Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of
‘cruelty’, which consists of two clauses. To attract Section
498-A, the prosecution has to establish the wilful conduct
on the part of the accused and that conduct is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the wife to commit suicide. We
fail to see how the failure to take one’s wife to his place of
posting, would amount to a wilful conduct of such a nature
which is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide. We fail
to see how a married woman left at the parental home by
the husband would by itself amount to a wilful conduct to
fall within the expression of ‘cruelty’, especially when the
husband is having such a job for which he has to be away
at the place of his posting. We also fail to see how a wife
left in a village life “in the company of rustic persons”,
borrowing language used by the trial Court, would amount
to wilful conduct of such a nature to fall within the
expression of ‘cruelty’. In our view, both the trial Court as
well as the High Court have completely misunderstood the
scope of Section 498-A IPC read with its explanation and we
are clearly of the view that no offence under Section 498-A
has been made out against the accused appellant.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 696 OF 2009
Mangat Ram .. Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana .. Respondent
Citation;2014(2) Crimes 80 SC
K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.
1. The appellant Mangat Ram, a member of SC
community, married the deceased Seema, a member of the
Aggarwal community on 13.7.1993 at Ambala. Few months
after the marriage, on 15.9.1993, according to the
prosecution, the appellant sprinkled kerosene oil on the
body of the deceased and set her on fire, having failed to
meet the dowry demand. On hearing the hue and cry,
neighbours assembled and took her to the Civil Hospital,
Gohana and, later, she was shifted to the Medical College
and Hospital, Rohtak, where she died on 17.9.1993. The
Page 2
2
appellant, along with his parents and sister, were chargesheeted
for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A
and 304-B IPC.
2. The prosecution, in order to bring home the offences,
examined PWs 1 to 7 and also produced various
documents. On the side of defence, DWs 1 to 5 were
examined and the accused appellant got himself examined
as DW6. After the evidence was closed, the accused was
questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Cr.P.C.), who denied all the incriminating
statements made against him. The trial Court, after
appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, came to
the conclusion that an offence under Section 498-A IPC was
made out against the appellant, but not against the other
three accused persons. The trial Court also found that no
offence under Section 304-B IPC was made out against the
accused persons, including the appellant. However, it was
held that an offence under Section 306 IPC was made out
against the appellant, though no charge was framed under
that section. After holding the appellant guilty, the trial
Court convicted the appellant under Section 498-A IPC and
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sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for three years
and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to further
undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for six months. The
appellant was also convicted under Section 306 IPC and
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of seven
years and to pay a fine of Rs.4,000/-, in default, to further
undergo RI for two years.
3. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded by
the trial Court, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No.
592-SB of 1997, which when came up for hearing before
the Division Bench of the High Court on 3.5.2007, the Court
passed the following order:
“Present: Mrs. Ritu Punj, DAG, Haryana
Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Dhillon, Advocate
is appointed as Amicus Curiae.
Heard
Dismissed, reasons to follow.”
4. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred
SLP (Criminal) No. 7578 of 2007 which was later converted
into Criminal Appeal No. 182 of 2008. The criminal appeal
came up for hearing before this Court on 25.1.2008 and this
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Court deprecated the practice of the High Court in disposing
of the criminal appeals without recording reasons in support
of its decision. Placing reliance on the judgments of this
Court in State of Punjab and others v. Jagdev Singh
Talwandi (1984) 1 SCC 596, State of Punjab and others
v. Surinder Kumar and others (1992) 1 SCC 489 and
Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and another v. State of
Gujarat and others (2004) 4 SCC 158, this Court set aside
the judgment of the High Court and directed the High Court
to hear the appeal on merits.
5. The High Court then considered the criminal appeal and
dismissed the same on merits vide its judgment dated
27.5.2008 confirming the conviction and sentence awarded
against the accused by the trial Court. Aggrieved by the
same, this appeal has been preferred.
6. Mr. Satinder S. Gulati, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant, took us elaborately through the oral and
documentary evidence adduced by the parties and
submitted that the judgment of the trial Court as well as the
High Court is based on conjunctures, full of contradictions
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and surmises and there is no evidence to substantiate the
charges levelled against the accused. Learned counsel
submitted that there was a complete misreading of the oral
and documentary evidence and, at every stage, the Courts
below adopted its own strange reasoning which was not
brought out from the deposition of the witnesses. Learned
counsel pointed out that, throughout the judgment of the
trial Court as well as the High Court, one can notice that the
Courts below were prejudiced to the accused for having
entered into an inter-caste marriage and opined that the
plight of such marriages would be discontentment and
unhappiness. Learned counsel pointed out that there is
sufficient evidence to conclude that the deceased was
suffering from Epilepsy for the last few years of the incident
and that death might have been caused by accident and, in
any view, it was not a homicidal death. Further, it was
pointed out that the prosecution could not prove that the
appellant was at home when the incident had happened.
Learned counsel also submitted that the trial Court has
committed an error in altering the offence to that of Section
306 IPC after finding the accused not guilty under Section
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304-B IPC. Learned counsel pointed out that the
ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B as well as
Section 306 IPC are entirely different and the trial Court has
committed a grave error in convicting the appellant under
Section 306 IPC. Learned counsel also pointed out that
there is absolutely no evidence of dowry demand and the
conviction recorded under Section 498-A IPC is also without
any material. In support of his various contentions, learned
counsel also made reference to few judgments of this Court,
which we will deal in the latter part of this judgment.
7. We did not have the advantage of hearing any counsel
on the side of the State, even though, the hearing was
going on for a couple of days. Learned counsel appearing
for the appellant took us through the depositions of the
witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution as well
as the defence, as also the documentary evidence placed
before the Court.
8. We may first examine whether an offence under
Section 498-A IPC has been made out against the appellant.
