I fully agree with the view taken by learned Brother Kanade J., in paragraph No. 58 of the aforesaid judgment that "even if the State is permitted in a given case to raise an objection regarding delay in filing of reference after a lapse of nearly 19 to 20 years, the claimants cannot be taken by surprise and merely by referring to certain averments in the claim applications which are on record, an inference cannot be drawn without giving a reasonable opportunity to the claimants, particularly when the limitation is a mixed question of fact and law".
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Bombay High Court
The State Of Maharashtra Through ... vs Sadashiv Ganpat Avhad (Since ... on 31 January, 2008
Bench: S Kumar, J Devadhar
1. By this common judgment, we will dispose of 357 First Appeals/Cross Objections, wherein the following questions of law arise for determination. Questions of law:
(i) Whether the claimants, on the basis of the evidence adduced, documentary and oral, are entitled to higher compensation (claimed at the rate of Rs. 100/per sq.mtr.) as the learned Reference Court has failed to appreciate the evidence produced by the claimants in its correct perspective?
(ii) What ought to be the rationale and legally acceptable date for determination of fair market value of the land in terms of Sections 23 and 231(A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Acquisition Act")?
(iii) Has the learned Reference Court fallen in error of law in determining the date for Section 23 of the Acquisition Act as 20th August, 1981 and for the benefit under Section 23 (1A) of the Acquisition Act as 5th February, 1976?
(iv) Whether the appeals of the claimants, whose petitions filed before the Collector were barred by time, can be entertained by this Court?
(v) What is the effect of the judgment of the learned third Judge dated 22nd February, 2007 passed in the present appeals?
(vi) As a corollary to the above, whether this Court has jurisdiction to condone the delay, if any, in filing of applications under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act?
2. The above questions of law are to be examined by us with reference to the following facts.
FACTS:
3. The Urban Development, Public Health and Housing Department, Government of Maharashtra, published a notification on 27th January, 1975 under Section 40(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "the Planning Act") and appointed the City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Limited (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation"), as a Special Planning Authority for the development of Nashik No. tified Area specified in the schedule thereto. Whereafter, the Government of Maharashtra has, under Section 40(3)(d) of the Planning Act, after consultation with the Director of Town Planning, approved the proposals submitted by the Corporation for development of lands in Nashik No. tified Area and has published the orders approving the proposals on 1st March, 1977 in the Extraordinary Maharashtra Government Gazette, PartI. It also appears from the record that notification under Section 125 of the Planning Act had already been issued approving the plans on 5th February, 1976 which was duly notified on 1st March, 1977, sanctioning the plans. The Corporation moved an application under Section 126(1) of the Planning Act to the Government for acquisition of the land for the purposes of planned development and utilisation of Nashik No. tified Area for industrial, commercial and residential purposes under the provisions of the Acquisition Act.
4. A notification was published on 20th August, 1981 by the Appropriate Government exercising its powers under Section 126(4) of the Planning Act read with Section 6 of the Acquisition Act. The area that was sought to be acquired was 1000 acres.
5. All the claimants are owners of the lands in villages Ambad and Satpur in District Nashik. The acquired lands are abutting the industrial area. The provisions of Section 17 of the Acquisition Act were also applied on 20th August, 1981 simultaneous to the issuance of the notification. The lands of the claimants were acquired and the physical possession thereof was taken on different dates with effect from 20th August, 1981 till 1983. The Collector, Nashik heard the claimants and made his award under Section 11 of the Acquisition Act on 12th February, 1986, awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. 4/and Rs. 6/per sq.mtr. respectively, to the claimants for acquisition of their lands depending upon the nature of the lands. The compensation was accepted by the claimants under protest and they preferred references under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act. The learned reference Court by its detailed judgment dated 26th October, 1994 enhanced the compensation payable to the claimants and granted the following relief to the claimants.
(i) Claimants in L.R. No. 49/89 is held entitled to compensation calculated at the rate of Rs. 29/per sq.mtr.
(ii) Claimants in L.R. No. 470/89 and L.R. No. 43/89 are held entitled to compensation calculated at the rate of Rs. 24/per sq. mtr.
(iii) Claimants in L.R. Nos. 51/89, 101/89, 103/89, 306/89, 310/89 are held entitled to compensation calculated at the rate of Rs. 33/per sq.mtr.
(iv) Claimants in the remaining references decided by this judgment are held entitled to compensation calculated at the rate of Rs. 27/per sq. mtr.
(v) If any claimant has been awarded any compensation by S.L.A.O. for wells, trees and structures, it shall remain unchanged.
2) All the claimants would be entitled to solatium at 30% p.a. on the total land value so calculated.
3) All the claimants would be entitled to amount under Section 23(1)(A) of the Land Acquisition Act at 12% p.a. on the value of land from 5276 to the dates of dispossession or awards, whichever is earlier.
4) All Claimants would be entitled to interest at 9% p.a. for the first year from the date of dispossession and at 15% p.a. for subsequent years on the entire compensation payable till payment of compensation by the S.L.A.O. From that day, the claimants would be entitled to interest at 15% p.a. on the total compensation awarded, as reduced by the amount paid by the S.L.A.O. till the balance is paid.
5) A chart showing amounts to which claimants in each reference are entitled shall be prepared and shall form part of this judgment. The State shall check the amounts stated therein for arithmetical accuracy and any other error before making payment.
6) The claimants would be entitled to corresponding cost. The State shall bear its own costs.
6. Dissatisfied from the extent of compensation awarded to the claimants, the claimants filed 155 appeals while the State filed 197 appeals. In the State appeals, other 5 claimants filed cross objections, thus making a total of 357 appeals/crossobjections arising from the single judgment as the Reference Court had disposed of all the references by a common judgment.
7. Before we proceed to discuss the principle or the merits of the principle or ancillary questions framed by us which arose for determination in the present case, it is necessary for us to notice certain important facts other than directly relatable to this case but which, in turn, have a direct bearing on the matters in issue herein.
