Tuesday, 8 April 2014

When jurisdiction of court is barred relating to award passed in land acquisition?


The Trial Court as can be seen has in a way glossed over the prayers sought in the suit in observing that since the title of the government is disputed therefore the civil court has jurisdiction. In the said process, the Trial court failed to notice that the Plaintiffs have already been divested of their title by virtue of acquisition which has taken place culminating in the declaration of the Award in 1984. The fact that the Plaintiffs have sought a declaration in respect of the letters issued by the Tahasildar and the Circle Officer is lost sight of by the Trial Court. On what basis the Trial Court has observed that there is no issue which is challenged under the said Act when the prayer made in the plaint stares us in the face. The Trial Court has therefore on a erroneous premise that the suit involves an issue of title and that the Plaintiffs are seeking to set up title by adverse possession has held that it has jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiffs have to first get over the hurdle of the acquisition of their lands. The proposition of law laid down by the learned Single Judge in the judgment cited (supra) by the learned counsel for the Applicants cannot be disputed. However, as indicated above the prayers in the plaint in the instant case unmistakably and unequivocally point out that the challenge is to the acquisition of lands by virtue of seeking a declaration that the Award is illegal, null and void and not binding on the Plaintiffs, as also the letters of the Tahasildar and the Circle Officer, the reliefs therefore cannot be read in isolation and that the issue of jurisdiction has to be decided on the said basis. The suit was therefore clearly barred under Section 29 and Section 22 of the 1976 Act or the 1986 Act. In my view, therefore, the Trial Court has erred in coming to a conclusion that it has jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit. The Trial Court has therefore assumed jurisdiction not vested in it. The impugned order is therefore required to be set and aside and is accordingly set aside in the revisionary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The preliminary issue is answered in favour of the Defendants. The suit in question is accordingly held to be not maintainable and dismissed as such. The above Civil Revision is accordingly allowed.IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Shri Dadu Rama Patil,

CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.981 OF 2012

versus

Shri Bapu Krishna Kurane

CORAM :
DATE   :
R. M. SAVANT, J.
20th March 2014.



Admit,   with   the   consent   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the   parties 
taken up for hearing forthwith.
The   revisionary  jurisdiction   of  this  Court  is  invoked  against  the 

order   dated   24/8/2012   passed   by   the   learned   Civil   Judge,   Senior   Division, 
Ichalkaranji by which order the Trial Court has decided the preliminary issue 
by holding that it has the jurisdiction to try and entertain the present suit.

The  Applicants herein  are  the  original  Defendant Nos.10, 11,13 
and 15 to the suit in question being Regular Civil Suit No.247 of 2005.   In the 
context  of  the  challenge  which   has  been   raised   in   the   above   Civil   Revision 
Application it would be apposite to refer to the reliefs claimed in the said suit.  
(Vernacular omitted)

12)
English translation of which is as under :­
Plaintiff therefore prays that :­
(a) To declare that the Plaintiff become owner by adverse 
possession;
(b) Order dated 29.11.2001 vide Desk 1512 Rehabilitation 
RR 3867/2001 Vashi­916/2001, Letter of Tahasildar Dt. 
7/12/2001   vide   S.B.N.   169/2001,   remark   of   circle 
officer,   Hupari   dt.   10.12.2001   and   award 
No.LAQ/10/4/1983   dated   17.7.1984   and   possession 
receipt dated 23.10.1985 all be declared illega, void ab 
inition, hollow and not acted upon.
(c) In the alternative, if this Court comes to a conclusion 
that   the   acquisition   is   legal   and   valid,   then   issue   a 
declaration   that   the   Defendant   Nos.   1  and   2  are   not 
entitled to acquire the Plaintiff's land, since the land in 
Jangamwadi in Gat No.35, Area 5 H. 20 ares, is already 
acquired for rehabilitation in the year 1984, ;
(d) To   restrain   by   an   injunction   to   Defendant   No.5   and 
others   acting   on   his   behalf   to   disturb   the   Plaintiff's 
possession and enjoyment in the suit property on the 
basis of the order referred in para 12 (b).

