Law Web: Indecent representation of picture of woman in bed room Vs Right to privacy of husband

The complainant went inside the room and

she was shocked and horrified to see that the accused

had made two pornographic paintings on the wall,

one on a canvass and the other on the wall. The

painting on the canvass on the wall depicted a man

and a woman in a most vulgar, obscene, sexual pose

with the image of the accused in the background.

The other painting depicted a half naked woman with

two dogs in the picture and something going from a

dog towards the woman. The said painting was a

very suggestive and obscene painting. The third

painting was on the cupboard of the accused where

he had written “Lust” “Lost”. The complainant felt

absolutely embarrassed and humiliated seeing all the

vulgar, obscene, suggestive, pornographic paintings

and felt very nervous and shameful and when she

turned back, she saw both the servants smiling and

giving lewd and lascivious looks. The complainant

somehow gathered courage and asked both the

servants to go and do their work.”

The complainant was so overwhelmingly

distraught that she could not bear the insult and

agony caused to her by the said vulgar and agony

caused to her by the said vulgar, obscene,

pornographic and suggestive paintings. She could

not control herself and broke down emotionally and

locked herself in her room. After about two hours

when the servants had taken the dogs out for a stroll,

she gathered courage and came out of her room and

took the photographs of the said paintings and

writing.” She filed complaint in court.Magistrate had issued process against accused.Accused has filed writ petition in high court for quashing said complaint.High court gave below mentioned finding.

"It is not possible to agree with

Mr.Pradhan that the complaint discloses no offence punishable

under either of the provisions of IPC or Indecent Representation

of Women's Act or that continuation of proceedings in

pursuance thereof is an abuse of the process of law. Once the

complaint discloses as above, then, it cannot be thrown out at

the threshold as prayed by the petitioner and particularly on the

ground of his absolute right of freedom of speech and

expression. It cannot be thrown out on the ground that the

work is confined and restricted in private area or private room

as well. Once, the areas in the flat or the rooms are not

demarcated, the flat is not divided, the petitioner ordinarily

resides at Delhi but he and respondent No.1 are only occupying

different rooms, then, it cannot be held that the petitioner

exercised his right to paint in his own bedroom in furtherance

of his right to privacy and life and liberty guaranteed by the

Constitution. The allegations clearly point out that the room

which is not frequently used and occupied by the petitioner is

open to servants and driver and the paintings can be seen by

them as also the respondent No.1, then, all the more, it would

not be proper to quash the complaint"

Chintan Upadhyay

Versus

Hema Upadhyay & Anr.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1418 OF 2013

CORAM : S. C. DHARMADHIKARI, J.

Pronounced on : 10th May 2013.

Citation;2014(2) Crimes 499 Bombay

Rule. Respondents waive service. By consent rule made

returnable forthwith. Heard parties.

By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India read with Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the

petitioner – original accused is challenging the order dated 8 th

January 2013 issuing process, which order has been passed by

Court, Bandra, Mumbai in C.C.No.3493/SS/2012.

the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 21 st

The respondent No.1 – complainant filed a complaint

alleging offences punishable under section 4 read with 6 of the

Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986

Indian Penal Code.

(hereinafter for short “said Act”) and section 292(2)(a) of the

The complaint proceeds on the footing that the petitioner

and the respondent No.1 were married but they are residing

separately in the matrimonial home at 102, Mittal Ocean View,

Juhu Tara Road, Santacruz (West), Mumbai 400 054.

They are coowners of the said flat. The respondent No.1

alleges that she resides in the master bed room whereas the

petitioner resides in the other bed room. They have common

hall, balcony and kitchen. The petitioner accused also has a

house in Delhi. He has been residing at Delhi since March

2011. The petitioner accused comes to Mumbai only when the

proceedings before the Family Court in Petition No.A1301 of

2010 are to be heard. In his stay at Mumbai he resides in the

After narrating as to how the parties were married on 31st

other room occupied by him.

October 1998, according to Hindu Vedic rites and ceremonies, it

is alleged that on account of their disputes, the petitioner filed

the above petition in the family court for dissolution of their

marriage by invoking section 13(1)(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act,

1955.