8. The notification dated 20th August, 1981 was challenged by the writ petitioners who were owners of the acquired land by filing a writ petition being Civil Writ Petition No. 4194 of 1981. This writ petition was filed by many petitioners including the present claimants. This writ petition came to be dismissed by order dated 22nd December, 1981. Against this order of the Division Bench of the High Court, the petitioners therein has filed Special Leave to Appeal being Civil Appeal No. 2490 of 1982 before the Supreme Court. The appeal before the Supreme Court was disposed of vide order dated 22nd July, 1982 wherein concession given by the respondents therein was also referred. Order of the Supreme Court reads thus Heard counsel for the parties. In the circumstances of the case, the respondent shall pay compensation at the market value as on 1st April, 1982 to the appellants. In view of this very just concession made by the respondents, this appeal is disposed of accordingly.
9. After passing of the above order, some of the persons whose lands have been acquired and were dissatisfied with the amount awarded to them by the Collector, had filed references under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act which came to be registered as LAR No. 51A of 1987. The reference court enhanced the compensation vide its judgment dated 31st March, 1994 and granted benefits under the Land Acquisition Act on the basis of the order of the Supreme Court and determined the market value of the acquired land as on 1.4.1982. The claimants in that case being dissatisfied with the judgment of the reference court, filed appeal in this Court being First Appeal No. 369 of 1996. This appeal alongwith other appeals was disposed of by the judgment of the High Court dated 24th January, 1997 wherein further relief was granted to the claimants, whereafter further relief was granted to the claimants which reads as under:
Rule is made absolute in terms of the aforesaid civil applications and this F.A. 369 of 1996 and order as given below:
The judgement and decree of the trial court is confirmed except to the extent that:
i) the claimants in ZoneI shall be entitled to the market value at the rate of Rs. 55/per sq. mtr. As against Rs. 35/awarded by the trial court, with all statutory benefits as per the decree.
ii) the claimants in ZoneII shall be entitled to the market value at the rate of Rs. 50/per sq.mtr. As against Rs. 25/per sq.mtr. Awarded by the trial court with all statutory benefits as per the decree.
iii) The claimants are also entitled to proportionate costs in these Appeals also.
10. Thus, it is obvious from the judgment of the reference court and of this Court in appeal that the State Government at no point of time raised any objection with regard to the market value of the land being determined with reference to the date of 1.4.1982. In fact, in the appeal filed by the State in those cases, which came to be registered as First Appeal No. 369 of 1996, no ground was taken by the State to challenge the correctness of the finding recorded by the learned Reference Court that relevant date for grant of benefit under Section 23 (1A) and for Section 4 notification would be 1st April, 1982. By conduct or otherwise, the State Government fully implemented the concession given by it before the Supreme Court as recorded in the order dated 22nd July, 1982. It can be usefully noticed at this stage itself that there is no justification provided to the contrary even in the present appeals. Even in the earlier appeals, no record was made available by the State as to why the concession of maintaining the relevant date for all purposes and intent i.e. 1st April, 1982 was offered and later on accepted by the State. Again, for the reasons best known to the State, the judgment of the Division Bench in First Appeal No. 369 of 1996 was not challenged before the Supreme Court. After the judgment had attained finality, an application was filed by the CIDCO in the appeals which were rejected by the High Court. The Corporation preferred an appeal against that order which also was dismissed by the Supreme Court vide its order dated 4th March, 2003. Therefore, the judgment in appeal as well as rejection of the impleadment application attained finality between the parties in those proceedings.
11. Another aspect of this case is that during the pendency of these appeals, primary objection was raised on behalf of the respondentState to the effect that the reference in the matter was badinlaw in asmuch as the reference applications filed under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act were filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and as such, the appeals could not be entertained. This aspect of the case came up for hearing before the Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 251 of 1996 arising out of LAR No. 351 of 1989 and other connected matters. There was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges presiding on the Bench. Resultantly, the matter was placed before the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. The Chief Justice referred the matter to the third Judge and the learned third Judge vide his judgment dated 22nd February, 2007, held that the State should take the objection of limitation. In order to put the matters beyond ambiguity, it will be useful to notice the relevant part of the judgment of the learned Judge which reads thus
14. I fully agree with the view taken by learned Brother Kanade J., in paragraph No. 58 of the aforesaid judgment that "even if the State is permitted in a given case to raise an objection regarding delay in filing of reference after a lapse of nearly 19 to 20 years, the claimants cannot be taken by surprise and merely by referring to certain averments in the claim applications which are on record, an inference cannot be drawn without giving a reasonable opportunity to the claimants, particularly when the limitation is a mixed question of fact and law".
15. I fully agree with all the legal propositions set forth in the erudite Judgment of my Learned Brother Khandeparkar J. However my Learned Brother Khandeparkar J. has proceeded on the basis of what is stated in application for reference, as mentioned in paragraph 51 of the Judgment, as the dates are mentioned therein, and as such there is no dispute.
16. It may be noted here that all the Reference Applications are cyclostyled applications, merely filled in by the learned Advocates and the list of dates are mentioned. The applications have not been solemnly affirmed by the claimants. The applications have been signed in Marathi or by thumb impressions by the Applicants. There is nothing on record to indicate that the Applicants were aware of the dates or contents in those Reference Applications. In the above group, there are 142 First Appeals and in most of them there are more than one claimant and in some of them the legal heirs of original claimants are representing.
17. It is also vital to note that till date there is no affidavit filed on behalf of the State, indicating the correct date of service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. Appellant State has merely filed a chart indicating dates of service.
18. It may also be noted that in the above, my Learned Brother Khandeparkar J. has stated in paragraph 2 the delay to be 65 days, and my Learned Brother Kanade J. has stated in Paragraph 61 as 107 days delay. In the above, there is no finding recorded before any forum on the issue of limitation.
19. Under the aforesaid facts and scenario, the claimants cannot be deprived of their statutory right to seek enhanced compensation, without a fair opportunity to the claimants to deal with the issue of limitation.
20. One would not forget that in Ram Kali Bhattacharjee case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself had remanded the matter back to the Reference Court on the issue of limitation.
21. In the above, in the group of 142 First appeals, most of the claimants are small and illiterate farmers, and they cannot be denied justice on technicalities and obstructive attitude of the Appellant State, which amounts to filibustering tactics.