Admittedly, the marriage between the appellant and the
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deceased was an inter-caste love marriage and, after few
months of the marriage, she died of burn injuries on
17.9.1993 at her matrimonial home. The question is
whether immediately before and during the period between
the date of marriage and the date of incident, was there
any dowry demand on the side of the accused. In order to
establish the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC, the
prosecution examined PW4, the maternal grand-father of
the deceased, who had brought up her on the demise of her
parents. On a plain reading of the deposition of PW4, it is
clear that he was against the inter-caste marriage of her
grand-daughter with the appellant, who belonged to the
Scheduled Caste community, while the deceased belonged
to the Aggarwal community. PW4, in his cross-examination,
stated that he had agreed for the marriage since the
deceased was adamant to marry the appellant. PW4 also
stated that he had not participated in Tikka ceremony held
in the house of accused appellant. Further, it was also
stated that he had not contacted any other member of the
family of the accused before the marriage. PW4, in the
cross-examination, stated that he had gone to Madhuban
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prior to the marriage to dissuade the appellant from
entering into such a marriage and, for the said purpose, he
met the DSP, Madhuban, who then called Mangat Ram, but
he was adamant to marry Seema. We have to appreciate
the evidence of PW4 in the light of the fact that he was
totally against the inter-caste marriage between the
accused and the deceased. PW4 also deposed that the
accused persons had demanded a dowry of Rs.10,000/- and
a scooter and, on 14.8.1993, PW4 gave Rs.10,000/- in cash
to the accused and had also promised to make
arrangement for the purchase of a scooter.
9. PW5, a distant relative of PW4, also stated that after
15-20 days of the marriage, the deceased came along with
the accused to the residence of PW4 and, at that time, the
deceased had told PW4 and others that the accused was
harassing her since she had not brought dowry. PW5 also
deposed that articles like cooler, fridge, sofa, double bed
were given to the accused by way of dowry. PWs 4 and 5
had deposed that a demand of dowry was made not only by
the accused Mangat Ram, but also by his parents and
sister. The trial Court recorded a clear finding that the
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prosecution had failed to bring home the guilt as against
the parents and sister of the accused under Section 498A,
304-B IPC, which was not questioned by the prosecution.
However, if that part of the evidence of PWs 4 and 5 could
not be believed against the rest of the accused, then we fail
to see how it could be put against the accused alone,
especially when PWs 4 and 5 had stated that the demand
for dowry was made by all the accused on 13.8.1993. The
evidence of PWs 4 and 5 has to be appreciated in the light
of the fact that they were against the inter-caste marriage,
since the appellant belonged to Scheduled Caste
community and the deceased belonged to Aggarwal
community, a forward community. Alleged dowry demand
of Rs.10,000/- and the demand of scooter, stated to have
been made by the accused, could not be established not
only against the other three accused persons, but also
against the appellant as well.
10. We may now examine, apart from the dowry demand,
had the appellant treated the deceased with cruelty and
abetted the deceased in committing suicide. We have
already found on facts that the prosecution could not
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10
establish that there was any dowry demand from the side of
the appellant. Once it is so found, then we have to examine
what was the cruelty meted out to the deceased so as to
provoke her to end her life. It has come out in evidence
that when the deceased sustained burn injuries, the
accused was not at home. In this connection, we may refer
to para 25 of the trial Court judgment, which reads as
follows:
“25. Secondly, Seema died un-natural death. The
most crucial point which the prosecution was
bound to establish, whether Seema was
subjected to cruelty and harassment on
account of paucity of dowry or there was a
fresh demand of dowry, there is no such
evidence on the file that she was subjected to
cruelty and harassment. Bidhi Chand and
Avinash Chander both appeared. They did
not state that Seema was subjected to cruelty
and harassment for paucity of dowry given at
the time of marriage........”
[Emphasis Supplied]
11. The trial Court itself says that there was no such
evidence on the file that she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment. But, in para 26 of its judgment, the trial Court,
adopted a strange reasoning to hold that the accused had
treated the deceased with cruelty, which is as follows:
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11
“26. ....... An educated girl of business community
was left in a village life and in the house of a
lower community people whose way of living,
whose way of talking, whose way of
behaviour is not at par with the family
members of Seema, since deceased. As such,
Seema was feeling perplexed agitated. She
expected from Mangat Ram that she must be
kept with him at his place of posting and not
to be left in a village life in the company of
rustic persons and that appeared the cause of
discontentment and unhappiness. It has
been experienced that such marriage meets
ill fate, like the present one. From statement
of Bidhi Chand and letters Ex.PE and PF an
inference can be easily drawn that Seema
was fully unhappy and dis-contended from
the behaviour of Mangat Ram accused, since
he had left her in village life at the mercy of
her mother-in-law Jiwni and that is why, she
had been calling her grand maternal father to
come for her rescue, but Bidhi Chand, as
explained by him, could not rush to village
Baroda because his son and his wife met with
an accident at Chandigarh and he went
there.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
12. Further, in para 31, the trial Court has stated that the
conduct of Mangat Ram keeping and leaving Seema in
Baroda at his home amounted to causing cruelty and
harassment to Seema. In para 32, the trial Court has also
recorded a very strange reasoning, which is as follows:
“32. Accused was very safely entered into defence
and led defence evidence that Seema had
been suffering from epilepsy prior to her
marriage. In case, if this fact would have been
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12
in the knowledge of Mangat Ram, he would
have never solemnised marriage with Seema.
After enjoying sex with her, he must have
deserted this lady...........”
13. We fail to see how the Court can come to the
conclusion that having known the deceased was suffering
from Epilepsy, he would not have married the deceased. If
the Court’s reasoning is accepted, then nobody would or
could marry a person having Epilepsy. Another perverse
reasoning of the trial Court which, according to the trial
Court, led to the act of suicide, is as follows:
“33. ...... She has been brought up by her grand
maternal father Bidhi Chand and he
contracted a love marriage with her. But in
spite of that, he quenched his lust of sex by
enjoying Seema and then left her in a rustic
life of village. Seema, out of frustration and
discontentment, wanted to get rid of that life.
When her maternal grand father did not reach
for her rescue, she being fully harassed,
sprinkled kerosene oil on her body and took
her life. ...............”
[Emphasis Supplied]
14. The underlined portion indicates that the deceased
had committed suicide out of frustration and
discontentment and due to the reason that her maternal
grandfather did not reach for her rescue. Reference to few
letters sent by the deceased to her maternal grand father in
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this respect is apposite. In her letter dated 18.8.1993
(Annexure P-17) to PW4, there is absolutely no indication of
any harassment or dowry demand by the accused. The
letter would only indicate that she was home-sick and
wanted very much to see her grand father, the operative
portion of the same reads as follows :
“…. But you should come it is very important work.
If you will not come on 25th or 26th then I will give
my life. Therefore both of you should come. Even
if Somnath mama will say no for you to go to
Baroda but both of you should come, it is
important work. If you will not come then your
daughter will give her life. What more should I
write you are wise enough. If there is any mistake
in the letter then forgive me. I sent a letter to
Bandoi also. That day we reached Baroda at 3
O’clock. Both of us wish Namaste to all of you.