The respondent No.1 alleges that they had a pet dog in the

matrimonial home who was attached to respondent No.1

complainant. That dog was removed by the petitioner accused

from the matrimonial house to the native place at Jaipur. The

respondent No.1 complainant states that since March 2011, she

adopted two dogs and brought them to her matrimonial home

for her safety and security, since she is all alone. There are two

domestic male servants. The application in the family court and

the disputes which are raised therein are referred to in para 7 to

In paras 10 to 14 of the complaint at pages 29 and 30, this

9 of the complaint.

is what is stated:

“10. On 20th July 2012, the accused was home

all through the morning and went out at about 3.30

p.m. The complainant was busy in her household

chores when suddenly she saw her two male servants

giving her strange looks and giggling and whispering

between themselves. On seeing the strange

behaviour of the male servants, complainant became

suspicious and asked them the reason. On this one of

the servants told her to go inside the room of accused

and see for herself what “Saheb” has done.”

“11. The complainant went inside the room and

she was shocked and horrified to see that the accused

had made two pornographic paintings on the wall,

one on a canvass and the other on the wall. The

painting on the canvass on the wall depicted a man

and a woman in a most vulgar, obscene, sexual pose

with the image of the accused in the background.

The other painting depicted a half naked woman with

two dogs in the picture and something going from a

dog towards the woman. The said painting was a

very suggestive and obscene painting. The third

painting was on the cupboard of the accused where

he had written “Lust” “Lost”. The complainant felt

absolutely embarrassed and humiliated seeing all the

vulgar, obscene, suggestive, pornographic paintings

and felt very nervous and shameful and when she

turned back, she saw both the servants smiling and

giving lewd and lascivious looks. The complainant

somehow gathered courage and asked both the

servants to go and do their work.”

“12. The complainant was so overwhelmingly

distraught that she could not bear the insult and

agony caused to her by the said vulgar and agony

caused to her by the said vulgar, obscene,

pornographic and suggestive paintings. She could

not control herself and broke down emotionally and

locked herself in her room. After about two hours

when the servants had taken the dogs out for a stroll,

she gathered courage and came out of her room and

took the photographs of the said paintings and

writing.”

“13. The complainant states that during the

hearing of the matter in Family Court on 19 th October

2012 the accused was confronted with the

photographs of the said painting and writing on the

cupboard. The accused has admitted having made

the said paintings and writing in the cross

examination. The said photographs are exhibited at

Exhibits 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55 in the evidence

recorded in the Family Court.”

“14. The complainant states that she is the lone

lady in the house with two male servants. The

accused is away in Delhi and comes and resides in the

matrimonial home whenever the hearing of the case

is fixed in the family court. The servants clean the

room of the accused everyday and serve him tea, food

etc. whenever he is in Mumbai. apart from servants,

the driver of the accused also visits the room

whenever called by the accused. The complainant

feels completely distraught, shameful and

embarrassed when the servants have to work in the

room in full view of the said vulgar, obscene,

pornographic and suggestive paintings.”

It is alleged that the paintings on the wall depict the

woman and /or her body in a indecent, derogatory manner and

denigrating women. These paintings are likely to deprave and

corrupt or injure the morality or morals. These are, therefore,

indecent representations of women and these offences are

punishable under section 4 read with section 6 of the said Act.

10] In para 16 of the complaint, it is alleged that the two

paintings on the wall are absolutely obscene. They are

lascivious and/or appeal to prurient interest and/or are as such

in its effect. They tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are

likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances to see and

read the said paintings on the wall and cupboard. The

petitioner has deliberately made such obscene paintings and/or

exhibited them knowing fully well that they would be seen by

his servants and other persons who would visit and frequent his

room. Thus, he has rendered himself liable for offences

punishable under section 292(2)(a) of the Indian Penal Code.

11] In para 17 of the complaint, it is alleged that the petitioner

has deliberately made the said obscene, vulgar and suggestive

paintings coupled with writing on the cupboard only to insult

and humiliate respondent No.1 knowing fully well that his room

is frequented by all the servants all the time and also visits of

his driver and manager at times. These paintings depict a

woman in such a way as to have the effect of being indecent

and likely to deprave and corrupt morals and it is derogatory to

the respondent No.1 – original complainant. The paintings are

an insult to a woman in general and womanhood in particular.

This complaint was filed on 23rd December 2012 and annexed

therewith are the photographs. After the complaint was filed,

the verification statement of the respondent No.1 was recorded

on 8th January 2013.

12] After perusing the complaint, the verification statement

and documents on record, the learned Metroplitan Magistrate

passed the following order:

“1. Perused the complaint, verification and

documents on record. Heard learned Advocate of

complainant.

Prima facie it appears that, accused made

pornographic paintings on the wall and also made

obscene images on the wall and also written obscene

material due to it complainant suffered and it also

amounts to lowering down the image of women and

prima facie there are material to proceed against

accused for the offences punishable under section 4

read with section 6 of the Indecent Representation of

Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 and under section

Order

292(2)(a) of Indian Penal Code. In the result,

following order is passed:

Issue process against accused for the

offence punishable under section 4 and 6 of Indecent

Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 and

section 292(2)(a) of the Indian Penal Code on

payment of process fee.”

