartial person

of international standing with relevant qualifications

and experience appointed by agreement between

the Parties. Any sole expert appointed shall be

acting as an expert and not as an arbitrator and the

decision of the sole expert on matters referred to

him shall be final and binding on the Parties and not

subject to arbitration. If the Parties are unable to

agree on a sole expert, the disputed subject matter

may be referred to arbitration.

33.3 Subject to the provisions herein, any

unresolved dispute, difference or claim which

cannot be settled amicably within a reasonable time

may, except for those referred to in Article 33.2, be

submitted to an arbitral tribunal for final decision as

hereinafter provided.

33.4 The arbitral tribunal shall consist of three

arbitrators. The Party or Parties instituting the

arbitration shall appoint one arbitrator and the Party

or Parties responding shall appoint another

arbitrator and both Parties shall so advise the other

Parties. The two arbitrators appointed by the Parties

shall appoint the third arbitrator.

33.5 Any Party may, after appointing an arbitrator,

request the other Party (ies) in writing to appoint the

second arbitrator. If such other Party fails to appoint

an arbitrator within forty-five (45) days of receipt of

the written request to do so, such arbitrator may, at

the request of the first Party, be appointed by the

Secretary General of the Permanent Court of

Arbitration at the Hague, within forty-five (45) days

6

of the date of receipt of such request, from amongst

persons who are not nationals of the country of any

of the Parties to the arbitration proceedings.

33.6 If the two arbitrators appointed by the Parties

fail to agree on the appointment of the third

arbitrator within thirty (30) days of the appointment

of the second arbitrator and if the Parties do not

otherwise agree, the Secretary General of the

Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague may, at

the request of either Party and in consultation with

both, appoint the third arbitrator who shall not be a

national of the country of any Party.

33.7 If any of the arbitrators fails or is unable to act,

his successor shall be appointed in the manner set

out in this Article as if he was the first appointment.

33.8 The decision of the arbitration tribunal and, in

the case of difference among the arbitrators, the

decision of the majority, shall be final and binding

upon the Parties.

33.9 Arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in

accordance with the arbitration rules of the United

Nations Commission on International Trade Law

(UNCITRAL) of 1985 except that in the event of any

conflict between these rules and the provisions of

this Article 33, the provisions of this Article 33 shall

govern.

33.10 The right to arbitrate disputes and claims

under this Contract shall survive the termination of

this Contract.

33.11 Prior to submitting a dispute to arbitration, a

Party may submit the matter for conciliation under

the UNCITRAL conciliation rules by mutual

agreement of the Parties. If the Parties fail to agree

on a conciliator (or conciliators) in accordance with

the rules, the matter may be submitted for

arbitration. No arbitration proceedings shall be

7

instituted while conciliation proceedings are pending

and such proceedings shall be concluded within

sixty (60) days.

33.12 The venue of conciliation or arbitration

proceedings pursuant to this Article, unless the

Parties otherwise agree, shall be London, England

and shall be conducted in the English Language.

The arbitration agreement contained in this Article

33 shall be governed by the laws of England.

Insofar as practicable, the Parties shall continue to

implement

the

terms

of

this

Contract

notwithstanding the initiation of arbitral proceedings

and any pending claim or dispute.

33.13 The fees and expenses of a sole expert or

conciliator appointed by the Parties shall be borne

equally by the Parties. Assessment of the costs of

arbitration including incidental expenses and liability

for the payment thereof shall be at the discretion of

the arbitrators.”

8. In accordance with Article 33.12, the arbitral proceedings

were to be held in London as the neutral venue. At the time

of entering into the PSCs, none of the parties were domiciled

in U.K. In fact, subsequently, the venue of the arbitral

proceedings was shifted to Paris and again re-shifted to

London. Consequently

on 24th February, 2004,

the parties to the PSCs entered into an agreement amending

the PSCs, whereby it was stated that :-

“4. Applicable Law and Arbitration :

8

Except the change of venue/seat of Arbitration

from London to Paris, the Articles 32 and 33 of the

Contract shall be deemed to be set out in full in

this Agreement mutatis mutandis and so that

references therein to the Contract shall be

references to this Agreement.”

9. It appears that certain disputes and differences have arisen

between the parties, under or in connection with the PSCs.

Consequently, the appellant issued a notice of arbitration

dated 16th December, 2010. The disputes, differences and

claims are common to both the Tapti PSC and Panna &

Mukta PSC. The appellant claims that all attempts to resolve

the

disputes

with

the

respondent

amicably

through

correspondences and meetings have failed. The disputes,

differences and claims arising out of or in connection with

the PSCs have been summarized in paragraph 6 of the

notice of arbitration.

10.Pursuant to the aforesaid notice, the arbitral tribunal was

duly constituted on 29th July, 2011. Under Article 33.12, the

venue of arbitration is in London. The parties confirmed the

term of appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal on 29th July,

2011, signed by the Chairman on 15th August, 2011. A

9

substantive hearing was held between 21st May, 2012 to 29th

May, 2012 in Singapore. Thereafter, on the basis of the

amendment made in the PSC as noticed above, by

agreement of the parties, the arbitral tribunal made the “Final

Partial Consent Award” on 14th September, 2011. In the

aforesaid award, it is recorded as under :

“3. Final Partial Award as to Seat

3.1 Upon the agreement of the Parties, each

represented by duly authorized representatives and

through counsel, the Tribunal hereby finds, orders

and awards:

a) That without prejudice to the right of the Parties

to subsequently agree otherwise in writing, the

juridical seat (or legal place) of arbitration for the

purposes of the arbitration initiated under the

Claimants’ Notice of Arbitration dated 16th

December, 2010 shall be London, England.

b) That any hearings in this arbitration may take

place in Paris, France, Singapore or any other

location the Tribunal considers may be convenient.

c) That, save as set out above, the terms and

conditions of the arbitration agreements in Article 33

of the PSCs shall remain in full force and effect and

be applicable in this arbitration.”

11. This Consent Award was duly signed by

Mr.

Christopher Lau SC (Chairman), Mr. Peter Leaver QC (Co-

arbitrator)

and

Mr.

Justice

B.P.

Jeevan

Reddy

10

(Co-arbitrator).

12.Pursuant to Clause 28 of the terms of appointment, the

Chairman

of

the

Tribunal

is

empowered

to

make

interlocutory orders and consult other members of the

tribunal if he considers appropriate or one of the parties

requests that a decision be given by the whole tribunal.

Various directions/ orders/ clarifications were made by the

Chairman, with the concurrence of the other members of the

tribunal.

Pursuant

to

the

above

directions/orders/clarifications, the claimants / Appellants

served upon the tribunal its statement of claim and

amendment to the statement of claim

dated 5th

August, 2011 and claimants’ revised amendment to the

statement of claim

dated 19th January, 2012.

Similarly, the Respondent served upon the Tribunal its

statement of defence dated 31st January, 2012 and

additional statement on behalf of Respondent dated 10th

April, 2012 pursuant to procedural order dated 13th March,

2012. The aforesaid procedural order dated 13th March, 2012

as amended by directions dated 15th May, 2012 set out the

11

list of issues (the May 2012 issues) to be heard and be

determined by the tribunal at the hearing fixed to commence

on 21st May, 2012 and to conclude on 29th May, 2012 (“the

May 2012 hearing”). The parties served upon each other

witness statement of their witnesses. The documents relied

upon by both the parties were also placed on record.

13.

The Partial Final Award dated 12th September, 2012

records the claimant’s claims for relief as set out in Section E

of the Statement of the Scheme.

Paragraph 30.3 of the

Statement of Claim reads as follows:-

“(1) a declaration that, for the purposes of Article

15.6.1, the value of Gas at the wellhead should be

calculated by deducting from the sales price at the

Delivery Point an amount reflecting all of the costs

which are incurred between the wellhead and the

Delivery point regardless of whether such costs are

classified as capital expenditure or operating

expenditure and regardless of whether such costs

are recoverable out of Cost Petroleum under Article

13 of the PSCs.

(2) a declaration that, with effect from the date of

any partial or final award to the termination of the

PSCs, and pursuant to Article 15.6.1 of the PSCs,

12

the Government is required to reimburse any

excess royalties paid as a result of the exclusion of

post-wellhead capital expenditure from wellhead

value calculations made pursuant to the Gazette

Notification or pay damages in the same amount for

failure to procure an exemption in respect of such

excess royalties.