Give love to Rahul, Sahul. I miss all of you a lot.
Daddyji after getting my letter come to Baroda on
25th or 26th immediately, it is important work. If
you will not come I will give my life therefore you
and mamaji should come. I am closing my letter.
I am writing again that Daddyji you should come.
It is very important work. If you will not come on
25th or 26th then on 27th you will get a telephone
call of my death. ….”
15. Reference may also be made to another letter dated
11.9.1997 sent by her to PW4. In that letter also, there was
no complaint of any harassment or dowry demand. On the
other hand, the letter would further reemphasize that she
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was home-sick and very much wanted to see her maternal
grand father, the operative portion of the letter reads as
follows:
“…. Daddyji you may not come for a night but you
should come to meet me for an hour or two. It is
very important work. Daddyji you keep on
replying to my letter I feel very happy. I miss
Rahul, Sahul, Raju, Sonu, Shalu and Rachit, Sapna,
Aarti and all of you. I keep on crying the whole
day and whole night by remembering you. I want
to meet all of you. Nanaji come to Baroda
immediately after reading my letter on 17th or 18th
date, it is very important work. If you love me
then you should come. Daddy if you will not come
even after reading my letter then I take your vow
that I will give my life. Reply to the letter on
getting it. From my side and from my mother in
law’s side and from Mangat’s side we wish
Namaste to all of you. Give love to children.
Writer of letter your daughter. (Seema)”
16. The picture that emerges from the conduct of the
deceased was that she was very home-sick at her
matrimonial home and was very much attached to PW4 and
her friends and relatives at her home. The accused being a
Police Constable had to serve at various places away from
his village and, then necessarily he had to leave his wife at
his home in the care and protection of his parents. Not
taking the wife along with him, itself was, however,
commented upon by the trial Court stating that the
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accused had left his wife, an educated girl belonging to a
business community, in a village and in the house of a
lower community people, whose way of life, whose way of
talking, whose way of behaviour would not be at par with
the family members of the deceased. On this reasoning,
the trial Court concluded that the deceased was feeling
perplexed, agitated and expected that the accused would
take her at his place of posting, rather than leaving in a
village in the company of rustic persons which, according to
the Court, led to discontentment and unhappiness.
17. We fail to understand how a judicially trained mind
would come out with such a reasoning and, at least, we
expected that the High Court would have set right that
perverse reasoning, but we are surprised to note that the
High Court adopted yet another strange reasoning, which
reads as follows:
“When deceased had contracted marriage with the
appellant-accused on her own accord against the
wish of her maternal grandfather then, deceased
was not expected to commit suicide because she
was to stay with the appellant-accused. On the
other hand, appellant-accused being employee
had not kept the deceased with him at the place of
his posting. Deceased was staying with the
parents of the appellant-accused. So, actions of
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the appellant-accused abetted the deceased to
commit suicide.”
18. We fail to see how the failure of a married person to
take his wife along with him to the place where he is
working or posted, would amount to cruelty leading to
abetment of committing suicide by the wife. Taking wife to
place of posting depends upon several factors, like the
convenience of both, availability of accommodation and so
many factors. In the instant case, the accused had left the
wife in the matrimonial home in the company of his parents
and we fail to see how that action would amount to
abetment to commit suicide.
19. We may point out that the High Court itself after
placing reliance on the letters – Exh. PE and PF - written by
the deceased to her maternal grandfather, has noted that
there was no reference at all in these letters of the demand
of dowry by the accused, but stated that the deceased was
unhappy and upset over the behaviour of the accused,
having left her in the company of his parents. We have
gone through those letters and, in those letters, there is
nothing to show that the deceased was upset by the
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behaviour of the accused. On the other hand, the letters
only expose that the deceased was extremely home sick
and wanted the company of her maternal grandfather. We
are surprised to note that the High Court found fault with
the accused for leaving the deceased “at the mercy of his
parents”. Again, the High Court made another strange
reasoning, which reads as follows:
“Immediately after marriage, two letters were
written in the months of August and September,
1993. Appellant-accused being employee should
have kept the deceased with him. No prudent
man is to commit suicide unless abetted to do so.
Actions of the appellant-accused amounts to
cruelty compelling the deceased to commit
suicide. Conviction under Section 306 IPC was
rightly recorded by the trial Court. No question of
interference. If husband is given a benefit of
doubt on the allegation that no direct evidence, no
circumstantial evidence, when the marriage was
inter-caste, then what type of evidence deceased
or complainant was to collect. .”
[Emphasis Supplied]
20. We find it difficult to comprehend the reasoning of the
High Court that “no prudent man is to commit suicide
unless abetted to do so.” A woman may attempt to commit
suicide due to various reasons, such as, depression,
financial difficulties, disappointment in love, tired of
domestic worries, acute or chronic ailments and so on and
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need not be due to abetment. The reasoning of the High
Court that no prudent man will commit suicide unless
abetted to do so by someone else, is a perverse reasoning.
21. We fail to see how the High Court can say that the
accused being a police man should have kept his wife with
him at his workplace. Further, the High Court then posed a
wrong question to itself stating that if there is no direct
evidence, no circumstantial evidence, then what type of
evidence the deceased or complainant was to collect, when
the marriage is inter-caste, a logic we fail to digest.
22. We are sorry to state that the trial Court as well as the
High Court have not properly appreciated the scope of
Sections 498-A and 306 IPC. Section 498-A IPC, is
extracted below for an easy reference:
“498-A. Whoever, being the husband or the
relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,
‘cruelty’ means-
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury
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or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing
her or any person related to her to meet
any unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security is on account of
failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand.”
23. Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of
‘cruelty’, which consists of two clauses. To attract Section
498-A, the prosecution has to establish the wilful conduct
on the part of the accused and that conduct is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the wife to commit suicide. We
fail to see how the failure to take one’s wife to his place of
posting, would amount to a wilful conduct of such a nature
which is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide. We fail
to see how a married woman left at the parental home by
the husband would by itself amount to a wilful conduct to
fall within the expression of ‘cruelty’, especially when the
husband is having such a job for which he has to be away
at the place of his posting. We also fail to see how a wife
left in a village life “in the company of rustic persons”,
borrowing language used by the trial Court, would amount
to wilful conduct of such a nature to fall within the
expression of ‘cruelty’. In our view, both the trial Court as
well as the High Court have completely misunderstood the
scope of Section 498-A IPC read with its explanation and we
are clearly of the view that no offence under Section 498-A
has been made out against the accused appellant.
