On perusal of the judgment delivered by the Division Bench in case of

Lt.Col.Anil Bhat & Ors. (supra), it is clear that once the court has not returned the

plaint on the ground of lack of pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction of that court but
had come to the conclusion that the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain
such suit on the ground that subject matter of the suit was beyond the jurisdiction
of that court, such court could not have passed an order for return of plaint but
ought to have dismissed the suit on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In my view,
Mr.Colabawala, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff is right in his
submission that the order passed by the City Civil Court for return of the plaint
itself was contrary to the law laid down by the Division Bench of this court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 1085 OF 2011

S.C.SUIT NO. 2393 OF 2001

Asif Ahmedally porbunderwalla Vs Mrs. Daulat Akbarali Porbunderwalla,)

Citation;2014(1) ALLMR378 Bom,2014(2) MHLJ210 Bom

CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

DATED : 22nd AUGUST, 2013

By this Notice of Motion, defendant no.7 seeks rejection of plaint under

Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and also seeks that the suit

be summarily dismissed as not maintainable. Defendant no.7 also seeks in the

alternative that the issue of limitation be framed and decided as a preliminary issue

Motion are as under :-

Plaintiff claims to be one of the beneficiary under the Trust Deed dated 12th

by this Court. Some of the relevant facts for the purpose of deciding this Notice of

June, 1972 whereby a trust known as 'Ali Mohamed K. Porbanderwala Family

Trust' was set up in respect of the land and building situated at Bandra. Defendant

nos. 1 to 4 are the trustees of the said trust. Defendant no.5 is husband of

defendant no.1. Defendant nos. 6 and 7 are children of defendant no. 1 and

defendant no.5. Defendant no.7 claims to be one of the beneficiary under the said

trust. It is the case of the plaintiff that in 1976 defendant nos. 1 and 2 in exercise

of their power under the said trust deed and in collusion with defendant no.5

constructed a industrial estate on the portion of the trust property by the name of

Amar Industrial Estate. Plaintiff was not given any part of the sale consideration

of the industrial units. On 20th June, 1979, defendant nos. 1 to 4 in their capacity

of the said trust executed a lease deed in respect of the trust property in favour of

defendant nos. 5 to 7 for a period of ninety nine years. According to the plaintiff,

the said lease deed provided for payment of Rs.3,000/- per month as lease rental

which was totally inadequate. Value of the lease property according to the plaintiff

at the material time was about Rs.35,11,000/-. It is the case of the plaintiff that

defendant nos. 5 to 7 were placed in possession of the trust property however, did

not take any steps to obtain vacant possession of any construction or to construct

any building as contemplated in the said trust deed. On 20th July, 1979, plaintiff's

grandfather died. On 5th February, 1982, the family arrangement was executed by

In the year 1991, plaintiff filed a suit (8783 of 1991) in the City Civil Court,

various members of the family including defendants herein.

Bombay interalia praying for various reliefs including direction to defendant nos. 1

to 5 to render accounts in respect of the said trust and for access to the records and

documents of the said trust. Defendant nos. 6 and 7 herein were not parties to the

said suit. In the written statement filed by defendant nos. 1, 2 and 5 in the said

suit, those defendants denied that any accounts had been maintained by them in

respect of the trust. Those defendants relied upon the lease deed alleged to have

been executed by plaintiff's grandfather in favour of defendant nos. 5 to 7 herein in

respect of the trust property. Those defendants however did not annex copy of the

lease deed in the said written statement. In that suit, defendant nos. 1, 2 and 5 to

the said suit raised an issue of jurisdiction.

The City Civil Court, Bombay

therefore framed an issue as under :-

“ Whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the

suit in view of the provisions of Indian Trust Act, 1882 ”.

By an order dated 21st June, 1998 passed by the Additional Principal Judge

of the City Civil Court, Bombay, it was held that the said suit filed before the City

Civil Court, Bombay was in relation to the trust and therefore City Civil Court had

no jurisdiction to entertain and try the said suit and this court would have

jurisdiction to entertain and try the said suit. Learned 2nd Additional Principal

Judge by the said order directed that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff for

presentation to the proper court. It was directed that the plaintiff shall present the

same within three weeks from the date of the said order. Relevant part of the said

order reads thus :-

The issue of jurisdiction is answered holding that

this Hon'ble Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try

the present suit.

In view of what has been stated above, the plaint is

returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper

court. The plaintiff shall present the same within 3 weeks

from today. Notice to be given by the plaintiff to the

defendants on any application being made to the Hon'ble

High Court.

It is the case of the plaintiff that by a purported deed of rectification dated 7th

February, 2001, defendant no.1 purported to rectify the Deed of Conveyance dated

1st June, 1956. It is the case of the plaintiff that defendant nos. 1 to 5 had contrary

to the terms of the said trust deed, provisions of the Indian Trust Act and contrary

to the interest of the beneficiaries including the plaintiff purported to create

leasehold right in favour of defendant nos. 5 to 7 herein. On 3rd July, 2001, the

plaintiff filed Short Cause Suit (2393 of 2001) in this court against defendant nos.

1 to 5 who were parties to the said suit filed before City Civil Court, Bombay and

joined defendant nos. 6 and 7 also as party defendants to the said suit interalia

praying for removal of defendant nos. 1 to 4 as trustees of the said trust and to

appoint other persons as trustees, directing defendant nos. 1, 2 and 5 to render true

and proper account, for a declaration that the said lease deed dated 20th June, 1979

was illegal, void and of no legal effect, for possession against defendant nos. 5 to 7

in respect of the trust property. In the alternative to prayers (c) and (d), plaintiff

also sought for an order and declaration that defendant nos. 5 to 7 were trustees in

respect of the trust property and hold the same for the beneficiary of the said trust

including the trustees. Plaintiff also applied for an order and decree declaring that

the deed of rectification dated 7th February, 2001 was illegal, void and of no legal

On 22nd April, 2004, defendant nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 filed written statement

effect.

in this suit and raised a plea of limitation on the ground that City Civil Court had

returned the plaint to the plaintiff on 21st July, 1998 with a direction to present the

same in the proper court within three weeks whereas the plaintiff has filed this suit

after lapse of 1056 days and the claim thus made in the plaint is hopelessly time

barred. Those defendants also raised a plea that the plaintiff had not taken leave of

this court for such a long delay of 1056 days before filing the present suit and

therefore the suit is liable to be dismissed. On 1st April, 2011, defendant no. 7 filed

this Notice of Motion for rejection of plaint and for other reliefs.