22. In the light of the above discussion, I answer the first question in the negative. If the Appellant wants to raise the issue of limitation, the same will have to be by way of an amendment application to amend the Memo of Appeal sufficient opportunity ought to be given to RespondentsClaimants to oppose the same. and the
23. I answer affirmative." the second question in the
12. Firstly, we will deal with the 178 applications filed by the State. All these appeals, admittedly, were filed within time. It is contended on behalf of the State that the plea of limitation being a plea of law, can be taken up by the applicants at any stage. In fact, the applications have been filed in furtherance to the above judgment of the court that such a plea will have to be taken by amending the Memorandum of Appeal. This is a question of law and furthermore, there was no serious opposition to these applications. Even otherwise, we are of the considered view that all these applications need to be allowed as they raise a point of law and secondly, 155 appeals filed by the claimants and the remaining appeals filed by the State are within time and where the claim petitions under Section 18 admittedly were filed within time. All these appeals are thus to be heard on merits. Thus, ends of justice would require that the State is permitted to raise the question of limitation and consequently maintainability of the present appeals. A legal plea can always be permitted to be taken up at the appellate stage. Of course, it will have to be examined in each case whether the petition under Section 18 of the Act was filed within limitation or not and what would be its effect on the merits of the appeal.
13. In the interest of justice and in view of the judgment of the court dated 22nd February, 2007, we allow these applications and permit the appellantState to take up the plea of limitation in regard to Section 18 applications and in consequence nonmaintainability of these appeals which we will decide on merits. Resultantly, all the 178 Civil Applications are allowed and, accordingly, disposed of.
14. We have heard arguments on the application as well as on the appeals of the respective parties. As records of the appeals had been received by the Registry of the Court and were made available during the course of hearing, we had directed the learned Counsel appearing for the parties to prepare statements/list of cases in which petition under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act filed before the Collector were barred by time or otherwise. The following are the Appeals which are barred by time.
First Appeal Nos. 242, 246, 248, 250, 273, 276. 283, 287, 525, 215, 220, 542, 515, 269, 271,, 274, 280, 290, 506, 523, 531, 538, 547 of 1996, 289, 285,. 287, 290, 292, 293, 294, 296 of 1997, 885, 886, 887 of 2004, 544 and 556 of 1996, 243, 245, 251, 253, 263, 268, 270, 277, 279, 261, 1473, 1477, 215, 220, 515, 523, 530, 547, 191, 525, 542 and 190 of 1996.
15. In all these appeals, the claimants had admittedly filed references under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act. In one claim petition, there were more than one claimants. Number of claimants had filed joint applications. The claimants were duly examined by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. It is only after inspection of the original reference applications that these very five lists were taken on record by the Court.
16. The arguments raised on behalf of the State before us is that as the applications filed under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act were filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, no reference could lie before the learned Additional District Judge and consequently the present appeals are also not maintainable. In these reference applications, the claimants have made specific averments in regard to the receipt of the notice and their making applications. The following portions of Section 18 application filed by the claimants can be appropriately referred to at this stage.
Limitation: At the time of the award was made, the claimant was neither present personally nor through his representative. He received the notice under Sec. 12
(2) of the Land Acquisition Act on or about 31.3. 1986 and. However, the notice did not contain the particulars of the essential contents of the award or reasons or the basis on which the amount of compensation was fixed as also the price etc. and hence he applied for a certified copy of the award on 2.4.1986 but he has not received the copy so far. Hence this application filed today is in time." The claim petition in this case was filed on 5th June, 1986 , that is beyond the prescribed period of limitation and as such application under Section 18 was barred by time and delay cannot be condoned by any Court and as such these appeals must be dismissed.
17. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the claimantsrespondents in State Appeals and appellants in their own appeal, argued that even if the applications were to be allowed, then the judgment of the learned Joint District Judge at Nashik should be set aside and the matter remanded for fresh trial in accordance with law as the claimants would be entitled to show before the Reference Court that their claim petitions are within time and that they were neither present at the time of making the Award by the Collector nor had they received the notice under Section 12(2) of the Acquisition Act.
18. We are unable to find any merit in the contention raised on behalf of the claimants. It is neither disputed before us nor was disputed before any other fora that in the applications filed by the claimants under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act they had categorically and specifically admitted that they had received the notices under Section 12(2) of the Acquisition Act on 31.3.1986. The applications under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act are dated 5th June, 1986. No. purpose would be served by remanding the matter to the Reference court inasmuch as the claimants cannot be permitted to go back from their admission of receipt of a statutory notice. Furthermore, it is not for any other purpose that the dates were mentioned in the application. The applicants were fully aware that they are filing applications under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act and had already received the notices under Section 12(2) of the Acquisition Act. These applications are signed by the applicants and that fact is also not in dispute. That being so, it is not necessary for us to set aside the judgments of the Reference Court and remand the matters to that Court. It is settled principle of law which in fact was not even disputed before us that the Collector and for that matter any other Court has no power to condone the delay in filing an application under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act. That being the settled position of law, again it will be futile for this Court to accept the contentions raised on behalf of the claimants for remanding the matter to the Court of the learned Joint District Judge. In the case of Mahadeo Bajirao Patil v. State of Maharashtra the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly enunciated the principle that power to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period of six weeks is not vested with the Collector or the Court.
19. In the light of the enunciated principles and the documents available on record before us, it is not required of this Court to remand the matter to the learned Joint District Judge. The reference applications have thus been erroneously decided by the learned Joint District Judge, in fact, under a mistaken impression of fact and law both. All the above appeals of the State thus necessarily should be allowed and we hereby allow the same, set aside the judgment of the reference Court in favour of the appellants in the above noticed appeals, while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
20. Another contention which had been raised on behalf of the claimants before us is that if this Court accepts the contention of the State as aforenoticed (Petitions under Section 18 of the Act being barred by time and consequently no appeals could lie before this Court), even then they would be entitled to get higher compensation on the strength of the provisions of Section 28A of the Act. On behalf of the State it is reiterated that the appeals filed by the State should be accepted and appeals, if any, in such cases filed by the claimants should be dismissed as not maintainable.