24. We have already indicated that the trial Court has
found that no offence under Section 304-B IPC has been
made out against the accused, but it convicted the accused
under Section 306 IPC, even though no charge had been
framed on that section against the accused. The scope and
ambit of Section 306 IPC has not been properly appreciated
by the Courts below. Section 306 IPC reads as under:
“306. If any person commits suicide, whoever
abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine.”
Abetment of suicide is confined to the case of persons
who aid or abet the commission of the suicide. In the
matter of an offence under Section 306 IPC, abetment must
attract the definition thereof in Section 107 IPC. Abetment
is constituted by instigating a person to commit an offence
or engaging in a conspiracy to commit, aid or intentional
aiding a person to commit it. It would be evident from a
plain reading of Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC that,
in order to make out the offence of abetment or suicide,
necessary proof required is that the culprit is either
instigating the victim to commit suicide or has engaged
himself in a conspiracy with others for the commission of
suicide, or has intentionally aided by act or illegal omission
in the commission of suicide.
25. In the instant case, of course, the wife died few
months after the marriage and the presumption under
Section 113A of the Evidence Act could be raised. Section
113A of the Evidence Act reads as follows:
“113A. Presumption as to abetment of
suicide by a married woman.- when the question is
whether the commission of suicide by a woman
had been abetted by her husband or any relative
of her husband and it is shown that she had
committed suicide within a period of seven years
from the date of her marriage and that her
husband or such relative of her husband and
subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume,
having regard to all the other circumstances of the
case, that such suicide had been abetted by her
husband or by such relative of her husband.”
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26. We are of the view that the mere fact that if a married
woman commits suicide within a period of seven years of
her marriage, the presumption under Section 113A of the
Evidence Act would not automatically apply. The legislative
mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her
husband or any relative of her husband has subjected her
to cruelty, the presumption as defined under Section 498-A
IPC, may attract, having regard to all other circumstances
of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her
husband or by such relative of her husband. The term “the
Court may presume, having regard to all the other
circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been
abetted by her husband” would indicate that the
presumption is discretionary. So far as the present case is
concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution
has not succeeded in showing that there was a dowry
demand, nor the reasoning adopted by the Courts below
would be sufficient enough to draw a presumption so as to
fall under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. In this
connection, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in
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Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 257,
wherein this Court has examined the scope of Section 113A
of the Evidence Act and Sections 306, 107, 498-A etc. and
held that, unlike Section 113B of the Evidence Act, a
statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law
merely on the proof of circumstances enumerated in
Section 113A of the Evidence Act. This Court held that,
under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution
has to first establish that the woman concerned committed
suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her
marriage and that her husband has subject her to cruelty.
Even though those facts are established, the Court is not
bound to presume that suicide has been abetted by her
husband. Section 113A, therefore, gives discretion to the
Court to raise such a presumption having regard to all other
circumstances of the case, which means that where the
allegation is of cruelty, it can consider the nature of cruelty
to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the
meaning of the word ‘cruelty’ in Section 498-A IPC.
27. We are of the view that the circumstances of the case
pointed out by the prosecution are totally insufficient to
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hold that the accused had abetted his wife to commit
suicide and the circumstances enumerated under Section
113A of the Evidence Act have also not been satisfied. In
Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat (2013)
10 SCC 48, this Court has examined the scope of Section
113A of the Evidence Act, wherein this Court has reiterated
the legal position that the legislative mandate of Section
113A of the Evidence Act is that if a woman commits
suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown
that her husband or any relative of her husband had
subjected her to cruelty, as per the presumption defined in
Section 498-A IPC, the Court may presume, having regard
to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide
had been abetted by the husband or such person. The
Court held that, though a presumption could be drawn, the
burden of proof of showing that such an offence has been
committed by the accused under Section 498-A IPC is on
the prosecution. The Court held that the burden is on the
prosecution to establish the fact that the deceased
committed suicide and the accused abetted the suicide.
In the instant case, there is no evidence to show whether it
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was an accidental death or whether the deceased had
committed suicide.
28. We have every reason to believe that, in the instant
case, the death was accidental, for the following reasons.
- Though not proved in her dying declaration, it has
come out in evidence that the deceased was suffering
from Epilepsy for the last three years i.e. before
15.3.1993, the date of incident. This fact is fortified
by the evidence of Dr. Kuldeep, who was examined as
DW1. He deposed that the deceased was suffering
from Epilepsy and was under his treatment from
23.12.1992 to 2.4.1993 at Kuldeep Hospital, Ambala
City. His evidence was brushed aside by the trial
Court on the ground that Dr. Kuldeep was not a
Psychiatrist. It may be noted that Epilepsy is not a
Psychiatrist problem. It is a disease of nerves system
and a MD (Medicine) could treat the patient of
Epilepsy. The reasoning given by the trial Court for
brushing aside the evidence of DW1 cannot be
sustained. Therefore, the possibility of an accidental
death, since she was suffering from Epilepsy, cannot
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be ruled out. Evidently, she was in the kitchen and,
might be, during cooking she might have suffered
Epileptic symptoms and fell down on the gas stove
and might have caught fire, resulting her ultimate
death.
- DW2, ASI Ram Mohan, the Investigating Officer of the
case, deposed that he had recorded the statements of
the deceased wherein she had stated that she was
suffering from Epilepsy for the last three years before
the incident and that on 15.9.1993 while she was
preparing meals on stove, she had an attack of fits
and fell on the stove and caught fire. She had also
deposed at that time that her husband was away at
duty at Madhuban, Karnal. In our view, the evidence
of DW2 has to be appreciated in the light of overall
facts and circumstances of the case.
29. Taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, we
are of the view that the prosecution has not succeeded in
establishing the offence under Section 498-A and Section
306 IPC against the appellant. Consequently, the appeal is
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allowed and the conviction and sentence awarded by the
trial Court and confirmed by the High Court, are set aside.
…………………………J.
(K. S. Radhakrishnan)
…………………………J.
(Vikramajit Sen)
New Delhi,
March 27, 2014.