(3) a declaration that the Government is liable to

reimburse the Claimants pursuant to Article 15.6.1

of the PSCs in respect of any additional royalties

imposed and paid by the Claimants since August

2007 as a result of the exclusion of post-wellhead

capital expenditure from wellhead value calculations

made pursuant to the Gazette Notification.

(4) on award in favour of the Claimants requiring the

Government to reimburse the Claimants pursuant to

Article 15.6.1 in the sum of US $ 11,413,172 in

respect of the additional royalties imposed and paid

under protest between August 2007 and March

2011 or pay damages in the same amount for

failure to procure on exemption in respect of such

additional royalties.”

14.In the alternative, the appellants claimed the reimbursement

pursuant to Article 15.7 and 15.8 of the relevant PSCs (as

13

the case may be), the relief prayed for was as under :

“a) directing the parties to consult in order to make

the necessary revisions and adjustments to the

PSCs so as to maintain the expected benefit to the

Claimants as from August 2007 by requiring the

respondent to reimburse any excess royalties

payable following the issuance of the Gazette

Notification;

b) consequential declaratory relief; and

c) an award in damages in the same amount as are

claimed in paragraph 30.3(4) of the Statement of

Claim.”

15.The third set of relief claimed by the appellant is set out in

paragraph 30.3 of the Statement of Claim and is as follows :

“(1) a declaration that payment of royalties under

the PSCs should be made by 15 February in

respect of the period 1 July to 31 December and by

15 august in respect of the period 1 January to 30

June.

(2) a declaration that, provided royalties are paid

within the timeframes specified in (1) no interest is

payable under the terms of the PSCs and any

14

interest otherwise imposed is to be reimbursed by

the Government.

(3) a declaration that, in the event royalties are paid

after the timeframes specified in (1), any interest in

excess of LIBOR plus one percentage point is to be

reimbursed by the Government.

(4) a declaration that the Government is liable to

reimburse the claimants pursuant to Article 15.6.1 of

the PSCs in respect of any additional royalties or

interest imposed which does not accord with the

principles outlined at (1) to (3) above.

(5) an award in favour of the claimants requiring the

Government to reimburse the Claimants pursuant to

Article 15.6.1 in the sum of Rs.7,26,00,532 in

respect of the additional royalties imposed in

relation to royalty payments made between 1995 to

2002.”

16.As noticed earlier, the aforesaid reliefs were claimed by the

appellant under Article 15.6.1, which is as under:-

“15.6.1 – The constituents of the (claimants) shall

be liable to pay royalties and cess on their

participating interest share of Crude Oil and Natural

Gas saved and said in accordance with the

15

provisions of this Agreement.

The royalty on oil

saved and sold will be paid at RS. 481 per metric

ton and cessan oil saved and said will be paid at

Rs.900 per metric ton. Royalty on Gas saved and

said will be paid at ten per cent (10%) of the value

at wellhead. No cess shall be payable in response

of Gas. Royalty and cess shall not exceed the

herein above amounts throughout the term of the

contract. Royalty and cess shall be payable in

Indian Rupees. Any such additional payment shall

be made by the (respondent)”

17.Further the relief is claimed under Article 15.8 of the Tapti

PSC which is in identical terms of Article 15.7 in the Panna

Mukta PSC, which is as under :

“15.8 – If any change in or to any Indian law, rule or

regulation by any authority results in a material

change to the economic benefits accruing to any of

the parties to this contract after the effective date,

the

parties

shall

consult

promptly

to

make

necessary revisions and adjustments to the contract

in order to maintain such expected benefits to each

of the parties.”

18.The four preliminary objections raised by the Union of India

before the Arbitral Tribunal are as follows :-

16

(1)

The Claimants’ claims in regard to royalties

(paragraph 14.1 of the Statement of Defence) are

not arbitrable;

(2)

The Claimants’ claims in respect of cess (paragraph

14.2 of the Statement of Defence) are not arbitrable;

(3)

The Claimants’ claims in respect of service tax

(paragraph 14.3 of the State of Defence) are not

arbitrable; and

(4)

The Claimants’ claims in respect of the Comptroller

and Auditor General’s (“CAG”) audit (paragraph

20.10 of the Statement of Defence) are not

arbitrable.

19.The aforesaid preliminary objections are raised for, for inter

alia, the following reasons :-

“(a) the Claimants’ claim entail a challenge to the

validity

of

the

Oilfields

(Regulation

and

Development) Act, 1948 (“the ORD Act”) and of the

powers exercised under it;

(b) the claimants cannot contract out of such

legislation and any agreement to that effect would

be void and unenforceable by virtue of Section 23 of

the Indian Contract Act, 1872;

17

(c) the Claimants cannot avoid the effect of the

legislation by relying on the doctrine of estoppel;

(d) any dispute in respect of royalties should be

referred to arbitration under Rule 33 of Petroleum

and Natural Gas Rules 1959 (“the PNG Rules”);

(e) there will likely be a defence to enforcement of

any award in India under Article V(2)(b) of the New

York Convention as a matter of the public policy of

India;

(f) since any award has to be enforced in India, this

Tribunal ought not to enter into or adjudicate

questions/issues relating to royalties in view of Rule

33 of the PNG Rules and the decisions of the Indian

Supreme Court in Nataraj Studios vs. Navarang

Studios (1981) 1 SCC 523,Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd.

vs. State of Punjab (1992) 2 SCC 411 and Mafatlal

Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536;

and

(g) were the Tribunal to do so in reliance on Tamil

Nadu Electricity Board v. ST-CMS Electric Co Pvt.

Ltd. (2007) 2 All ER (Comm) 701, it would be

contrary to the law as laid down by the English

Court of Appeal in Ralli Bros v. CIA Navleria (1920)

18

2 KB 287.”

20.The respondents also contended that the Arbitral Tribunal

cannot, or ought not, to go into or adjudicate the questions

raised by the appellants (claimants) with respect to royalties;

and leave the parties, if they choose, to seek the necessary

relief before the specific forums created under the Oilfields

(Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 and the Petroleum

and Natural Gas Rules, 1956.

21.The appellants (the claimants) on the other hand submitted

that the issue of arbitrability is governed by the law of the

seat of arbitration. The seat of the arbitration being England,

the issue of arbitrability is governed by the English Law. It

was also submitted that although challenge to the validity of

the terms of PSC is governed by Indian Law (Article 32.1 of

the PSC), nevertheless it falls within the jurisdiction of the

tribunal just as any other substantive dispute. The appellants

relied upon the judgment in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board

Vs. ST-CMS Electric Co. Pvt. Ltd.1 It was also submitted

1

(2007) 2 All ER (Comm) 701

19

that the reliefs claimed are founded, only, on contractual

rights. Further, whether or not any of those contractual rights

are vitiated by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is

a question of substance and accordingly a dispute as to the

underlying merits of the claim. The case of the appellants

(claimants) assumes that respondent is entitled to rely on the

relevant legislation but the claims of the appellants are

purely contractual in nature.

22.Upon consideration of the entire matter, the arbitral tribunal

in the final award concluded as under :

Summary of Conclusions – Formal Final Partial

Award –

“6.1 The Tribunal, having carefully considered the

documentary evidence, the oral evidence and the

submissions of the Claimants and the respondent,

and rejecting all submissions to the contrary,

hereby makes, issues and publishes this Formal

Final Partial Award and for the reasons set out

above

FINDS,

AWARDS,

ORDERS

AND

DECLARES that the Claimants’ claims in respect

of royalties, cess, service tax and CAG audit are

arbitrabe.

6.2. In stating its conclusion on the four arbitrability

20

issues identified in Section A of the List of issues

for the May 2012 Hearing, the Tribunal wishes to

make it clear that it is expressing no opinion on the

merits of the parties’ respective submissions which

were made during the May 2012 Hearing. Subject

to further order in the meantime, the merits of

those issues will be decided in the March, 2013

Hearing.”

23.Union of India challenged the aforesaid award before the

High Court of Delhi in OMP No.46 of 2013. The respondents

invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 34 of

the Arbitration Act for various reasons namely, (i) the terms

of the PSCs entered would manifest an unmistakable

intention of the parties to be governed by the laws of India

and more particularly the Arbitration Act 1996; (ii) the

contracts were signed and executed in India; (iii) the subject

matter of the contracts, namely, the Panna Mukta and the

Tapti Fields are situated within India; (iv) the obligations

under the contracts have been for the past more than 15

years performed within India; (v) the contracts stipulate that

they “shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with

the laws of India”; (vi) they also provided that “nothing in this

21

contract” shall entitle either of the parties to exercise the

rights, privileges and powers conferred upon them by the

contract “in a manner which will contravene the laws of

India” (Article 32.2); and (vii) the contracts further stipulate

that “the companies and the operations under this Contract

shall be subject to all fiscal legislation of India” (Article 15.1).