21. The first and the foremost question that requires consideration by the Court is what is the effect of the applications filed by the claimants being barred by time. We have already discussed this issue at some length that the applications filed under Section 18 of the Act which were barred by time could not have been entertained by the Collector and consequently reference could not have been answered in favour of the claimants. Once the very initiation of the proceedings under Section 18 of the Act was barred in law, no subsequent proceedings could entail to the benefit of either parties. Both the Collector and the Court have no power to condone the delay in filing an application under Section 18 of the Act. The obvious result thereto would be that the appeals filed by the claimants in such cases would not be maintainable while the appeals of the State in similar cases would have to be accepted as ordered above. The other relevant and pertinent question which would require consideration is that where Section 18 petition is held to be barred by time, can the claimants invoke the provisions of Section 28A of the Act and, if so, which is the appropriate forum?. As far as the first part of this aspect is concerned, it is no more res integra and has been answered in unambiguous terms by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Hansoli Devi and Ors. , where the Court after discussing the law on the subject and in the facts of the case where Section 18 petition was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation held that the claimants could invoke the provisions of Section 28A for redetermination of compensation to the Collector. It will be useful to refer to the dictum of the Supreme Court in this case.
4. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the correct interpretation of Section 28A, we think it appropriate to bear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of statute. The rule stated by Tindal, C.J., in Sussex Peerage case, (1844)11 C1 and F 85, still holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to the effect:
If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver.
It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the Court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In Kirkness v. John Hudson and Co. Ltd. 1955 (2) All ER 345, Lord Reid pointed out as to what is the meaning of "ambiguous" and held that "a provision is not ambiguous merely because it contains a word which in different context is capable of different meanings and it would be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which does not contain such a word. A provision is, in my judgment, ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase which in that particular context is capable of having more than one meaning". It is no doubt true that if on going through the plain meaning of the language of statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices and absurdities, then the Court may look into the purpose for which the statute has been brought and would try to give a meaning, which would adhere to the purpose of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. In the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose 1953 SCR 1 had held that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inappsoite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In Quebec Railway Light Heat and Power Co. v. Vandray AIR 1920 PC 181, it had been observed that the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible to add words to a statute which are not there unless on a literal construction being given a part of the statute becomes meaningless. But before any words are read to repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible to state with certainty that these words would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by the legislature had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law. At times, the intention of the legislature is found to be clear but the unskilfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language and in such a situation, it may be permissible for the Court to reject the surplus words so as to make the statute effective. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the provisions of Section 28A of the Act to answer the questions referred to us by the Bench of two learned Judges. It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28A of the Act to confer a right of making a reference, who might have not made a reference earlier under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a reference under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay he would not get the right of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the reference is answered. But the Parliament having enacted Section 28A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression "had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18" in Section 28A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the land owner has made an application for reference under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be permissible for a land owner to make a reference and get it answered and then subsequently make another application when some other person gets the reference answered and obtains a higher amount. In fact, in Pradeep Kumari's case the three learned Judges, while enumerating the conditions to be satisfied, whereafter an application under Section 28A can be moved, had categorically stated "the person moving the application did not make an application" as observed by this Court would mean, did not make an effective application which had been entertained by making the reference and the reference was answered. When an application under Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to an effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference being answered to move an application under Section 28A cannot be denied. We, accordingly answer question No. 1 (a) by holding that the dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
5. So far as question 1 (b) is concerned, this is really the same question, as in question 1 (a) and, therefore, we reiterate that when an application of a land owner under Section 18 is dismissed on the ground of delay, then the said land owner is entitled to make an application under Section 28A, if other conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled.
6. Coming to the second question for reference the receipt of compensation with or without protest pursuant to the award of the Land Acquisition Collector is of no consequence for the purpose of making a fresh application under Section 28A. If a person has not filed an application under Section 18 of the Act to make a reference, then irrespective of the fact whether he has received the compensation awarded by the Collector with or without protest, he would be a person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 28A and would be entitled to make an application when some other land owner's application for reference is answered by the reference Court. It is apparent on the plain language of the provisions of Section 28A of the Act. Otherwise, it would amount to adding one more condition, not contemplated or stipulated by the Legislature itself to deny the benefit of substantial right conferred upon the owner.
22. The provisions of Section 28A can be invoked by a person interested in the land, if he had not filed an application under Section 18 of the Act and the Court had enhanced the compensation in relation to the land covered by the said notification as that of the person interested. Such a written application has to be made to the Collector within the specified time. The above dictum of the Supreme Court which is directly applicable to the facts of the present case protects the right of the person interested in the land, even if he had filed an application under Section 18 of the Act and the same was dismissed as being barred by time. Such filing has been construed by the Supreme Court "as if not filed". In the cases in hand we have already held that the applications filed by the claimants under Section 18 of the Act at the time of their filing were barred by time. But this finding could not be recorded because no such objection was raised on behalf of the State and in fact it was overlooked by the learned Reference Court as well. As the finding that these applications are being barred by time is for the first time recorded by this Court in appeal, the right of the claimants to move the Collector in terms of Section 28A cannot be taken away, subject to the applicants satisfying the statutory and other requirements of Section 28A of the Act.
23. Some other appeals also were stated to be not maintainable for the same reason. On verification of the records, the applications under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act were found to be within time and as such all those appeals, in particular the appeals other than specifically mentioned hereinabove shall be decided on merits hereafter.
24. First Appeal Nos. 207, 209, 505 and 278 of 1996 are the appeals in which no records are available before this Court. The learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties fairly stated that despite their best efforts as well as the efforts of the registry, the records of these appeals, particularly applications under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act are not available on the judicial file of the Court. However, according to the State, the applications are barred by time while, according to the claimants, the applications were filed before the Collector within the prescribed period of limitation. The question of limitation being a mixed question of law and fact, it would be necessary for us to set aside the judgment of the Reference Court in these appeals and remand the matter for determination in accordance with law. Compensation.
