Another judgment cited at the bar is Prithawi Nath Ram v.
State of Jharkhand and Others; (2004) 7 SCC 261. Para 8 of the
said judgment makes the following reading:
“8. If any party concerned is aggrieved by the order
which in its opinion is wrong or against rules or its
implementation is neither practicable nor feasible, it
should always either approach the court that passed
the order or invoke jurisdiction of the appellate court.
Rightness or wrongness of the order cannot be
urged in contempt proceedings. Right or wrong,
the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of
the court would render the party liable for
contempt. While dealing with an application for
contempt the court cannot traverse beyond the
order, non-compliance with which is alleged. In
other words, it cannot say what should not have been
done or what should have been done. In cannot
traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness
or otherwise of the order or give additional direction
or delete any direction. That would be exercising
review jurisdiction while dealing with an application
for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same
would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view
of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside
and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration. It
shall deal with the application in its proper
perspective in accordance with law afresh. We make it
clear that we have not expressed any opinion
regarding acceptability or otherwise of the application
for initiation of contempt proceedings”.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CONMT. PET. (C) No. 374 of 2012 In C.A. No. 2790 of 2012
Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd.
V
Rajesh Verma & Ors.
Dated;April 22, 2014
A.K SIKRI, J.
1.All the aforesaid matters were heard analogously as they are
inter-connected. In fact, it is the judgment dated 14.3.2012
passed in C.A. No. 2790 of 2012 which has become the trigger
point of all other cases. C.A. No. 2790 of 2012 was filed by M/s.
Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd. (formerly known as Bhushan
Limited) (hereinafter referred to as 'BPSL'). That was an appeal
against the judgment passed by High Court of Orissa whereby the
High Court had dismissed the writ petition of the BPSL. Before
proceeding further, we would like to narrate the nature of different
cases and the background in which they came to be filed.
2.The erstwhile Bhushan Limited had proposed setting up of plant
in some identified villages in the District of Sambalpur, Orissa. For
this purpose it had made a request for acquisition of land,
measuring 1250 acres, which was acquired for Bhushan Limited. It
had also applied for grant of lease of mining of iron ore for use in
the proposed plant. These applications were favourably
considered by the State Government which agreed to accord due
priority to Bhushan Limited for grant of suitable iron ore areas and
also agreed to recommend the proposal to the Government of
India for grant of a Coal Block. Even a MOU was entered into
between the State Government and Bhushan Limited containing
the commitment of the State Government to recommend to the
Central Government, grant of iron ore mines for its use in the
proposed plant. For this purpose area earmarked for
recommendation were Thakurani area with 96 million tonnes iron
ore reserves and Keora Area, District Sundargarh for additional
128 million tonnes of iron ore; both for 50 years requirement of
the plant. Though various statutory and other permissions
required for setting up of the plant were granted and the plant
was also set up, but due to some in-fight between the family
members who owned Bhushan Limited, it faced difficulties in
getting the grant of iron ore lease.
3.In so far as granting of mining lease of iron ore reserves in the
aforesaid areas is concerned, it fell into rough weather. It resulted
into show cause notice dated 18.1..2006 by the State Government
which led to the decision that mining lease over the Thakurani
area could not be allowed on various grounds and the application
made by Bhushan Limited was premature. Thereafter, the
Government of Orissa made a recommendation to the Central
Government on 9.2.2006 to grant mining lease in favour of one
M/s Neepaz Metallics (P) Ltd. in relaxation of Rule 59(1) of the
Mining Rules, for a period of 30 years. Challenging these orders,
Bhushan Limited filed the writ petition in the High Court on
8.5.2006. This Writ Petition was dismissed by the High Court on
14.12.2007 and challenging this decision Special Leave Petition
was filed which was granted converting the SLP into C.A. No.