24.The

appellant

raised

preliminary

objection

to

the

maintainability of the arbitration petition primarily on the

ground that by choosing English Law to govern their

agreement to arbitration and expressly agreeing to London

seated arbitration, the parties have excluded the application

of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996. It was submitted that

the High Court of Delhi had no jurisdiction to entertain the

objection filed by the Union of India under Section 34 of the

Arbitration Act, 1996. It was emphasized that Courts of

England and Wales have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain

any challenge to the award. It was pointed out that the PSCs

were amended on two occasions. On 24th February, 2004,

PSC was sought to be amended to change the seat of

arbitration from London to Paris. However, on 14th

22

September, 2011, the parties to the arbitration agreed that

the seat of the present arbitration proceedings would be

London, England. This agreement is recorded in the Final

Partial

Consent Award rendered by the arbitral tribunal

on 29th July, 2011. As noticed earlier, the final partial consent

award provided that the juridical seat or legal place of

arbitration for the purpose of arbitration initiated under the

claimants notice of arbitration

dated 16 th

December, 2011 shall be London, England. Article 33.9 of

the PSC provides that the arbitration shall be conducted in

accordance with the UNCITRAL Rules, 1985. However,

subsequently it was recorded in the award that the

applicable rules shall be the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,

1976. It was also submitted on behalf of the appellants that

the objections raised by the UOI are yet to be determined by

the tribunal on merits and shall be considered after

considering the evidence at the time of rendering the final

award.

25.Upon consideration of the entire matter, the High Court has

held that undoubtedly the governing law of the contract i.e.

23

proper law of the contract is the law of India. Therefore, the

parties never intended to all together exclude the laws of

India, so far as contractual rights are concerned. The Laws

of England are limited in their applicability in relation to

arbitration agreement contained in Article 33. This would

mean that the English Law would be applicable only with

regard to the curial law matters i.e. conduct of the arbitral

proceedings. For all other matters, proper law of the contract

would be applicable. Relying on Article 15(1), it has been

held that the fiscal laws of India cannot be derogated from.

Therefore, the exclusion of Indian public policy was not

envisaged by the parties at the time when they entered into

the contract. The High Court further held that to hold that the

agreement contained in Article 33 would envisage the

matters other than procedure of arbitration proceedings

would be to re-write the contract. The High Court also held

that the question of arbitrability of the claim or dispute cannot

be examined solely on the touchstone of the applicability of

the law relating to arbitration of any country but applying the

public policy under the laws of the country to which the

parties have subjected the contract to be governed.

24

Therefore, according to the High Court, the question of

arbitrability of the dispute is not a pure question of applicable

law of arbitration or lex arbitri but a larger one governing the

public policy. The High Court then concluded that public

policy of India cannot be adjudged under the laws of

England. Article 32.1 specifically provides that laws of India

will govern the obligations of the parties in the PSCs. The

High Court also concluded that the effect of the interplay of

Article 32.1 and Article 32.2 and 33.12 leads to the

conclusion that law of England shall operate in relation to

matters contained in Article 33 in so far as they are not

inconsistent with the law of India. Since the question of

arbitrability of the claim is a larger question effecting public

policy of State it should be determined by applying laws of

India. This would give a meaningful effect to Article 32.2,

otherwise it would be rendered otiose. On the basis of the

aforesaid plain reading, according to the High Court, the

conclusion is that the intention of the parties under the

agreement was always to remain subject to Indian laws and

not to contravene them. It is further held that Article 33 was

confined to conducting the arbitration in accordance with the

25

laws of England and not for all other purposes. Relying on

the judgment of this Court in Bhatia International Vs. Bulk

Trading S.A. & Anr.2, it has been held that Part I of the

Arbitration Act, 1996 would be applicable as there is no clear

express or implied intention of the parties to exclude the

applicability of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The High Court also

relies on the judgment of this Court in Venture Global

Engineering Vs. Satyam Computer Services Ltd.3, in

support of the conclusion that the Delhi High Court has

jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the petition under

Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. Since, according to

High Court, the dispute raised by the appellant relate to

public policy of India, the petition under Section 34 of the

Arbitration Act is maintainable. The High Court also gives

additional reasons for concluding that the petition to

challenge final partial award is maintainable. According to

the High Court, the disputes involved rights in rem.

Therefore, due regard has to be given to Indian laws. An

award which is said to be against public policy can be

permitted to be challenged in India even though the seat of

2

3

(2002) 4 SCC 105

(2008) 4 SCC 190

26

arbitration is outside India. The High Court also took support

from the doctrine of public trust with regard to natural

resources. Since the appellants are seeking refund of

amount of cess, royalties, service tax, all matters of public

money in India, the jurisdiction of the Indian courts cannot be

excluded. The High Court concludes that there is no reason

why the public money be allowed to invested for seeking

adjudication of the claims which may be eventually found to

be impermissible to be enforced. Finally, the High Court

declined to consider the law laid down by the Constitution

Bench of this Court in Bharat Aluminium on the basis that

the operation of the judgment has been made prospective by

the court. The final conclusion has been given in paragraph

59 which is as under :

“59. No submission on the part of the respondents

remains unaddressed. I have already observed that

upon testing the instant case on the principles of

law laid down in the case of Bhatia International

(supra) as well as Venture Global (supra), no infer-

ence as to express or implied exclusion of the Part I

of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be

drawn. Resultantly, the objection raised by the re-

spondents relating to lack of jurisdiction of Indian

court on the count of express choice of laws provi-

sions cannot be sustained as Indian laws including

provisions of Part I of the Act are not expressly nor

impliedly excluded. The said objection is therefore

27

rejected.”

26.It is this judgment of the High Court which is subject matter

of this appeal.

27.We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

28.Learned senior counsel for both the parties have made very

elaborate oral submissions. These submissions have been

summed up and supplemented by the written submissions.

Dr. Singhvi appearing for the appellants submitted that once

the English Law is selected as the proper law of arbitration,

the applicability of Arbitration Act, 1996 would be ruled out.

He submits that the High Court has wrongly intermingled the

issues relating to the challenge to the arbitral proceedings or

the arbitration award with the merits of the disputes relating

to the underlying contract. According to him, even if the law

laid down in Bhatia International (supra) is applicable, the

arbitral tribunal would apply the provisions contained in the

Indian Contract Act.

But the English Courts will have

jurisdiction over the control and supervision of the arbitration

28

including, challenge to the arbitral award. In support of his

submission, Dr. Singhvi relies on Videocon Industries

Limited Vs. Union of India & Anr.4 He has also relied on

Yograj

Infrastructure

Limited

Vs.

Ssang

Yong

Engineering and Construction Company Limited5, M/s

Dozco India P. Ltd. Vs. M/s Doosan Infracore Co. Ltd.6,

Bharat Aluminium Company Vs. Kaiser Aluminium

Technical Services Inc.7

29.Dr. Singhvi submitted that the reliance placed by the High

Court

on

Venture

Global

Engineering

(supra)

is

misplaced. In that case, the Court was not concerned with a

clause such as Article 32.1 of the PSC, which has to be

interpreted subject to the provisions contained in Article

33.12. According to Dr. Singhvi, the ratio of Venture Global

Engineering (supra) has lost its efficacy as it has been

overruled by the Constitution Bench in Bharat Aluminium

Company (supra).

Dr. Singhvi then submitted that the

concern shown by the High Court for Indian public policy

4

(2011) 6 SCC 161

(2011) 9 SCC 735

6

(2009) 3 ALR 162

7

(2012) 9 SCC 552

5

29

was wholly misplaced and erroneous. The High Court has

failed to appreciate that Article 32.1 and 32.2 deal only with

the proper law of the contract and not with the proper law of

the arbitration agreement. The High Court has erroneously

distinguished the ratio of law laid down in Videocon

Industries Limited (supra) on the ground that although the

arbitration clause therein was the same but the question of

public policy had not been addressed by the Court. Relying

on State of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Justice R.A. Mehta

(Retired) & Ors.8, Dr. Singhvi submitted that even if the

issue of public policy was not particularly raised or

addressed, the judgment in Videocon Industries Limited

(supra) still be a binding precedent. According to him, whilst

concluding that the parties did not intend to exclude the

applicability of the Arbitration Act, 1996 to the arbitration

agreement, the High Court has erroneously held that it was

necessary for the parties to exclude not only the provisions

of the Arbitration Act but also specifically plead that public

policy is also excluded.

counsel,

8

(2013) 3 SCC 1

Article

15.6.1

According to the learned senior

has

no

relevance

for

the

30

determination of the question as to whether the Arbitration

Act, 1996 will apply to the arbitration, which is being held in

London.