25. As already noticed in the facts stated above, the claimants were dissatisfied with the Award of the Collector giving them compensation at the rate of Rs. 4/and Rs. 6/per sq. mtr. and had filed applications under Section 18 of the Act, the Reference Court vide its judgment dated 26th October, 1994 had enhanced the compensation to Rs. 27/and Rs. 36/per sq. mtr. respectively. Both these authorities had granted different compensation to the claimants depending on the nature of the land i.e. where there were developed plots, the compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs. 36/and where the land was purely agricultural bagayat land, compensation at the rate of Rs. 27/was allowed. Let us examine the evidence which had been produced by the parties on record in the shape of of sale instances to ask for enhanced compensation. Exhibits105, 106 and 109 are the sale instances where land was sold in the revenue estate of the same village. Vide Exhibit105, the land was sold at the rate of Rs. 19.28 per sq.mtr. on 31st April, 1981, Exhibit106 it was sold at the rate of Rs. 14.63 per sq.mtr. on 16th June, 1981 and Exhibit109 was sold at the rate of Rs. 10.63 per sq.mtr. on 2nd May, 1981. The area sold was nearly 400 to 492 sq.mtrs. in the sale instances.
26. Exhibit26/ Exhibit82, Exhibit30 and Exhibit43 are the other sale instances which had been proved on record. Land at the rate of Rs. 69.98 per sq.mtr. admeasuring about 1786 sq.mtrs. was sold on 28th May, 1981 vide Exhibit26/ 82. In terms of Exhibit30, land admeasuring about 585 sq.mtr. was sold at the rate of Rs. 55.01 per sq.mtr. on 3rd October, 1981 and on 17th December, 1981, land admeasuring about 258 sq.mtrs. was sold at the rate of Rs. 58.13 per sq.mtr. vide Exhibit43.
27. Still another sale instance being Exhibit29 was proved by the parties where the land admeasuring 270.77 sq.mtr. from the same village was sold at the rate of Rs. 66.05 per sq.mtr. on 18th May, 1982.
28. In addition to the above documentary evidence, the claimants also examined themselves as witnesses to state with regard to the lands and the quantum of compensation that they were entitled to receive. Exhibit11 is the statement of Dattu, one of the claimants, who stated that he was entitled to get compensation at the rate of Rs. 100/per sq.mtr. While referring to the judgment of the Court in LAR NO. 51A of 1987, he stated that the court had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 25/to 35/per sq. mtr. and the valuation was given as of 1st April, 1982. Exhibit56 is the map showing the notified area and that Ambad and Satpur Industrial area were adjacent to the notified area. The industrial map, Exhibit56 and even the notifications issued by the Government, Exhibits19 and 20 read in conjunction with the statement of the claimants show that the land had potential and its location was near to the industrial areas of CIDCO. The land in question thus had a good location and potential for development as industrial and/or residential unit.
29. Keeping in view the above evidence, the learned Reference Court formed an opinion that sale instance Exhibits25/ 63 had to be ignored because there was a mistake in the sale deed itself. After considering 13 sale instances produced by the claimants and 8 produced by the State, the Reference Court excluded some of them for different reasons and finally after referring to certain judgments of the Court came to the conclusion that the claimants were entitled to different compensation. While enhancing the compensation, the Reference Court held as under: Considering all this, I would take the rates awarded by my learned predecessor as the basis for working out rates of compensation to be awarded in these references, since the trends referred to in paras 57 and 58 above between Rs. 50/to Rs. 60/and Rs. 10/to Rs. 20/also point to a middle figure of Rs. 35/. Since my learned predecessor had not made any distinction between the rate awarded for small pieces and large chunks, which distinction, I propose to make (in light of reasons in paras 3243) a marginal rationalization of the rates, in order to avoid fractions in being made. The rates for small plots with the relevant date taken as 20881 would therefore be fixed at Rs. 36/per sq.mtr. and with the relevant date as 7783 at Rs. 44/per sq.mtr. From this, a deduction of 25% would be made to work out rates for large chunks of lands. These rates with relevant dates 20881 and 7783 would come to Rs. 27/and Rs. 33/per sq.mtr. respectively for these lands. As for disadvantaged group, not having frontage on any main road, or not situated around village Morwadi (precisely those in L,.R. Nos. 49/89 and 470/89) lesser rates, reduced by another 10% would have to be awarded. Since in L.R. No. 49/89 the relevant date is 7783, for that land compensation would be calculated at the rates of Rs. 29/per sq.mtr. For land the subject matter of L.R. No. 470/89, the relevant date being 20881, compensation would be calculated at the rate of Rs. 24/per sq. mtr. For lands in the advantageous group with the relevant date as 7783 (those subject matter of L.R. Nos. 51/89, 101/89, 103/89, 306/89 and 310/89), the rate would be Rs. 33/per sq.mtr. For all the remaining lands in this group of references the rate would be Rs. 27/per sq. mtr.
30. As is evident from the above finding, the compensation has been awarded at the rate of Rs. 27/and Rs. 36/per sq.mtr. respectively. In the present case, notification under Section 126 (1) of the Planning Act, which is equivalent to Section 4 of the Acquisition Act, was issued on 20th August, 1981, though in the development plans and area notified on 5th February, 1976, the relevant date, as already noticed, was not taken to be 1st April,1982 for all purposes and intent in the acquisition proceedings. Whichever be the relevant date, some of the sale instances will be even beyond the last date i.e. 1st April, 1982 and thus would be irrelevant and cannot be taken into consideration by the Court. Exhibits27, 29, 65 and 119 are the sale instances which would fall in that category. Learned Counsel appearing for the parties stated that Exhibits30, 40, 26/82, 26/42, 105, 106 and 109 are the sale instances which would be relevant, while keeping in mind the aforestated dates. In the present case, notification under Section 126 (4) of the Planning Act was issued on 20th August, 1981 and from this point of view the most and relevant sale instance giving the lowest and the highest price would be Exhibits26/ 82 and 109. Both sale instances are of the month of May, 1981 and give a price of Rs. 69.98 and Rs. 10.63 per sq.mtr. Taking average of these two sale instances, the price in the year would come to Rs. 40 roughly. Even Exhibits26/ 82, 105, 106 and clearly show an increasing trend in the sale price of the land in question. The Court would have to consider the entire evidence and then determine the fair market value of the land at the relevant time. If the relevant date to be taken is 20th August, 1981, Exhibits109 and 26/82 would be the relevant piece of evidence to be examined by the Court. If the date to be taken is 1st April, 1982, in that event, Exhibit43 will be a better piece of evidence to be considered by the Court as it will be closest to the relevant date (deemed date of notification).