13] It is this order which is challenged in the present petition.

14] Mr.Pradhan learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioner submitted that the complaint does not disclose any

offence, much less, punishable under section 4 and 6 of the said

Act or section 292(2)(a) of the Indian Penal Code. This

complaint is a fall out or a counter blast to the matrimonial

petition/ proceedings pending in the family court. It is not

without any reason that such a complaint has been filed by the

respondent No.1. The purpose is obvious and to involve the

present petitioner in frivolous proceedings. The petitioner is a

well known artist. Even the respondent No.1 is an artist.

Therefore, any paintings made on the walls in one's home which

is enclosed and particularly within four corners of the bedroom

cannot amount to publication/ advertisement within the

meaning of the said Act and Penal Code.

15] This is not a matter which touches public morality, public

order or law and order. This is in exercise of the artist's right to

freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)

(a) of the Constitution of India. Bedroom walls on which these

paintings have been painted is a closed room and the expression

is thus personal and private. This is not within the four corners

of section 292 but rather in furtherance of the right of privacy

flowing from Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.

16] Mr.Pradhan submits that the complaint read as a whole

does not disclose any offences and much less punishable under

the aforesaid Act and the penal code. It is not enough to allege

that the original complainant found the said paintings vulgar.

In fact, the requirement in law is not of this nature. If obscene

material or article is exhibited publicly or in public view or it

depraves or corrupts the public at large, then, possibly section

292 of I.P

.C. is attracted. Mr.Pradhan's argument then proceeds

further to urge that the paintings were made by the petitioner

in his bedroom. A person's dwelling place is his private abode

and a restricted area. Any painting made therein does not

amount to public display of the questioned material/ article. To

constitute an offence, it is necessary that the questioned

material/article be put to sale, let on hire, be circulated,

distributed and exhibited in public, so that it corrupts the minds

of the public at large, who views it. It is pertinent to note that

in the present case, there being no publication or circulation of

the alleged obscene article, no case has been made out to

prosecute the petitioner, for the offences in question.

17] Mr.Pradhan, therefore, lays special emphasis on the object

and purpose of the said Act and the scope of section 4. He

submits that none of the ingredients of section 4 of the said Act

are attracted. The act defines advertising and distribution and

advertising or material containing indecent representation of

women in any form is prohibited. In the present case, the

complaint does not disclose publication or exhibition of the

nature contemplated by the said Act.

18] For all these reasons, even if the photographs annexed to

the complaint correctly depicts the painting and their contents

still, no offence within the meaning of aforesaid provisions of

law has been committed. The complaint does not disclose any

offence at all. The learned Magistrate, therefore, has erred in

law in issuing process and summoning the petitioner accused to

answer the charge. The impugned order is thus completely

vitiated and by error of law apparent on the face of the record

and perversity. It, therefore, deserves to be set aside.

19] Mr.Pradhan has relied upon two decisions of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of S.Khushboo Vs. Kanniammal and

Anr., reported in (2010) 5 S.C.C. 600 and in the case of Ranjit

D. Udeshi Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C.

881.

20] On the other hand, Mr.Bhambhani, learned Advocate

appearing for respondent No.1 – original complainant

submitted that a reading of the entire complaint would reveal

that the first respondent has not made any grievance of the

nature projected by the petitioner. The matrimonial

proceedings and the disputes in relation thereto have nothing to

do with the allegations in the present complaint. The

matrimonial proceedings will be decided on their own merits

and in accordance with law. This is a specific act in which the

petitioner had indulged and which is not confined, as he falsely

alleges, to his own room. There has been no order passed by

the family court or any competent court partitioning or dividing

the house. It may be that in view of the differences between the

parties that within the same house they are using separate

rooms for their use and occupation. However, if the petitioner

resides in Delhi since March 2011, then, the petitioner has no

business to make the paintings which are vulgar, obscene and

depict the woman in general in a indecent manner. In these

circumstances and when there are specific allegations that the

room which is occupied and used by the petitioner is also

visited by others and when the two male servants in the house

and even the driver enter that room for the purpose of cleaning

etc., then, this is not an activity which could be said to be

private or within the limits of or confined to the petitioner's

bedroom so as not to be termed as an offence. For all these

reasons, it is submitted that the petition be dismissed.