Mr.Rege, learned counsel appearing for defendant no.7 (applicant to the

Notice of Motion) submits that though by an order dated 21st July, 1998, City Civil

Court, Bombay had returned the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper

court with a direction to file the same within three weeks from the date of the said

order plaintiff filed this suit after for more than three years. It is submitted that in

this suit, there is no reference to the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff.

It is

submitted that the prayers (c) and (f) claimed in this suit were not claimed in the

said suit filed before City Civil Court, Bombay. Defendant nos. 6 and 7 who were

parties to this suit were not parties to the said suit. Learned counsel invited my

attention to Order VII Rule 10 and Rule 10(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure

which reads as under :-

10. Return of plaint.- (1) Subject to the provisions of rule 10A,

the plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be

presented to the court in which the suit should have been

instituted.

Explanation: For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared

that a court of appeal or revision may direct, after setting aside

the decree passed in a suit, the return of the plaint, under this

sub-rule.

(2) Procedure on returning —On returning a plaint, the Judge

shall endorse thereon the date of its presentation and return, the

name of the party presenting it, and a brief statement of the

reasons for returning it.

10A. Power of court to fix a date of appearance in the court

where plaint is to be filed after its return.- (1) Where, in any

suit, after the defendant has appeared, the court is of opinion

that the plaint should be returned, it shall, before doing so,

intimate its decision to the plaintiff.

(2) Where an intimation is given to the plaintiff under sub-rule

(1), the plaintiff may make an application to the court—

(a) specifying the court in which he proposes to present

the plaint after its return,

(b) praying that the court may fix a date for the

appearance of the parties in the said court, and

be given to him and to the defendant.

(3) Where an application is made by the plaintiff under sub-rule

(2), the court shall, before returning the plaint and

notwithstanding that the Order for return of plaint was made by

it on the ground that it has not jurisdiction to try the Suit,—

(a) fix a date for the appearance of the parties in the

(b) give to the plaintiff and to the defendant notice of

such date for appearance.

court in which the plaint is proposed to be presented, and

(4) Where the notice of the date for appearance is given under

sub-rule (3)

(a) it shall not be necessary for the court in which the

plaint is presented after its return, to serve the defendant

with the summons for appearance in the suit, unless that

court, for reasons to be recorded, otherwise directs, and

(b) the said notice shall be deemed to be a summons for

the appearance of the defendant in the court in which the

plaint is presented on the date for fixed by the court by

which the plaint was returned.

(5) Where the application made by the plaintiff under sub-rule

(2) is allowed by the court, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to

appeal against the Order returning the plaint.

Learned counsel also placed reliance on Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of

Civil Procedure which reads as under :-

11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the

following cases:—

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the

plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the

valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do

so;

plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the

plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the

requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the

Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiff fails comply with the provision of

Rule 9.

to be barred by any law;

Provided that the time fixed by the court for the correction

of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp papers

shall not be extended unless the court, for reasons to be

recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any

cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the

valuation or supplying the requisite stamp papers, as the

case may be within the time fixed by the court and that

refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to

the plaintiff.

Learned counsel for applicant (defendant no.7) would submit that the

plaintiff has not complied with the provisions of Order VII Rule 10(A) by not

presenting plaint returned by the City Civil Court in this Court within three weeks

from the date of the said order. It is submitted that since the plaintiff did not file

any appeal against the said order passed by the City Civil Court, the said order

became final and was binding on the plaintiff. Instead of presenting the same

plaint in this suit, plaintiff however filed this suit after three years. Learned

counsel however fairly submits that this Notice of Motion filed by defendant no.7

would not fall under Order VII Rule 11. It is submitted that this Notice of Motion

for dismissal of suit has been filed on the ground of non-compliance of the

provisions of Order VII Rule 10(A). It is submitted that Notice of Motion is filed

praying for dismissal of suit in view of the non-compliance of the said provisions

by the plaintiff and also the order passed by City Civil Court. Learned counsel

placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in case of St.George Shipping Co.

Ltd. vs. m.v. “Irene P” a foreign flag vessel and others delivered by the Single

Judge of this court reported in 1999 (3) Mh.L.J. 109 and in particular paragraphs

18 to 24 thereof in support of his submission that if the court has returned the

plaint by referring the provisions of Order VII Rule 10, non-compliance thereof

would be not only improper but would also be illegal. Paragraphs 18 to 24 of the

said judgment reads thus :-

18. The next objection that was raised by Mr. Pratap was that

the plaintiffs has filed a Regular Suit No. 611 of 1998 before

the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhavnagar, for the same

relief, but the Bhavnagar Court ultimately i.e. on 12-10-1998

passed an order holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain

and try the suit and consequently the plaint was returned to the

plaintiffs for presentation before the Court having jurisdiction.

Mr. Pratap contended that after this order of the Bhavnagar

Court, it was obligatory on the plaintiffs to present the same

plaint before this Court and it was not open to the plaintiffs to

file a fresh suit. He also further contended that from this order

of the Bhavnagar Court it was clear that Bhavnagar Court had

taken note of the right of the defendant No. 4 as a purchaser of

the ship i.e. defendant No. 1 and as such it was obligatory on

the plaintiffs, if at all the plaintiffs wanted to file the same

plaint to add the defendant No. 4 as defendant or when the

plaintiffs chose to file a separate and fresh plaint before this

Court to join the defendant No. 4 in the suit from the initial

stage but according to Mr. Pratap the same plaint i.e. the plaint

returned by the Bhavnagar Court was not presented by the

plaintiffs before this Court to avoid joining of defendant No. 4

from the first stage, and this according to Mr. Pratap is a mala

fide act on the part of the plaintiffs resorted with a view to

obtain ex parte order against the interest of the defendant No.