30.Mr. A.K. Ganguly, learned senior counsel appearing for

Union of India submits that the decision in this case has

been correctly rendered by the High Court based on the law

laid down by this Court in Bhatia International and Venture

Global Engineering (supra) as the arbitration agreement is

pre BALCO. He submits that in order to determine whether

Arbitration Act, 1996 is excluded, the contract had to be

seen as a whole. Here, the contract is in India, for the work

to be done in India over 25 years; secondly, it deals with

natural resources, Union of India is a trustee of these

resources for the citizens of India. London was designated

as the seat of arbitration only to provide certain measure of

comfort level to the foreign parties. The contract can not be

read in such a way as to exclude the Arbitration Act, 1996.

The High Court has correctly concluded that arbitrability had

to be decided by taking into consideration Indian Laws,

which would include the Indian Arbitration Act and not under

31

the English Arbitration Act, 1996. He emphasized that the

present proceedings relate to the interpretation of the

contract, which is of national importance to develop the oil

rich areas in the Indian Coasts. He points out that under the

PSC, the contractor has agreed to be always mindful of the

rights and interests of India in the conduct of petroleum

operations [Article 7.3(a)]. Mr. Ganguly also relied on Article

32.1 and 32.2 and submitted that Contract is to be governed

and interpreted in accordance with laws of India. He points

out that there is a negative covenant in Article 32.2, wherein

Government or the contractor are not entitled to exercise the

rights, privileges, and powers conferred under the PSC in a

manner which will contravene laws of India. Mr. Ganguly

further pointed out that the High Court has correctly applied

the law laid down by this court in Bhatia International and

Venture Global Engineering (supra). He also objected to

the additional documents, which are sought to be relied upon

by the petitioners in I.A. No. 7 of 2014. He submitted that

none of these documents were on the record before the High

Court and can not be permitted to be relied on for the first

time in this Court. He, therefore, submitted that I.A. No. 2

32

ought to be dismissed. He submitted that similar request

was made before the High Court, which was rejected.

31.Mr. Ganguly emphasized that the issues raised by the Union

of India are of public law and not purely contractual as

sought to be projected by the appellants. He points out that

the appellants have sought a number of reliefs with respect

to CAG Audit. It is a challenge to the conclusions recorded

by the CAG Audit and such a challenge would not be

arbitrable.

It is further submitted by him that the issues

raised with regard to royalty is also not arbitrable as it is not

a commercial issue. He has distinguished the judgment of

this Court in Videocon Industries Limited (supra) on the

basis that the issue with regard to the public law was not

considered by the Court in that judgment.

32.As noticed earlier, both the learned senior counsel have also

submitted written submissions. Primarily, the submissions

made in the Court have been reiterated and, therefore,

reference will be made to the same as and when necessary.

33

33.We have considered the submissions made by the learned

counsel for the parties.

34.Before we analyze the submissions made by the learned

senior counsel for both the parties, it would be appropriate to

notice the various factual and legal points on which the

parties are agreed. The controversy herein would have to be

decided on the basis of the law declared by this Court in

Bhatia International (supra). The parties are agreed and it

is also evident from the Final Partial Consent Award dated

14th September, 2011 that the juridical seat (or legal place) of

arbitration for the purposes of the arbitration initiated under

the Claimants’ Notice of Arbitration dated 16th December,

2010 shall be London, England. The parties are also agreed

that hearings of the Notice of Arbitration may take place at

Paris, France, Singapore or any other location the Tribunal

considers may be convenient. It is also agreed by the parties

that the terms and conditions of the arbitration agreement in

Article 33 of the PSCs shall remain in full force and effect

and be applicable to the arbitration proceedings.

34

35.The essential dispute between the parties is as to whether

Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be applicable to the

arbitration agreement irrespective of the fact that the seat of

arbitration is outside India. To find a conclusive answer to

the issue as to whether applicability of Part I of the

Arbitration Act, 1996 has been excluded, it would be

necessary to discover the intention of the parties. Beyond

this parties are not agreed on any issue.

36.We are also of the opinion that since the ratio of law laid

down in Balco (supra) has been made prospective in

operation by the Constitution Bench itself, we are bound by

the decision rendered in Bhatia International (supra).

Therefore, at the outset, it would be appropriate to reproduce

the relevant ratio of Bhatia International in paragraph 32

which is as under :-

“32. To conclude, we hold that the provisions of

Part I would apply to all arbitrations and to all pro-

ceedings relating thereto. Where such arbitration is

held in India the provisions of Part I would com-

pulsorily apply and parties are free to deviate only to

the extent permitted by the derogable provisions of

Part I. In cases of international commercial arbitra-

tions held out of India provisions of Part I would ap-

ply unless the parties by agreement, express or im-

35

plied, exclude all or any of its provisions. In that

case the laws or rules chosen by the parties would

prevail. Any provision, in Part I, which is contrary to

or excluded by that law or rules will not apply.”

37.In view of the aforesaid, it would be necessary to analyze

the relevant Articles of the PSC, to discover the real intention

of the parties as to whether the provisions of Arbitration Act,

1996 have been excluded. It must, immediately, be noticed

that Articles 32.1 and 32.2 deal with applicable law and

language of the contract as is evident from the heading of

the Article which is “Applicable Law and Language of the

Contract”. Article 32.1 provides the proper law of the contract

i.e. laws of India. Article 32.2 makes a declaration that none

of the provisions contained in the contract would entitle

either the Government or the Contractor to exercise the

rights, privileges and powers conferred upon it by the

contract in a manner which would contravene the laws of

India.

38.Article 33 makes very detailed provision with regard to the

resolution of disputes through arbitration. The two Articles do

not overlap - one (Art.32) deals with the proper law of the

36

contract, the other (Art.33) deals with ADR, i.e. consultations

between the parties; conciliation; reference to a sole expert

and ultimately arbitration. Under Article 33, at first efforts

should be made by the parties to settle the disputes among

themselves (33.1). If these efforts fail, the parties by

agreement shall refer the dispute to a sole expert (33.2). The

provision with regard to constitution of the arbitral tribunal

provides that the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three

arbitrators (33.4). This article also provides that each party

shall appoint one arbitrator. The arbitrators appointed by the

parties shall appoint the third arbitrator. In case, the

procedure under Article 33.4 fails, the aggrieved party can

approach the Permanent Court of Arbitration at Hague for

appointment of an arbitrator (33.5). Further, in case the two

arbitrators fail to make an appointment of the third arbitrator

within 30 days of the appointment of the second arbitrator,

again the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of

Arbitration at Hague may, at the request of either party

appoint the third arbitrator. In the face of this, it is difficult to

appreciate the submission of the respondent – Union of India

that the Arbitration Act, 1996 (Part I) would be applicable to

37

the arbitration proceedings. In the event, Union of India

intended to ensure that the Arbitration Act, 1996 shall apply

to the arbitration proceedings, Article 33.5 should have

provided that in default of a party appointing its arbitrator,

such arbitrator may, at the request of the first party be

appointed by the Chief Justice of India or any person or

Institution designated by him. Thus, the Permanent Court of

Arbitration at Hague can be approached for the appointment

of the arbitrator, in case of default by any of the parties. This,

in our opinion, is a strong indication that applicability of

Arbitration Act, 1996 was excluded by the parties by

consensus. Further, the arbitration proceedings are to be

conducted in accordance with the UNCITRAL Rules, 1976

(33.9). It is specifically provided that the right to arbitrate

disputes and claims under this contract shall survive the

termination of this contract (33.10).

39.The Article which provides the basis of the controversy

herein is Article 33.12 which provides that venue of the

arbitration shall be London and that the arbitration

agreement shall be governed by the laws of England.

It

appears, as observed earlier, that by a Final Partial Consent

38

Award, the parties have agreed that the juridical seat (or

legal place of arbitration) for the purposes of arbitration

initiated under the claimants’ notice of arbitration dated 16th

December, 2010 shall be London, England.