21] I have reproduced the allegations in the complaint and

which sum up the case of the original complainant – respondent

No.1. Before I proceed to refer to the legal provisions, the

undisputed position is and even Mr.Pradhan does not deny that

the paintings are the same as depicted in the photographs

annexed to the plaint. They are of women and some of them

depict the woman body either in nude form or seminude form.

Further, there are certain writings and sketches on the wall also.

22] Mr.Pradhan does not dispute that these paintings are

suggestive but urges that there is no offence committed within

the meaning of the said Act and the Penal Code. He submits

that when the activities of the nature complained of are

confined or restricted to the bedroom or portion of the house

and occupied exclusively by the petitioner, then, there is no

question of the offences being committed. He submits that

there is a certain freedom and liberty taken by the Artists and

Painters and sketches and nude paintings of such Artists and

Painters cannot be said to be denigrating or embarrassing

women. Once the legal position is that the Artists' freedom of

speech and expression is covered by Article 19(1)(a) of the

Constitution of India, then, the Act of the present nature cannot

be an offence.

23] It is not possible to accept the contentions of Mr.Pradhan

because the said act is an act to prohibit indecent representation

of women through advertisement or any publication, writings,

paintings, figures in any manner or in any other manner or for

matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The

statement of objects and reasons leading to the said Act reads as

under:

“The law relating to obscenity is codified in sections

292, 293 and 294 of the Indian Penal Code. In spite

of these provisions, there is a growing body of

indecent representation of women or references to

women in publications, particularly advertisements

etc., which have the effect of denigrating women and

are derogatory to women. Though there may be no

specific intention, these advertisements, publications,

etc. have an effect of depraving or corrupting persons.

It is therefore, felt necessary to have a separate

legislation to effectively prohibit the indecent

representation of women through advertisements,

books, pamphlets etc. Hence this Bill.”

Mr.Pradhan's argument is that these paintings are on the wall

and neither the sketches or the paintings are sold or distributed

nor advertised or published. This argument overlooks two

definitions at least. Firstly, the definition of the term “indecent

representation of women” must be perused. That is to be found

in section 2(c), which reads as under:

“2(c) “Indecent representation of women” means

the depiction in any manner of the figure of a

woman, her form or body or any part thereof in such

a way as to have the effect of being indecent, or

derogatory to, or denigrating, women, or is likely to

deprave, corrupt or injure the public morality or

morals.”

24] Therefore, indecent representation of a woman means

depiction in any manner of the figure of woman, her form or

body or any part thereof which is in such a way as to have the

effect of being indecent or derogatory to or denigrating women.

If it is likely to deprave, corrupt or injure the public morality or

and that is inclusive definition, which reads as under:

morals. Now the word “advertising” is defined in section 2(a)

“2(a)“Advertisement” includes any notice,

circular, label, wrapper or other document and also

includes any visible representation made by means of

any light, sound, smoke or gas”

25] It includes any notice, circular, label, wrapper or other

documents and any visible representation. The distribution is

also inclusive concept as defined in section 2(b) so as to take

within its fold distribution by way of samples whether free or

otherwise. The word “label” is defined in section 2(d). The

definition reads as follows:

“Label” mean any written, marked, stamped,

printed or graphic matter, affixed to, or appearing

upon, any package”

26] Section 3 of the Act contains a prohibition on

advertisement containing indecent representation of women.

27] In the present case, the learned Judge has not issued

process by invoking section 3. Therefore, there is no question of

considering and accepting Mr.Pradhan's argument in the facts of

this case as to what is an advertisement and the impugned act

being not termed as advertisement. What the Act contemplates

is indecent representation of women. The emphasis is on

indecent representation of women. The Act prohibits indecent

representation of women through advertisement or publication,

writings, paintings, figures or in any manner.

28] Whether, therefore, section 4 is attracted or not has to be

prima facie seen. It reads as under:

“4.

Prohibition of publication or sending by post

of books, pamphlets, etc; containing indecent

representation of women. No person shall produce or

cause to be produced, sell , let to hire, distribute,

circulate or send by post any book, pamphlet, paper,

slide, film, writing, drawing, painting, photograph ,

representation or figure which contains indecent

representation of women in any form:

Provided that noting in this section shall apply to

(a) any book, pamphlet, paper, slide, film, writing,

drawing, painting, photograph, representation or figure

–

(i) the publication of which is proved to be

justified as justified as being for the public good on the

ground that such book, pamphlet, paper, slide, film,

writing, drawing, painting, photography, representation

or figure is in the interest of science, literature, art, or

learning , art, or learning or other objects of general

concern; or

(ii) which is kept or used bona fide for religious

purpose;

(b) any representation sculptured, engraved, painted

or otherwise represented on or in –

(i) any ancient monument within the meaning

of the Ancient Monument and Archaeological Sites and

Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958); or

(ii) any temple, or on any car used or the

conveyance of idols, or kept or used for any religious

purpose;

II of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952), will be

applicable.”