Print Page
‘cruelty’, which consists of two clauses. To attract Section
498-A, the prosecution has to establish the wilful conduct
on the part of the accused and that conduct is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the wife to commit suicide. We
fail to see how the failure to take one’s wife to his place of
posting, would amount to a wilful conduct of such a nature
which is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide. We fail
to see how a married woman left at the parental home by
the husband would by itself amount to a wilful conduct to
fall within the expression of ‘cruelty’, especially when the
husband is having such a job for which he has to be away
at the place of his posting. We also fail to see how a wife
left in a village life “in the company of rustic persons”,
borrowing language used by the trial Court, would amount
to wilful conduct of such a nature to fall within the
expression of ‘cruelty’. In our view, both the trial Court as
well as the High Court have completely misunderstood the
scope of Section 498-A IPC read with its explanation and we
are clearly of the view that no offence under Section 498-A
has been made out against the accused appellant.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 696 OF 2009
Mangat Ram .. Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana .. Respondent
Citation;2014(2) Crimes 80 SC
K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.
1. The appellant Mangat Ram, a member of SC
community, married the deceased Seema, a member of the
Aggarwal community on 13.7.1993 at Ambala. Few months
after the marriage, on 15.9.1993, according to the
prosecution, the appellant sprinkled kerosene oil on the
body of the deceased and set her on fire, having failed to
meet the dowry demand. On hearing the hue and cry,
neighbours assembled and took her to the Civil Hospital,
Gohana and, later, she was shifted to the Medical College
and Hospital, Rohtak, where she died on 17.9.1993. The
Page 2
2
appellant, along with his parents and sister, were chargesheeted
for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A
and 304-B IPC.
2. The prosecution, in order to bring home the offences,
examined PWs 1 to 7 and also produced various
documents. On the side of defence, DWs 1 to 5 were
examined and the accused appellant got himself examined
as DW6. After the evidence was closed, the accused was
questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Cr.P.C.), who denied all the incriminating
statements made against him. The trial Court, after
appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, came to
the conclusion that an offence under Section 498-A IPC was
made out against the appellant, but not against the other
three accused persons. The trial Court also found that no
offence under Section 304-B IPC was made out against the
accused persons, including the appellant. However, it was
held that an offence under Section 306 IPC was made out
against the appellant, though no charge was framed under
that section. After holding the appellant guilty, the trial
Court convicted the appellant under Section 498-A IPC and
Page 3
3
sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for three years
and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to further
undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for six months. The
appellant was also convicted under Section 306 IPC and
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of seven
years and to pay a fine of Rs.4,000/-, in default, to further
undergo RI for two years.
3. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded by
the trial Court, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No.
592-SB of 1997, which when came up for hearing before
the Division Bench of the High Court on 3.5.2007, the Court
passed the following order:
“Present: Mrs. Ritu Punj, DAG, Haryana
Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Dhillon, Advocate
is appointed as Amicus Curiae.
Heard
Dismissed, reasons to follow.”
4. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred
SLP (Criminal) No. 7578 of 2007 which was later converted
into Criminal Appeal No. 182 of 2008. The criminal appeal
came up for hearing before this Court on 25.1.2008 and this
Page 4
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Court deprecated the practice of the High Court in disposing
of the criminal appeals without recording reasons in support
of its decision. Placing reliance on the judgments of this
Court in State of Punjab and others v. Jagdev Singh
Talwandi (1984) 1 SCC 596, State of Punjab and others
v. Surinder Kumar and others (1992) 1 SCC 489 and
Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and another v. State of
Gujarat and others (2004) 4 SCC 158, this Court set aside
the judgment of the High Court and directed the High Court
to hear the appeal on merits.
5. The High Court then considered the criminal appeal and
dismissed the same on merits vide its judgment dated
27.5.2008 confirming the conviction and sentence awarded
against the accused by the trial Court. Aggrieved by the
same, this appeal has been preferred.
6. Mr. Satinder S. Gulati, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant, took us elaborately through the oral and
documentary evidence adduced by the parties and
submitted that the judgment of the trial Court as well as the
High Court is based on conjunctures, full of contradictions
Page 5
5
and surmises and there is no evidence to substantiate the
charges levelled against the accused. Learned counsel
submitted that there was a complete misreading of the oral
and documentary evidence and, at every stage, the Courts
below adopted its own strange reasoning which was not
brought out from the deposition of the witnesses. Learned
counsel pointed out that, throughout the judgment of the
trial Court as well as the High Court, one can notice that the
Courts below were prejudiced to the accused for having
entered into an inter-caste marriage and opined that the
plight of such marriages would be discontentment and
unhappiness. Learned counsel pointed out that there is
sufficient evidence to conclude that the deceased was
suffering from Epilepsy for the last few years of the incident
and that death might have been caused by accident and, in
any view, it was not a homicidal death. Further, it was
pointed out that the prosecution could not prove that the
appellant was at home when the incident had happened.
Learned counsel also submitted that the trial Court has
committed an error in altering the offence to that of Section
306 IPC after finding the accused not guilty under Section
Page 6
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304-B IPC. Learned counsel pointed out that the
ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B as well as
Section 306 IPC are entirely different and the trial Court has
committed a grave error in convicting the appellant under
Section 306 IPC. Learned counsel also pointed out that
there is absolutely no evidence of dowry demand and the
conviction recorded under Section 498-A IPC is also without
any material. In support of his various contentions, learned
counsel also made reference to few judgments of this Court,
which we will deal in the latter part of this judgment.
7. We did not have the advantage of hearing any counsel
on the side of the State, even though, the hearing was
going on for a couple of days. Learned counsel appearing
for the appellant took us through the depositions of the
witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution as well
as the defence, as also the documentary evidence placed
before the Court.
8. We may first examine whether an offence under
Section 498-A IPC has been made out against the appellant.
