have not filed affidavit, his case is unrebutted is without any
merit.
A contempt matter is essentially between the
contemnor and the court. On the basis of the record and the
attendant circumstances the court has to decide whether
there is any contempt or not.
No doubt, the respondents
could have filed an affidavit, but merely because there is no
affidavit, the contemnor cannot escape his liability.
The
facts of the case are gross. The contempt is in the face of
High Court.
The fact that the respondents have not
affidavit in reply does not dilute the contempt
committed by the appellant.
In the ultimate analysis we are of the view that the High
Court cannot be faulted for punishing the appellant for
contempt of court.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1240 OF 2004
Ram Niranjan Roy
Versus
State of Bihar and Ors.
Citation;2014 (2) crimes 109 SC
(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
1.
A petition was filed in public interest in the Patna High
Court being C.W.J.C. No. 1311 of 2003 by Bihar Vyavsayik
Sangharsh Morcha and another raising several issues
relating to law and order problem in the State of Bihar. The
State of Bihar, the Director General of Police of Bihar and
others were made party respondents.
The issues raised
inter alia were whether the respondents were duty bound to
provide safe and healthy atmosphere for
the proper
development of the State or not and whether the inaction of
the
respondents
was
violative
of
fundamental
rights
guaranteed under Articles 19 and 20 of the Constitution of
India.
The petitioner inter alia sought direction to the
respondents to take measures to stop exploitation of
shopkeepers, dealers, artisans, labourers and industrial units
by officers and police personnel.
2.
The High Court issued notices to the respondents
pursuant to which they filed affidavits. On 14/08/2003 the
High Court directed the Director General of Police to make a
list of officers from the Station House Officers upto the
Additional Director General of Police, of those who have
remained in their station for more than four years. Relevant
paragraphs from the High Court’s order could be quoted:
“The court suggests the following measures as an
ad interim exercise:
a)
Let the Director General Police make out a
list of officers from the Station House Officer upto
the Additional Director General of Police, of those
who have remained in their station for more than
four years. This dossier is to be supported with
information from service record as to which officer
throughout their career has remained at which
station and for how long.
Officers who have
remained at one station for over four years must
see a posting out within six weeks from today.
These would be officers below the rank of
Inspector General of Police. Staff below the SHOs
who have remained at a particular station beyond
three years will be identified by the District heads
of police concerned and their movement will be
undertaken by the Director General of Police.
It must be mentioned that the period of four
years is set because in the normal course of
government service, transfers and postings are
made for officers if they have been at a particular
station for more than three years. This order
obviously does not preclude the Director General
of Police from making any transfers should an
officer have been at a posting for a lesser period,
which is within normal administrative powers.”
3.
In December, 2003, the appellant, who was holding the
post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Investigation
Department (CID), Bihar, filed an intervention application
being I.A.No.5588 of 2003.
The appellant claimed in the
application that he was the President of Bihar Police Seva
Sangh, a service association of members of Bihar Police
Service. He stated in the application that the transfers and
postings of the officers of Bihar Police Service were done
arbitrarily in violation of guiding principles framed by the
Home Department of Government of Bihar.
The appellant
referred to a Writ Application filed by him being C.W.J.C.
No.12225 of 1999 against the State of Bihar for an order
directing the respondents to implement the said guiding
principles. He stated that the said writ application has been
pending in the High Court for last four years during which
the government has tried to victimize him mala fide.
He
further stated that his application should be heard along with
the C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003. He, therefore, prayed that he
may be impleaded in C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003.
4.
Admittedly, the appellant is posted at Patna for several
years. It is clear from several orders that the High Court has
passed in this matter that while dealing with the question of
law and order situation in Bihar, the High Court was looking
into the State Government’s policy of postings and transfer
of police officers, obviously because that has a direct bearing
on efficiency and rectitude of the police officers.
The High
Court even recorded the statement of the Advocate General
that certain transfers of police officers are being effected.
The appellant was unhappy and disturbed about the task
undertaken by the High Court. This is evident from the first
paragraph of his intervention application where he has
referred to the order passed by the High Court directing the
respondents to submit a list of officers who have not been
removed from their station for more than four years. It is
this that made him intervene in C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003.
5.
The appellant wanted his writ application pending in the
Patna High Court to be heard with C.W.J.C. No. 1311 of 2003.
We have, therefore, carefully gone through that petition.
The appellant wants to create an impression that he is
fighting for the cause of police officers of Bihar, but a careful
reading of his application makes it clear that he is espousing
his own cause. He has stated that he is continuously posted
for seven years in Cabinet Vigilance Department.