29] A bare perusal of section 4 would demonstrate that no

person shall produce cause to be produced, sell, let to hire,

distribute, circulate or send by post any book, pamphlet, paper,

slide, film, writing, drawing, painting, photograph,

representation or figure which contains indecent representation

of women in any form. The proviso excludes from the section

various publications, representations and films.

30] The word publication in the Act has not been defined in

the Act and, therefore, that word must receive the ordinary and

plain meaning and which could be said to be fitting in the

context as well. In Advanced Law Lexicon by P

.Ramanatha Iyer,

3rd Edition, Reprint 2007, the word “Publication” is defined as

under.

The act by which a thing is made public.

Publication means the act of making the defamatory

statement known to any person or persons other than

the plaintiff himself. A private and confidential

communication to a single, individual is sufficient.

Nor need it be published in the sense of being written

or printed; for we have seen that actions as well as

words may be defamatory.”

“PUBLICATION” is accomplished in a variety of

ways according to the subject matter. A book or other

literary matter is published by being surrendered by

its author for public use. Thus, the sale of a MS. copy

of a book is a publication of it (While Vs. Veroch, I

Chit, 26). But a circulation amongst friends

gratuitously, or to pupils e.g. by lectures, is not

(Queensbury Vs. Shebbeare, 2 Ex.329; Prince Albert

Vs. Strange, 18 LJ Ch.120; Caird Vs. Sime, 12 App

Cas 326; Palmer Vs. Dewitt 234 LT 823; Barlett Vs.

Crittenden 4, McLean 300); so, of a circulation

amongst subscribers for their private use (Exchange

Telegraph Co. Vs. Central News, (1897) 2 Ch. 48).

Nor is the use of letters as evidence in Court a

publication (7 JARMAN CONV

. BY SWEET, 628 n).”

31] In State of M.P

. Vs. Ram Raghubir Prasad A.I.R. 1979 S.C.

888, the Hon'ble Supreme Court construed the word as under:

“17. ..... The real party, in many litigative battles

under Article 226 is the community whose processual

participation is alien to the adversary system

inherited from an individualistic legal culture. The

judges are the guardians of that silent sector until our

system of procedure is restructured. ....”

“21. ..... To publish a news item is to make known to

people in general; “an advising of the public or

making known of something to the public for a

purpose”. (Black's Legal Dictionary p.1386). In our

view, the purpose of section 3 animates the meaning

of the expression “publish”. “Publication” is the act of

publishing anything; offering it to public notice, or

rendering it accessible to public scrutiny ... an

advising of the public; a making known of something

to them for a purpose.”

It cannot be said, therefore, that the allegations in the present

complaint do not disclose commission of offences under the said

Act. The Act prohibits advertisements containing indecent

representation of women and publication or sending by post,

books, pamphlets containing indecent representation of women.

Therefore, no person shall produce or cause to be produce, sell,

let to hire, distribute, circulate or send by post any book,

pamphlet etc. which contains indecent representation of

women in any form. Therefore, Section 4 takes within its fold

production, sale, letting on hire, distribution, circulation etc.

The word “distribution” is defined not restrictively but

illustratively so as to include distribution by way of samples

whether free or otherwise. Equally, the word circulation or

circulate must be given its ordinary and common sense

meaning. In the context in which all these words appear it is

clear that depiction in any manner of the figure of a woman,

her body or form or any part thereof is what is prohibited.

Additionally, prohibition of advertisements and publication or

sending by post is envisaged. Therefore, it is not as if the

offence is prima facie committed only if the distribution to

public is made. Therefore, it is not as if the petitioner has

committed no offence within the meaning of this Act because

the painting or the figure has been depicted on the walls of one

bedroom in a house. Once, that bedroom is allegedly accessible

not only to the respondent No.1 but a driver and male servants

and even to visitors coming to visit the house of the petitioner,

then, all the more, the allegations point towards the commission

of the offence. Prima facie the act is covered by section 4 and

punishable by section 6 of the said Act. The arguments of

Mr.Pradhan are more in the nature of a defence because it is

the petitioner who proclaims that the room which he sometimes

occupies and whenever in Mumbai, is his exclusive room and

that in the same flat the petitioner and respondent No.1 are

residing separately. It is the petitioner's case that the paintings

on the wall and the caricatures or the figures are not visible or

cannot be seen by anybody else. The complaint alleges that the

room can be accessed by servants and the paintings are visible

also to the neighbours. Therefore, on the version the petitioner,

it cannot be said that no offence is committed. On the other

hand, if the complaint and the verification statement

demonstrates that prima facie an offence is committed, then,

the process issued cannot be faulted.

