Whether court which passed decree for specific performance retains control over decree after decree has been passed?

 In Hungerford Investment Trust Limited (In
Voluntary Liquidation) v. Haridas Mundhra and
Others4, it has been held that:
“22. It is settled by a long course of decisions of
the Indian High Courts that the Court which passes
a decree for specific performance retains control
over the decree even after the decree has been
passed. In Mahommadalli Sahib v. Abdul Khadir
Saheb (1930) MLJ Vol. 59, p.351 it was held that
the Court which passes a decree for specific
performance has the power to extend the time
fixed in the decree for the reason that Court
retains control over the decree, that the contract
between the parties is not extinguished by the
passing of a decree for specific performance and
that the contract subsists notwithstanding the
passing of the decree. ...”
(Emphasis supplied)

(1972) 3 SCC 684.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1873 OF 2014
[Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 19215 OF 2011]
RAJINDER KUMAR
... APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
SHRI KULDEEP SINGH & OTHERS
Citation;AIR 2014 SC 1155,(2014) 2 MLJ 496 (SC)

Specific performance is an equitable relief granted by
the courts in specific situations. Plainly speaking,
equity means fairness. According to Sir Edward Fry,
the Court by a decree of specific performance
compels the defaulting party to do that which in
conscience he is bound to do, viz., actually and
specifically to perform his contract 1. Conscience
means a person’s moral sense of right or wrong 2.
FRY A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts by
The Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Fry, Sixth Edition, see Paragraph
62, at page 29.

Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edition.

Thus, what is morally wrong cannot be equitably right
and necessarily what is morally right will be just and
proper. This prelude is the keyhole for us to see
through the factual and legal position of a three
decade long litigation on a specific performance.
FACTS
3.
One Nand Lal (deceased) was the perpetual lessee of
the
Land
and
Development
Officer
(hereinafter
referred to as ‘L&DO’) of property bearing Bungalow
No. 9, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi measuring 0.179
acres equal to 865 sq. yards equal to 721 sq. metres.
His legal heirs are - (1) Banarsi Das; (2) Dhanpat Rai;
(3) Din Dayal; and (4) Gaindo Devi (widow of a pre-
deceased son Paras Ram) as his legal heirs.
Each
had a 1/4th share in the suit property. Din Dayal
passed away leaving behind, as originally claimed -
(5) his widow Sushila Devi; (6) son Mohinder Kumar
Gupta; (7) son Surinder Dayal; (8) son Narinder
Dayal; and (9) daughter Vijay Laksmi and each of
them had 1/24th share each in the suit property.