He has
stated that his posting in Criminal Investigation Department
is wrong and he should be posted as Sub Divisional Police
Officer anywhere in Patna or in any other proper office such
as traffic or transport department in Patna, so that he may
do government duties and
take over the responsibility as
the President of Bihar Police Seva Sangh. We shall advert to
this Seva Sangh a little later, but, suffice it to say at this
stage
that
the
appellant’s
pending
writ
application
concentrates on his posting and he figures in the prayer
clause also.
6.
From
the
impugned
order
it
appears
that
on
27/01/2004, the appellant appeared in-person before the
High Court.
He shouted and told the court that he was
intervener and that the High Court has not focused its
attention on the wrong policies of transfers within the police
department.
He raised his voice with impertinence and
declared that the High Court is not taking up his case
wherein he has challenged his transfer and posting made in
the police department.
Learned Judges, then, asked him
whether he had been granted leave by the Director General
of Police to present his case. He again shouted at the court
and stated that he had applied for leave but whether leave is
granted to him or not is not the concern of the court. The
High Court has observed that he could not show to the court
that
leave
had
been
granted
to
him
by
the
Police
Headquarters to argue his case in-person and challenge
transfer policy of the police department. The High Court has
further observed that the appellant baited the court.
He
wanted his writ application to be considered out-of-turn on
the ground that it was concerning transfers and postings of
police officers.
The High Court, therefore, called for the
record, perused the appellant’s application and found out
that it mainly related to his own transfer. The appellant,
then, claimed to be an office bearer of Bihar Police Seva
Sangh and stated that the Police Manual has declared him a
member of the protected staff and he has immunity from
transfers and he cannot be touched. He produced a letter
addressed by a Cabinet Minister to the Chief Minister of
Bihar
questioning
why
he
was
transferred
from
one
establishment to another, though, within the city. The said
letter is quoted in the impugned order. It appears from the
impugned order that the appellant did not show the slightest
Page 7
8
remorse nor regret and instead continued to bait the court
and repeat that even the Minister had given him protection
and had granted stay of his transfer.
In view of this
contumacious behaviour, the High Court directed that the
appellant may be taken into custody by the Court Officer and
the Sergeant and sent to jail as punishment for a day i.e. for
twenty four hours.
rejected.
His intervention application came to be
Aggrieved by this order, the appellant has
approached this Court.
7.
The appellant
appeared in-person.
Looking to the
importance of the matter, we requested Mr. Siddharth
Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General, to assist us. As
usual, Mr. Luthra has rendered remarkable assistance to this
Court.
We heard the appellant at some length.
submitted that he is not guilty of contempt of court.
He
He
submitted that he has highest regard for the court and he
never shouted in the court as stated in the impugned order.
He submitted that he is the President of the Bihar Police
Seva Sangh and is espousing the cause of police officers in
Page 8
9
general. On a query made by this Court, whether the Bihar
Police Seva Sangh is a registered society or whether it has
got any recognition, he submitted that the application in that
behalf is pending.
The Bihar Police Seva Sangh, however,
has not received any recognition so far. He submitted that
the respondents have not refuted any of his contentions by
filing any affidavit in reply. He drew our attention to Section
14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and submitted that
no opportunity, as contemplated therein, was given to him to
make his defence.
He submitted that he had filed an
application for bail. However, no order was passed thereon.
He further submitted that the High Court has unnecessarily
cast aspersions on him. He urged that the impugned order
may be set aside.
8.
Mr. Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General, on the
other hand, submitted that the appellant is guilty of
contempt committed in the face of the High Court and his
case is covered by the judgment of this Court in Leila
Page 9
10
David(6)
v.
State of Maharashtra and Others 1 where
this Court has observed that when a contemnor disrupts the
court
proceedings
by
using
offensive
language,
it
is
permissible to adopt summary proceedings to punish him.
Mr. Luthra further submitted that the appellant tried to get
his personal application tagged to the Public Interest
Litigation petition for his personal gain and he utilized a
letter of a Cabinet Minister to overawe the court. Besides,
he produced incorrect copy of the impugned order in this
Court. He claimed that he had filed bail application when no
such application is found in the record. He has committed
breach of undertaking given in the affidavit filed in this
Court.
Mr. Luthra submitted that no leniency should be
shown to such a person and the appeal may, therefore, be
dismissed.
9.
We have extensively referred to the contents of the
impugned order of the High Court with a purpose. It reflects
the appellant’s rude behaviour. The intemperate language
used by the appellant while addressing learned Judges of the
1
(2009) 10 SCC 337
Page 10
11
High Court is most objectionable and contumacious.