19. As against this, Ms. Sethna for the plaintiff relied upon the

provisions of Order VII, Rule 13 of the C.P.C. Order VII, Rule

13 reads as under;

"13. Where rejection of plaint does not preclude

presentation of fresh plaint.---The rejection of the plaint

on any of the grounds hereinbefore mentioned shall not

of its own force preclude the plaintiff from presenting a

fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action."

She therefore contended that after the Bhavnagar Court has

rejected the plaintiffs' plaint by its order dated 12-10-1998, no

illegality was committed by the plaintiffs in not presenting the

same plaint in respect of the same cause of action.

20. I am unable to agree to the submissions made by Ms.

Sethna. This submission was made by Ms. Sethna firstly

because this is not a case where Bhavnagar Court rejected the

plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 and secondly because the

Order of the Bhavnagar Court about the return of the plaint is

under Order VII, Rule 10 of the C.P.C. Order VII, Rule 10

reads as under:-

10 Return of Plaint.---(1) Subject to the provisions of

Rule 10-A, the plaint shall at any stage of the suit be

returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit

should have been instituted.

(Explanation- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby

declared that a Court of appeal or revision may direct,

after setting aside the decree passed in a suit, the return

of the plaint under this sub-rule.)

(2) Procedure on returning plaint- On returning a plaint,

the Judge shall endorse thereon the date of its

presentation and return, the name of the party presenting

it, and a brief statement of the reasons for returning it."

Rule 11 of Order VII provides for rejection of the plaint in the

following cases, namely, where it does not disclose the cause

of action where relief claimed is under valued or where the

suit is barred by limitation. This order of rejection of plaint is

totally different from order of return of the plaint which is

done under Order VII, Rule 10 C.P.C. The order of the

Bhavnagar Court will show that after the plaintiffs filed the

Suit No. 611 of 1998 before that Court and the defendants

appeared and raised objection to jurisdiction and thereafter the

said objection to jurisdiction was decided as preliminary issue

and consequently order of the return of the plaint was passed

preceded by finding that Bhavnagar Court has no jurisdiction

to try and entertain the suit and ad-interim order was also

vacated. It is therefore clear that the Bhavnagar Court returned

the plaint by resorting the provisions of Order VII, Rule 10. If

this was so it was not only improper but it was also illegal

because Order VII, Rule 10-A makes special provision about

the procedure to be followed by the Court ordering return of

the plaint. This procedure is very elaborate and it provides

where, in any suit, after the appearance of the defendants, the

Court is of opinion that the plaint should be returned, it has to

intimate its decision to the plaintiffs. After receiving such an

intimation, three options have been given to the plaintiff under

Order VII, Rule 10(2) to make applications under any of the

options. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 10-A further provides that if such

an application is made by the plaintiffs and the plaint is

returned on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction then

the Court can fix the date for appearance of parties in the

Court in which the plaint is proposed to be presented and give

to the plaintiff and the defendant notice of such date for

appearance. Further provisions of Rule 10-A are about the

contingencies where notice of the date of appearance is given.

21. All these provisions of Rule 10-A of Order VII will clearly

show that the order of return of the plaint has to be followed

by the mandatory procedure of Rule 10-A. This will also make

it clear that the plaintiff has no option to file a fresh suit in that

eventuality i.e. when the plaint is returned under Rule 10 of

Order VII and particularly on the ground of jurisdiction. The

submission made by Ms. Sethna that the plaintiffs was entitled

to file a fresh suit under Rule 13 of Order VII cannot therefore

be accepted.

22. The order of Bhavnagar Court particularly para 13 shows

that the defendant No. 1 had brought it to the notice of the

Bhavnagar Court that the defendant No. 1 has entered into a

Memorandum of Agreement with one Mountain Shipping

Ltd., of Gibraltar on 16-9-1998 to sell the vessel m.v. "Irene

P" who then resold the vessel to Jai Bharat Steel Company,

Bhavnagar, for demolition purpose and the vessel has arrived

in Alang, Bhavnagar, on or about 23-9-1998 and the delivery

was accepted on 4-10-1998. My attention was drawn on

particular order of the Bhavnagar Court by Mr. Pratap in order

to show filing of the fresh suit i.e. filing fresh plaint before

this Court by the plaintiff (without submitting the plaint

returned by Bhavnagar Court along with the order of the

Bhavnagar Court) was a deliberate, intentional and mala fide

act on the part of the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs wanted to

obtain an ex parte order by not joining M/s Jai Bharat Steel

Company as a defendant.

23. As against this, submissions of Ms. Sethna that because the

plaint was required to be filed in the High Court, some

changes were required to be made in the plaint and therefore

the plaint returned by the Bhavnagar Court could not be

presented before this Court, is not at all acceptable. The

provisions of C.P.C. i.e. Order VII, Rule 10, 10-A and 13 are

absolutely clear. No choice is given to the plaintiff when the

plaint is returned under Order VII, Rule 10 or 10-A but to file

the returned plaint before the proper Court. Needless to say

that if such a returned plaint is to be filed before proper Court,

the plaintiff will also have to file the order of that Court which

returned the plaint and considering this legal aspect, the

submissions of Ms. Sethna and explanation given by her

cannot at all be accepted. It is prima facie clear that filing of

the fresh plaint and not filing of the returned plaint and not

filing the copy of the Bhavnagar Court order was done by the

plaintiffs with a mala fide intention of getting orders behind

the back of the defendant No. 4 and by keeping the defendant

No. 4 in dark about the filing of the suit.

24. It is pertinent to note that in the plaint of the present suit,

the plaintiffs has in para 8 given facts about filing of the suit

before the Bhavnagar Court but nothing has been stated

regarding the order dated 12-10-1998 of the Bhavnagar Court

about returning of the plaint for presentation to proper Court.

What the plaintiffs have stated that the ex parte ad interim

order was vacated on an application of the defendant No. 1

strictly on the grounds of jurisdiction i.e. the Court at

Bhavnagar do not possess admiralty jurisdiction so as to detain

the defendant No. 1 vessel. This cannot be considered as a true

statement of fact by the plaintiffs because Bhavnagar Court

not only vacated the injunction but before doing that it ordered

the return of the plaint for presentation before the proper Court

Learned counsel for defendant no.7 submits that plaintiff had no option to

10.

or before the Court having jurisdiction.

file a fresh suit in view of the return of the plaint by the City Civil Court and

particularly on the ground of jurisdiction. It is submitted that the plaint returned to

the plaintiff by the City Civil Court itself ought to have been presented to this

11.

court. No fresh suit could have been filed by the plaintiff.