4.
The eight legal heirs of Nand Lal entered into an
agreement to sell the aforesaid immovable property
on 29/30.07.1980 with Kuldeep Singh-(respondent)
for a total sum of Rs.14,00,000/- out of which Kuldeep
Singh paid Rs.1,40,000/- as earnest money and
possession of one garage in the suit property was
handed
over
to
him.
The
balance
amount
of
Rs.12,60,000/- was to be paid by the respondent on
the execution and registration of the sale deed and
delivery of possession.
5.
One Rajinder Kumar (Petitioner in SLP (C) No.
19215/2011) claims that he is son of the late Din
Dayal and at the time of agreement to sell, he was a
minor.
He
filed
a
suit
through
his
maternal
grandfather (Suit No. 1428 of 1981) and sought a
declaration that the agreement for sale was illegal as
he was not a party to it. The suit was dismissed for
default on 22.05.1984. After more than 17 years, it
was eventually restored on 17.01.2002.
6.
The respondent-Kuldeep Singh filed a suit (Suit No.
280/1982) on 10.01.1982 for specific performance of
4
Page 4
the
agreement
against
the
eight
legal
heirs,
impleading also Rajinder Kumar in the said suit as
defendant no. 9, on the original side of High Court of
Delhi. The suit was decreed ex parte on 30.04.1984.
Appeal (RFA (OS) NO. 14/1985) against the above
Judgment dated 30.04.1984 was dismissed vide order
dated 22.03.1985 as time barred. An application
under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 filed thereafter for setting aside the decree was
also dismissed on 15.07.1985. Thus, the decree has
attained finality.
7.
Kuldeep Singh filed Execution Petition (No. 164/1990)
on 07.11.1990. Mohinder Kumar Gupta (petitioner in
SLP No. 28302 of 2010), one of the judgment debtors,
filed Application No. 110/1991 objecting to the
execution of the decree. Another application EA NO.
111/1991 was filed by minor Rajinder Kumar under
Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. Single Judge of the Delhi High Court vide
Judgment dated 01.02.2002 dismissed both petitions
holding
that
the
decree
dated
30.04.1984
is
5
Page 5
executable. Aggrieved, Mohinder Kumar Gupta filed
FAO (OS) No. 66/2002 against the aforesaid judgment
dated 01.02.2002 and Rajinder Kumar filed EFA (OS)
No. 4/2002 before the Division Bench of the High
Court.
8.
Meanwhile, on 24.04.1999, some of the appellants
filed an application under Section 28 of Specific Relief
Act,1963 (IA No. 4274/1999 in Suit No. 280/1982) for
rescission of the agreement. That was dismissed by
the Single Judge, High Court of Delhi vide Order dated
23.02.2000. FAO (OS) 110/2000 before the Division
Bench of the High Court arises against the order
dated 23.02.2000.
9.
The Division Bench vide Judgment dated 19.02.2010
dismissed FAO (OS) No. 110 of 2000, FAO (OS) NO. 66
of 2002 but allowed EFA (OS) No. 4/2002 filed by the
then
minor
Rajinder
Kumar,
holding
that
the
execution against him cannot be pursued as there is
no decree against him.
6
Page 6
10. The
appellants
210/2010
&
then
328/2010
filed
review
against
petitions
Judgment
No.
dated
19.02.2010 in FAO (OS) No. 110/2000. The High Court
dismissed the Review Petition No. 210/2010 in FAO
(OS) No. 110/2000 and Review Petition No. 328 of
2010 in FAO (OS) No. 66 of 2002 on 25.04.2011.
Thus, they are before this Court in these appeals.
11. It is the main contention of the appellants that the
decree dated 30.04.1984 is inexecutable since it is
vague and contingent. It is also contended that the
High Court of Delhi failed to properly exercise its
jurisdiction
while
deciding
the
application
for
rescinding the contract. There are other ancillary
contentions as well.
12. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the parties, we feel that mainly two issues arise
for consideration:
A. Is the decree executable?
B. Was the application for rescission properly
decided?
7
Page 7
13. The agreement for sale was executed by the
appellants (Defendants 1 to 8) on 30.07.1980. They
received part of the consideration, viz., Rs. 1,40,000/-
as
earnest
money.
Possession
of
part
of
the
agreement schedule property, a garage was parted
with. The balance Rs.12,60,000/- was to be paid at
the time of execution of the sale deed. That deed
could have been executed only after obtaining
permission from
the
L&DO,
Delhi.
As
per
the
agreement, it was for the vendors to obtain that
permission from the L&DO on paying the unearned
increase. There were certain other obligations as well.
That the vendors actually intended to sell the
property is clear from the fact that they had
approached the L&DO and the L&DO gave permission
on 12.11.1981, subject to payment of an amount of
Rs.7,17,330/-. The unearned increase came to be
such a large amount only because of the delay
caused by the purchaser in getting his power of
attorney, it is alleged. The amount was not deposited
8
Page 8
by the vendors even during the time extended by the
L&DO.
14. It was in the meanwhile, Rajinder Kumar (petitioner in
SLP (Civil) No. 19215 of 2011) claiming to be the
minor son of Din Dayal, filed a suit on 15.12.1981
attacking the agreement, claiming his 1/24 th share
and for other reliefs. Rajinder Kumar aged 7 years at
the time of the agreement, filed the suit through his
maternal grandfather even though his mother and
natural guardian who is signatory to the agreement
to sale, was very much alive and available. Smelling a
rat, the purchaser-Kuldeep Singh on 10.01.1982 filed
OS No. 1428 of 1981 on the original side of the High
Court for specific performance. At that time, the suit
filed by Rajinder Kumar was pending for plaintiff’s
evidence. Rajinder Kumar was arrayed as Defendant
No. 9 in the suit for specific performance. For some
reason or other, the defendants did not file written
statement despite several chances. Hence, the suit
was decreed as prayed for on 30.04.1984.
9
Page 9
15. For the purposes of easy reference, we may extract
the decree as such:
“(DECREE IN A SUIT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
AND AWARD OF DAMAGES)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
(Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction)
Suit No. 280 of 1982
S. Kuldip Singh son of S. Hara Singh
Resident of 20, Rajindra Park, New
Delhi, Through his General Attorney
S. Harkirat Singh
Plaintiff
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
...
Versus
Sh. Banarsi Dass,
son of Shri Nand Lal,
R/o M-49, Greater Kailash-I,
New Delhi.
Sh. Dhanpat Rai,
son of Shri Nand Lal
resident of E-4, N.D.S.E., Part-I,
New Delhi.
Shrimati Gaindo Devi,
widow of Shri Paras Ram,
son of Shri Nand Lal,
Resident of N-21, N.D.S.E., Part-I,
New Delhi.
Smt. Sushila Devi,
widow of late Shri Din Dayal,
resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society,
South Extension Part I, New Delhi.
Shri Mohinder Kumar Gupta,
son of Shri Din Dayal,
resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society,
South Extension Part I, New Delhi.
Shri Surinder Dayal,
son of Shri Din Dayal,
resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society,
South Extension Part I, New Delhi.
1
Page 10
7.
Shri Narinder Dayal
son of Shri Din Dayal,
resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society,
South Extension Part I, New Delhi.
8.
Miss. Vijay Lakshmi
daughter of Shri Din Dayal,
resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society,
South Extension Part I, New Delhi.
9.
Shri Rajinder Kumar (Minor),
son of Late Shri Din Dayal,
resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society,
South Extension Part I, New Delhi-49
through his legal guardian and Maternal Grand
father Shri Nand Kishore Mittal,
son of Shri Sagar Mal Mittal,
746, Gali Bhagwan, Kotla Mubarakpur,
New Delhi.
...
Defendants
Value of the suit for
purposes of jurisdiction
Court fee paid
Suit filed on
)
)
Rs. 15,40,000/-
..... Rs. 17,374.40
..... 11.2.1982
CLAIM:
In the event of Defendant No.9 being
held to have no right, title or interest in the
property in suit, it is prayed:-
1(A) A decree for specific performance of the
agreement to sale dated 29/30.7.80 in respect of
entire property No.9, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi be
granted in favour of the plaintiff against the
Defendants 1 to 8 against the total agreed
consideration of Rupees Fourteen Lakhs.
(B) The Defendants 1 to 8 be ordered to deliver the
actual, physical, vacant possession of the said
entire property Bungalow No.9, Sunder Nagar, New
Delhi except one garage, the possession whereof
has already been delivered to the plaintiff by
Defendants 1 to 8 in terms of the agreement to
sale referred to above.
1
Page 11
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
That Defendants 1 to 8 be ordered to deposit
Rs.7,17,330/- as the unearned increase in the
value of the plot No.9, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi,
and failing such payment, the plaintiff be allowed
to deposit the said amount in the account of the
Defendants1 to 8 out of the unpaid balance of
Rs.12,60,000/-.
That Defendants 1 to 8 be ordered to pay
Rs.1,40,000/- as and by way of liquidated damages
for the breach of contract and the said amount of
Rs.1,40,000/- be allowed to be appropriated out of
the unpaid balance consideration of Rs.12,60,000/-
due and payable to the said Defendants 1 to 8.
That it may also be ordered that all public dues
payable by the Defendants 1 to 8 in respect [sic] of
the property in suit be paid by the plaintiff in the
account of the said Defendants and the amount so
paid be allowed to be appropriated out of the last
mentioned unpaid balance money payable to the
Defendants 1 to 8 for conveying the said property
to the plaintiff.
That the Defendants 1 to 8 be required to apply to
their respective Income-Tax Officers and to obtain
the respective Clearance Certificates for the sale
of the property in favour of the plaintiff. It may
further be ordered that if Defendants 1 to 8 or any
of them neglects to apply to their Income-Tax
Officers for obtaining the necessary Clearance
Certificates for the sale of the said property, then
an officer of this Hon’ble Court do make such
application on behalf of the concerned Defendants
1 to 8 and all costs of the said applications as also
any amounts demanded by the Taxation
authorities for issue of the requisite Clearance
Certificates be ordered to be deducted out of the
said amount of Rs.12,60,000/- and incase of a
short fall a decree for the additional amount
involved by passed in favour of the plaintiff against
the Defendants 1 to 8 jointly and severally.
That the Defendants 4 to 8 be required to produce
the Estate Duty Clearance Certificate in respect of
the conveyance of one quarter undivided right,
1
Page 12
(H)
(I)
(J)
II.
title and interest in the said property previously
belonging to Shri Din Dayal, the deceased husband
of Defendant No.4 and father of Defendants 5 to 8.
It may also be ordered that in case Defendants 4
to 8 neglect to obtain the Requisite Estate Duty
Clearance Certificate, then an Officer of this
Hon’ble Court do apply for the grant of the said
Estate Duty Clearance Certificates on behalf of
Defendants 4 to 8 and all costs of such