2790/2012. This appeal was allowed by this Court vide judgment
dated 14.3.2012 with the following directions:
“Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the
judgment and order of the High Court of Orissa and
also the decision of the State Government dated
9.2.2006, rejecting the Appellant's claim for grant of
mining lease. During the course of hearing, we have
been informed that Thakurani Block A has large
reserves of iron ore, in which the Appellants can also
be accommodated. We, accordingly, direct the State
of Orissa to take appropriate steps to act in terms of
the MOU dated 15.5.2002, as also its earlier
commitments to recommend the case of the
Appellants to the Central Government for grant of
adequate iron ore reserves to meet the requirements
of the Appellants in their steel plant at Lapanga”.
4.It would be pertinent to mention that State of Orissa had filed
Review Petition seeking review of this judgment but the same was
rejected. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, though the BPSL
has been given Thakurani Block A, the order has not been
implemented qua Keora, District Sundargarh. That is precisely the
cause for filing Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 374 of 2012 by BPSL.
5. The State of Orissa and its officials who are impleaded as
Contemners in the CCP have filed their replies to the CCP
expressing certain difficulties because of which they claim that
the directions given in the judgment are incapable of
enforcement. Simultaneously, Respondent No. 1/ State of Orissa
has filed instant I.A. No. 14 of 2013 as well, in which certain
subsequent developments which have taken place after the
passing of the judgment dated 12.3.2012 are traversed. It is
highlighted that there are certain other and legal proceedings
filed by them are pending at various stages in the High Court or in
this Court and the area claimed by them in those legal
proceedings overlap with the area which is the subject matter of
grant to BPSL. A reference is also made to subsequent judgment
in the case of Sandur Manganese & Iron Ore v. State of Karnataka;
(2010) 13 SCC 1 which has changed the legal position thereby
making it difficult for the State to recommend the case of the
petitioner. It is also stated that the issue which is dealt with by
this Court in Sandur Manganese (Supra) was not raised in the Writ
proceedings/ Civil Appeal of the BPSL. On the basis of the
aforesaid averment prayer made in the I.A. reads as under:-
“Pass appropriate directions with regard to
implementation of the directions contained in final
order and judgment dated 14.3.2012 passed by this
Hon'ble Court in Civil Appeal No. 2790 of 2012 in so
far as it relates to the mining lease applications of the
petitioner for an additional 128 million tonnes of iron
ore over lands in Keora area of Sundergarh District”.
I.A. NO. 2 OF 2013 IN I.A. NO. 14 OF 2013
6. In I.A. No. 14 of 2013, this I.A. is preferred by M/s. Shri
Mahavir Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd. The grievance of this applicant is
against the status quo order dated 21.4.2008 passed in the
applications filed by the BPSL. It is alleged that the applicant has
filed 9 applications for grant of Iron Ore Mining Lease of different
areas, notified as well as non-notified, including the Thakurani
area. However, because of the status quo order the applications
of the applicant not being considered by the State Government
which is adversely affecting the interest of the applicant.
7. While narrating the facts of C.A. No. 2790 of 2012 in brief,
we had mentioned about the inter se disputes between the family
members of erstwhile Bhushan Limited because of which BPSL
faced difficulties in getting the grant of iron ore lease. It so
happened that during the pendency of the aforesaid appeal, the
family members resolved their disputes. On 28.2.2006, Bhushan
Limited altered its name to BPSL. Other group got incorporated a
company named as M/s. Bhushan Steel Limited (BSL). BSL is the
petitioner in the instant petition. This significant development was
taken note of in the judgment dated 14.3.2012 in the following
manner:-
“As indicated hereinbefore, on 21st April, 2008, this
Court passed an interim order in the Special Leave
Petition filed by Bhushan Limited directing the parties
to maintain status quo with regard to the lands
indicated in the application filed by the appellants for
grant of mining lease. However, one of the most
significant developments that subsequently took
place was that on 25th November, 2011, Shri B.B.
Singhal and Shri Neeraj Singhal, Vice-Chairman and
Managing Director of Bhushan Steel and Strips Ltd.
filed affidavits withdrawing all their claims and rights
in the MOU dated 15th May, 2002, executed between
the State Government and Bhushan Limited and
declaring that the said MOU was and had always been
in favour of Bhushan power & Steel Ltd. The above
named persons also prayed for deletion of their
names from the array of parties.”