Mr.Rege, learned counsel submits that there is no disclosure about the order

passed by the City Civil Court in this plaint. It is submitted that since plaint in this

case has been returned by the City Civil Court on the ground of lack of inherent

jurisdiction, same plaint was to be lifted by the plaintiff and ought to have been

presented in this court and amendment could be made subsequently.

It is

submitted that under Order VII Rule 10, plaintiff ought to have disclosed in plaint

as to when cause of action had arisen and also the fact showing the jurisdiction

which has not been done by the plaintiff in this plaint.

Mr.Colabawala, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff on the

12.

other hand submits that in view of the statement made by Mr.Rege, learned

counsel appearing for defendant no.7 that Notice of Motion filed by the defendant

no.7 does not fall under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,

prayer (a) of the Notice of Motion does not survive and has to be rejected. As far

as prayer (b) in the Notice of Motion is concerned, it is submitted by the learned

counsel that if the case of the defendant no.7 would have fallen under Order VII

Rule 11 or under section 9(A), the court cannot dismiss the suit at this stage. It is

submitted that Order VII Rule 10 or Rule 10(A) does not give any power to the

court to dismiss suit at preliminary stage and such issue has to be taken up at the

final hearing. In so far as prayer (c) of the Notice of Motion that in the alternative

to prayers (a) and (b), this court shall frame a issue of limitation and to decide the

said issue as a preliminary issue is concerned, reliance is placed by the learned

counsel on the Order dated 7th November, 2003 passed by Mr.Justice V.M.Kanade

in Notice of Motion No. 1725 of 2001 filed by the plaintiff. This court after

considering section 10 of the Limitation Act, which is applicable to the suit against

the trustees and their representatives and after considering the judgment of the

Supreme Court, this court considered the issue of limitation raised by defendant

no.7 in the said order. It has been held that though plaintiff in this suit had not

given any reasons as to why this suit could not be filed within a period of three

weeks, however looking at wording of section 10 of the Limitation Act, in view of

non obstant clause, this suit cannot be held to be barred by law of limitation

specially when it is a suit which is filed against the other proceedings challenging

the lease deed in favour of defendant nos. 3 to 5 who are also trustees of the

private trust. Mr.Colabawala, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff

further submits that in view of rejection of plea of limitation already raised in the

said Notice of Motion No. 1505 of 2001 by defendant no.7, said issue cannot be

raised once again in this Notice of Motion. It is submitted that in view of section

10 of Limitation Act, such suit filed by the plaintiff herein shall not be barred by

any length of time.

13.

Mr.Colabawala, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff invited

my attention to the averments and prayers made in this plaint and submits that this

suit is not against the same defendants who were parties to the suit filed before the

City Civil Court, Bombay or for the same reliefs. Defendant nos. 6 and 7 in this

suit were not parties to the said suit filed in City Civil Court, Bombay. It is

submitted that except prayer (b), which is identical to prayer (d), all other prayers

are different. Mr.Colabawala submits that there is new cause of action based on

the lease deed which is subject matter of this suit. It is submitted that prayer (a) in

this suit is for removal of trustees which relief was not claimed by the plaintiff in

the suit filed in the City Civil Court, Bombay. It is submitted that even other

reliefs claimed in prayers (c), (d) and (e) were not claimed in the City Civil Court

suit.

In the alternative to the submission aforesaid Mr.Colabawala, learned

14.

counsel for the plaintiff submits that City Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to

return the plaint on the ground that City Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to

entertain the subject matter of the said suit. It is submitted that City Civil Court

could in such circumstances only dismiss the said suit and could not have returned

the plaint for presentation in this court.

Mr.Colabawala, learned counsel for the plaintiff placed reliance on the

15.

judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Hanamanthappa and another vs.

Chandrashekharappa and others reported in (1997) 9 SCC 688 and in particular

paragraphs 2 and 3 in support of his submission that on return of plaint under

Order VII Rule 10(A) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by a court, plaintiff can

either challenge the said order before an appellate forum or represent to the court

having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the suit would be a suit filed

afresh subject to the limitation, pecuniary jurisdiction and payment of court fees.

Learned counsel would submit that this suit cannot be dismissed on the ground that

the averments made by the plaintiff in this suit were not made in the suit filed

before the City Civil Court, Bombay. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the said judgment in

case of Hanamanthappa and another (supra) reads as under :-

2. Admittedly, the respondents filed O.S. No. 158/94, in the

Court of District Munsiff, Navalagund. On grounds of lack

of territorial jurisdiction the plaint was returned for

presentation to the proper Court. Accordingly, after making

necessary amendment to the plaint the respondents

represented the suit, which came to be numbered as O. S.

No. 10/91, in Civil Court at Dharwad. The petitioners filed

an application under Order VII, Rule 10, C. P. C. for

dismissal of the petition on the ground that the plaint was

materially altered, without seeking permission for

amendment of the plaint as required under Order VI, Rule

17, C. P. C. The High Court dismissed the petition.

3. It is contended by Shri Kulkarni, learned Counsel for the

petitioners, that since the petition had been filed with

amended averments in the plaint, necessarily it must be

treated to be a fresh plaint and not one after representation to

the proper Court. We find no force in the contention. The

object of Order 7, Rule 10A is that the plaintiff, on return of

the plaint, can either challenge in an appellate forum or

represent to the Court having territorial jurisdiction to

entertain the suit. In substance, it is a suit filed afresh subject

to the limitation, pecuniary jurisdiction and payment of the

Court fee as had rightly been pointed out by the High Court.

Therefore, it cannot be dismissed on the ground that the

plaintiff made averments which did not find place in the

original plaint presented before the Court of District

Munsiff, Navalgund. It is not always necessary for the

plaintiff to seek amendment of the plaint under Order VI,

Rule 17, C. P. C. At best it can be treated to be a fresh plaint

and the matter can be proceeded with according to law.

Under those circumstances, we do not think that (here is any

error of law committed by the High Court in giving the

above direction.

16.