applications as also the payment of any dues
demanded by the Estate Duty Officer be allowed to
be deducted out of the balance consideration
money, if any, in the hands of the plaintiff and in
the event of the plaintiff being required to pay any
amount to the Taxation authorities, then a decree
for a like amount be passed in favour of the
plaintiff and the Defendants 1 to 8.
That Defendants 1 to 8 be also required to pay all
the public dues, lease money, and misuse charges,
if any pertaining to Bungalow No.9, Sunder Nagar,
New Delhi, and if they fail to do so, then the
plaintiff be required to pay all such dues, and a
decree for a like amount be passed in favour of the
plaintiff against Defendants 1 to 8 jointly and
severally.
That the Defendants 1 to 8 be ordered to hand
over all the antecedent original title deeds of the
property No.9, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi to the
plaintiff.
That pending the completion of all the jobs to be
undertaken and completed by the Defendants 1 to
8 as detailed above, the plaintiff be allowed to
deposit final balance amount if any, payable by the
said Defendants 1 to 8 in this Hon’ble Court and
the said balance may be ordered to be released to
the Defendants 1 to 8 only after they have fully
complied with their part of the contract, as
decreed by this Hon’ble Court.
That in the event of this Hon’ble court deciding
that for any reason whatsoever a decree for
specific performance is not to be allowed to the
plaintiff (which is not expected ):-
1
Page 13
Then in the alternative:
A decree for the refund of Rs.1,40,000/- alongwith
interest thereon at Rs.1.25 paise percent per
month or part of a month from the date of
payment viz. 30.7.80 to the date of receipt by the
plaintiff be passed in favour of the plaintiff against
the Defendants 1 to 8 jointly and severally and the
said Defendants may further be ordered to pay
Rs.11,00,000/- for breach of contract to the
plaintiff as and by way of damages, and the same
be decreed accordingly.
III.(A)That in the event that this Hon’ble Court holds that
Defendant No.9 is the owner of an undivided 1/24 th
right, title and interest in the said property, then a
decree for specific performance of the agreement
to sale dated 29/30.7.80 in respect of an undivided
23/24th right, title and interest in the said property
No.9, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi belonging to
Defendants 1 to 8 be granted in favour of the
plaintiff against the Defendants against the
payment of the agreed total consideration of
Rs.14,00,000/-.
(B) That the Defendants 1 to 8 be ordered to deliver
the actual, physical, joint possession of the said
entire property to the plaintiff and Defendant No.9
jointly except one garage, the possession whereof
has already been delivered to the plaintiff by
Defendants 1 to 8 in terms of the agreement to
sale referred to above.
(C) That Defendants 1 to 8 be ordered to pay
Rs.7,17,330/- to the Land and Development Officer
as the unearned increase in the value of the plot
No.9, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi, as also the other
dues demanded by the said Officer, and in case
the Defendants neglect to pay the said amounts
then the plaintiff be permitted to pay the above
amounts in the account of Defendants 1 to 8 and
to deduct the same out of the unpaid balance of
Rs.12,60,000/-.
1
Page 14
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
That Defendants 1 to 8 be ordered to pay
Rs.1,40,000/- as and by way of liquidated damages
for the breach of contract and the said amount of
Rs.1,40,000/- be allowed to be appropriated out of
the unpaid balance consideration of Rs.12,60,000/-
due and payable to the said Defendants 1 to 8.
That it may also be ordered that all public dues
payable by the Defendants 1 to 8 in respect of the
property in suit be paid by the plaintiff in the
account of the said Defendants 1 to 8 and the
amount so paid be allowed to be appropriated out
of the last mentioned unpaid balance money
payable to the Defendants 1 to 8 for conveying the
said property to the plaintiff.
that the Defendants 1 to 8 be required to apply to
their respective Income Tax Officers and to obtain
Clearance Certificate for the sale of the property in
favour of the plaintiff. It may further be ordered
that if Defendants 1 to 8 or any of them neglect to
apply to their Income Tax Officers for obtaining the
necessary Clearance Certificate for sale of the said
property, then an officer of this Hon’ble Court do
make such applications on behalf of the concerned
Defendants 1 to 8 and all costs for the making of
the said applications as also any amounts
demanded by the Taxation authorities for issue of
the requisite Clearance Certificates be ordered to
be deducted out of the said amount of
Rs.12,60,000/- and in case of a short fall a decree
for the additional amount involved be passed in
favour of the plaintiff against the Defendants 1 to
8 jointly and severally.
That the Defendants 4 to 8 be required to produce
the Estate Duty Clearance Certificate in respect of
the Conveyance of one-quarter undivided right,
title and interest in the said property previously
belonging to Shri Din Dayal, the deceased husband
of Defendant No.4, and father of Defendants 5 to
8. It may also be ordered that in case Defendants
4 to 8 or any of them, neglect to obtain the
requisite Estate Duty Clearance Certificate, then
an officer of this Hon’ble Court do apply for the
1
Page 15
(H)
(I)
(J)
grant of the said Estate Duty Clearance Certificate
on behalf of the Defendants 4 to 8 and all costs of
such applications as also the payment of any dues
demanded by the Estate Duty Officer be allowed to
be deducted out of the balance consideration
money, if any, in the hands of the plaintiff and in
the event of there being a short fall, the plaintiff be
required to pay the requisite amount to the
Taxation authorities and a decree for a like amount
be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the
Defendants 1 to 8, jointly and severally.
That the Defendants 1 to 8 be ordered to hand
over all the original title deeds of the property
No.9, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi to the plaintiff.
That pending the completion of all the jobs to be
undertaken and completed by Defendants 1 to 8,
the plaintiff be allowed to deposit the final balance
amount, if any, payable to the Defendants in this
Hon’ble court and the said balance may be
ordered to be released to the Defendants 1 to 8
only after they have fully complied with their part
of the contract as decreed by this Hon’ble Court.
The costs of the suit may also be awarded, to the
plaintiff against the Defendants 1 to 8.
30th day of April 1984
CORAM:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Yogeshwar Dayal
For the Plaintiff
: Mr. S. R. Bhagat, Advocate.
For the Defendants : Mr. G.L. Rawal, Advocate
for Deft. No.9.
The suit coming on this day for final disposal
before this Court in the presence of counsel for the
parties as aforesaid; it is ordered that a decree as
prayed by the plaintiff and the same is hereby
passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the
Defendants 1 to 8 only.
It is lastly ordered that Defendants 1 to 8
herein do pay to the plaintiff herein the cost of the
suit incurred by the latter as Rs.18,028.75p (Rs.
Eighteen Thousand Twenty Eight and Paise
1
Page 16
Seventy Five only) as taxed by the Taxing Officer
of this court and noted in the margin of this
decree.
Given under my hand and the seal of the
court this the 30th day of April, 1984.
Sd/
Dy. Registrar”
16. Appeal was dismissed as time barred. A few months
thereafter an Application under Order IX Rule 13 of
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was filed for setting
aside the ex parte decree. That too was dismissed. It
appears the vendors lost all hope and left things as
they were at that stage. It is seen from the pleadings
that attempts were also made for an out of court
settlement, but in vain.
17.
We do not think that the vendors would be justified
in setting up any defence on executability of the
decree both on law and facts of the case. At the risk
of redundancy, on referring to the facts, it can be
seen that the vendors had in fact wanted to fructify
the agreement for sale. Having received the advance
amount of Rs.1,40,000/-, they had parted possession
of a part of the property, viz., garage. They had jointly
made an application to the L&DO in terms of the
1
Page 17
agreement, for permission to transfer the property.
The L&DO did grant the permission but on condition
of deposit of an amount of Rs.7,17,330/- towards the
unearned increase, which is more than 50% of the
sale consideration. The value of the property had shot
up by that time. It is pertinent to note that as per the
original agreement, the unearned increase was to be
paid by the vendors. On account of the escalation, it
appears, their hearts started burning and they were
extremely reluctant to part with the property. Their
attempts thereafter have always been, one way or
the other, to delay, if not deny, their obligation for
conveyance of the property.
18. The main contention of the vendors is that that there
is no decree in terms of Section 2 (2) of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 because there is no formal
expression of adjudication and the court has not
conclusively determined the rights of the parties. But
it has to be seen that the vendors did not contest the
suit. They had not even filed a written statement. In
that context only, the suit was decreed as prayed for.
1
Page 18
In the Judgment dated 30.04.1984, the Court has
referred to the averments in the plaint. The opening
and concluding sentences of the Judgment read as
follows:
“Plaintiff, S. Kuldeep Singh has filed the present
suit against Shri Banarsi Dass and 8 others for
specific performance of an agreement to sell dated
29/30th July 1980. The agreement relates to plot
No.9, Block No.171 in the layout plan of the New
Capital of Delhi, now known as Bungalow No.9,
Sunder Nagar, New Delhi. ...
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
However, since the Defendants have failed to
file written statement, as directed in my order
dated 15th February, 1984, I proceed to pronounce
the judgment under the provisions of order 8 rule
10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and decree the
suit of the plaintiff as prayed for with costs against
Defendants 1 to 8 only as there is no relief prayed
against Defendant No.9.”
19. Having referred to the entire contentions of the
plaintiff, the Judgment was pronounced under Order
VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 since
there was no written statement. The Court has taken
the position that the defendants had failed to file
written statement. Therefore, the Court, in the facts
of the case, opted to pronounce the Judgment, under
1
Page 19
Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 and draw the decree accordingly.
20. No doubt, the decree passed under Order VIII Rule 10
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is an ex parte