The
appellant is Deputy Superintendent of Police. He claims to
be the President of Bihar Police Seva Sangh. A responsible
police officer is not expected to behave in such undignified
and unruly manner in the Court. He shouted at the Judges.
When they asked him whether the police headquarters had
granted him any permission to argue his case in-person and
challenge transfer policy of the police department, he rudely
stated that that was not the concern of the court. He was,
however, unable to produce any permission. Thereafter, he
told the court that his application should be heard along with
Public Interest Litigation as it related to postings and
transfers of police officers. On scrutiny, it was found that it
mainly related to his transfer.
statement before the Court.
Thus, he made a wrong
He, then, stated that he is a
protected staff member and has immunity from transfer and
he cannot be touched.
He tried to overawe the court by
producing a Cabinet Minister’s letter addressed to the Chief
Minister recommending his case.
He did not show any
remorse. He did not tender any apology, but, continued his
Page 11
12
rude behaviour of shouting at the court and baiting the
court.
By this behaviour he lowered the dignity and
authority of the High Court. He challenged the majesty of
the
High
Court
by
showing
utter
disrespect
to
it.
Undoubtedly he committed contempt of the High Court in its
presence and hearing.
He is, therefore, guilty of having
committed contempt in the face of the High Court. His case
is squarely covered by Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971.
10. In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra2, on a question put to
him by a Judge of the Allahabad High Court, the contemnor,
who was an advocate, started shouting at the Judge and told
him that the question could not have been put to him and he
would get the Judge transferred or see that impeachment
motion is brought against him in Parliament. He made more
such derogatory comments.
Learned Judge addressed a
letter to the Acting Chief Justice narrating the incident. The
Acting Chief Justice forwarded the letter to the then Chief
2
(1995) 2 SCC 584
Page 12
13
Justice of India.
This Court, then, issued a notice to the
advocate taking a view that there was a prima facie case of
the criminal contempt of the court. This Court treated the
said contempt as criminal contempt committed in the face of
the High Court and sentenced the advocate.
Commenting
on the contemnor’s conduct, this Court observed as under:
“To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to be
disrespectful to him, to question his authority to
ask the questions, to shout at him, to threaten him
with transfer and impeachment, to use insulting
language and abuse him, to dictate the order that
he should pass, to create scenes in the court, to
address him by losing temper are all acts
calculated to interfere with and obstruct the
course of justice. Such acts tend to overawe the
court and to prevent it from performing its duty to
administer justice. Such conduct brings the
authority of the court and the administration of
justice into disrespect and disrepute and
undermines and erodes the very foundation of the
judiciary by shaking the confidence of the people
in the ability of the court to deliver free and fair
justice.”
The above observations of this Court have a bearing on
the present case.
Page 13
14
11. In Ranveer Yadav
v.
State of Bihar 3
the
appellant and the other contemnors disrupted the court
proceedings by aggressively exchanging heated words and
created unpleasant scenes in the Court. The decorum and
dignity of the court was so much threatened that the Judge
was forced to rise. This Court held that the offending acts of
the appellant constitute contempt in the face of the court.
The relevant paragraph could be quoted.
“The offending acts of the appellant constitute
contempt in the face of court. When contempt
takes place in the face of the court, peoples’ faith
in the administration of justice receives a severe
jolt and precious judicial time is wasted. Therefore,
the offending acts of the appellant certainly come
within the ambit of interference with the due
course of judicial proceeding and are a clear case
of criminal contempt in the face of the court.”
12. The appellant’s contention that no opportunity was
given to him to make his defence must be rejected.
Pritam Pal
v.
In
High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Jabalpur, through Registrar4, while dealing with the
nature and scope of power conferred upon this Court and the
3
4
(2010) 11 SCC 493
1993 Supp (1) SCC 529
Page 14
15
High Court, being courts of record under Articles 129 and
215 of the Constitution of India respectively, this Court
observed that the said power is an inherent power under
which the Supreme Court and the High Court can deal with
contempt of itself. The jurisdiction vested is a special one
not derived from any other statute but derived only from
Articles 129 and 215.
This Court further clarified that the
constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged,
abrogated or cut down by legislation including the Contempt
of Courts Act.