Relying upon the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, learned counsel

for the plaintiff would submit that judgment of the Single Judge of this Court

reported in St.George Shipping Co. Ltd. (supra) is contrary to the principles laid

down by the Supreme Court in case of Hanamanthappa and another (supra) and

thus judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge in that matter cannot be relied

17.

upon as a precedent.

Mr.Colabawala, then placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in case of

Hirachand Succaram Gandhy and others vs. G.I.P.Ry. Co. reported in AIR 1928

Bombay 421 and particularly paragraphs on page 421 and 422 which reads thus :-

It is urged on behalf of the appellants that Section 80 of

the Civil Procedure Code has not been properly

construed, that the suits were already instituted in the

First Class Subordinate Judge's Court, that the suits in

the District Court were merely continuations of those

suits and therefore no notice under Section 80 of the

Civil Procedure Code was necessary, and that the notice

given under Section 149 of the Indian Railways Act was

a sufficient notice. In support of the contention that the

suit in the District Court was a continuation of the

previous suit, reliance is placed on Order XXII, Rule 10,

of the Civil Procedure Code, and the decision in

Chunnilal v. Abdul All Khan . If the plaints had not been

returned by the First Class Subordinate Judge for

presentation to the proper Court and the suits had been

tried by the First Class Subordinate Judge, it could have

been said that the suits were continued against the

Secretary of State, who was added as a party, under

Order XXII, Rule 10. Jurisdiction is now given to the

Subordinate Judge to try suits against State managed

railway companies by Bombay Act VI of 1926, but in

the present case the plaints were returned for

presentation to the proper Court before Bombay Act VI

of 1926 came into force. Under Section 32 of Bombay

Civil Courts Act, XIV of 1869, the First Class

Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to try a suit in

which the Government was a party. See Secretary of

State

Narsibhai

MANU/MH/0099/1923

AIR1924Bom65 . The First Class Subordinate Judge

was, therefore, justified in returning the plaints for

presentation to the District Court under Order VII, Rule

10. When a plaint is returned for presentation to the

proper Court and is in fact presented to the Court having

jurisdiction, it cannot be said that the previous suit

instituted in a Court having no jurisdiction was

continued in the Court which had jurisdiction to try the

suit. Under Section 26 of the Civil Procedure Code,

"every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a

plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed."

Under Order IV, Rule 1, "every suit shall be instituted,

by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it

appoints in this behalf," and under Rule 2 "the Court

shall cause the particulars of every suit to be entered in a

book to be kept for the purpose and called the register of

civil suits, and such entries shall be numbered in every

year according to the order in which the plaints are

admitted."

On presentation of the plaints in the District Court,

the suits were entered in the register of civil suits of the

District Court. The presentation, therefore, of the plaints

in the District Court was an institution of the suits under

Section 26 and the provisions of Order IV of the Civil

Procedure Code. Under Section of the Indian Limitation

Act, the time occupied in prosecuting the previous suite

shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation

for the fresh suits instituted in the District Court. In

Hedlot v. Karan , it was held that the combined effect of

Section 57 of the old Civil Procedure Code

(corresponding to Order VII, Rule (10)), and Section of

the Indian Limitation Act was at when the plaint was

returned to be presented in a Court of competent

jurisdiction, the suit was to be considered as instituted on

the date of such presentation, and the plaintiff should

amend the plaint so as to include all intermediate

transactions between the date of the first presentation

and the date of the presentation to the competent Court.

To the same effect are the decisions in the cases of

Bimala Prosad Mukerji v. Lal Moni Devi and Mohidin

Rowthen v. Nallaperumal Pillai.

Mr.Colabawala, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this

18.

Court in case of M/s.Vishnu Horticultural Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. M/s.Shampiyan

Viniyard Ltd. & Ors. reported in 2010 (1) ALL MR 149 and in particular

paragraphs 9 and 13 in support of his submission that when the plaint is returned

for the presentation to the proper court and is presented in that court, the suit can

be deemed to be instituted in the proper court only when the plaint is presented in

that court. After the plaint is presented in the proper court, it cannot be treated as

continuation of the proceedings of the court which had no jurisdiction, but a suit

would commence from the stage of its institution on the date when the plaint

would be presented to the proper court. It is submitted that after the return of the

plaint, it is presented in the appropriate court, the suit would have to be treated as a

fresh suit and it can proceed in accordance with law from the stage of its

presentation subject to the provisions contained in Rule 10(A) of the Order VII of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Reliance is placed on paragraphs 9 and 13 of

the said judgment which read as under :-

In Hanamantthappa's case (supra) a civil suit had

been filed. The plaint was returned for its presentation to the

proper court. The plaintiff after making necessary

amendment in the plaint represented it. The defendant took

up the plea that amendment could not be made in the plaint.

The Supreme Court held that it is a fresh plaint and the

amendment could be made in the plaint presented. In

paragraph 3 of the Judgment, the Supreme Court observed

thus:-

"The object of Order VII, Rule 10-A is that the

plaintiff, on return of the plaint, can either challenge

in an appellate forum or represent to the court having

territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In

substance, it is a suit filed afresh subject to the

limitation, pecuniary jurisdiction and payment of the

Court fee as had rightly been pointed out by the High

Court. Therefore, it cannot be dismissed on the

ground that the plaintiff made averments which did

not find place in the original plaint presented before

the Court of District Munsiff,Navalgund. It is not

always necessary for the plaintiff to seek amendment

of the plaint under Order VI, Rule 17 , CPC. At best it

can be treated to be a fresh plaint and the matter can

be proceeded with according to law. Under those

circumstances, we do not think that there is any error

of law committed by the High Court in giving the

above direction." (emphasis suppled)

13. The law is now clear. When a plaint is returned for

presentation to the proper court and is presented in that

court, the suit can be deemed to be instituted in the proper

court only when the plaint is presented in that court. In

other words, after the plaint is presented in the proper

Court, it cannot be treated as continuation of the

proceedings of the court which had no jurisdiction, but a

suit would commence from the stage of its institution on

the date when the plaint would be presented to the proper

court. In substance, it is a suit filed afresh subject to the

limitation, pecuniary jurisdiction, and payment of the

court fee. Such a suit cannot be dismissed on the ground

that the plaintiff made averments in the plaint, which did

not find place in the original plaint presented before the

court which had no jurisdiction to entertain the same or

which returned the plaint. Similarly a written statement

also cannot be rejected on the ground that the defendant

made averments in the written statement, which did not

find place in the original written statement filed in the suit

before it was returned. It is not always necessary either for

the plaintiff or for the defendant to seek amendment of the

plaint/written statement under Order VI rule 17 of CPC. In

short, where, in any suit, after the defendant has appeared,

the plaint is returned and it is presented in the appropriate

court the suit will have to be treated as a fresh suit and it

can proceed in accordance with the law from the stage of

its presentation subject to the provisions contained in Rule

10-A of Order VII of C. P C.