decree. But merely because it is an ex parte decree,
the same does not cease to have the force of the
decree. It is a valid decree for all purposes.
21. It is also worthwhile to note that the Judgment was
pronounced under the pre-amended Rule 10 under
Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and
there was more discretion with the Court regarding
pronouncement of the Judgment in the absence of
written statement. Still further, it is to be noted that
Rule 10 speaks about the requirement of written
statement indicating thereby that there are cases
where written statement was required to be filed.
Written statement is the defense of the defendants.
They chose not to file it. Despite the absence of such
defense, the court still applied its mind and after
referring to the pleadings, pronounced a Judgment
allowing the suit for specific performance. Though the
2
Page 20
Judgment says that the suit is decreed as prayed for
and though all the prayers have been incorporated in
the decree, it is to be noted that the suit is one for
specific performance of the agreement. The suit that
has been decreed is the suit for specific performance
of the agreement. Once the decree for specific
performance attained finality, they cannot thereafter
turn round and make weak and lame contentions
regarding the executability of the decree.
22. If the suit for specific performance is not decreed as
prayed for, then alone the question of any reference
to the alternative relief would arise. Therefore, there
is no question of any ambiguity. As held by this Court
in Topanmal Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram
and Others3 and consistently followed thereafter,
even if there is any ambiguity, it is for the executing
court to construe the decree if necessary after
referring to the Judgment. If sufficient guidance is not
AIR 1960 Supreme Court 388 – Paragraph 4- “At the worst
the decree can be said to be ambiguous. In such a case it is
the duty of the executing Court to construe the decree. For
the purpose of interpreting a decree, when its terms are
ambiguous, the Court would certainly be entitled to look
into the pleadings and the Judgment. ...”
3
2
Page 21
available even from the Judgment, the Court is even
free to refer to the pleadings so as to construe the
true import of the decree. No doubt, the court cannot
go behind the decree or beyond the decree. But while
executing a decree for specific performance, the
Court, in case of any ambiguity, has necessarily to
construe the decree so as to give effect to the
intention of the parties. Thus, there is no question of
any alternate relief regarding the damages etc. in the
present
case
since
the
suit
for
the
specific
performance for the conveyance of the property has
been decreed.
23. There is no case that the court does not have
jurisdiction to pass the decree. Nor is there any case
that the decree is a nullity on account of any
jurisdictional error. Hence, the decree is executable
for all intents and purposes but limited to the shares
of the vendors. The claim of Rajinder Kumar would
depend on the outcome of the pending suit.
24. Now we shall deal with the issue regarding the
approach of the High Court in dealing with the
2
Page 22
application for rescission. Apparently, the purchaser-
Kuldeep Singh was also not quite serious in pursuing
the cause. Though the decree is dated 30.04.1984,
the execution petition was filed only after six and a
half years, on 07.11.1990. No doubt, it was within the
time prescribed by the law of limitation. But the efflux
of time assumes importance and seriousness in the
background of the escalation of price in real estate.
25. It is very strange that no serious steps have been
taken by the executing court for almost a decade.
While so, only on 24.04.1999, respondents 3 to 7 and
13 filed Application – IA No. 4274 of 1999 in the suit
for rescinding the agreement for sale. The main
ground taken in the Application for rescission of the
agreement was that the plaintiff/purchaser failed to
deposit the balance consideration of Rs.12,60,000/-. It
was also contended that between the date of decree
in 1984 and the date of filing the Application for
rescission, even the notified rates in land value shot
up from Rs.2,000/- per square yard to Rs.13,860/- per
square meter and the unearned increase would be
2
Page 23
around Rs.50,00,000/- and, thus, it would be highly
unjust, unconscionable and inequitable to compel the
vendors to make the payment of the unearned
increase. It was also averred that the vendors were
prepared to pay a reasonable compensation to the
purchaser. The purchaser-Kuldeep Singh in response
to the Application for rescission, stated that the court
had not fixed any time for deposit of the balance
amount, the balance amount was payable only on the
execution and registration of the conveyance deed.
He also contended that execution was possible only
on permission from the L&DO on payment of
unearned increase by the vendors and for which the
vendors are at fault in not having taken any serious
steps in completing their obligations under the
decree; and that the purchaser had always been
ready
and
willing
to
perform
his
part
of the
agreement.
26. By Order dated 23.02.2000, the learned Single Judge
dismissed the applications holding that the purchaser
was not at fault either in having done something or in
2
Page 24
not having done something which stood in the way of
the execution of the decree. On the contrary, it was
the vendors who did not perform their duties in the
sequence of events prior to and leading to the
registration of the sale deed. In short, it was held that
the vendors having not performed their obligations
under the agreement, they could not approach the
court for rescinding the agreement on the ground
that the purchaser had not deposited the balance
amount.
27. It is extremely important and crucially relevant to
note that the court did not advert to one of the main
contentions regarding the escalation in land value by
which the vendors had to incur the liability of around
four times the balance consideration by way of
payment of unearned increase to the
L&DO so as
to complete their obligation. It is pertinent also to
note that the said unconscionable liability for the
vendors arose only on account of the delayed
execution of the decree.
2
Page 25
28. It is significant to note that during the pendency of
the appeals, the purchaser sought permission of the
court to deposit the balance consideration and, on
06.01.2010, the same was granted. He, accordingly,
deposited some amounts towards the liability of
unearned income also.
29. It appears from the Order dated 06.01.2010 in FAO
(OS) No. 66 of 2002 that only oral submissions were
made for the deposit of balance consideration, by the
respondent-Kuldeep Singh. For the purpose of ready
reference, we may extract the Order as such:
“Learned counsel for Respondent No.1 (Kuldeep
Singh) says that the balance consideration in
terms of the contract entered into between the
parties will be deposited by his client on or before
11th
January,
2010.
Learned
counsel
for
Respondent No.1 also says that the unearned
increase that is required to be calculated by the L
and DO has not yet been so calculated but his
client is prepared to deposit an amount of Rs. 10
lakhs on account in this regard. This amount will
be deposited with the Registrar General of this
Court on or before 11th January, 2010.
List for directions on 12th January, 2010.
Arguments have been heard and concluded and
judgment is reserved. The matter is listed on 12 th
January, 2010 only for compliance with regard to
the deposit.”
2
Page 26
30. We have referred to above development to keep in
mind one significant and important aspect of the
matter that the vendors did not get an opportunity to
make their response to the oral submission made by
the purchaser with regard to deposit of the balance
consideration, after passage of around 26 years after
the decree.
31. Having regard to the facts and circumstances which
we have discussed above, we are afraid the High
Court has not made an attempt to balance equity. As
in the case of a decree for specific performance
where equity weighs with the court so is the situation
in considering an application under Section 28 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 for rescinding the contract.
Under
Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963, a vendor is free to apply to the Court which
made decree to have the contract rescinded in case
the purchaser has not paid the purchase money or
other sum which the Court has ordered him to pay
within the period allowed by the decree or such other
period
as
the
court
may
allow.
On
such
an
2
Page 27
application, the Court may, by order, rescind the
contract “as the justice of the case may require”. It is
now settled law that a suit for specific performance
does not come to an end on passing of a decree and
the Court which passed the decree retains control
over the decree even after the decree has been
passed and the decree is sometimes described as the
preliminary decree.
32. In Hungerford Investment Trust Limited (In
Voluntary Liquidation) v. Haridas Mundhra and
Others4, it has been held that:
“22. It is settled by a long course of decisions of
the Indian High Courts that the Court which passes
a decree for specific performance retains control
over the decree even after the decree has been
passed. In Mahommadalli Sahib v. Abdul Khadir
Saheb (1930) MLJ Vol. 59, p.351 it was held that
the Court which passes a decree for specific
performance has the power to extend the time
fixed in the decree for the reason that Court
retains control over the decree, that the contract
between the parties is not extinguished by the
passing of a decree for specific performance and
that the contract subsists notwithstanding the
passing of the decree. ...”
(Emphasis supplied)
4
(1972) 3 SCC 684.
2
Page 28
33. The discretionary power vested in court by Section 28
of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is intended to apply in
such circumstances:
“The effect of this provision is to empower the
court which passed the decree for specific
performance to rescind the contract and set aside
the decree which it has passed earlier if the
successful plaintiff failed to comply with the terms
of the decree by making payment of the purchase
money or other sums which the court ordered him
to pay. ...5”
(Emphasis supplied)
34. The decree for specific performance is a decree in
favour of both the plaintiff and the defendant in the
suit,
as
held
by
this
Court
in
Hungerford
Investment Trust Limited case (supra). Hence, the
decree can be executed either by the plaintiff or the
defendant.
35. The plaintiff or the defendant is also free to approach
the court for appropriate clarification/directions in the
event of any ambiguity or supervening factors
making the execution of the decree inexecutable. To
quote Fry (ibid) (please see Pages-546-548):
Pollock & Mulla, The Indian Contract and Specific Relief
Acts, 14th Edition, Page 2064.
5
2