The mutual settlement of the disputes between the
members of the Bhushan Group has altered the
situation considerably, since BSSL has withdrawn its
claim under the MOU dated 15th May, 2002 and has
declared that the said MOU was and had always been
executed by the State Government in favour of
Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd., which had set up its steel
plant at Lapanga. As indicated hereinbefore, although,
the MOU was entered into by the State Government
with the Bhushan Group for setting up a steel plant at
Lapanga, at a later stage, BSSL also laid claim under
the MOU for setting up a separate steel plant at
Mehramandali and a suggestion was also made for
execution of a fresh MOU between the State
Government and BSSL to this effect.”
8. It is the case of the BSL in the present Writ Petition that BSL
was a part of the then Bhushan Group. It executed a MOU dated
15.5.2002 with the State of Orissa. Consequent to a family
settlement, M/s. Bhushan Steel and Strips Ltd. (BSSL) executed a
separate MOA dated 3.11.2005 in which the State of Orissa had
identical duties and obligations as those contained in 2002 MOU.
On 12.4.2007, BSSL was re-named as BSL herein. It is thus
claimed that BSL is identically situated as BPSL and, therefore, the
benefit given to BPSL vide judgment dated 14.3.2012 needs to be
extended to the BSL as well. The direction in the nature of
mandamus is sought to implement the decision of 12th IIAC
Meeting dated 27.8.2003 and terms of MOA dated 3.11.2005
against the State Government by making appropriate
recommendation to the Central Government for allotment of the
remaining portion in Thakurani RF Block A, District Keonjhar i.e.
601.500 hectares applied while ML Application No. 882 and the
areas applied vide ML Application No. 1079 i.e. 722.30 hectares
approximately in village Kadalia, Kuriyakudar, Mithirda etc. under
Bonai sub-division, District Sundegarh to meet the captive
requirements of BSL plants.
9. In essence, the petitioner wants same treatment as is given
to BPSL and, therefore, has prayed for the extension of the benefit
of judgment dated 12.3.2012 to BSL as well.
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 194 OF 2013
10. This Writ Petition is filed by Jindal Steel and Power Limited
(hereinafter referred to as 'Jindal Steel'). It had entered into MOU
with the State of Orissa on 8.5.2002. It is stated in the writ
petition that this petitioner became an intervenor in C.A. No. 2790
of 2012 to protect its interest which has been duly taken note of in
the judgment dated 14.3.2012 in the following manner:-
“Appearing for the Intervener, M/s. Jindal Steels Ltd.,
Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned Senior Advocate,
submitted that so long as any allotment made in
favour of the Appellants did not impinge on the
allotment made in favour of M/s. Jindal Steels Ltd;, it
could have no grievance against a separate allotment
being made in favour of the Appellants.”
11.It is pleaded that the case of Jindal Steel is even on a better
footing for grant of mining lease, application for which purpose
are pending with the State of Orissa. It had also signed the MOU
for setting up an integrated Steel Plant wherein similar promise
was made by the State Government for grant of a mining lease.
Additionally, Jindal Steel had the advantage of being an earlier
applicant for the mining lease in regard to Thakurani RF Block A
area which was also a part of an MOU by BPSL. It is further
mentioned that 16 mining lease applications were received in
respect of the said area and the Director of Mines vide his report
dated 8.11.2002 rejected all other applications except that of
Jindal Steel herein, BPSL and three other applicants. In the case of
Jindal Steel, recommendation was for 264 hectares in Thakurani
RF Block A as against 383 Hectare in respect of BPSL. It is also
stated that even when recommendation in respect of BPSL in
Thakurani area is made by the State Government and approved
by the Union of India, recommendation of Jindal Steel is still
pending with the State Government. It is thus, pleaded that the
case of the petitioner, Jindal Steel, is squarely covered by
judgment dated 14.3.2012 passed in C.A. NO. 2790 of 2012 and
benefit thereof be extended to this petitioner as well.