Admittedly, the marriage between the appellant and the
Page 7
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deceased was an inter-caste love marriage and, after few
months of the marriage, she died of burn injuries on
17.9.1993 at her matrimonial home. The question is
whether immediately before and during the period between
the date of marriage and the date of incident, was there
any dowry demand on the side of the accused. In order to
establish the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC, the
prosecution examined PW4, the maternal grand-father of
the deceased, who had brought up her on the demise of her
parents. On a plain reading of the deposition of PW4, it is
clear that he was against the inter-caste marriage of her
grand-daughter with the appellant, who belonged to the
Scheduled Caste community, while the deceased belonged
to the Aggarwal community. PW4, in his cross-examination,
stated that he had agreed for the marriage since the
deceased was adamant to marry the appellant. PW4 also
stated that he had not participated in Tikka ceremony held
in the house of accused appellant. Further, it was also
stated that he had not contacted any other member of the
family of the accused before the marriage. PW4, in the
cross-examination, stated that he had gone to Madhuban
Page 8
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prior to the marriage to dissuade the appellant from
entering into such a marriage and, for the said purpose, he
met the DSP, Madhuban, who then called Mangat Ram, but
he was adamant to marry Seema. We have to appreciate
the evidence of PW4 in the light of the fact that he was
totally against the inter-caste marriage between the
accused and the deceased. PW4 also deposed that the
accused persons had demanded a dowry of Rs.10,000/- and
a scooter and, on 14.8.1993, PW4 gave Rs.10,000/- in cash
to the accused and had also promised to make
arrangement for the purchase of a scooter.
9. PW5, a distant relative of PW4, also stated that after
15-20 days of the marriage, the deceased came along with
the accused to the residence of PW4 and, at that time, the
deceased had told PW4 and others that the accused was
harassing her since she had not brought dowry. PW5 also
deposed that articles like cooler, fridge, sofa, double bed
were given to the accused by way of dowry. PWs 4 and 5
had deposed that a demand of dowry was made not only by
the accused Mangat Ram, but also by his parents and
sister. The trial Court recorded a clear finding that the
Page 9
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prosecution had failed to bring home the guilt as against
the parents and sister of the accused under Section 498A,
304-B IPC, which was not questioned by the prosecution.
However, if that part of the evidence of PWs 4 and 5 could
not be believed against the rest of the accused, then we fail
to see how it could be put against the accused alone,
especially when PWs 4 and 5 had stated that the demand
for dowry was made by all the accused on 13.8.1993. The
evidence of PWs 4 and 5 has to be appreciated in the light
of the fact that they were against the inter-caste marriage,
since the appellant belonged to Scheduled Caste
community and the deceased belonged to Aggarwal
community, a forward community. Alleged dowry demand
of Rs.10,000/- and the demand of scooter, stated to have
been made by the accused, could not be established not
only against the other three accused persons, but also
against the appellant as well.
10. We may now examine, apart from the dowry demand,
had the appellant treated the deceased with cruelty and
abetted the deceased in committing suicide. We have
already found on facts that the prosecution could not
Page 10
10
establish that there was any dowry demand from the side of
the appellant. Once it is so found, then we have to examine
what was the cruelty meted out to the deceased so as to
provoke her to end her life. It has come out in evidence
that when the deceased sustained burn injuries, the
accused was not at home. In this connection, we may refer
to para 25 of the trial Court judgment, which reads as
follows:
“25. Secondly, Seema died un-natural death. The
most crucial point which the prosecution was
bound to establish, whether Seema was
subjected to cruelty and harassment on
account of paucity of dowry or there was a
fresh demand of dowry, there is no such
evidence on the file that she was subjected to
cruelty and harassment. Bidhi Chand and
Avinash Chander both appeared. They did
not state that Seema was subjected to cruelty
and harassment for paucity of dowry given at
the time of marriage........”
[Emphasis Supplied]
11. The trial Court itself says that there was no such
evidence on the file that she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment. But, in para 26 of its judgment, the trial Court,
adopted a strange reasoning to hold that the accused had
treated the deceased with cruelty, which is as follows:
Page 11
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“26. ....... An educated girl of business community
was left in a village life and in the house of a
lower community people whose way of living,
whose way of talking, whose way of
behaviour is not at par with the family
members of Seema, since deceased. As such,
Seema was feeling perplexed agitated. She
expected from Mangat Ram that she must be
kept with him at his place of posting and not
to be left in a village life in the company of
rustic persons and that appeared the cause of
discontentment and unhappiness. It has
been experienced that such marriage meets
ill fate, like the present one. From statement
of Bidhi Chand and letters Ex.PE and PF an
inference can be easily drawn that Seema
was fully unhappy and dis-contended from
the behaviour of Mangat Ram accused, since
he had left her in village life at the mercy of
her mother-in-law Jiwni and that is why, she
had been calling her grand maternal father to
come for her rescue, but Bidhi Chand, as
explained by him, could not rush to village
Baroda because his son and his wife met with
an accident at Chandigarh and he went
there.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
12. Further, in para 31, the trial Court has stated that the
conduct of Mangat Ram keeping and leaving Seema in
Baroda at his home amounted to causing cruelty and
harassment to Seema. In para 32, the trial Court has also
recorded a very strange reasoning, which is as follows:
“32. Accused was very safely entered into defence
and led defence evidence that Seema had
been suffering from epilepsy prior to her
marriage. In case, if this fact would have been
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12
in the knowledge of Mangat Ram, he would
have never solemnised marriage with Seema.
After enjoying sex with her, he must have
deserted this lady...........”
13. We fail to see how the Court can come to the
conclusion that having known the deceased was suffering
from Epilepsy, he would not have married the deceased. If
the Court’s reasoning is accepted, then nobody would or
could marry a person having Epilepsy. Another perverse
reasoning of the trial Court which, according to the trial
Court, led to the act of suicide, is as follows:
“33. ...... She has been brought up by her grand
maternal father Bidhi Chand and he
contracted a love marriage with her. But in
spite of that, he quenched his lust of sex by
enjoying Seema and then left her in a rustic
life of village. Seema, out of frustration and
discontentment, wanted to get rid of that life.
When her maternal grand father did not reach
for her rescue, she being fully harassed,
sprinkled kerosene oil on her body and took
her life. ...............”
[Emphasis Supplied]
14. The underlined portion indicates that the deceased
had committed suicide out of frustration and
discontentment and due to the reason that her maternal
grandfather did not reach for her rescue. Reference to few
letters sent by the deceased to her maternal grand father in
Page 13
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this respect is apposite. In her letter dated 18.8.1993
(Annexure P-17) to PW4, there is absolutely no indication of
any harassment or dowry demand by the accused. The
letter would only indicate that she was home-sick and
wanted very much to see her grand father, the operative
portion of the same reads as follows :
“…. But you should come it is very important work.