“1170. It may and not unfrequently does happen
that after judgment has been given for the specific
performance of a contract, some further relief
becomes necessary, in consequence of one or
other of the parties making default in the
performance of something which ought under the
judgment to be performed by him or on his part ;
as, for instance, where a vendor refuses or in
unable to execute a proper conveyance of the
property, or a purchaser to pay the purchase-
money. The character of the consequential relief
appropriate to any particular case will of course
vary according to the nature of the subject-matter
of the contract and the position which the applicant
occupies in the transaction; but in every case the
application must, under the present practice, be
made only to the Court by which the judgment was
pronounced, and the multiplicity of legal
proceedings which sometimes occurred before the
fusion of the jurisdictions of the Courts of Chancery
and Common Law is now practically impossible.
1171. There are two kinds of relief after judgment
for specific performance of which either party to
the contract may, in a proper case, avail himself.
1172.(i.) He may obtain (on motion in the action)
an order appointing a definite time and place for
completion of the contract by payment of the
unpaid purchase-money and delivery over of the
executed conveyance and title-deeds, or a period
within which the judgment is to be obeyed, and, if
the other party fails to obey the order, may
thereupon at once issue a writ of sequestration
against the defaulting party’s estate and effects.
Furthermore, if the default was in the payment of
money, the plaintiff may issue his fi.fa. or elegit: if
in some act other than or besides the payment of
money, he may move, on notice to the defaulter,
for a writ of attachment against him. Indeed, in a
case where a person who had agreed to accept a
lease would not, though ordered by the Court to do
so, execute the lease, it was held that an