32] Apart from the above, the petitioner is also proceeded

against under section 292 of the Indian Penal Code. That

section reads as under:

“292. Sale, etc., of obscene books, etc.

[(1) For the purposes of sub section (2), a book,

pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting

representation, figure or any other object,

shall be deemed to be obscene if it is lascivious

or appeals to the prurient interest or if its

effect, or (where it comprises two or more

distinct items) the effect of any one of its

items, is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend

to deprave and corrupt persons who are

likely, having regard to all relevant

circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter

Whoever

(a) sells, lets to hire, distributes, publicly

exhibits or in any manner puts into

circulation, or for purposes of sale, hire,

distribution, public exhibition or circulation,

makes, reduces or has in his possession any

obscene book, pamphlet, paper, drawing,

painting, representation or figure or any

other obscene object whatsoever, or

(2)

contained or embodied in it.]

(b) imports, exports or conveys any obscene

object for any of the purposes aforesaid, or

knowing or having reason to believe that such

object will be sold, let to hire, distributed or

publicly exhibited or in any manner put into

circulation, or

any business in the course of which he knows

or has reason to believe that any such obscene

objects are, for any of the purposes aforesaid,

made, produced, purchased, kept, imported,

exported, conveyed, publicly exhibited or in

any manner put into circulation, or

(d) advertises or makes known by any

means whatsoever that any person is engaged

or is ready to engage in any act which is an

offence under this section, or that any such

obscene object can be procured from or

through any person, or

(e)

offers or attempts to do any act which is

an offence under this section, shall be

punished [on first conviction with

imprisonment of either description for a term

which may extend to two years, and with fine

which may extend to two thousand rupees,

and, in the event of a second or subsequent

conviction, with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to

five years, and also with fine which may

extend to five thousand rupees].

[ Exception This section does not extend

(a) any book, pamphlet, paper, writing,

drawing, painting, representation or figure

(i) the publication of which is proved

to be justified as being for the public good on

the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper,

writing, drawing, painting, representation or

figure is in the interest of science, literature,

art or learning or other objects of general

concern, or

(ii) which is kept or used bona fide for

religious purposes;

(b) any representation sculptured,

engraved, painted or otherwise represented on

or in

(i) any ancient monument within the

meaning of the Ancient Monuments and

Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958

(24 of 1958), or

(ii) any temple, or on any car used for

the conveyance of idols, or kept or used for

any religious purpose.]]”

33] Mr.Pradhan relies upon the judgement of the Supreme

Court in the case of Ranjeet Udeshi (supra). However, if this

provision is invoked, then, it is apparent that whoever sells, lets

to hire, distributes, publicly exhibits or in any manner puts into

circulation or has in his possession any obscene book, pamphlet

etc., he shall be punished in terms of this section of the IPC.

Therefore, it is not as if process is issued only for the offences

under the said Act but the complaint discloses prima facie

commission of offence under section 292(2)(a) of the IPC.

Even with regard thereto, it is ultimately for the Court to decide

as to whether the any offence is committed or not. The

Supreme Court not only in the case of Ranjeet Udeshi (supra)

but in the later decision in the case of Samaresh Bose Vs. Amal

Mitra reported in (1985) 4 S.C.C. 289 = A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 967

held that the Court must come to the conclusion as to whether

the offending work comes within the purview of this section.

The comment by Mr.Pradhan that the Hon'ble Supreme Court

found the work which was subject matter of Ranjeet Udeshi's

case (supra) as obscene and vulgar but later on that work has

been not termed as such but saved by the freedom of speech

and expression guaranteed by our Constitution and particularly

of an Artist. To my mind all these matters cannot be decided at

the prima facie stage. It is not expected that a definite, leave

alone conclusive or final finding has to be rendered at this

stage. It is enough if there is prima facie material. That is

definitely there.

34] Mr.Pradhan's arguments overlook atleast two things. That

freedom of a citizen under Article 19(1)(a) is not absolute. It is

subject to reasonable restrictions and the same enables making

a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the

right in the interest of inter alia public order, decency or

morality. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr.Ramesh

Prabhu Vs. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte & Ors. reported in A.I.R.