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 837 OF 2013
12. This Writ Petition is filed by Shri Mahavir Ferro Alloys Pvt.
Ltd. It has also proposed to set up a 0.35 MTPA Captive Integrated
Steel Plant with additional facilities and 60 MW Captive Power
Plant in Sundargarh district had an overall investment of Rs. 435
crores. This petitioner claims that pursuant to MOU entered into
with the State Government for grant of mining leases, it had
submitted its application in this behalf. However, more than 10
years have elapsed but the State Government has not
recommended its case, primarily because of status quo orders
passed by this Court in C.A. NO. 2790 of 2012. It is pointed out
that for this reason this petitioner has already filed I.A. No. 2 in I.A.
NO. 14 of 2013 in C.A. NO. 290 of 2012. Case of this petitioner,
again, is that it is equally circumscribed and placed as BPSL as
well as Jindal Steel and, therefore, entitled to the grant of mining
lease as done in favour of BPSL by this Court vide judgment dated
14.3.2012.
13.We have reproduced, hereinabove gist of the cases filed by
different parties to get the favour of the proceedings. It becomes
obvious and can be readily understood that in so far as BPSL is
concerned, by means of Contempt Petition, it is seeking the
enforcement of the directions contained in its favour in the
judgment dated 14.3.2012 passed in C.A. NO. 2790 of 2012. Three
other parties namely BSL, Jindal Steel and Mahavir Ferro Alloys (P)
Ltd. have filed Writ Petitions claiming same relief as given to the
BPSL vide judgment dated 14.3.2012 on the ground that they are
placed in the similar or even better position than BPSL and,
therefore, entitled to same treatment. Further, as already pointed
out above, the State Government has ventured to exhibit its
helplessness in carrying out the directions contained in the
judgment dated 14.3.2012 even qua the beneficiary of the said
judgment namely BPSL. In so far as other three writ petitioners
are concerned, not only same difficulties are sought to be
projected, it is also mentioned that are precluded from seeking
same relief as given to BPSL for various reasons. That apart, even
the maintainability of the writ petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution filed by these petitioners is questioned. In such a
scenario it is apposite to first deal with the CCP filed by BPSL.
14. We have already narrated the gist of factual background in
which BPSL approached the High Court and thereafter this Court
for grant of mining leases of iron ore. As already mentioned, in the
MOU entered into between the parties, the State Government had
committed to recommend to the Central Government, for grant of
iron ore mines to the BPSL for its use in the plant to be set up at
Lapanga. In this behalf it was agreed to make the following
recommendations to the Central Government:-
(a) For grant of 96 million tonnes iron ore reserves in
Joda Barbil Sector of Keonjhar (Thakurani area)
for 50 years requirement of the plant.
(b) For additional 128 million tonnes of iron ore
reserves in Keora, District Sundergarh, to meet a
requirement of 1.6. million tonnes for 50 years.
15. It is not necessary to set out the detailed facts which have
been noted in judgment dated 14.3.2012, pertaining to the grant
of permissions by various authorities enabling BPSL to get the
land, electricity, permission for installation of a Captive Power
Plant etc. etc. Armed with those permission, the BPSL set up the
plant in Lapanga in the district of Sambalpur, Orissa. BPSL claims
that is has invested Rs. 25,000 crores in this project. It is further
mentioned that for running of this steel plant, uninterrupted
supply of iron ore is essential. This plant was set up in a backward
area of Orissa persuant to the scheme of the State Government. It
is for this reason that the State Government agreed to grant
mining rights of iron ore reserves, keeping in view a total
requirement of 200 million tonnes over a period of 50 years for
the smooth running of the said plant. For this reason MOU dated
15.5.2002 was entered into. Since the grant of mining lease is by
the Central Government under the Mining Act, State Government
which is a recommendatory authority had agreed to recommend
the case of the BPSL. There was deadlock for some period
because of infight within Bhushan family. However, this impasse
came to be resolved. Taking note of these developments the Court
was of the opinion that there were two issues which arose for
considerations namely:
(a) Whether the Memorandum of Understanding
dated 15th May, 2002 continues to subsist in
favour of the appellants?