attachment was the only means to which the Court
could resort for enforcing such execution.
1173. (ii.) He may apply to the Court (by motion in
the action) for an order rescinding the contract. On
an application of this kind, if it appears that the
party moved against has positively refused to
complete the contract, its immediate rescission
may be ordered : otherwise, the order will be for
rescission in default of completion within a limited
time. And where a deposit has been paid, and
there is no condition of the contract determining,
expressly or impliedly, what is to be done with it in
the event of such a rescission, the Court will
decline to order the deposit to be returned to a
defaulting purchaser. An order for the defendant to
pay the plaintiff’s costs, and a stay of further
proceedings in the action, except such proceedings
as may be necessary for recovery of the costs of
the action and the costs of the motion, may also be
obtained on this application. A vendor plaintiff is
not debarred from moving for an order for
rescission by the fact that the judgment at the trial
contained a declaration of his vendor’s lien, and
gave him liberty to apply as to enforcing it.
In some cases the order has expressly excepted
from the stay of proceedings any application to the
Court to award and assess damages sustained by
the plaintiff’s by reason or in consequence of the
breach of contract. In Henty v. Schroder (12
Ch.D.666), however, Jessel M.R. declined to make
this exception, consider that the plaintiffs could not
at the same time obtain an order to have the
contract rescinded and claim damages for the
breach of it. If this be so, it would seem that in
many cases the Court must fail to give the plaintiff
the full measure of relief requisite for replacing him
in the position in which he stood before the
contract,-the repayment, for instance, of expenses
incurred by him in showing his title.”
(Emphasis supplied)
36. Dealing with a situation where deterioration takes
place by the conduct, according to Fry (ibid) (please
see Page 654):
“1431. If, after the contract and before the
purchaser takes, or ought to take, possession, any
deterioration take place by the conduct of the
vendor or his tenants, he will be accountable for it
to the purchaser. “He is not entitled to treat the
estate as his own. If he willfully damages or injures
it, he is liable to the purchaser ; and more than
that, he is liable if he does not take reasonable
care of it.” And this liability may be enforced by
action, even after a conveyance made in ignorance
of the facts.
1432. Where a purchaser had paid his money into
Court under an order, and was held entitled to
compensation for deterioration, which had taken
place while the vendors retained possession, he
was allowed the amount out of his purchase-
money, with interest at 4 per cent., and the costs
of an issue to ascertain the amount of damage.”
(Emphasis supplied)
37. In the instant case, converse is the position. If the
purchaser is entitled to claim compensation for
deterioration,
a fortiori it must be held that
vendor should also be entitled to compensation for
accretion in value of the subject matter of the
agreement for specific performance, in case the
execution thereof is unduly delayed by the purchaser.
Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act provides that the