Mr.Colabawala also invited my attention to the averments made in the plaint

19.

and in particular paragraphs 20 to 22 of the plaint in reply to the submissions made

by Mr.Rege, learned counsel appearing for defendant no.7 that there was no

reference to the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff, written statement filed by

defendants in that suit and the order passed by the City Civil Court, Bombay for

return of the plaint in this suit. Learned counsel submits that the said submission

made by the learned counsel for defendant no.7 is on the face of it contrary to the

averments made in paragraphs 20 to 22 of the plaint. It is submitted that the

plaintiff has not only pointed out in detail about filing of the said suit in the City

Civil Court, written statement filed by the defendants in the said suit but has also

annexed copy of the order dated 21st July, 1998 passed by the City Civil Court to

this plaint. It is submitted that in view of the subsequent events and in view of the

plaintiff having obtained certified copy of the lease deed which was not annexed

by the defendants to the written statement in the said suit, plaintiff has filed this

20.

suit for various reliefs.

Mr.Colabawala, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the

Division Bench of this court in case of Lt.Col.Anil Bhat & Ors. vs. Citibank N.A.,

reported in AIR 2009 Bombay 99 in support of his submission that City Civil

Court once having taken a view that suit was barred on the ground that subject

matter of the suit could not have been tried by the City Civil Court, such a suit

ought to have been rejected and no order for return of the plaint under Order VII

Rule 10 could have been passed. Paragraphs 6 to 8 of the said judgment of the

Division Bench reads thus :-

Let us consider the submission. An added

submission is that even if the Civil Court holds that it has

no jurisdiction over the subject matter then its jurisdiction

to direct return the plaint is limited to those cases relating

to want of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction. The

argument proceeds on the footing that if the Court has no

jurisdiction over the subject matter, once it holds that it has

no jurisdiction it can pass no further order. In a case of

territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction the Court would have

jurisdiction over the subject matter, but cannot entertain the

proceedings because it does not have territorial jurisdiction

or the claim is not within its pecuniary limits.

Such an issue had come up for consideration before the

Supreme Court in Raizada Topandas and Anr. v.

Gorakhram

Gokalchand

MANU/SC/0227/1963

[1964]3SCR214 .

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether on a

proper interpretation of Section 28 of the Bombay Rents,

Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 the

Court of Small Causes, Bombay, had exclusive jurisdiction

to deal with the same. Relief sought in a Suit filed before

the City Civil Court was that the plaintiff be declared to be

a in lawful possession and the Defendants had no right to

enter into or remain in possession of the shop, injunction

and other consequential reliefs. The defence raised was that

the question involved in the suit related to possession of

the premises as between landlord and tenant and the Court

of Small Causes alone will have jurisdiction to entertain

and try the suit. On these pleadings a preliminary issue was

framed. The City Civil Court held in favour of the

defendants and accordingly made an order that the plaint

be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper

Court. In Appeal before the High Court the Court took a

view that the City Civil Court had jurisdiction. Against that

order Special Leave to Appeal was preferred from which

the Appeal arose. Before the Court the issue was, if the

defendant raised the claim or question as to existence of

relationship of landlord and tenant as to between the

defendant and the Plaintiff the jurisdiction of City Civil

Court is ousted even though the plaintiff pleads that there is

no such relationship and the only Court which has

exclusive jurisdiction to try the suit is the Court of Small

Causes. In answering the question the Court relied on the

principle as explained in a Full Bench decision of the

Allahabad High Court in Ananti v. Channu

MANU/UP/0079/1929 : AIR1930All193 . We may

gainfully reproduce the said paragraph:

“The plaintiff chooses his forum and files his suit. If he

establishes the correctness of his facts he will get his relief

from the forum chosen. If ...he frames his suit in a manner

not warranted by the facts and goes for his relief to a court

which cannot grant him relief on the true facts, he will have

his suit dismissed. Then there will be no question of

returning the plaint for presentation to the proper court, for

the plaint as framed, would not justify the other kind of

court to grant him the relief.... If it is found on a trial on the

merits so far as this issue of jurisdiction goes, that the facts

alleged by the plaintiff are not true and the facts alleged by

the defendants are true, and that the case is not cognizable

by the court, there will be two kinds of orders to be passed.

If the jurisdiction is only one relating to territorial limits or

pecuniary limits, the plaint will be ordered to be returned

for presentation to the proper Court. If, on the other hand,

it is found that, having regard to the nature of the suit, it is

not cognizable by the class of court to which the court

belongs, the plaintiff's suit will have to be dismissed in its

entirety.”

Relying on this principle the Court held, that the view

taken by the High Court was correct. The proposition

which follows is that the power of the Civil Court to direct

return of the plaint is limited to those cases where it has no

territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction. In case if it has no

jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter then it cannot

direct return of the plaint. If this principle is accepted on

the facts of the case then the Tribunal would have no

jurisdiction to direct return of the plaint as it came to the

conclusion that it had no jurisdiction over the subject

matter.

The next question that we are called upon to is to

answer the issue is whether the D.R.T., can exercise all the

powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure.

Return of the plaint is governed by the provisions of Order

7 Rule 10. We have earlier reproduced the relevant

provisions of Section 22(2) of the C.P.C. The power to

return the plaint is not one such power which the Tribunal

and the Appellate Tribunal has been conferred specifically.