(b) Whether the State Government is obliged to
make recommendations for the grant of iron ore
mines in terms of the stipulations contained in the
aforesaid MOU dated 15th May, 2002 and
whether in respect of the areas which had not
been notified under Rule 59(1), the State
Government can make a recommendation for
relaxation of Rule 59(1) under Rule 59(2).
16. The Court deliberated at length on these issues and decided
in favour of BPSL holding that MOU dated 15.5.2002 still subsisted
in favour of the BPSL and also that State Government was under
obligation to make recommendations as per the said MOU. The
most relevant part of discussion, in this behalf, reads as under:
“Pursuant to the MOU with Bhushan Limited, the
State Government had not only allotted land for the
setting up of the steel plant at Lapanga, it had even
extended all help for the commissioning of the plant,
which, in fact, had already started functioning.
However, it is the claim made by BSSL under the MOU
executed on 15th May, 2002, that had created
obstructions in the setting up of the steel plant at
Lapanga. Despite having allotted land and granted
sanction to Bhushan Limited to take steps for
construction of the said plant, it was subsequently
contended that the application filed by Bhushan
Limited was premature and could not, therefore, be
acted upon. Specific instances have been mentioned
hereinabove of the steps taken by the various
departments in extending cooperation to Bhushan
Limited to set up its steel plant at Lapanga. To now
turn around and take a stand that the application
made by Bhushan Limited was premature, is not only
unreasonable, but completely unfair to Bhushan
Limited, who have already invested large sums of
money in setting up the plant. The State Government
had, on its own , entered into the MOU with
Bhushan Limited on 15th May, 2002, and had even
agreed to request the Central Government to allot
mining areas and coal blocks for operating the steel
plant. Whatever differences that may have resulted
on account of the dispute within the Bhushan Group,
which could have led to the rethinking on the part of
the State Government, have now been laid to rest by
virtue of the settlement arrived at between the
Bhushan Limited (now BPSL) and BSSL. The State
Government has also accepted the said position. In
addition to the above, the action taken by the State
Government appears to us to be highly unreasonable
and arbitrary and also attracts the doctrine of
legitimate expectation. There is no denying the fact
that the Appellants have altered their position to their
detriment in accordance with the MOU dated 15th
May, 2002. whatever may have been the
arrangement subsequently arrived at between the
State Government and BSSL, the original MOU dated
15th May, 2002, continued to be in existence and
remained operative”.
17. In so far as reserve of 96 million tonnes of iron ore in
Thakurani mines are concerned, the State Government had made
the recommendation to the Central Government, which has also
approved the same in favour of the BPSL. The dispute now relates
to Keora mines for a reserve of 128 million tonnes.
18. Respondents/ Contemners do not dispute (and in fact there
is no scope for any dispute) that the aforesaid directions
contained in the judgment have become final. Review Petition was
filed by the State Government but unsuccessfully. One would,
therefore, command for obeying these directions. However, the
State Government/ Contemners have pleaded their helplessness
by narrating certain circumstances which are captured herein
below.
“(a) These areas fall almost entirely within the areas
notified on 23.8.1991 under Rule 59(1) of the
Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. The validity of
the notification dated 23.8.1991 is an issue in
SLP(c)No. 31593 of 2010 and connected cases which
are now listed for hearing on 17.01.2013 before
another Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court.
(b) Further, it is seen that the applied area is
overlapping with the applied area of several other
applicants, including M/s. Larsen & Toubro Limited and
M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Limited.
(c) It is also pointed out that earlier on 21.10.1997
an area of 998.93 hectares overlapping with applied
area of the BPSL, was recommended in favour of
M/s Larsen & Toubro Ltd. in puruance with the said
company. However, this recommendation was
withdrawn for certain reasons. Thereafter, even
revised ML/ PL application of M/s. Larsen and Toubro
Ltd. Were rejected. The said company challenged the
order of rejection before the Revisional Authority i.e.