court has to pass an order as the justice of the case
may require. Justice is not an abstract proposition. It
is a concrete reality. The parties on approaching the
court must get the feeling that justice has been done
in
the
facts
and
circumstances
of
the
case,
particularly in specific performance related cases, in
terms of equity, equality and fairness.
38. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is very
difficult to balance the equity and balance the rights
of both the parties in the background of their
conduct. No doubt there was no time fixed in the
agreement for payment of the purchase money. That
was also contingent on a series of obligations to be
performed by the vendor and the duty of the
purchaser to pay the purchase money was only
thereafter. But if we closely analyze the pleadings
and submissions, we can see that the purchaser had
made an attempt, though belatedly, for getting the
obligations performed even at his expense.
39. The plaintiff purchaser very well knew that the
vendors have been delaying the performance of their

obligation under the agreement and things were
getting complicated. It was open to the plaintiff, in
such circumstances, to file an application, rather he
ought to have filed an application in court on the
original side for appropriate direction with regard to
the payment of purchase money and for other
procedural formalities. Despite the application filed
by the vendor for rescission of the agreement in
1999, for the first time, an oral prayer was made by
the purchaser before the court for the deposit of
balance of purchase money only in the year 2010.
That
too
was
Consequently,
merely
the
an
oral
defendants
submission.
never
had
an
opportunity to respond to the same or contest the
proposition. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that in
the peculiar factual background of this case, the
plaintiff purchaser was also at fault in not taking
prompt steps.
40. In this context, one more reference to Hungerford
Investment
Trust
Limited
(supra)
would
be
relevant:

“25. It was contended on behalf of Mundhra that
he was always ready and willing to pay the
purchase money, but since the decree did not
specify any time for payment of the money, there
was no default on his part. In other words, the
contention was that since the decree did not
specify a time within which the purchase money
should be paid and, since an application for fixing
the time was made by the appellant and dismissed
by the Court, Mundhra cannot be said to have
been in default in not paying the purchase money
so that the Appellant might apply for rescission of
the decree. If a contract does not specify the time
for performance, the Law will imply that the parties
intended that the obligation under the contract
should be performed within a reasonable time.
Section 46 of the Contract Act provides that where,
by a contract, a promiser is to perform his promise
without application by the promise, and no time for
performance is specified, the engagement must be
performed within a reasonable time and the
question "what is reasonable time" is, in each
particular case, a question of fact. ...”
(Emphasis supplied)
41. Analyzing the conduct of the vendors-defendants
also, one can see that they are equally at fault. In the
contract, no time was fixed for payment and,
therefore, the purchaser was obliged to pay the
purchase money within a reasonable time. Owing to
the laches or lapses on the part of the parties in case
there is any insurmountable difficulty, hardship or, on
account of subsequent development, any inequitable
situation had
arisen, either
party was free to

approach the court for appropriate direction. Though
the suit was decreed in the year 1984 and execution
petition filed in 1990, the application for rescission
was filed only in the year 1999.
42. In Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd.
and Others6, it has been held by this Court:
“6. It is true that grant of decree of specific
performance lies in the discretion of the court and
it is also well settled that it is not always necessary
to grant specific performance simply for the reason
that it is legal to do so. It is further well settled that
the court in its discretion can impose any
reasonable condition including payment of an
additional amount by one party to the other while
granting
or
refusing
decree
of
specific
performance. Whether the purchaser shall be
directed to pay an additional amount to the seller
or converse would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of a case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is
not to be denied the relief of specific performance
only on account of the phenomenal increase of
price during the pendency of litigation. That may
be, in a given case, one of the considerations
besides many others to be taken into consideration
for refusing the decree of specific performance. As
a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the
plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone,
the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the
value of the property during the pendency of the
litigation. While balancing the equities, one of the
consideration to be kept in view is as to who is the
defaulting party. It is also to be borne in mind
whether a party is trying to take undue advantage
over the other as also the hardship that may be
6
(2002) 8 SCC 146

caused to the defendant by directing the specific
performance. There may be other circumstances
on which parties may not have any control. The
totality of the circumstances is required to be
seen.”
(Emphasis supplied)
In the above case, this Court balanced the equity by
directing
payment
of Rs.6,25,000/-
in the
place
of
Rs.25,000/-.
43. In Satya Jain (Dead) Through Lrs. and Others v.
Anis Ahmed Rushdie (Dead) Through Lrs. and
Others7, it has been held that:
“38. The ultimate question that has now to be
considered is: whether the plaintiff should be held
to be entitled to a decree for specific performance
of the agreement of 22-12-1970?
39. The long efflux of time (over 40 years)
that has occurred and the galloping value of real
estate in the meantime are the twin inhibiting
factors in this regard. The same, however, have to
be balanced with the fact that the plaintiffs are in
no way responsible for the delay that has occurred
and their keen participation in the proceedings till
date show the live interest on the part of the
plaintiffs to have the agreement enforced in law.
40. The discretion to direct specific
performance of an agreement and that too after
elapse of a long period of time, undoubtedly, has
to be exercised on sound, reasonable, rational and
acceptable principles. The parameters for the
exercise of discretion vested by Section 20 of the
7
(2013) 8 SCC 131

Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot be entrapped
within any precise expression of language and the
contours thereof will always depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. The ultimate
guiding test would be the principles of fairness and
reasonableness as may be dictated by the peculiar
facts of any given case, which features the
experienced judicial mind can perceive without
any real difficulty. It must however be emphasized
that efflux of time and escalation of price of
property, by itself, cannot be a valid ground to
deny the relief of specific performance. Such a
view has been consistently adopted by this Court.
By way of illustration opinions rendered in P.S.
Ranakrishna Reddy v. M.K. Bhagyalakshmi8: and
more recently in Narinderjit Singh v. North Star
Estate
Promoters
Ltd.9
may
be
usefully
recapitulated.
41. The twin inhibiting factors identified
above if are to be read as a bar to the grant of a
decree of specific performance would amount to
penalizing the plaintiffs for no fault on their part; to
deny them the real fruits of a protracted litigation
wherein the issues arising are being answered in
their favour. From another perspective it may also
indicate the inadequacies of the law to deal with
the long delays that, at times, occur while
rendering the final verdict in a given case. The
aforesaid two features, at best, may justify award
of additional compensation to the vendor by grant
of a price higher than what had been stipulated in
the agreement which price, in a given case, may
even be the market price as on date of the order of
the final Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
44. The circle rate of the residential property based on
which the unearned increase is calculated by the
8
9
(2007) 10 SCC 231
(2012) 5 SCC 712

L&DO, would show a sharp increase during the
period. Sunder Nagar comes under Category ‘A’
colonies. Under the Delhi Stamp (Prevention of
Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 2007, the
notified circle rate for Category ‘A’ colonies from July
2007 was Rs.43,000/- per square meter and from
February 8, 2011, it was Rs.86,000/- per square
meter. From November 16, 2011, it was Rs.2,15,000/-
per square meter and from January 5, 2012, it is
Rs.6,45,000/- per square meter.
45. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
we are of the view that the trial court should have
passed an equitable order while considering the
application for rescission. Having regard to the fact
that the decree was passed in 1984, we feel that it
would be unjust and unfair to relegate the parties to
the trial court at this distance of time. For doing
complete justice to the parties, we are of the view
that it is a case where the purchaser should be
directed to pay the land value to the vendors as per
the circle rate notified for the residential property in

Category ‘A’ colonies prevailing during November 16,
2011 to January 5, 2012, at the rate of Rs.2,15,000/-
per square meter. The purchaser shall also be liable
to meet the liability arising by way of unearned
increase to be paid to the Land and Development
Office. He is free to withdraw the amounts deposited
by him in the court as per order dated 06.01.2010. It
is also ordered that in case the plaintiff does not
deposit the amount to be paid to the vendors within
three months from today, the vendors shall deposit in
court within two months thereafter the amount
calculated as per the circle rate referred to above by
way of compensation to be paid to the purchaser, and
in which event, they shall stand discharged of their
obligations under the contract and the decree. In the
event of the purchaser depositing the amount as
above, the execution proceedings shall be finalized
within another one month. The Court in seisin of the
Suit OS No. 1428 of 1981 shall dispose of the same
within three months from today.

46. The Appeal filed by Rajinder Kumar [arising out of SLP
(C) No. 19215/2011] is dismissed and the other
Appeals are partly allowed as above. There is no
order as to costs.
..............................................J.
(CHANDRAMAULI KR.
PRASAD)
...............................................J.
(KURIAN JOSEPH)
New Delhi;
February 07, 2014.