The subject matter of the suit is the land bearing Gat No.572 admeasuring 3 
Hectors and 28 Ares.  The Plaintiffs claim to be in possession of the said land. 
In   the   plaint   the   acquisition   which   has   taken   place   under   the   Maharashtra 
Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act 1986 (herein after referred to as 
“the said Act”) has been referred to, and in Paragraph 3B the lands have been 
allotted by the District Rehabilitation Officer to the project affected persons has 
been mentioned.   The plaint also contains an averment that the Respondents 

are   seeking   to   intervene   in   the   Plaintiffs'   peaceful   possession   of   the   suit 
property.   The prayer clauses indicate that by prayer clause (b) the Plaintiffs 
have sought declaration that the letters dated 29/11/2001,  7/12/2001, Award 
dated 17/7/1984 and the possession receipt dated 23/10/1985 are all illegal, 
void abinitio, hollow, bogus and not acted upon. By way of prayer clause (c) it 
has   been   alternatively   prayed   that   in   the   event   the   Trial   Court   comes   to   a 
conclusion that the acquisition is legal then it be declared that in view of the 
lands   from   Gat   No.   35   admeasuring   5   Hectors   and   20   Ares   being   already 
acquired,   the   authorities   are   not   entitled   to   acquire   further   lands   from   the 
Plaintiffs.   By prayer clause (d) injunction is sought that the Defendant No.5 
should not interfered with the Plaintiffs' possession on the basis of the letters 
and award which have been referred to in prayer clause (b). 
4
A reading of the said prayer clauses therefore indicates that the 
entire substratum of the suit is based on the acquisition of the Plaintiffs lands 

from Gat No.572.  It is in the said context that the Applicants above named i.e. 
the Defendant Nos.10, 11, 13 and 15 applied for framing of a preliminary issue 
as regards the maintainability of the suit. The said applications were Exhibits 
85 and 96.  Pursuant to the applications, the preliminary issue to the following 
effect has been framed :­
“Whether   this   Court   has   jurisdiction   to   try   and   entertain   the   suit   as   per 

Sections 22 and 24 of the Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation 
Act, 1986?

The Trial Court adjudicated upon the said preliminary issue and 
has by the impugned order dated 24/8/2012 ruled that it has the jurisdiction 
to try and entertain the suit. The gist of reasoning of the Trial Court can be 
found   in   Paragraph   No.18   of   the   said   order   wherein   the   Trial   Court   has 
observed that from the pleadings and the documents produced on record it 
shows that the title is disputed and therefore the civil court has jurisdiction to 
try   and   entertain   the   suit.     The   Trial   Court   has   further   observed   that   the 
Plaintiffs have not challenged the issue under the Maharashtra Project Affected 
Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1986 and that the plea of adverse possession cannot 
be decided under the said Act. The Trial Court has further observed that the 
Plaintiffs have challenged mutation entries passed by the revenue officer and 
not challenged the award, and has held that considering the judgments cited 

before it the suit filed by the Plaintiffs was maintainable and the civil court has 
jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit.   As indicated above, the said order 
dated 24/8/2012 passed by the Trial Court which is taken exception to by way 
of the above Civil Revision Application.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties.   The learned counsel 
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   Applicants   Shri   P   D   Dalvi   would   contend   that 

having regard to prayer clauses (b) and (c) in the plaint, the suit as filed by the 
Plaintiffs   was   not   maintainable   in   view   of   the   fact   that   the   Plaintiffs   by 
claiming the relief sought by way prayer clause (b) have in fact sought the 
relief in respect of the award that was passed on 17/7/1984 and the letters of 
the   District   Rehabilitation   Officer   which   have   been   issued   pursuant   to   the 
acquisition of the lands of the Plaintiffs allotting the said lands to the project 
affected persons.   The learned counsel for the Applicants would contend that 
the   Trial   Court   glossed   over   the   said   prayer   clauses   (b)   and   (c)     and   has 
erroneously held that there is no issue which arises under the said Act.   The 
learned counsel would further contend that the Trial Court has erred on laying 
emphasis   on   the   plea   of   adverse   possession   when   the   Plaintiffs   in   fact   are 
challenging the  Award declared under  the  said  Act.  The   learned  counsel  in 
support of the contention that the suit was not maintainable sought to rely 
upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in  (2013) 3 SCC 66  in the 
matter of Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority and another v/s.  

Brijesh Reddy and another  wherein the Apex Court has held that the Land 
Acquisition   Act   is   a   complete   code   in   itself   and   is   meant   to   serve   public 
purpose, and therefore, by necessary implication, power of civil court to take 
cognizance under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure stands excluded and 
civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of validity or legality of 
notification   under   Section   4,   declaration   under   Section   6   and   subsequent 

proceedings.