40.We are of the opinion, upon a meaningful reading of the

aforesaid Articles of the PSC, that the proper law of the

contract is Indian Law; proper law of the arbitration

agreement is the law of England. Therefore, can it be said as

canvassed

by

the

respondents,

that

applicability

of

Arbitration Act, 1996 has not been excluded?

41.It was submitted by Mr. Ganguly that the intention of the

parties was never to exclude the applicability of Arbitration

Act, 1996. It is submitted that the expression “laws of India”

under Article 32.2 would also include the Arbitration Act,

1996. This submission is without any merit. In our opinion,

the expression “laws of India” as used in Article 32.1 and

32.2 have a reference only to the contractual obligations to

be performed by the parties under the substantive contract

i.e. PSC. In other words, the provisions contained in 33.12

39

are not governed by the provisions contained in Article 32.1.

It must be emphasized that Article 32.1 has been made

subject to the provision of Article 33.12. Article 33.12

specifically provides that the arbitration agreement shall be

governed by the laws of England. The two Articles are

particular in laying down that the contractual obligations with

regard to the exploration of oil and gas under the PSC shall

be governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of

India. In contra-distinction, Article 33.12 specifically provides

that the arbitration agreement contained in Article 33.12 shall

be governed by the laws of England. Therefore, in our

opinion, the conclusion is inescapable that applicability of

Arbitration Act, 1996 has been ruled out by a conscious

decision and agreement of the parties. Applying the ratio of

law as laid down in Bhatia International (supra) it would

lead to the conclusion that the Delhi High Court had no

jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Article 34 of the

Arbitration Act, 1996.

42.Article 33 provides for ADR – its limited application is to

dispute resolution through arbitration as opposed to civil

40

litigation.

Therefore, there is no violation of 32.2, as

Arbitration Act, 1996, in fact signifies Parliamentary sanction

of ADR. In fact, Article 32.3 indicates that obligations under

PSC and Arbitration Agreement are separate. Hence, it is

provided that English shall be the language of the Contract.

Followed by the stipulation that English shall also be the law

of arbitral proceedings.

Therefore, the conclusion of the

High Court that PSC is a composite contract is not in tune

with the approved provisions of the PSC. This separateness

is further emphasized by Article 32.1 by making the provision

“subject to the provision of Article 33.12”.

Laws of India

have been made applicable to the substantive contract. Law

of England govern the Dispute Resolution Mechanism.

Provision for Arbitration is a deliberate election of remedy

other than usual remedy of a civil suit. The ADR mechanism

under the Arbitral Laws of different nations is legally and

jurisprudentially accepted, sanctified by the Highest Law

Making Bodies of the member States, signatories to the New

York Convention. India is not only a signatory to the New

York Convention, but it has taken into account the

UNCITRAL Model Laws and the UNCITRAL Rules, whilst

41

enacting the Arbitration Act, 1996. Therefore, it would not be

possible to accept the submission of Mr. Ganguly that the

Law of the Contract is also the Law of the Arbitration

Agreement.

43.In our opinion, it is too late in the day to contend that the

seat of arbitration is not analogous to an exclusive

jurisdiction clause. This view of ours will find support from

numerous judgments of this Court. Once the parties had

consciously agreed that the juridical seat of the arbitration

would be London and that the arbitration agreement will be

governed by the laws of England, it was no longer open to

them to contend that the provisions of Part I of the Arbitration

Act would also be applicable to the arbitration agreement.

This Court in the case of Videocon Industries Ltd. (supra)

has clearly held as follows :-

“33. In the present case also, the parties had

agreed that notwithstanding Article 33.1, the

arbitration agreement contained in Article 34 shall

be governed by laws of England. This necessarily

implies that the parties had agreed to exclude the

provisions of Part I of the Act. As a corollary to the

above conclusion, we hold that the Delhi High Court

did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition

filed by the respondents under Section 9 of the Act

42

and the mere fact that the appellant had earlier filed

similar petitions was not sufficient to clothe that

High Court with the jurisdiction to entertain the

petition filed by the respondents.”

44.In coming to the aforesaid conclusion this Court interpreted

similar if not identical provisions contained in the arbitration

agreement. The provision with regard to proper law of the

contract and the arbitration agreement was as follows :

3. For the sake of convenience, the relevant clauses

of Articles 33, 34 and 35 of the PSC are extracted

below:

“33.1. Indian law to govern.—Subject to the provi-

sions of Article 34.12, this contract shall be gov-

erned and interpreted in accordance with the laws

of India.

33.2. Laws of India not to be contravened.—Subject

to Article 17.1 nothing in this contract shall entitle

the contractor to exercise the rights, privileges and

powers conferred upon it by this contract in a man-

ner which will contravene the laws of India.

*

*

*

34.3. Unresolved disputes.—Subject to the provi-

sions of this contract, the parties agree that any

matter, unresolved dispute, difference or claim

which cannot be agreed or settled amicably within

twenty-one (21) days may be submitted to a sole

expert (where Article 34.2 applies) or otherwise to

an Arbitral Tribunal for final decision as hereinafter

provided.

43

*

*

*

34.12. Venue and law of arbitration agreement.—

The venue of sole expert, conciliation or arbitration

proceedings pursuant to this article, unless the

parties otherwise agree, shall be Kuala Lumpur,

Malaysia, and shall be conducted in the English lan-

guage. Insofar as practicable, the parties shall con-

tinue to implement the terms of this contract not-

withstanding the initiation of arbitral proceedings

and any pending claim or dispute. Notwithstanding

the provisions of Article 33.1, the arbitration agree-

ment contained in this Article 34 shall be governed

by the laws of England.

*

*

*

35.2. Amendment.—This contract shall not be

amended, modified, varied or supplemented in any

respect except by an instrument in writing signed by

all the parties, which shall state the date upon which

the amendment or modification shall become

effective.”

45.We are of the opinion that in the impugned judgment the

High Court has erred in not applying the ratio of law laid

down in Videocon Industries Ltd. (supra) in the present

case. The first issue raised in Videocon Industries Limited

(supra) was as to whether the seat of arbitration was

London or Kuala Lumpur. The second issue was with regard

to the Courts that would have supervisory jurisdiction over

the arbitration proceedings. Firstly, the plea of Videocon

44

Industries Limited was that the seat could not have been

changed from Kuala Lumpur to London only on agreement

of

the parties without

there

being

a

corresponding

amendment in the PSC. This plea was accepted. It was

held that seat of arbitration cannot be changed by mere

agreement of parties. In Paragraph 21 of the judgment, it

was observed as follows:-

“21. Though, it may appear repetitive, we deem it

necessary to mention that as per the terms of

agreement, the seat of arbitration was Kuala Lum-

pur. If the parties wanted to amend Article 34.12,

they could have done so only by a written instru-

ment which was required to be signed by all of

them. Admittedly, neither was there any agreement

between the parties to the PSC to shift the juridical

seat of arbitration from Kuala Lumpur to London nor

was any written instrument signed by them for

amending Article 34.12. Therefore, the mere fact

that the parties to the particular arbitration had

agreed for shifting of the seat of arbitration to Lon-

don cannot be interpreted as anything except phys-

ical change of the venue of arbitration from Kuala

Lumpur to London.”

46.The other issue considered by this Court in Videocon

Industries Limited (supra) was as to whether a petition

under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be

maintainable in Delhi High Court, the parties having

specifically agreed that the arbitration agreement would be

45

governed by the English Law.

This issue was decided

against Union of India and it was held that Delhi High Court

did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by

Union of India under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.

47.In the present appeal, this Court is also considering the

issue as to whether the petition under Section 34 of the

Arbitration Act, 1996 filed by Union of India in Delhi would be

maintainable.

The parties have made the necessary

amendment in the PSCs to provide that the juridical seat of

arbitration shall be London.

It is also provided that the

arbitration agreement will be governed by laws of England.

Therefore, the ratio in Videocon Industries Limited (supra)

would be relevant and binding in the present appeal.

48.The aforesaid judgment (Videocon) has been rendered by

this

Court

upon

consideration

of

Venture

Global

Engineering (supra). Venture Global Engineering and

Videocon Industries Ltd. are both judgments delivered by

two-Judge Bench.

In our opinion, the factual and legal

issues involved in the Videocon Industries case are very

46

similar to the controversy involved in the present appeal.