If you will not come on 25th or 26th then I will give
my life. Therefore both of you should come. Even
if Somnath mama will say no for you to go to
Baroda but both of you should come, it is
important work. If you will not come then your
daughter will give her life. What more should I
write you are wise enough. If there is any mistake
in the letter then forgive me. I sent a letter to
Bandoi also. That day we reached Baroda at 3
O’clock. Both of us wish Namaste to all of you.
Give love to Rahul, Sahul. I miss all of you a lot.
Daddyji after getting my letter come to Baroda on
25th or 26th immediately, it is important work. If
you will not come I will give my life therefore you
and mamaji should come. I am closing my letter.
I am writing again that Daddyji you should come.
It is very important work. If you will not come on
25th or 26th then on 27th you will get a telephone
call of my death. ….”
15. Reference may also be made to another letter dated
11.9.1997 sent by her to PW4. In that letter also, there was
no complaint of any harassment or dowry demand. On the
other hand, the letter would further reemphasize that she
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was home-sick and very much wanted to see her maternal
grand father, the operative portion of the letter reads as
follows:
“…. Daddyji you may not come for a night but you
should come to meet me for an hour or two. It is
very important work. Daddyji you keep on
replying to my letter I feel very happy. I miss
Rahul, Sahul, Raju, Sonu, Shalu and Rachit, Sapna,
Aarti and all of you. I keep on crying the whole
day and whole night by remembering you. I want
to meet all of you. Nanaji come to Baroda
immediately after reading my letter on 17th or 18th
date, it is very important work. If you love me
then you should come. Daddy if you will not come
even after reading my letter then I take your vow
that I will give my life. Reply to the letter on
getting it. From my side and from my mother in
law’s side and from Mangat’s side we wish
Namaste to all of you. Give love to children.
Writer of letter your daughter. (Seema)”
16. The picture that emerges from the conduct of the
deceased was that she was very home-sick at her
matrimonial home and was very much attached to PW4 and
her friends and relatives at her home. The accused being a
Police Constable had to serve at various places away from
his village and, then necessarily he had to leave his wife at
his home in the care and protection of his parents. Not
taking the wife along with him, itself was, however,
commented upon by the trial Court stating that the
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accused had left his wife, an educated girl belonging to a
business community, in a village and in the house of a
lower community people, whose way of life, whose way of
talking, whose way of behaviour would not be at par with
the family members of the deceased. On this reasoning,
the trial Court concluded that the deceased was feeling
perplexed, agitated and expected that the accused would
take her at his place of posting, rather than leaving in a
village in the company of rustic persons which, according to
the Court, led to discontentment and unhappiness.
17. We fail to understand how a judicially trained mind
would come out with such a reasoning and, at least, we
expected that the High Court would have set right that
perverse reasoning, but we are surprised to note that the
High Court adopted yet another strange reasoning, which
reads as follows:
“When deceased had contracted marriage with the
appellant-accused on her own accord against the
wish of her maternal grandfather then, deceased
was not expected to commit suicide because she
was to stay with the appellant-accused. On the
other hand, appellant-accused being employee
had not kept the deceased with him at the place of
his posting. Deceased was staying with the
parents of the appellant-accused. So, actions of
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the appellant-accused abetted the deceased to
commit suicide.”
18. We fail to see how the failure of a married person to
take his wife along with him to the place where he is
working or posted, would amount to cruelty leading to
abetment of committing suicide by the wife. Taking wife to
place of posting depends upon several factors, like the
convenience of both, availability of accommodation and so
many factors. In the instant case, the accused had left the
wife in the matrimonial home in the company of his parents
and we fail to see how that action would amount to
abetment to commit suicide.
19. We may point out that the High Court itself after
placing reliance on the letters – Exh. PE and PF - written by
the deceased to her maternal grandfather, has noted that
there was no reference at all in these letters of the demand
of dowry by the accused, but stated that the deceased was
unhappy and upset over the behaviour of the accused,
having left her in the company of his parents. We have
gone through those letters and, in those letters, there is
nothing to show that the deceased was upset by the
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behaviour of the accused. On the other hand, the letters
only expose that the deceased was extremely home sick
and wanted the company of her maternal grandfather. We
are surprised to note that the High Court found fault with
the accused for leaving the deceased “at the mercy of his
parents”. Again, the High Court made another strange
reasoning, which reads as follows:
“Immediately after marriage, two letters were
written in the months of August and September,
1993. Appellant-accused being employee should
have kept the deceased with him. No prudent
man is to commit suicide unless abetted to do so.
Actions of the appellant-accused amounts to
cruelty compelling the deceased to commit
suicide. Conviction under Section 306 IPC was
rightly recorded by the trial Court. No question of
interference. If husband is given a benefit of
doubt on the allegation that no direct evidence, no
circumstantial evidence, when the marriage was
inter-caste, then what type of evidence deceased
or complainant was to collect. .”
[Emphasis Supplied]
20. We find it difficult to comprehend the reasoning of the
High Court that “no prudent man is to commit suicide
unless abetted to do so.” A woman may attempt to commit
suicide due to various reasons, such as, depression,
financial difficulties, disappointment in love, tired of
domestic worries, acute or chronic ailments and so on and
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need not be due to abetment. The reasoning of the High
Court that no prudent man will commit suicide unless
abetted to do so by someone else, is a perverse reasoning.
21. We fail to see how the High Court can say that the
accused being a police man should have kept his wife with
him at his workplace. Further, the High Court then posed a
wrong question to itself stating that if there is no direct
evidence, no circumstantial evidence, then what type of
evidence the deceased or complainant was to collect, when
the marriage is inter-caste, a logic we fail to digest.
22. We are sorry to state that the trial Court as well as the
High Court have not properly appreciated the scope of
Sections 498-A and 306 IPC. Section 498-A IPC, is
extracted below for an easy reference:
“498-A. Whoever, being the husband or the
relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,
‘cruelty’ means-
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury
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or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing
her or any person related to her to meet
any unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security is on account of
failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand.”
23. Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of
‘cruelty’, which consists of two clauses. To attract Section
498-A, the prosecution has to establish the wilful conduct
on the part of the accused and that conduct is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the wife to commit suicide. We
fail to see how the failure to take one’s wife to his place of
posting, would amount to a wilful conduct of such a nature
which is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide. We fail
to see how a married woman left at the parental home by
the husband would by itself amount to a wilful conduct to
fall within the expression of ‘cruelty’, especially when the
husband is having such a job for which he has to be away
at the place of his posting. We also fail to see how a wife
left in a village life “in the company of rustic persons”,
borrowing language used by the trial Court, would amount
to wilful conduct of such a nature to fall within the
expression of ‘cruelty’. In our view, both the trial Court as
well as the High Court have completely misunderstood the
scope of Section 498-A IPC read with its explanation and we
are clearly of the view that no offence under Section 498-A
has been made out against the accused appellant.