In the absence of conferring such power, can the Tribunal

under the powers conferred on it under Section 22(1) direct

return of the plaint. A similar issue had come up for

consideration and stands concluded in the case of Industrial

Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Garapco

Industries Ltd. and Ors. MANU/SC/0372/1999 :

[1999]3SCR759 . The question for consideration before the

Court was whether the Tribunal under the RDB Act had

jurisdiction to grant ad-interim exparte order of injunction

or stay against the defendant on an application filed by the

bank or financial institution for recovery of debt. After

considering the provisions the High Court had taken a view

that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant exparte order.

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court

and observed as under:

“ We, however, do not agree with the reasoning adopted by

the High Court. When Section 22 of the Act says that the

Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid by the

Code of Civil Procedure, it does not mean that it will not

have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a Court of Civil

Procedure. Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code

of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is part on its

powers is to observe the principles of natural justice.”

Considering the language of Section 22 the Court observed

as under:

“We have to give meaning to Section 22 of the Act as here

the Tribunal is exercising powers of a Civil Court while

trying a money suit. Further, when power is given to the

Tribunal to make interim order by way of injunction or

stay, it inherits in it the power to grant that order even ex

parte, if it is so in the interest of justice and as per the

requirements as spelt out in the judgment of this Court in

Morgan's case which has been quoted above.”

We need not refer to in detail the judgment in the case of

Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das

MANU/SC/0553/1994 : (1994)4SCC225 . There the Court

was considering Section 14 of the Consumer Protection

Act, 1986, which section did not provide for grant of any

interim relief or even ad-interim relief and provided only

for final relief. The Supreme Court there laid down the

principles to be taken into consideration by Court or

Tribunal in granting ex-parte injunction. Apart from the

other general principles the Supreme Court took the view

that the exparte order should be granted only under

exceptional circumstances and that grant of exparte order is

not a rule but an exception." Considering the judgment in

Grapco Industries Ltd. (supra) the proposition follows that

even though there is no specific power conferred on a

Tribunal under the RDB Act, considering Section 22(1) the

Tribunal though not bound by the procedure laid down in

the Code of Civil Procedure is not extinguished of

jurisdiction to exercise powers of a Court under the C.P.C.,

rather the Tribunal can travel beyond the scope of C.P.C.,

but in doing so, the only fetter is to observe the principles

of natural justice. The Tribunal therefore, would have

jurisdiction to direct return of the plaint but in cases limited

to pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction.

Having said so the question still remains whether

after having come to the conclusion that it had no

jurisdiction over the subject matter considering the

principles laid down in Raizada Topandas & Anr (supra)

the Tribunal could have directed the return of the plaint.

The principle which the Supreme Court accepted in

Raizada Topandas & Anr (supra) was that if a plaint as

drafted does not confer jurisdiction on the Court in respect

of the subject matter, then it will have no jurisdiction to

direct return of the plaint. In such a case it will have

jurisdiction limited to the extent of a case of pecuniary and

territorial jurisdiction. If this proposition is accepted then

the learned Tribunal on determination of the issue as to

whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter could not

have directed the return of the plaint.

Mr.Colabawala submits that under Order VII Rule 10 (A), (i), if the court is

of the opinion that the plaint should be returned, it should, before doing so,

intimate its decision to the plaintiff before return of plaint. It is submitted that

under Order VII Rule 10(A) (2), plaintiff has an option to make an application to

the court, specifying the court in which he proposes to present the plaint after its

return and to pray that the court may fix a date for the appearance of the parties in

that court. It is submitted that no such application was admittedly made by the

plaintiff when the City Civil Court passed an order for return of the plaint. There

is thus no question of complying with any order passed by the City Civil Court in

the said order as canvassed by defendant no.7. It is submitted that under Order VII

Rule 10(A) if such application would have been made by the plaintiff under sub-

rule (2) and if so allowed by the court, in that event the plaintiff would not have

been permitted to file an appeal against the order returning the plaint. Learned

counsel submits that the plaintiff has prayed for various reliefs which were not

prayed in the City Civil Court suit except prayer (b). There is no substance in the

submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the defendant no.7 that the

plaintiff ought to have filed an appeal against the said order passed by the City

Civil Court.

22.

In rejoinder, Mr.Rege, learned counsel appearing for defendant no.7 submits

that all parties to this suit except defendant nos. 6 and 7 are same. It is submitted

that though wording of prayers in the plaint filed in this court are different the

reliefs claimed in this suit and that suit are identical. Learned counsel placed

reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Pune Municipal Corpn.

vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (2007) 5 SCC 211 in support of his

plea that unless order passed by Bombay City Civil Court was set aside, it had

Pune Municipal Corpn. (supra) reads as under :-

course of law. Paragraph 36 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of

36. It is well settled that no order can be ignored

altogether unless a finding is recorded that it was
illegal, void or not in consonance with law. As Prof.
Wade states:

He further states:

"The principle must be equally true even where the

'brand of invalidity' is plainly visible; for there also the

order can effectively be resisted in law only by

obtaining the decision of the Court".

“ The truth of the matter is that the court will

invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought

by the right person in the right proceedings and

circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a

nullity, but the Court may refuse to quash it because of

the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he does not

deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived

his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such

case the 'void' order remains effective and is, in reality,

valid. It follows that an order may be void for one

purpose and valid for another, and that it may be void

against one person but valid against another.”

23.

Mr.Rege, learned counsel made an attempt to distinguish the judgment cited

by Mr.Colabawala, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff on the ground that

there was no liberty granted to the plaintiff by City Civil Court to file fresh suit.

REASONS AND CONCLUSION

24.

As far as prayer (a) of the Notice of Motion i.e. for rejection of plaint under

Order VII Rule 11 is concerned, in view of the submission made by the learned

counsel appearing for defendant no.7 that this Notice of Motion filed by defendant

no.7 does not fall under Order VII Rule 11, prayer (a) is rejected on that

submission alone. Even otherwise on bare reading of Order VII Rule 11, plaint

cannot be rejected on the ground of alleged non-compliance of order passed by

court for return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 by invoking any of the provisions under Order VII Rule 11.