13. In Leila David(6)
this Court has
contempt in the face of the Court.
petitioners
discussed what is
In
this case, the
made contumacious allegations in the writ
petition and supporting affidavits. Notices were
them why
as to
issued to
contempt proceedings
them. The hearing commenced. The
writ petitioners disrupted the very offensive, intemperate
be issued
a
against
and
should
proceedings
abusive
by
not
using
language
at
high pitch. One of the petitioners stated that the Judges
Page 15
16
should be jailed by initiating proceedings against them and
threw footwear at the Judges. The petitioners stood by what
they had said and done in the Court.
One of the learned
Judges felt that there was no need to issue notice to the
petitioners and held them guilty of criminal contempt of the
court. The other learned Judge observed that the mandate
of Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 must be
followed before sending the contemnors to jail. The question
was, therefore, whether the petitioners were entitled to any
opportunity of hearing.
The matter was thereafter placed
before a three Judge Bench. The three Judge Bench resolved
the difference of opinion and observed as under:
“Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act no
doubt contemplates issuance of notice and an
opportunity to the contemnors to answer the
charges in the notice to satisfy the principles of
natural justice. However, where an incident of the
instant nature takes place within the presence and
sight of the learned Judges, the same amounts to
contempt in the face of the Court and is required
to be dealt with at the time of the incident itself.
This is necessary for the dignity and majesty of
the courts to be maintained. When an object, such
as a footwear, is thrown at the Presiding Officer in
a court proceeding, the object is not to merely
scandalise or humiliate the Judge, but to
Page 16
17
scandalise the institution itself and thereby lower
its dignity in the eyes of the public.”
14. Thus, when a contempt is committed in the face of the
High Court or the Supreme Court to scandalize or humiliate
the Judge, instant action may be necessary. If the courts do
not deal with such contempt with strong hand, that may
result in scandalizing the institution thereby lowering its
dignity in the eyes of the public.
The courts exist for the
people. The courts cherish the faith reposed in them by
people. To prevent erosion of that faith, contempts
committed in the face of the court need a strict treatment.
The appellant, as observed by the High Court was not
remorseful. He did not file any affidavit tendering apology
nor did he orally tell the High Court that he was remorseful
and he wanted to tender apology. Even in this Court he has
not tendered apology.
Therefore, since the contempt was
gross and it was committed in the face of the High Court,
learned Judges had to take immediate action to maintain
honour and dignity of the High Court. There was no question
of giving the appellant any opportunity to make his defence.
Page 17
18
This submission of the appellant must, therefore, be
rejected.
15. In this Court also the appellant’s behaviour is far from
satisfactory. He told us that he had filed an application for
bail in the High Court, but the High Court did not consider it.
The bail application attached at Annexure-A/6 to the petition
is unsigned, supported by unsigned affidavit bearing no
name of the lawyer.
We have gone through the entire
record of the High Court and we find that there is no bail
application in the record. Still worse is the tampering of the
impugned order. The appellant has not filed the true copy of
the impugned order.
The first sentence of paragraph 4 of
the copy of the impugned order filed in this Court reads as
under:
“The intervenor who presents himself in person
otherwise a police officer didn’t shout at the Court
that he is an intervenor in this case....”
Page 18
19
However, in the original impugned order
the said
sentence does not have the words ‘didn’t shout.’ It reads
as under:
“the intervenor who presents himself in person
otherwise a police officer shouted at the Court
that he is an intervenor in this case.......”
Thus, the words ‘didn’t shout’ have
word ‘shouted.’
replaced the
When we asked for an explanation, the
appellant stated that there is no tampering, but it is merely a
typing error. We refuse to accept this explanation.
In this
case, by replacing the word ‘shouted’ by the words ‘didn’t
shout’ the appellant has changed the entire meaning of the
sentence to suit his case that he did not shout in the court.
Thus, he is guilty of tampering with the High Court’s order
and filing it in this Court.
This would, in our opinion, be
criminal contempt as defined by Section 2(c) of the
Contempt of Court Act, 1971.
There is abundance of
judgments of this Court on this issue. This Court has taken a
strict view of such conduct.
Chandra Shashi
5
v.
We may usefully refer to
Anil Kumar Verma 5 where in a
(1995) 1 SCC 421
Page 19
20
transfer
petition
the
contemnor
had
filed
a
forged
experience certificate purportedly issued by the Principal of
a college from Nagpur. The Principal filed affidavit stating
that the said certificate is forged. This Court observed that
an act which interferes or tends to interfere or obstructs or
tends to obstruct the administration of justice would be
criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971.
This Court further observed that if
recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same
would definitely hinder, hamper or impede even flow of
justice and would prevent the courts from performing their
legal duties as they are supposed to do.
The contemnor
was, therefore, suitably sentenced.