Central Government which passed orders dated
10.7.2003 wherein direction is given to consider
application of M/s. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. Alongwith
about 196 applications for grant of mining lease and
after granting an opportunity of hearing to all the
applicants. However, BPSL is outside the 196
applications that were to be considered afresh.
(d) M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd has challenged the
aforesaid orders of the Central Government by filing
Writ Petition in the High Court which was dismissed by
the Single Judge of Delhi High Court. Appeal
thereagainst was dismissed by the Division Bench on
3.7.2012. Order of the Division Bench of the High
Court is challenged by filing SLP (C) NO. 33812 of
2012 in which notice has been issued and as the
matter is sub-judice in those proceedings it is difficult
to pass any orders qua BPSL at this stage.
(e) It is further pointed out that in the case of
Sandur Mangnese (Supra) this Court has considered
the provisions of Section 11(4) of the MMDR Act and
has concluded that all applications filed over
areas notified under Rule 59(1) of the Mineral
Concession Rules, 1960 deserve simultaneous
consideration. As per the mandate of Section 11(4)
of the MMDR Act, the State Government may
grant a mining lease over a notified area to such one
of the simultaneous applicants after considering the
matters specified in sub-section (3) of Section 11.
The process of simultaneous consideration of the
applications filed over Khajhurdihi R.F. In Sundergarh
and Rakma, Marsuanand Tiriba of Keonjhar district
had remained stalled due to the various stay orders
passed in litigations concerning such area. Subject
to the orders, if any, passed by this Hon'ble
Court in this application, the process of
simultaneous consideration of applications will take
considerable time in view of the large number of
overlapping applications over the areas in question.
Each of these applicants is required to be given an
opportunity of personal hearing and credentials of
these applicants are required to be evaluated for
assessment of relative merits in terms of Section
11(3) of the MMDR Act.”
19. It is thus, argued that the developments narrated above and
the statutory mandate embodied in Section 11(4) of the MMDR
Act, 1957 have come in the way of the Respondent State in
implementing the final order and judgment dated 14.3.2012 in so
far it relates to the Keora area of Sundergarh district. It is also
sought to be argued that the question of entitlement of the
petitioner to the recommendation of mines in the Keora area,
which are almost entirely covered under notification issued under
Rule 59(1) of MC Rules, 1960 with specific reference to Sections
11(4) and 11(3) of the MMDR Act was not raised in the Writ
Proceedings/ Civil Appeal. During the course of the
implementation of the order of this Hon'ble Court dated 14.3.2012
passed in Civil Appeal No. 2790 of 2012, the Respondent No. 1 is
faced with the difficulties with regard to the Keora area as
enumerated above. Hence, this application for appropriate
directions.
20.The question is as to whether such a plea can be raised to
avoid implementation of the directions contained in the judgment?
Our answer is in the negative, having regard to the categorical
and authoritative principle of law enunciated by various
judgments of this Court. From the reading of these judgments one
can comfortably get a complete answer to the so-called difficulties
feigned by the State Government/ Contemners.
21. First judgment which needs to be noticed is in the case of
T.R. Dhananjaya v. J. Vasudevan; (1995) 5 SCC 619. The
following discussion contained in the said judgment squarely
applies here:-
“10. When this order was passed, what remained for
the respondent was only implementation of the order
passed by this Court in furtherance of the action taken
thereunder by the Corporation. It is now clear that
instead of implementing the order, an attempt has
been made to circumvent the same and deny the
benefits to the petitioner. As stated earlier, the
petitioner is a Corporation employee and the stand of
the Government appears to be to give benefit to their
employees. So, an attempt has now been made to get
into the rule position and to find whether the
petitioner is eligible to be considered for promotion to
the post of Executive Engineer, Superintending
Engineer and Chief Engineer. It is now stated that
according to the rules the petitioner would be eligible
only as superintending engineer and not as Chief
Engineer. When direction was given in LA. 3 of 1993,
Government was a party to the proceedings and it was
never brought to our notice that the petitioner was not
eligible. On the other hand, the Division Bench of
Karnataka High Court upheld the right of the petitioner
which became final.