As far as prayer (b) for dismissal of suit is concerned, perusal of the plaint

25.

filed in this suit indicates that except prayer (b) in this suit, all other prayers were

not subject matter of the said suit filed in the City Civil Court. Defendant nos. 6

and 7 who are parties to this suit were not parties to the said suit filed in the City

Civil Court. Plaintiff in this suit has also applied for removal of defendant nos. 1

to 4 as trustees, for declaration that lease deed dated 20th June 1979 was illegal,

void and of no legal effect has applied for vacant possession from defendant nos. 5

to 7, has applied for declaration that the deed of rectification dated 7th February,

2001 are illegal, void ab-initio and of no legal effect. The cause of action in this

suit in my view is different. In my view there is no substance in the submission

made by defendant no.7 that since avermetns made in this suit were not made in

the plaint filed before City Civil Court, this suit is not maintainable on that ground.

There is also no substance in the submissions made by defendant no.7 that in view

of the order of return of plaint by the City Civil Court to the plaintiff for

presentation before the proper court having jurisdiction, plaintiff ought to have

lifted the plaint returned by the City Civil Court and ought to have presented the

same plaint in this court without carrying out any amendment. This issue has been

already decided by the Supreme Court in case of Hanamanthappa and another

(supra) that the object of Order VII Rule 10(A) is that plaintiff, on the return of the

plaint, can either challenge the said order before appropriate forum or represent to

the court having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is held that the suit

filed afresh should be subject to the limitation, pecuniary jurisdiction and payment

of the court fee and therefore it cannot be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff

made averments which did not find place in the original plaint presented before

the court having no jurisdiction. It is held that it is not always necessary for the

plaintiff to seek amendment of the plaint under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908. At best it can be treated to be a fresh plaint and the matter

can be proceeded with according to law. In my view plaintiff was not precluded

from filing this plaint with addition of parties and with new cause of action. In my

view, these proceedings would not be treated as proceedings in continuation of the

proceedings filed before the City Civil Court by the plaintiff but would be a fresh

suit subject to limitation, pecuniary jurisdiction and payment of court fees.

26.

Learned Single Judge of this Court in case of M/s.Vishnu Horticultural Pvt.
Ltd. & Anr. (supra) has followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of
Hanamanthappa and another (supra) and has held that a suit filed after return of
the plaint afresh would be subject to limitation pecuniary jurisdiction and payment
of court fees and such suit cannot be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff
made averments in the plaint, it did not find place in the original plaint presented
before the court which had no jurisdiction to entertain the same or which returned
the plaint. Such suit will have to be treated as a fresh suit and can proceed in
accordance with law from the stage of its presentation.

27.

In my view, even if an averments made in this plaint were not made in the

earlier suit or the reliefs claimed in this suit were not made in the earlier suit, this

suit can not be dismissed on such grounds. The plaintiff is entitled to file a fresh

suit for different cause of action.

On perusal of the plaint, it is clear that the plaintiff has not only referred to

28.

the plaint filed before the City Civil Court, Bombay but has also referred to the

written statement filed by the defendants in the said suit and has also annexed copy

of the said order passed by the City Civil Court for return of the plaint. In my

view, the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the defendant no.7

that there was no such reference in this suit about such proceedings is factually

29.

incorrect.

On perusal of the judgment delivered by the Division Bench in case of

Lt.Col.Anil Bhat & Ors. (supra), it is clear that once the court has not returned the

plaint on the ground of lack of pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction of that court but

had come to the conclusion that the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain

such suit on the ground that subject matter of the suit was beyond the jurisdiction

of that court, such court could not have passed an order for return of plaint but

ought to have dismissed the suit on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In my view,

Mr.Colabawala, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff is right in his

submission that the order passed by the City Civil Court for return of the plaint

itself was contrary to the law laid down by the Division Bench of this court.

30.

As far as issue of limitation raised by defendant no.7 on the ground that the

plaintiff did not file the suit within three weeks from the date of the order passed

by the City Civil Court for return of plaint as directed in the said order, this suit is

barred by law of limitation is concerned, this court has already negatived such

contention raised by defendant no.7 in the Notice of Motion filed in the same suit

by the plaintiff by order dated 7th November, 2003 in Notice of Motion No. 1725

of 2001. This court considered the judgment of the Supreme Court and also

section 10 of the Limitation Act and held that in view of section 10 of Limitation

Act, this suit was not barred by law of limitation. The said order passed by this

court has not been challenged by defendant no.7. In my view such plea cannot be

raised once again in this Notice of Motion and therefore said plea as well as prayer

31.

As far as judgment of Supreme Court in case of Pune Municipal Corpn.

(supra) relied upon by defendant no.7 is concerned, it has been held by the

Supreme Court that no order can be ignored altogether unless a finding is recorded

that it was illegal, void or not in consonance with law. On perusal of the order

passed by the Division Bench of this court in case of Lt.Col.Anil Bhat & Ors.

(supra), it is clear that City Civil Court could not have passed order for return of

plaint once having come to the conclusion that the subject matter of the said suit
was beyond the jurisdiction of that court. In any event, plaintiff was not precluded
from filing the fresh suit for a different cause of action. The judgment of the

Supreme Court thus placed reliance upon by defendant no.7 is of no assistance to

the defendant no.7.

On perusal of written statement filed by defendant no.7 in this suit, it is clear

32.

that defendant no.7 had filed written statement in this suit as far back as on 22nd

April, 2004 in which those defendants have raised plea of limitation alleging non-

compliance of the order passed by the City Civil Court whereas this Notice of

Motion has been filed by defendant no.7 on 1st April, 2011. In my view, in view of

such gross delay on the part of the defendant no.7 in filing this Notice of Motion,

no relief can be granted by this Court in this Notice of Motion for dismissal of the

suit on the ground setout in the affidavit in support or otherwise.

In my view, no case is made out for grant of any reliefs claimed in the

33.

34.

Notice of Motion.

Notice of Motion is thoroughly misconceived and deserve to be dismissed.

I, therefore, pass the following order :-

(a) Notice of Motion is dismissed.

(b) Parties are directed to exchange draft issue within four

Suit to be placed on board for framing issues after six

weeks from today.

No order as to costs.

[R.D. DHANUKA, J.]

(d)

(c)

weeks from the date of this order.

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Monday, 14 April 2014

Bombay HC: When subject matter of suit is beyond jurisdiction of court, plaint must be rejected and not returned under O 7 R 10 of CPC

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