24. We have already indicated that the trial Court has
found that no offence under Section 304-B IPC has been
made out against the accused, but it convicted the accused
under Section 306 IPC, even though no charge had been
framed on that section against the accused. The scope and
ambit of Section 306 IPC has not been properly appreciated
by the Courts below. Section 306 IPC reads as under:
“306. If any person commits suicide, whoever
abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine.”
Abetment of suicide is confined to the case of persons
who aid or abet the commission of the suicide. In the
matter of an offence under Section 306 IPC, abetment must
attract the definition thereof in Section 107 IPC. Abetment
is constituted by instigating a person to commit an offence
or engaging in a conspiracy to commit, aid or intentional
aiding a person to commit it. It would be evident from a
plain reading of Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC that,
in order to make out the offence of abetment or suicide,
necessary proof required is that the culprit is either
instigating the victim to commit suicide or has engaged
himself in a conspiracy with others for the commission of
suicide, or has intentionally aided by act or illegal omission
in the commission of suicide.
25. In the instant case, of course, the wife died few
months after the marriage and the presumption under
Section 113A of the Evidence Act could be raised. Section
113A of the Evidence Act reads as follows:
“113A. Presumption as to abetment of
suicide by a married woman.- when the question is
whether the commission of suicide by a woman
had been abetted by her husband or any relative
of her husband and it is shown that she had
committed suicide within a period of seven years
from the date of her marriage and that her
husband or such relative of her husband and
subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume,
having regard to all the other circumstances of the
case, that such suicide had been abetted by her
husband or by such relative of her husband.”
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26. We are of the view that the mere fact that if a married
woman commits suicide within a period of seven years of
her marriage, the presumption under Section 113A of the
Evidence Act would not automatically apply. The legislative
mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her
husband or any relative of her husband has subjected her
to cruelty, the presumption as defined under Section 498-A
IPC, may attract, having regard to all other circumstances
of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her
husband or by such relative of her husband. The term “the
Court may presume, having regard to all the other
circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been
abetted by her husband” would indicate that the
presumption is discretionary. So far as the present case is
concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution
has not succeeded in showing that there was a dowry
demand, nor the reasoning adopted by the Courts below
would be sufficient enough to draw a presumption so as to
fall under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. In this
connection, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in
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Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 257,
wherein this Court has examined the scope of Section 113A
of the Evidence Act and Sections 306, 107, 498-A etc. and
held that, unlike Section 113B of the Evidence Act, a
statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law
merely on the proof of circumstances enumerated in
Section 113A of the Evidence Act. This Court held that,
under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution
has to first establish that the woman concerned committed
suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her
marriage and that her husband has subject her to cruelty.
Even though those facts are established, the Court is not
bound to presume that suicide has been abetted by her
husband. Section 113A, therefore, gives discretion to the
Court to raise such a presumption having regard to all other
circumstances of the case, which means that where the
allegation is of cruelty, it can consider the nature of cruelty
to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the
meaning of the word ‘cruelty’ in Section 498-A IPC.
27. We are of the view that the circumstances of the case
pointed out by the prosecution are totally insufficient to
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hold that the accused had abetted his wife to commit
suicide and the circumstances enumerated under Section
113A of the Evidence Act have also not been satisfied. In
Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat (2013)
10 SCC 48, this Court has examined the scope of Section
113A of the Evidence Act, wherein this Court has reiterated
the legal position that the legislative mandate of Section
113A of the Evidence Act is that if a woman commits
suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown
that her husband or any relative of her husband had
subjected her to cruelty, as per the presumption defined in
Section 498-A IPC, the Court may presume, having regard
to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide
had been abetted by the husband or such person. The
Court held that, though a presumption could be drawn, the
burden of proof of showing that such an offence has been
committed by the accused under Section 498-A IPC is on
the prosecution. The Court held that the burden is on the
prosecution to establish the fact that the deceased
committed suicide and the accused abetted the suicide.
In the instant case, there is no evidence to show whether it
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was an accidental death or whether the deceased had
committed suicide.
28. We have every reason to believe that, in the instant
case, the death was accidental, for the following reasons.
- Though not proved in her dying declaration, it has
come out in evidence that the deceased was suffering
from Epilepsy for the last three years i.e. before
15.3.1993, the date of incident. This fact is fortified
by the evidence of Dr. Kuldeep, who was examined as
DW1. He deposed that the deceased was suffering
from Epilepsy and was under his treatment from
23.12.1992 to 2.4.1993 at Kuldeep Hospital, Ambala
City. His evidence was brushed aside by the trial
Court on the ground that Dr. Kuldeep was not a
Psychiatrist. It may be noted that Epilepsy is not a
Psychiatrist problem. It is a disease of nerves system
and a MD (Medicine) could treat the patient of
Epilepsy. The reasoning given by the trial Court for
brushing aside the evidence of DW1 cannot be
sustained. Therefore, the possibility of an accidental
death, since she was suffering from Epilepsy, cannot
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be ruled out. Evidently, she was in the kitchen and,
might be, during cooking she might have suffered
Epileptic symptoms and fell down on the gas stove
and might have caught fire, resulting her ultimate
death.
- DW2, ASI Ram Mohan, the Investigating Officer of the
case, deposed that he had recorded the statements of
the deceased wherein she had stated that she was
suffering from Epilepsy for the last three years before
the incident and that on 15.9.1993 while she was
preparing meals on stove, she had an attack of fits
and fell on the stove and caught fire. She had also
deposed at that time that her husband was away at
duty at Madhuban, Karnal. In our view, the evidence
of DW2 has to be appreciated in the light of overall
facts and circumstances of the case.
29. Taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, we
are of the view that the prosecution has not succeeded in
establishing the offence under Section 498-A and Section
306 IPC against the appellant. Consequently, the appeal is
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allowed and the conviction and sentence awarded by the
trial Court and confirmed by the High Court, are set aside.
…………………………J.
(K. S. Radhakrishnan)
…………………………J.
(Vikramajit Sen)
New Delhi,
March 27, 2014.
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