11. Question is whether it is open to the respondent
to take at this stage this volte-face step. It is seen that
all through Government was a party, when the
direction was given in LA. No. 3 filed by the petitioner,
it was not brought to out notice that the petitioner was
not eligible for promotion, in contradiction with
Dasegowda, or any other. When the claim inter se had
been adjudicated and the claim of the petitioner had
become final and that of Dasegowda was negatived, it
is no longer open to the Government to go behind the
order and truncate the effect of the orders passed by
this Court by hovering over the rules to get round the
result, to legitimise legal alibi to circumvent the orders
passed by this Court. Thus, it is clear that the
concerned officers have deliberately made concerted
effort to disobey the orders passed by this court to
deny the benefits to the petitioner. So, we are left with
no option but to hold that the respondent has
deliberately and wilfully, with an intention to defeat
the orders of this Court, passed the impugned order.”
22. Another judgment cited at the bar is Prithawi Nath Ram v.
State of Jharkhand and Others; (2004) 7 SCC 261. Para 8 of the
said judgment makes the following reading:
“8. If any party concerned is aggrieved by the order
which in its opinion is wrong or against rules or its
implementation is neither practicable nor feasible, it
should always either approach the court that passed
the order or invoke jurisdiction of the appellate court.
Rightness or wrongness of the order cannot be
urged in contempt proceedings. Right or wrong,
the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of
the court would render the party liable for
contempt. While dealing with an application for
contempt the court cannot traverse beyond the
order, non-compliance with which is alleged. In
other words, it cannot say what should not have been
done or what should have been done. In cannot
traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness
or otherwise of the order or give additional direction
or delete any direction. That would be exercising
review jurisdiction while dealing with an application
for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same
would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view
of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside
and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration. It
shall deal with the application in its proper
perspective in accordance with law afresh. We make it
clear that we have not expressed any opinion
regarding acceptability or otherwise of the application
for initiation of contempt proceedings”.
23. This very principle has been reiterated by in Bihar Finance
Service H.C. Coop. Soc. Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami and Ors.; (2008)
5 SCC 339 in the following words:
“32. While exercising the said jurisdiction this
Court does not intend to re-open the issues which
could have been raised in the original proceeding nor
shall it embark upon other questions including the
plea of equities which could fall for consideration only
in the original proceedings. The Court is not
concerned with as to whether the original order was
right or wrong. The court must not take a different
view or traverse beyond the same. It cannot
ordinarily give an additional direction or delete a
direction issued. In short, it will not do anything which
would amount to exercise of its review jurisdiction”.
24. We cannot lose sight of the fact that there is a judgment,
inter parties, which has become final. Even when the Civil Appeal
was being heard, certain other parties claiming their interest in
these very lands had moved intervention applications which were
dismissed. At that time also it was mentioned that there are 195
applicants. However, notwithstanding the same, this Court issued
firm directions to the State Government to recommend the case
of the petitioners for mining lease in both the areas. In view of
such categorical and unambiguous directions given in the
judgment which has attained finality, merely because another
judgment has been delivered by this Court in Sandur Manganese
case, cannot be a ground to undo the directions contained in the
judgment dated 14.3.2012. In so far as law laid down in Sandur
Manganese (Supra) is concerned, that may be applied and
followed by the State Government in respect of other applications
which are still pending. However, that cannot be pressed into
service qua the petitioner whose rights have been crystallised by
the judgment rendered in its favour. It cannot be re-opened, that
too at the stage of implementation of the said judgment.
25. We would like to place on record the arguments of learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the total area under
notification is 731.67 sq. kms. and out of this 406 sq. km. is yet to
be allotted. The area which comes to the share of the petitioner
under MOU is 13.91 sq. km. which is barely 3 percent of 406 sq.
km and, therefore recommendation by the State Government in
favour of the petitioner cannot be stalled or put to naught only on
the basis of inchoate applications, fate whereof is yet to be
decided. It is also pointed out that in so far as the petitioners in
other writ petitions are concerned area claimed by them is not
overlapping with the petitioner's area. However, it may not even
be necessary to go into these contentions in detail. Once we hold
that the respondents are bound to implement the direction
contained in judgment dated 14.3.2012, in so far as the State
Government is concerned, it is obliged to comply therewith and
such matters, alongwith other relevant considerations, can be left
to the wisdom of the Central Government while taking a decision
on the recommendation of the State Government.