The Arbitration Agreement in this appeal is identical to the

arbitration agreement in Videocon Industries. In fact, the

factual situation in the present appeal is on a stronger

footing than in Videocon Industries Limited (supra). As

noticed

earlier,

in

Videocon

Industries,

this

Court

concluded that the parties could not have altered the seat of

arbitration without making the necessary amendment to the

PSC.

In the present appeal, necessary amendment has

been made in the PSC.

Based on the aforesaid

amendment, the Arbitral Tribunal has rendered the Final

Partial Consent Award of 14th September, 2011 recording

that the juridical seat (or legal place) of the arbitration for the

purposes of arbitration initiated under the Claimant’s Notice

of Arbitration

shall be London, England.

dated 16 th December, 2010

Furthermore, the judgment in

Videocon Industries is subsequent to Ventura Global. We

are, therefore, bound by the ratio laid down in Videocon

Industries Limited (supra).

49.We may also point out that the judgment in Videocon

47

Industries has been followed on numerous occasions by a

number of High Courts. This apart, the judgment of this

Court in Videocon Industries Ltd. also reflects the view

taken by the Courts in England on the same issues. In the

case of A Vs. B9 considering a similar situation, it has been

held as follows :

““.....an agreement as to the seat of an arbitration is

analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Any

claim for a remedy......as to the validity of an

existing interim or final award is agreed to be made

only in the courts of the place designated as the

seat of arbitration.”

(emphasis supplied).

50.This Court in Dozco India Ltd. (supra) again reiterated the

principle of law laid down in Sumitomo Heavy Industries

Ltd. (supra), wherein the law was very clearly enunciated in

Para 16:

“The law which would apply to the filing of the

award, to its enforcement and to its setting aside

would be the law governing the agreement to

arbitrate and the performance of that agreement.”

This judgment is rendered by a three-Judge Bench.

51.It is noteworthy that the judgment in Sumitomo was not

9

2007 (1) All E.R. (Comm) 591

48

dissented from in Bhatia International on which the

judgment in Venture Global is based. This again persuades

us to follow the law laid down in Videocon (supra).

52.Again this Court in Yograj Infrastructure (two-Judge

Bench) considered a similar arbitration agreement. It was

provided that the arbitration proceedings shall be conducted

in English in Singapore in accordance with the Singapore

International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) Rules. (Clause 27.1).

Clause 27.2 provided that the arbitration shall take place in

Singapore and be conducted in English language. This Court

held that having agreed that the seat of arbitration would be

Singapore and that the curial law of the arbitration

proceedings would be SIAC Rules, it was no longer open to

the appellant to contend that an application under Section

11(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be maintainable.

53.This judgment has specifically taken into consideration the

law laid down in Bhatia International (supra) and Venture

Global (supra). The same view has been taken by Delhi

High Court, Bombay High Court and the Gujarat High Court,

49

in fact this Court in Videocon has specifically approved the

observations made by the Gujarat High Court in Hardy Oil

(supra).

54.The effect of choice of seat of arbitration was considered by

the Court of Appeal in C Vs. D10. This judgment has been

specifically approved by this Court in Balco (supra) and

reiterated in Enercon (supra).

In C Vs. D (supra),

the Court of Appeal has observed:-

“Primary Conclusion

16. I shall deal with Mr Hirst's arguments in due

course but, in my judgment, they fail to grapple with

the central point at issue which is whether or not, by

choosing London as the seat of the arbitration, the

parties must be taken to have agreed that

proceedings on the award should be only those

permitted by English law. In my view they must be

taken to have so agreed for the reasons given by

the judge. The whole purpose of the balance

achieved by the Bermuda Form (English arbitration

but applying New York law to issues arising under

the policy) is that judicial remedies in respect of the

award should be those permitted by English law and

only those so permitted. Mr Hirst could not say (and

did not say) that English judicial remedies for lack of

jurisdiction on procedural irregularities under

sections 67 and 68 of the 1996 Act were not

permitted; he was reduced to saying that New York

judicial

remedies

were also permitted.

That,

however, would be a recipe for litigation and (what

is worse) confusion which cannot have been

10

[2008] 1 Lloyd’s Law Rep 239

50

intended by the parties. No doubt New York law has

its own judicial remedies for want of jurisdiction and

serious irregularity but it could scarcely be

supposed that a party aggrieved by one part of an

award could proceed in one jurisdiction and a party

aggrieved by another part of an award could

proceed in another jurisdiction. Similarly, in the case

of a single complaint about an award, it could not be

supposed that the aggrieved party could complain in

one jurisdiction and the satisfied party be entitled to

ask the other jurisdiction to declare its satisfaction

with the award. There would be a serious risk of

parties rushing to get the first judgment or of

conflicting decisions which the parties cannot have

contemplated.”

55.The aforesaid observations were subsequently followed by

the High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division,

Commercial Court (England) in SulameRica CIA Nacional

De Seguros SA Vs. Enesa Engenharia SA – Enesa11. In

laying down the same proposition, the High Court noticed

that the issue in this case depends upon the weight to be

given to the provision in Condition 12 of the insurance policy

that “the seat of the arbitration shall be London, England.” It

was observed that this necessarily carried with it the English

Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration process.

It was observed that “this follows from the express terms of

the Arbitration Act, 1996 and, in particular, the provisions of

11

(2012) WL 14764

51

Section 2 which provide that Part I of the Arbitration Act,

1996 applies where the seat of the arbitration is in England

and Wales or Northern Ireland. This immediately establishes

a strong connection between the arbitration agreement itself

and the law of England. It is for this reason that recent

authorities have laid stress upon the locations of the seat of

the arbitration as an important factor in determining the

proper law of the arbitration agreement.”

56.In our opinion, these observations are fully applicable to the

facts and circumstances of this case. The conclusion

reached by the High Court would lead to the chaotic situation

where the parties would be left rushing between India and

England for redressal of their grievances. The provisions of

Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996 (Indian) are necessarily

excluded; being wholly inconsistent with the arbitration

agreement which provides “that arbitration agreement shall

be governed by English law.” Thus the remedy of the

respondent to challenge any award rendered in the

arbitration

proceedings

would

lie under

the

relevant

provisions contained in Arbitration Act, 1996 of England and

52

Wales. Whether or not such an application would now be

entertained by the courts in England is not for us to examine,

it would have to be examined by the Court of Competent

Jurisdiction in England.

Public Policy:

57.Mr. Ganguly has vehemently argued that the issues involved

here relate to violation of public policy of India. Therefore,

the applicability of Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act cannot

be excluded even if the seat of arbitration is London. It would

also, according to

Mr. Ganguly, make no difference

that the arbitration agreement specifically provides for the

arbitration agreement to be governed by the Laws of

England. According to Mr. Ganguly, proper law of the

contract would be relevant to determine the question as to

whether the interim final award would be amenable to

challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. In

our opinion, the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel

runs counter to the well settled law in India as well as in

other jurisdictions. As noticed earlier,

Mr. Ganguly has

submitted that the disputes in relation to royalties, cess,

53

service tax and the CAG audit report are not arbitrable. In

support of this submission, he relies on the provisions

contained in Article 15.1 read with Article 32.2. Relying upon

these two Articles,

Mr. Ganguly submitted that the

obligation with regard to taxes, royalties, rentals etc. are not

purely contractual, they are governed by the relevant

statutory provisions. He, therefore, placed strong reliance on

the judgment in Venture Global (supra) in support of his

submission that since the disputes are not arbitrable, the

award cannot be enforced under Part II of the Arbitration Act,

1996 but is amenable to challenge under Section 34 of the

Act. It would be appropriate to point out that the judgment in

Venture Global is in two parts. The first part is based on

Bhatia International Ltd., wherein it is held as follows :-

“32. .......In cases of international commercial arbit-

rations held out of India provisions of Part I would

apply unless the parties by agreement, express or

implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. In that

case the laws or rules chosen by the parties would

prevail. Any provision, in Part I, which is contrary to

or excluded by that law or rules will not apply.”

58.In this case, the parties have by agreement provided that the

juridical seat of arbitration will be in London. On the basis of

the aforesaid agreement, necessary amendment has been

54

made in the PSCs. On the basis of the agreement and the

consent of the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal has made the

“Final Partial Consent Award” on 14th September, 2011 fixing

the juridical seat (or legal place) of arbitration for the

purposes of arbitration initiated under the claimants notice of

arbitration dated 16th December, 2010 in London, England.