1996 S.C. 1113 had an occasion to consider the ambit and

scope of this fundamental freedom and whether the words

“decency or morality” therein have any restricted meaning. The

Supreme Court held thus:

“27. It is true, as argued by Shri Jethmalani,

that the freedom of speech and expression

guaranteed to all citizens under Article 19(1)(a) is

absolute subject to the reasonable restrictions

imposed by any law saved by clause (2) of the Article

19, under one of the heads specified therein. The

heads specified in clause (2) of Article 19 are,

therefore, several and they are intended to cover the

entire area within which the absolute freedom to say

anything which the speaker may like would not

extend, in keeping with the standards of a civilised

society, the corresponding rights in others in an

orderly society, and the constitutional scheme.”

“28. The expression “in the interests of” used in

clause (2) of Article 19 indicates a wide amplitude of

the permissible law which can be enacted to provide

for reasonable restrictions on the exercise of this right

under one of the heads specified therein, in

conformity with the constitutional scheme. Two of

the heads mentioned are: decency or morality. Thus

any law which imposes reasonable restrictions on the

exercise of this right in the interest of decency or

morality is also saved by clause (2) of Article 19. Shri

Jethmalani contended that the words “decency or

morality” relate to sexual morality alone. In view of

the expression “in the interest of” and the context of

election campaign for a free and fair poll, the right to

contest the election being statutory and subject to the

provisions of the Statute, the words “decency or

morality” do not require a narrow or pedantic

meaning to be given to these words. The dictionary

meaning of decency is “correct and tasteful standards

of behaviour as generally accepted; conformity with

current standards of behaviour or propriety;

avoidance of obscenity; and the requirements of

correct behaviour” (The Oxford Encyclopedic English

Dictionary); “conformity to the prevailing standards

of propriety, morality, modesty, etc; and the quality of

being decent” (Collins English Dictionary).”

“29. Thus, the ordinary dictionary meaning of

“decency” indicates that the action must be in

conformity with the current standards of behaviour or

propriety, etc. In a secular polity, the requirement of

correct behaviour or propriety is that an appeal for

votes should not be made on the ground of the

candidate's religion which by itself is no index of the

suitability of a candidate for membership of the

house. In Knuller (Publishing, Printing and

promotions) Ltd., Vs. Director of Public Prosecutions

(1972) 2 ALL ER 898 the meaning of “indecency” was

indicated as under:

“.......... Indecency is not confined to

sexual indecency; indeed it is difficult to find any limit

short of saying that it includes anything which an

ordinary decent man or woman would find to be

shocking, disgusting and revolting.....”

35] Thus, going by the ordinary dictionary meaning, what is

not decent is indecent and that which is not correct and tasteful

standards of behaviour is indecent. Further, one cannot ignore

the fundamental duties of every citizen of India. There cannot

be a right without corresponding duty. It is the duty of every

citizen to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of

women (see Article 51A(e). Therefore, I have no hesitation in

my mind in holding that the order issuing process cannot be

interfered with on the ground that Article 19(1)(a) of the

Constitution of India is violated. Further, the right of privacy or

life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution is

also not violated by an order issuing process on a complaint of

present nature because what the petitioner terms as confined or

restricted and private activity cannot be decided by his version

alone. It is ultimately for the court to decide as to whether the

offence under section 4 of the said Act is not committed as

urged by the petitioner or that it is committed as asserted by the

respondent No.1. That would depend upon oral and

documentary evidence led by the prosecution and the defence

and their arguments. At the stage at which the matter stands

namely, issuance of process, it cannot be held that any of the

fundamental freedoms and particularly as noted above, have

been violated by the order issuing process.

36] Mr.Pradhan's arguments also overlook the fact that the

judgement in the case of Khushboo (supra) does not mean that

the order issuing process should be quashed and set aside, even

if the allegations in the complaint disclose commission of an

offence.

37] In this context what the Supreme Court observed in the

case reported in 2010(5) S.C.C. 600 is relevant.

“21. There can be no quarrel about this Court’s

competence to quash criminal proceedings

pending before the subordinate courts.

A perusal of the complaints reveals that most

of the allegations have pertained to offences

such as defamation (Sections 499, 501 and

502 IPC), obscenity (Section 292 IPC),

indecent representation of women and

incitement among others. At the outset, we

are of the view that there is absolutely no

basis for proceeding against the appellant in

respect of some of the alleged offences. For

example, the Act, 1986 was enacted to punish

publishers and advertisers who knowingly

disseminate materials that portray women in

an indecent manner. However, this statute

cannot be used in the present case where the

appellant has merely referred to the incidence

of premarital sex in her statement which was

published by a news magazine and

subsequently reported in another periodical.