26. In so far as intervention applications by Tatas and LNT are
concerned these are dismissed as non maintainable, in view of
law laid down in by this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v.
Union of India & Anr.; (1998) 4 SCC 409;
“42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to
be exercised sparingly and with caution whenever an
act adversely affects the administration of justice or
which tends to impede its course or tends to shake
public confidence in the judicial institutions. This
jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act
complained of adversely affects the majesty of law or
dignity of the courts. The purpose of contempt
jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the
courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction
combining “the jury, the judge and the hangman” and
it is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any
claim between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is
not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual
judge but to protect the administration of justice from
being maligned. In the general interest of the
community it is imperative that the authority of courts
should not be imperilled and there should be no
unjustifiable interference in the administration of
justice. It is a matter between the court and the
contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It is
exercised in a summary manner in aid of the
administration of justice, the majesty of law and the
dignity of the courts. No such act can be permitted
which may have the tendency to shake the public
confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the
administration of justice”.
27. As a consequence, we hold that the Respondents/
Contemners are in contempt of orders dated 14.3.2012 passed by
this Court in not complying with the directions in respect of Keora
area. However, we are giving one final opportunity to them to
purge the contempt by transmitting requisite recommendations to
the Central Government. It would be for the Central Government
to consider the said recommendations on its own merits and in
accordance with law. In case the recommendation is sent within
one month from the date of copy of receipt of this order, we
propose not to take any further action and the respondents/
contemners shall stand discharged from this Contempt Petition.
However, in case the respondents do not purge in the manner
mentioned above, it would be open to the petitioners to point out
the same to this Court by moving appropriate application and in
that event the Contemners shall be proceeded against.
28. With this, I.A. No. 14 in C.A. NO. 2790 of 2012 and I.A. No. 2
in I.A. NO. 14 in C.A. NO. 2790 of 2012 also stand disposed of.
Writ Petitions
29. In so far as three writ petitions are concerned we need not
go into the detailed arguments advanced by Counsel for the
petitioners in those petitions. As already noted above, for their
own reasons all the three petitioners pray that the same
directions as given in favour of BPSL in judgment dated
14.3.2012, be passed in their cases as well. This they claim on the
basis of parity with BPSL. However, we are constrained to hold
that, on the basis of such an argument, they cannot approach this
court directly under Article 32 of the Constitution by filing writ
petitions. It has already been authoritatively determined that no
fundamental right of the petitioners is violated. No fundamental
right is violated by non-granting of mining lease. (See (2012) 11
SCC 1 and (1973) 1 SCC 584).
30. That apart, there are few other aspects, aptly pointed out
by Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned ASG, which come in the way of
maintainability of the instant petitions. He, inter alia, submitted
that atleast in respect of applications which are still pending and
yet to be decided, judgment in Sandur Manganese (Supra) shall
have to be applied as it does not remain virgin area, which was
the position when the case of BPSL was decided. He had made
various other submissions on merit as well. Without going into all
these issues, we dismiss these petitions giving liberty to the
petitioners to approach the High Court in the first instance and/ or
any other forum which is available, as per law. We make it clear
that in so far as these petitions are concerned we have not dealt
with the issues on merits. Wherever the petitions are filed, it
would be open to the said forum to deal with the question as to
whether the petitioners would be entitled to the benefit of
judgment dated 14.3.2012 passed in the case of BPSL or not. All
other issues are also kept open to be agitated in those
proceedings. Writ petitions are dismissed with liberty as aforesaid.
…................................J.
[Surinder Singh Nijjar]
…................................J.
[A.K. SIKRI]
New Delhi
April 22, 2014
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