To make it even further clear that the award also records

that any hearing in the arbitration may take place in Paris,

France, Singapore or any other location the tribunal

considers convenient. Article 33.12 stipulates that arbitration

proceedings shall be conducted in English language. The

arbitration agreement contained in Article 33 shall be

governed by the laws of England. A combined effect of all

these factors would clearly show that the parties have by

express agreement excluded the applicability of Part I of the

Arbitration Act, 1996 (Indian) to the arbitration proceedings.

59.We are also unable to agree with Mr. Ganguly that Part I of

the Arbitration Act, 1996 (Indian) would be applicable in this

case, in view of the law laid down by this Court in Venture

Global Engineering (supra). In our opinion, even the

55

second part of the ratio in Venture Global Engineering

(supra) from paragraph 32 of the judgment onwards would

not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.

Firstly, in our opinion, all the disputes raised by the

petitioners herein are contractual in nature. Secondly, the

performance of any of these obligations would not lead to

any infringement of any of the laws of India per se. Thirdly,

the non-obstante clause which was under consideration in

Venture Global is non-existent in the present case. In

Venture Global, the court was concerned with direct

violation of Foreign Exchange Management Act. The actions

of the respondents therein would also have been contrary to

various provisions of the Companies Act in the event the

shares were to be transferred in accordance with the award.

Therefore, this Court was persuaded to take the view that

inspite of the applicability of Part I having been excluded as

the seat of arbitration was outside nonetheless Part I would

apply as the transfer of the shares would be against the laws

of India and, therefore, violate public policy. In our opinion,

such circumstances do not exist in the present case as there

is no danger of violation of any statutory provisions. Prima

56

facie, it appears that there is no challenge to the Gazette

Notification. In fact, claim statement shows that the amounts

of royalties/cess levied have been paid.

Prayer is for

reimbursement of the amounts paid, based on Articles 15.6

and 15.7 of the PSC. There also seems to be a claim for

making necessary revisions and adjustment to the contract

to off-set the effect of any changes in the law. We fail to see

any apparent or so patently obvious violation of Indian Laws

in any of these claims. The basis for filing the petition under

Section 34 is that the Appellants are bound to obey the Laws

of the country. The appellants have nowhere claimed to be

exempted from the Laws of India.

They claim that the

Government of India, party to the Contract, i.e., PSC has

failed to seek and obtain exemption as stipulated in the

contract. Whether or not the claim has substance is surely

an arbitral matter. It is not the case of the appellants that

they are not bound by the Laws of India, relating to the

performance of the contractual obligations under the PSCs.

In view of what we have said earlier, it is not possible to

sustain the conclusion reached by the High Court.

The

arbitration agreement can not be jettisoned on the plea that

57

award, if made against the Government of India, would

violate Public Policy of India. Merely because the Arbitral

Tribunal has held that claims are arbitral does not mean that

the claims have been accepted and an award adverse to

India has been given. We, therefore, have no hesitation in

rejecting the submission made by Mr. Ganguly. For the

same reasons, we are unable to sustain the conclusions

reached by the High Court of Delhi.

60.Another good reason for not accepting or approving the

conclusions reached by the High Court is that it has failed to

distinguish between the law applicable to the proper law of

the contract and proper law of the arbitration agreement.

The High Court has also failed to notice that by now it is

settled, in almost all international jurisdictions, that the

agreement to arbitrate is a separate contract distinct from

the substantive contract which contains the arbitration

agreement. This principle of severability of the arbitration

agreement from the substantive contract is indeed statutorily

recognized by Section 16 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1996.

Section 16(1) specifically provides as under:-

58

“16.Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its

jurisdiction.- (1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on

its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objec-

tions with respect to the existence or validity of the

arbitration agreement, and for that purpose,--

(a) an arbitration clause which forms part of a con-

tract shall be treated as an agreement independent

of the other terms of the contract; and

(b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the con-

tract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the in-

validity of the arbitration clause.”

61.A bare perusal of the aforesaid would show that the

arbitration agreement is independent of the other terms of

the contract. Further, even if the contract is declared null

and void, it would not lead to the foregone conclusion that

the arbitration clause in invalid. The aforesaid provision has

been considered by this Court in a number of cases, which

are as follows:-

Reva Electric Car Company P. Ltd. Vs. Green Mobil.12,

Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ludhiana Im-

provement Trust and Anr.,13, Enercon (India) Ltd. & Ors. Vs.

Enercon GMBH & Anr.,14 World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd.

Vs. MSM Satellite (Singapore) PTC Ltd. [Civil Appeal No. 895

12

(2012) 2 SCC 93

2013 (7) SCALE 327

14

2014 (1) Arb. LR 257 (SC)

13

59

of 2014]

62.This principle of separability permits the parties to agree:

that law of one country would govern to the substantive

contract and laws of another country would apply to the

arbitration agreement. The parties can also agree that even

the conduct of the reference would be governed by the law

of another country. This would be rare, as it would lead to

extremely complex problems. It is expected that reasonable

businessman do not intend absurd results. In the present

case, the parties had by agreement provided that the

substantive contract (PSC) will be governed by the laws of

India. In contradistinction, it was provided that the arbitration

agreement will be governed by laws of England. Therefore,

there was no scope for any confusion of the law governing

the PSC with the law governing the arbitration agreement.

This principle of severability is also accepted specifically

under Article 33.10 of the PSC, which is as under:-

“The right to arbitrate disputes and claims under this

Contract shall survive the termination of this con-

tract.”

63.We are, therefore, unable to uphold the conclusions

recorded by the High Court that the applicability of the

English Law would be limited in its application only to the

conduct of the reference. For the same reasons, we are

unable to accept the submissions made by

Mr.

Ganguly on this issue.

64.In 1982, the Government provided a model Production

Sharing Contract to potential bidders, which provided a

governing law clause, which read as follows:-

“32.1 This contract shall be governed and inter-

preted in accordance with laws of India.”

This was specifically amended and incorpor-

ated in the present PSCs signed on 22nd December,

1994 and provided that the governing law clause

(32.1) would be “subject to the provision of Article

33.12”.

65.Considering the aforesaid two provisions, it leaves no

manner of doubt that Article 32.2 would have no impact on

the designated juridical seat as well as governing law of the

61

arbitration agreement. This would become evident from a

perusal of the Final Partial Consent Award dated 14th

September, 2011, signed by all the three members of the

arbitral tribunal recording that the juridical seat of the

arbitration initiated under the Claimant’s Notice dated 16th

December, 2010 shall be London, England. Therefore, we

are unable to accept the conclusion reached by the Delhi

High Court and the submission made by Mr. Ganguly that

Arbitration Act, 1996 (Part I) would be applicable to the

arbitration agreement.

66.Mr. Ganguly has next sought to persuade us that the seat of

arbitration shall be in India as the PSC is governed by the

law of India. According to Mr. Ganguly, laws of India would

include the Arbitration Act, 1996. Therefore, irrespective of

the provisions contained in Article 33.12, Arbitration Act,

1996 would be applicable to arbitration proceedings. The

English law would be applicable only in relation to the

conduct of the arbitration upto the passing of the Partial Final

Award. We are unable to accept the aforesaid submissions

of

Mr. Ganguly.

As noticed earlier, Article 32.1 itself

62

provides that it shall be subject to the provision of Article

33.12. Article 33.12 provides that the arbitration agreement

contained in this Article shall be governed by the laws of

England.

The term ‘laws of England’ cannot be given a

restricted meaning confined to only curial law. It is

permissible under law for the parties to provide for different

laws of the contract and the arbitration agreement and the

curial law. In Naviera Amazonica SA (supra), the Court of

Appeal

in

England

considered

an

agreement

which

contained a clause providing for the jurisdiction of the courts

in Lima, Peru in the event of judicial dispute and at the same

time contained a clause providing that the arbitration would

be governed by the English Law and the procedural law of

arbitration shall be the English Law. The Court of Appeal

observed as follows :-

“All contracts which provide for arbitration and

contain a foreign element may involve three

potentially relevant systems of law: (1) the law

governing the substantive contract; (2) the law

governing the agreement to arbitrate and the

performance of that agreement; (3) the law

governing the conduct of the arbitration. In the

majority of cases all three will be the same. But (1)

will often be different from (2) and (3). And

occasionally, but rarely (2) may also differ from (3).”

63

67.From the above, it is evident that it was open to the parties

to agree that the law governing the substantive contract

(PSC) would be different from the law governing the

arbitration agreement. This is precisely the situation in the

present case. Article 32.1 specifically provides that the

performance of the contractual obligations under the PSC

would be governed and interpreted under the laws of India.