16.
In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh6 a forged/fabricated
order of this court was used for the purpose of conferring
some benefits on a group of persons. This Court took a strict
view of the matter and observed as under:
“The law of contempt of court is essentially meant
for keeping the administration of justice pure and
6
(2001) 5 SCC 501
undefiled. It is difficult to rigidly define contempt.
While on the one hand, the dignity of the court has
to be maintained at all costs, it must also be borne
in mind that the contempt jurisdiction is of a
special nature and should be sparingly used. The
Supreme Court is the highest court of record and
it is charged with the duties and responsibilities of
protecting the dignity of the court. To discharge its
obligation as the custodian of the administration
of justice in the country and as the highest court
imbued with supervisory and appellate jurisdiction
over all the lower courts and tribunals, it is
inherently deemed to have been entrusted with
the power to see that the stream of justice in the
country remains pure, that its course is not
hindered or obstructed in any manner, that justice
is delivered without fear or favour. To discharge
this obligation, the Supreme Court has to take
cognizance of the deviation from the path of
justice. The sole object of the court wielding its
power to punish for contempt is always for the
course of administration of justice. Nothing is
more incumbent upon the courts of justice than to
preserve
their
proceedings
from
being
misrepresented, nor is there anything more
pernicious when the order of the court is forged
and produced to gain undue advantage. Criminal
contempt has been defined in Section 2(c) to
mean interference with the administration of
justice in any manner. A false or misleading or a
wrong statement deliberately and wilfully made by
a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable
order
would
undoubtedly
tantamount
to
interference with the due course of judicial
proceedings. When a person is found to have
utilised an order of a court which he or she knows
to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons
who are not entitled to the same, the very
utilisation of the fabricated order by the person
concerned would be sufficient to hold him/her
guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact
whether he or she himself or herself is the author
of fabrication.”
We respectfully concur with these observations.
17. We shall now turn to the affidavit filed by the appellant
in this Court.
He has sworn an affidavit stating that the
annexures of the criminal appeal are the true copies of the
originals and the facts stated in the criminal appeal are true
to his knowledge. As already noted by us, the appellant has
tampered with the original impugned order. He stated that
he had filed a bail application in the High Court. The copy of
the said bail application filed in this Court is unsigned and
supported by unsigned affidavit bearing no name of the
lawyer.
The appellant has not made the Registrar of the
Patna High Court party to the appeal. The Registrar could
have clarified whether any bail application was, in fact, filed
by the appellant. In any case, we have perused the record
and we find that there is no such bail application in the
record.
Thus, in this Court the appellant has filed a false
affidavit. This amounts to contempt of this Court.
Page 22
23
18. Another very disturbing feature of this case is the
manner in which the appellant flourished in the High Court a
Cabinet Minister’s letter addressed to the Chief Minister
recommending his case. We do not want to comment on the
propriety of the Cabinet Minister in addressing such a letter
to the Chief Minister in this case, though this Court has in
Prakash Singh and ors.
v.
Union of India and ors 7
sought to insulate the police from political interference. In
any case, the appellant should not have tried to overawe the
High Court by producing the said letter. We deprecate this
conduct. We were also taken aback when we were informed
that the appellant is the President of the Bihar Police Seva
Sangh. We are, however, informed that membership of such
association is permitted in the State of Bihar even to the
police officers.
However, the fact remains that the said
association is not registered.
19. The appellant’s contention that since the respondents
have not filed affidavit, his case is unrebutted is without any
7
(2006) 8 SCC 1
merit.
A contempt matter is essentially between the
contemnor and the court. On the basis of the record and the
attendant circumstances the court has to decide whether
there is any contempt or not.
No doubt, the respondents
could have filed an affidavit, but merely because there is no
affidavit, the contemnor cannot escape his liability.
The
facts of the case are gross. The contempt is in the face of
the
filed
High Court.
The fact that the respondents have not
affidavit in reply does not dilute the contempt
committed by the appellant.
20. In the ultimate analysis we are of the view that the High
Court cannot be faulted for punishing the appellant for
contempt of court.
No interference is necessary with the
impugned order. We are also concerned with the contempt
of this Court committed by the appellant.
We direct the
appellant to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-. The fine shall
be
deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee
within four weeks from today, failing which the appellant
shall suffer simple imprisonment for seven days.
The
amount deposited by the appellant may be utilized for issues
concerning juvenile justice.
21. The appeal is disposed of in the afore-stated terms.
..........................................J.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
..........................................J.
(Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi;
March 31, 2014.
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