It would defy logic to invoke the offences

mentioned in this statute to proceed against

the appellant, who cannot be described as an

‘advertiser’ or ‘publisher’ by any means.

22.

However, this power must be exercised

sparingly and with circumspection. In light of

the position summarized above, we can

examine the present case with two

considerations in mind, namely whether the

allegations made against the appellant

support a prima facie case for the offences

mentioned in the respective complaints, and

whether the complaints were made in a bona

fide manner.

24. Coming to the substance of the complaints,

we fail to see how the appellant’s remarks

amount to ‘obscenity’ in the context of Section

292 IPC. Clause (1) to Section 292 states

that the publication of a book, pamphlet,

paper, writing, drawing, painting,

representation, figure, etc., will be deemed

obscene, if –

∙ It is lascivious (i.e. expressing or causing

sexual desire) or

∙ Appeals to the prurient interest (i.e.

excessive interest in sexual matters), or

∙ If its effect, or the effect of any one of the

items, tends to deprave and corrupt persons,

who are likely to read, see, or hear the matter

contained in such materials.

Similarly, Section 509 IPC criminalises a

‘word, gesture or act intended to insult the

modesty of a woman’ and in order to

establish this offence it is necessary to show

that the modesty of a particular woman or a

readily identifiable group of women has been

insulted by a spoken word, gesture or

physical act. Clearly this offence cannot be

made out when the complainants’ grievance

is with the publication of what the appellant

had stated in a written form. ........

23.

In the past, authors as well as publishers of

artistic and literary works have been put to

trial and punished under this section.

25.

In the present case, the appellant takes full

responsibility for her statement which was

published in ‘India Today’, a leading news

magazine. It would be apt to refer back to the

decision of this Court in Ranjit D. Udeshi Vs.

State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1965 SC 881),

wherein it was held that if a mere reference to

sex by itself is considered obscene, no books

can be sold except those which are purely

religious. It was observed that in the field of

art and cinema, the adolescent is shown

situations which even a quarter of a century

ago would be considered derogatory to public

morality, but having regard to changed

conditions, the same are taken for granted

without in any way tending to debase or

debauch the mind. What is to be considered is

whether a class of persons, not an isolated

case, into whose hands the book, article or

story falls will suffer in their moral outlook

or become depraved by reading it or might

have impure and lecherous thoughts aroused

in their minds. Even though the decision in

that case had upheld a conviction for the sale

of a literary work, it became clear that

references to sex cannot be considered obscene

in the legal sense without examining the

context of the reference.

26.

This position was later clarified in Samaresh

Bose Vs. Amal Mitra, (AIR 1986 SC 967),

where the Court held that:

“29. ...... in judging the question of

obscenity, the judge in the first place should

There are numerous other decisions, both

from India and foreign country which

mandate that ‘obscenity’ should be gauged

with respect to contemporary community

standards that reflect the sensibilities as well

as the tolerance levels of an average

reasonable person. Owing to the clear

formulation on this issue it is not necessary

for us to discuss these precedents at length.”

27.

try to place himself in the position of the

author and from the viewpoint of the author,

the judge should try to understand what is it

that the author seeks to convey and whether

what the author conveys has any literary and

artistic value. The Judge should thereafter

place himself in the position of a reader of

every age group in whose hands the book is

likely to fall and should try to appreciate

what kind of possible influence the book is

likely to have on the minds of the readers.”

38] The decision is rendered in this case by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court on the basis of the facts as noted namely filing

of 23 complaints against Ms.Khushboo. That was because she

expressed her opinion on premarital sex and which was printed

and published in the media. The Hon'ble Supreme Court

respecting her right to express her own opinion, even on such a

touchy and delicate subject quashed the complaints because

there institution itself was found to be malafide and causing

undue embarrassment and harassment to a woman only

because she fearlessly expressed her independent/individual

opinion. Such is not a case here. Whether the petitioner was

proceeded against only because of the matrimonial disputes

and, therefore, the complaint is vexatious or not, cannot be

decided at this stage. Prima facie, there is no argument that the

institution of the complaint is malafide or that it is a gross abuse

of the process of the Court.

38] In the case of Ajay Goswami Vs. Union of India and Ors.,

reported in 2007 (1)SCC 143, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held

that the standards to be adopted for judging decency the test

should be that of an ordinary man of common sense and

prudence and not out of the ordinary and hyper sensitive man.

Ultimately, after referring to the said Act , and section 292 of

the Penal Code in particular and taking review of the

observations aforesaid. (See paras 68 and 71).

Legislation, on Decency, the Supreme Court referred to the

39] For the above reasons, it is not possible to agree with