So far as the alternative dispute redressal agreement i.e. the

arbitration agreement is concerned, it would be governed by

laws of England. There is no basis on which the respondents

can be heard to say that the applicability of laws of England

related only to the conduct of arbitration reference. The law

governing the conduct of the arbitration is interchangeably

referred to as the curial law or procedural law or the lex fori.

The delineation of the three operative laws as given in

Naviera Amazonica (supra) has been specifically followed

by this Court in the case of Sumitomo (supra). The court

also, upon a survey, of a number of decisions rendered by

the English Courts and after referring to the views expressed

by learned commentators on International Commercial

64

Arbitration concluded that:-

“16. The law which would apply to the filing of the

award, to its enforcement and to its setting aside

would be the law governing the agreement to arbit-

rate and the performance of that agreement.”

68.In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, this Court relied on a

passage from Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in

England, 2nd Edn. by Mustill and Boyd which is as under :

“An agreed reference to arbitration involves two

groups of obligations. The first concerns the mutual

obligations of the parties to submit future disputes,

or an existing dispute to arbitration, and to abide by

the award of a tribunal constituted in accordance

with the agreement. It is now firmly established that

the arbitration agreement which creates these oblig-

ations is a separate contract, distinct from the sub-

stantive agreement in which it is usually embedded,

capable of surviving the termination of the substant-

ive agreement and susceptible of premature termin-

ation by express or implied consent, or by repudi-

ation or frustration, in much the same manner as in

more ordinary forms of contract. Since this agree-

ment has a distinct life of its own, it may in principle

be governed by a proper law of its own, which need

not be the same as the law governing the substant-

ive contract.

The second group of obligations, consisting of what

is generally referred to as the ‘curial law’ of the ar-

bitration, concerns the manner in which the parties

and the arbitrator are required to conduct the refer-

ence of a particular dispute. According to the Eng-

lish theory of arbitration, these rules are to be ascer-

tained by reference to the express or implied terms

of the agreement to arbitrate. This being so, it will

be found in the great majority of cases that the curi-

al law, i.e., the law governing the conduct of the ref-

erence, is the same as the law governing the obliga-

tion to arbitrate. It is, however, open to the parties to

submit, expressly or by implication, the conduct of

the reference to a different law from the one govern-

ing the underlying arbitration agreement. In

such a case, the court looks first at the arbitration

agreement to see whether the dispute is one which

should be arbitrated, and which has validly been

made the subject of the reference, it then looks to

the curial law to see how that reference should be

conducted and then returns to the first law in order

to give effect to the resulting award.

It may therefore be seen that problems arising out

of an arbitration may, at least in theory, call for the

application of any one or more of the following laws

—

1. The proper law of the contract, i.e., the law

governing the contract which creates the sub-

stantive rights of the parties, in respect of

which the dispute has arisen.

2. The proper law of the arbitration agree-

ment, i.e., the law governing the obligation of

the parties to submit the disputes to arbitra-

tion, and to honour an award.

3. The curial law, i.e., the law governing the

conduct of the individual reference.

1. The proper law of the arbitration agreement gov-

erns the validity of the arbitration agreement, the

question whether a dispute lies within the scope of

the arbitration agreement; the validity of the notice

of arbitration; the constitution of the tribunal; the

question whether an award lies within the jurisdic-

tion of the arbitrator; the formal validity of the award;

the question whether the parties have been dis-

charged from any obligation to arbitrate future dis-

putes.

2. The curial law governs the manner in which the

reference is to be conducted; the procedural

powers and duties of the arbitrator; questions of

evidence; the determination of the proper law of the

contract.

3. The proper law of the reference governs the

question whether the parties have been discharged

from their obligation to continue with the reference

of the individual dispute.

In the absence of express agreement, there is a

strong prima facie presumption that the parties in-

tend the curial law to be the law of the ‘seat’ of the

arbitration, i.e., the place at which the arbitration is

to be conducted, on the ground that that is the

country most closely connected with the proceed-

ings. So in order to determine the curial law in the

absence of an express choice by the parties it is

first necessary to determine the seat of the arbitra-

tion, by construing the agreement to arbitrate.”

69.The same legal position is reiterated by this Court in Dozco

(supra). In paragraph 12 of the judgment, it is observed as

follows :

“12. In the backdrop of these conflicting claims, the

question boils down to as to what is the true inter-

pretation of Article 23. This Article 23 will have to be

read in the backdrop of Article 22 and more particu-

larly, Article 22.1. It is clear from the language of

Article 22.1 that the whole agreement would be gov-

erned by and construed in accordance with the laws

of The Republic of Korea. It is for this reason that

the respondent heavily relied on the law laid down

in Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd.6

This judgment is a complete authority on the pro-

position that the arbitrability of the dispute is to be

determined in terms of the law governing arbitration

agreement and the arbitration proceedings have to

be conducted in accordance with the curial law. This

Court, in that judgment, relying on Mustill and Boyd:

The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in

England, 2nd Edn., observed in para 15 that where

the law governing the conduct of the reference is

different from the law governing the underlying arbit-

ration agreement, the court looks to the arbitration

agreement to see if the dispute is arbitrable, then to

the curial law to see how the reference should be

conducted, “and then returns to the first law in order

to give effect to the resulting award”. In para 16, this

Court, in no uncertain terms, declared that the law

which would apply to the filing of the award, to its

enforcement and to its setting aside would be the

law governing the agreement to arbitrate and the

performance of that agreement.

70.We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid judgment.

71.In view of the aforesaid binding precedent, we are unable to

accept the submission of Mr. Ganguly that the Arbitration

Act, 1996 has not been excluded by the parties by

agreement.

For the same reasons, we are unable to

approve the conclusions reached by the Delhi High Court

that reference to laws of England is only confined to the

procedural aspects of the conduct of the arbitration

reference.

72.We are also unable to agree with the submission of Mr.

Ganguly that since the issues involved herein relate to the

public policy of India, Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would

be applicable. Applicability of Part I of Arbitration Act, 1996 is

not dependent on the nature of challenge to the award.

Whether or not the award is challenged on the ground of

public policy, it would have to satisfy the pre-condition that

the Arbitration Act, 1996 is applicable to the arbitration

agreement. In our opinion, the High Court has committed a

jurisdictional error in holding that the provisions contained in

Article 33.12 is relevant only for the determination of the

curial law applicable too the proceedings. We have already

noticed earlier that the parties by agreement have provided

that the juridical seat of the arbitration shall be in London.

Necessary amendment has also been made in the PSCs, as

69

recorded by the Final Partial Consent Award dated 14th

September, 2011. It is noteworthy that the Arbitration Act,

1996 does not define or mention juridical seat. The term

‘juridical seat’ on the other hand is specifically defined in

Section 3 of the English Arbitration Act. Therefore, this would

clearly indicate that the parties understood that the

arbitration law of England would be applicable to the

arbitration agreement.

73.In view of the aforesaid, we are unable to uphold the

conclusion arrived at by the Delhi High Court that the

applicability of Arbitration Act, 1996 to the arbitration

agreement in the present case has not been excluded.

74.In view of the above, we hold that:

(i)

The petition filed by respondents under Section

34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 in the Delhi High

Court is not maintainable.

(ii)

We further over-rule and set aside the conclusion

of the High Court that, even though the arbitra-

tion agreement would be governed by the laws of

England and that juridical seat of arbitration

would be in London, Part I of the Arbitration Act

would still be applicable as the laws governing

the substantive contract are Indian Laws.

(iii)

In the event, a final award is made against the

respondent, the enforceability of the same in In-

dia, can be resisted on the ground of Public

Policy.

(iv)

The conclusion of the High Court that in the

event, the award is sought to be enforced outside

India, it would leave the Indian party remediless

is without any basis as the parties have consen-

sually provided that the arbitration agreement will

be governed by the English law. Therefore, the

remedy against the award will have to be sought

in England, where the juridical seat is located.

However, we accept the submission of the appel-

lant that since substantive law governing the con-

tract is Indian Law, even the Courts in England,

in case the arbitrability is challenged, will have to

decide the issue by applying Indian Law viz. the

principle of public policy etc. as it prevails in Indi-

an Law.

75.In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the

impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.

.....................................J.

[Surinder Singh Nijjar]

......................................J.

[A.K.Sikri]

New Delhi;

May 28, 2014.

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