31. The other relevant piece of evidence would be the judgments of the Court wherein compensation had been granted by the courts between Rs. 50/and Rs. 55/per sq.mtr. The most important of this is LAR No. 51A of 1987 against which the claimants in those cases had filed appeals which were disposed of by the judgment of this Court on 24th January, 1997 in First Appeal No. 369 of 1996 and the Court had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 50/and Rs. 55/per sq.mtr. depending upon the developed or undeveloped area. It is conceded before us that all the evidence produced in the present cases was also produced in those cases and even the claimants, to some extent, were involved in the cases as part of their land was subject matter of those claims while the remaining land has been the subject matter of the present references. We have also indicated that the State had accepted the judgment of the Court dated 24th January, 1997 in First Appeal No. 369 of 1996 and the same was not challenged before the Supreme Court in appeal. It was CIDCO which had filed an impleadment application before this Court which was dismissed. Against that judgment, Special Leave Petition was filed which also came to be dismissed. In other words, the compensation awarded by this Court in those appeals, which is from the same village, has attained finality. After considering the entire evidence which has been produced in the present cases, there would be no reason for this Court to come to a different conclusion and award any different compensation. Viewed from another angle, even if average of the various sale instances in relation to the relevant period are considered, the fair market value of the land would come to nearly the same amount.
32. In First Appeal No. 369 of 1996, this Court had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 50/and Rs. 55/per sq.mtr. The notification under Section 126(4) of the Planning Act was issued on 28th January, 1980. Thus the claimants in the present appeals would be entitled to some increase in the market value of the land as a result of the intervening period of one year between the two notifications. Even on this score, the claimants would be entitled to higher compensation. It is a settled principle of law that judgments of the Court are relevant piece of evidence particularly when they relate to the same village. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (i) Karansing v. Union of India wherein the Apex Court has held that judgments of courts in land acquisition cases or awards given by the Land Acquisition Officer could be relied upon as a good piece of evidence for determining the market value. In the case of Bhag Sing v. U.T. Of Chandigarh , the Apex Court has held that a judgment of a court in a land acquisition case determining the market value of a land in the vicinity of the acquired land, even though not inter parties, could be admitted in evidence either as an instance or one from which the market value of acquired land could be adduced or inferred.
33. The judgment of this Court in First Appeal No. 369 of 1996 would be the most relevant and comparable instance. It will be a fair precept for determining the fair market value of the land as on the date of notification under Section 126(4) of the Planning Act. Furthermore, if the date is taken as 1st April, 1982, then Exhibits30 and 43 would be the relevant piece of evidence. The average of these two sale instances would be nearly Rs. 56/per sq.mtr. as in the year 1981 and giving a reasonable appreciation for the intervening period between the sale instances and the date of notification, some enhancement is to be given to the claimants. This enhancement may be liable to be set off against the fact that Exhibits30 and 43 relate to sale of small pieces of land measuring about 500 sq.ft. The safest course of action in consonance with the settled principles of law, in our opinion, would be to give 10 per cent increase to the claimants annually on the basis of the value determined by a Division Bench judgment of this Court in First Appeal No. 369 of 1996 which has attained finality between the parties. In fact, the State did not choose to file appeal against the Division Bench judgment of this Court. In other words, the Government has accepted the said judgment as a good precedent. Thus, just and fair market value of the land in consonance with the statutory principles contained in Section 23 of the Act would be Rs. 58.80 per sq.mtr. for lands in advantageous group and Rs. 53.55 for the remaining lands. The relevant dates
34. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act contemplate two dates relevant for determining the dispute in the cases in hand. One, the date on which the notification under the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and/or any other law for the time being in force is published and two, the dates or the period for which the land owners would be entitled to the statutory benefit under section 231(A) of the Land Acquisition Act. In the present case, the reference court took the relevant date for the purpose of fixing the market value of the land as 20th August, 1981 i.e. the date on which notification under Section 126(4) of the Planning Act was published. While granting benefit under Section 231(A) of the Land Acquisition Act, the date was taken as 5th February, 1976 i.e. when the plans were published. It will be useful if the relevant finding of the reference court can be noticed at this stage which reads thus
...For land the subject matter of L.R. No. 470/89, the relevant date being 20.8.81, compensation would be calculated at the rate of Rs. 24/per sq.mtr. For lands in the advantageous group with the relevant date as 7.7.83, (those subject matter of L.R. Nos. 51/89, 101/89,103/89, 306/89 and 310/89). the rate would be Rs. 33/per sq. mtr. For all the remaining lands in this group of references, the rate would be Rs. 27/per sq.mtr.
THE DATE OF NOTIFICATION UNDER SEC : 4 AND THE DATE OF DISPOSSESSION:
68. It is necessary to fix the date of notification under Sec.4 of the L.A. Act since that is the starting point for calculation of amount under Section 23(1A) of the L.A. Act. In this case, there has been no notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act. Therefore, the date of notification under Section 126 of M.R.T.P. Act corresponding to one under Section 4 of the L.A. Act will have to be taken as starting point for this notification. Section 126(3) of the M.R.T.P. Act speaks of the dates for the purpose of valuation. Section 126(4) of the M.R.T.P. Act modifies that when the declaration is not issued in three years. But these provisions do not speak of the date of notification corresponding to one under Section 4 of the L.A. Act. Under Section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act, as discussed earlier, the declaration of intention to acquire, corresponding to declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act, has to be made within three years of publication of plan. Under the L.A. Act, declaration under Section 6 has to be made within 3 years of notification under Section 4. Considering these parallels, it would be reasonable to hold that the date of notification of plan would be the date of corresponding to notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act. In this case plans were published on 5.2.76. Therefore that would be the starting point for computing of the amount under Section 23(1)(A) of the L.A. Act. It would be payable till the dates of possession or respective awards whichever is earlier.
35. In addition to recording of the above findings, the learned reference court felt that the date of 1.4.1982 could not be taken as the relevant date under either of these provisions primarily for the reason that the powers of the Civil Court were limited whereas High Court under Article 226 and Supreme Court under Article 32 could ass such orders under its inherent jurisdiction.
36. At the cost of repetition and with the object of maintaining continuity for recording the relevant findings, we may refer to some facts. As already noticed, the notification in relation to acquisition of the lands in question was challenged before the High Court wherein the writ was dismissed. In a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, the Government had offered concession on 27th July, 1982 that the relevant date for acquisition of the lands would be 1st April, 1982 and not 20th August, 1981 when the notification under section 126(4) was issued. In furtherance thereto, the Special Leave Petition, thus, was disposed of upon the statement made on behalf of the State. Different owners of the land including the owners who had challenged the notification, filed references before the Collector who in turn, referred the same for adjudication to the court of competent jurisdiction. Various references were decided including Land Reference No. 51A of 1987. The court vide its judgment dated 31st March, 1994 had taken the relevant date as 1.4.1982. No. objection was raised by the respondents before the reference court and, in fact, they voluntarily and fully implemented the statement made by them before the Supreme Court and granted all benefits to the owners of the lands on the basis of the relevant date being 1.4.1982. It may also be noticed that against the decision of the reference court including in Land Reference No. 51A of 1987, the State preferred no appeal. However, the claimants prayed for further enhancement and the appeal was registered as First Appeal No. 369 of 1996 wherein the compensation was enhanced to Rs. 50/and 55/per sq.mtr. depending upon the nature of the land. Even at this stage, no objection was raised on behalf of the State and it, in fact, by its specific conduct, accepted the relevant date to be 1.4.1982. The State did not choose to challenge the judgment of this Court in those first appeals and accepted the order. However, the Development Authority viz. CIDCO had filed an application for impleadment in view of the judgment which was dismissed and even the Special Leave Petition filed by CIDCO was also dismissed. The maps/development plans were notified on 5.2.1976. However, the notification under Section 126(4) of the Planning Act, which is a notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act as held by the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co.(P) Ltd. , was published on 20th August, 1981. However, agreed date on which the market value of the land was to be determined was 1.4.1982. This date was duly given effect to by the State in subsequent proceedings. No. explanation whatsoever has come forward on behalf of the State before the reference court and even before this Court in the cases in hand as to what are the distinguishing features, if any, for not granting benefit of the date of 1.4.1982 to the claimants, particularly when the judgment of the court dated 24th January, 1997 which is binding precedent in First Appeal No. 369 of 1996 has attained finality between the parties relating to the same land in the revenue estate of the same village and where some of the owners are even common.
37. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Anoop Singh and Anr. and Siddappa Vasappa Kuri and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Anr. , has clearly stated the principle that the claimants are not entitled to any benefit under the provisions of the Acquisition Act where the possession had been taken prior to Section 4 notification, for the period commencing from the date of possession till the date of issuance of the notification. In other words, there is restriction upon the rights of the owners, the possession of whose lands is taken prior to issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act and/or under Section 126(4) of the Planning Act. Such claimants cannot claim any benefit or raise any tenable claim under the provisions of the Acquisition Act. The Government is expected to act fairly and not to discriminate in relation to grant of compensation or benefit where the persons are similarly situated. We have noticed that there is no distinct features either in law or on facts between the land owners/claimants in previous references/appeals and in the present one. The onus lies upon the State to show why the benefit of 1.4.1982 i.e. the relevant date, be denied to the present claimants. The State has miserably failed to justify any discriminatory treatment. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has fixed the relevant date of acquisition as 1.4.1982 on the basis of which the benefits have been granted to various owners from the same acquisition and as such, this even could be a precedent to be followed by this Court. The notification under Section 126(4) of the Planning Act was issued on 20th August, 1981 but the State had offered and agreed to treat the relevant date as 1.4.1982 as the date of acquisition for all intent and purpose in relation to the acquisition proceedings. The obvious reason could be that as the restriction on the rights of the owners was put by the State Government on 5th February, 1976, it was proper to compensate the claimants for such inordinate delay, since plans under Section 125 of the Planning Act were issued. This is what the court can reasonably presume, though it has already been noticed that there was no explanation rendered by the State Government in any of the appeals regarding fixing the relevant date as 1.4.1982.
38. The learned Counsel appearing for the claimants while relying upon the judgment in Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2007(3) CCC 5 (SC) contended that liberal interpretation should be given to the provisions of the Acquisition Act so as to manifestly avoid the injustice. While giving benefit, there has to be rational approach and arbitrariness in the state action is impermissible. In this very case, the Supreme court has also held that the publication of declaration under subsections ( 2) and (4) of Section 126 read with Section 6 of the Acquisition Act is a sine qua non for the commencement of any proceedings for acquisition under the Planning Act. On this premise, it is claimed by the claimants that they should be given the market value of the acquired land as on 1.4.1982 as is given in the other cases while benefit of Section 23(1A) of the Acquisition Act should be given with effect from 20th August, 1981. We may notice that such an approach would not be permissible under the provisions of the Acquisition Act. As discussed above, the only relevant dates are the date of acquisition by issuing notification under Section 4 of the Act and the date when the possession of the land was taken subsequent to notification under Section 4 of the Act or even after the pronouncement of the award.
39. The scheme of the Act does not permit that there could be two dates of acquisition. The date of acquisition could be one and that can either be 20th August, 1981 or 1st April, 1982. In view of the stand taken by the State in the previous cases where it has paid compensation to the claimants and granted other benefits with reference to 1.4.1982. In view of the fact that during the course of arguments, even the learned Counsel appearing for the claimants fairly stated that they would be entitled to the benefits under this provision from 1.4.1982, we hold that the relevant date of acquisition for all intent and purpose under the Act would be 1.4.1982.
40. In the case of Raj Kumar Johri and Anr. v. State of M.P. and Ors. , it was held that deemed date of notification was given by creating a legal fiction for giving enhanced compensation and it has to be limited to that only. It cannot be extended beyond it leading to the issuance of fresh declaration or giving a fresh award. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. , the Supreme Court also stated that Section 126 (1) of the MRTP Act is a substitute for Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. No. rmally, the date of notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act or under section 126 of the Planning Act would be the relevant date but when by the act of the parties and with their consent, the date is altered and it is taken by virtue of deemed fiction to be 1.4.1982, we hardly see any reason to alter that date particularly when the same has been accepted by the Supreme Court and subsequently, acted upon by the reference court without any objection or protest from either parties to the lis.
41. In the case of State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh and Ors.1995(1) Mh. L.J. 793, the Supreme Court declared that if a declaration is not made within three years of the publication of the Draft Regional Plan, development or any other plan where land is reserved for any public purpose specified in the plan as specified in Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act or having been made the aforesaid had expired on the commencement of the Amendment Act 14 of 1971, the State Government has been empowered to make fresh declaration by virtue of the provisions of Section 126(4) in relation to acquisition of the land in the manner provided in subsections (2) and (3) of Section 126 of the Act. The acquisition proceedings could not lapse as fresh declaration could be issued under Section 126(4) of the Act. In the present case, such a declaration was issued on 20th August, 1981. In the case of Siddappa Vasappa Kuri (supra), the Supreme Court also clearly held that the claimants were not entitled to the benefit prior to Section 4 notification even if the possession was taken prior to such notification but clearly stated the dictum that the claimants would be entitled to compensation from the date of notification till the date of the award irrespective of the fact that the possession has already been taken. Applying these principles to the facts of the present cases, there is no reason for this Court not to grant benefits to the claimants with effect from the deemed date of notification to the date of award i.e. from 1.4.1982 to 12.2.1986.
42. In the light of these principles, we are unable to accept the contention of the claimants that they are entitled to the different benefits from different dates as indicated above. In our opinion, the relevant date for all intent and purpose would be the date of acquisition agreed between the parties, determined by the courts and duly implemented without protest by the parties to the lis. In the circumstances, we cannot accept the finding recorded by the reference court that 1.4.1982 would not be treated as material date. We have determined the compensation with reference to the effective date i.e. 141982 while applying the rule of average on the basis of sale instances at Exhibits30 and 43. This computation also falls in line with the earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court in First Appeal No. 369 of 1996 where, on the basis of similar documentary evidence, the Court had granted Rs. 50/and 55/respectively per sq.mtr. on the basis of division of zones. Zone1 consisted of developed plots while ZoneII consisted of undeveloped plots/agricultural land. Somewhat similar basis was applied by the reference Court even in the judgment under appeal. We are in agreement with the judgment of the Division Bench as there is definite evidence on record before us to bifurcate the lands into two zones. The reference Court has bifurcated the lands as lands in advantageous group and remaining land in para 67 of its judgment. The lands in advantageous group would certainly be entitled to higher compensation than the undeveloped plots.
43. To sum up the conclusions of our above discussion, we answer the questions framed at the beginning of the judgment as follows:
(i) The claimants would be entitled to higher compensation. The owners of the developed plots falling in Zone1 ( advantageous group as termed by the reference Court) would be entitled to receive compensation at the rate of Rs. 58.80 per sq.mtr. (Rs. 56 being the average of sale deeds at Exhibits30 and 43 executed during the period October/December, 1981 and appreciation at the rate of 10 per cent per annum as compensation is to be determined as on 141982).
The claimants, owners of undeveloped plots, would be entitled to receive compensation at the rate of Rs. 53.55 (Rs. 51/plus 10 per cent per annum appreciation for the same period).
(ii) In view of the conduct of the parties, the order of the Supreme Court and on the basis of logical consequence of the aforestated principles of law, the relevant and acceptable date should be 1.4.1982 for all intents and purposes of the Acquisition Act.
(iii) The reference Court could not have fixed two different dates, one for the purpose of Section 23 of the Acquisition Act and the other for Section 23 (1A) of the Acquisition Act. Even the provisions of Section 23 (1A) of the Acquisition Act contemplate additional benefit to be given from the date of notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act till the date of possession or award whichever is earlier. There is nothing on record to show that actual physical possession of the land was taken by the authorities on 5th February, 1976.
(iv) Some of the applications under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act filed by the claimants were barred by time and as such, their First Appeals before this Court would not be maintainable as even reference proceedings before the reference court were untenable.
(v) The effect of the judgment of the third Judge dated 22nd February, 2007 in the present case is that some of the appeals are not maintainable and the State Government is entitled to take the plea of limitation while amending the memorandum of appeals which was permitted by the court.
(vi) This Court has no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the application under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act.
44. In view of our above discussion on the different issues involved in the present appeals, we dispose of all the appeals and cross objections filed by the parties. The claimants would be entitled to the following compensation on the basis of the market value of the land determined by the court as on 1.4.1982.
(i) The appeals filed by the claimants are partially accepted.
(ii) The claimants would be entitled to receive compensation for acquisition of their lands at the rate of Rs. 58.80 per sq.mtr. and Rs. 53.55 per sq. mtr. for developed (advantageous group) and undeveloped (other than advantageous group) lands respectively.
(iii) The claimants would be entitled to the extra benefit of Section 23(1A) of the Acquisition Act from 1.4.1982 till the date of the award i.e. 12th February, 1986.
(iv) The claimants will also be entitled to the benefit of Section 28 of the Acquisition Act in accordance with law.
(v) All the Appeals mentioned in paragraph 14 of this judgment are allowed and the award of the reference Court is set aside.
(vi) In the Appeals mentioned in paragraph 24 of this judgement, the award of the reference Court is set aside and the cases are remanded to the reference Court for adjudication in accordance with law. Firstly, the reference Court would decide the question of maintainability of references under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act on the plea of limitation. Secondly, if this is answered in favour of the claimants, then it would proceed to determine compensation in accordance with law.
45. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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