Per   contra,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the 
Respondent Nos.1(a) to 1(e), 2 and 3 i.e. the original Plaintiffs Shri  N J Patil 
sought to support the impugned order. The learned counsel would contend that 
the Plaintiffs claim to be in possession of the property since the year 1959.  It is 
the submission of the learned counsel for the Respondents­original Plaintiffs 
that the averments and the reliefs sought in the plaint would have to be read 
together and if so read, it can be seen that the suit is filed for protecting the 
possession   of   the   Plaintiffs.     The   learned   counsel   sought   to   rely   upon   the 
judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court reported in  2010(1) Mah.  
L.J.   187  in   the   matter   of  Lockwood   Industrial   and   Transport   Services,  
Bombay v/s. Victoria Timber Supplying Company, Bombay in support of his 
contention   that   the   averments   in   the   plaint   would   have   to   be   taken   into 
consideration.   The   learned   counsel   would   contend   that   the   Trial   Court   has 
rightly adjudicated upon the preliminary issue by considering what is essence 

of the suit which is according to the learned counsel a suit for protecting the 
possession of the Plaintiffs.

Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   I   have 
considered the rival contentions.  As indicated above, the issue which arises for 
consideration is whether the civil court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the 
suit. The said issue would have to be addressed considering the reliefs which 

have been sough in the suit.  As indicated above, the reliefs sought in the suit 
by way of prayer clauses (b) and (c) specifically relate to the acquisition of the 
land of the Plaintiffs by award dated 17/7/1984.  The challenge is also to the 
letters issued by the District Rehabilitation Officer allotting the lands to the 
project affected persons after the lands have been acquired. The prayer clause 
(c) in the plaint is a pointer to the nature of challenge in the suit. By the said  
prayer the Plaintiffs have alternatively prayed that in the event the acquisition 
is held to be legal and valid, then the declaration be issued that in view of the 
lands acquired from the Plaintiffs, further land cannot be acquired from the 
Plaintiffs, meaning thereby that the  Plaintiffs accepted the  position  that the 
lands in question have been acquired under the provisions of the said Act.  It 
would therefore be apposite to refer to the relevant provisions of the said Act 
which are Sections 29 and 22. The same are reproduced herein under for the 
sake of convenience :­

Bar of Jurisdiction ­­­ No Civil Court shall have 
jurisdiction to settled, decide or deal with any question 

which  is by  or  under  this  Act  required  to be   settled, 
decided   or   dealt  with   by   the   Director,   Commissioner, 
Deputy   Director,   Resettlement   Officer   or   the   State 
Government.”

“22 Bar   of   Jurisdiction   ­­­No   Civil   Court   shall   have 
jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question 
which  is by  or  under  this  Act  required  to be   settled, 
decided   or   dealt   with   by   the   project   Authority, 
Collector, Commission, or the State Government.”
The aforesaid Sections 29 and 22 are appearing in the 1976 Act and 1986 Act 

respectively.  It is therefore in the context of the said provisions that the said 
preliminary issue ought to have been decided.

The   Trial   Court   as   can   be   seen   has   in   a   way   glossed   over   the 
prayers sought in the suit in observing that since the title of the government is 
disputed therefore the civil court has jurisdiction.  In the said process, the Trial 
court failed to notice that the Plaintiffs have already been divested of their title 
by virtue of acquisition which has taken place culminating in the declaration of 
the Award in 1984.   The fact that the Plaintiffs have sought a declaration in 
respect of the letters issued by the Tahasildar and the Circle Officer is lost sight 
of by the Trial Court. On what basis the Trial Court has observed that there is 
no issue which is challenged under the said Act when the prayer made in the 
plaint   stares   us   in   the   face.     The   Trial   Court   has   therefore   on   a   erroneous 
premise that the suit involves an issue of title and that the Plaintiffs are seeking 
to   set   up   title   by   adverse   possession   has   held   that   it   has   jurisdiction 

notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiffs have to first get over the hurdle of 
the acquisition of their lands. The proposition of law laid down by the learned 
Single   Judge   in   the   judgment   cited   (supra)   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the 
Applicants cannot be disputed. However, as indicated above the prayers in the 
plaint in the instant case unmistakably and unequivocally point out that the 
challenge is to the acquisition of lands by virtue of seeking a declaration that 
the Award is illegal, null and void and not binding on the Plaintiffs, as also the 

letters of the Tahasildar and the Circle Officer, the reliefs therefore cannot be 
read in isolation and that the issue of jurisdiction has to be decided on the said 
basis.  The suit was therefore clearly barred under Section 29 and Section 22 of 

the 1976 Act or the 1986 Act. 
In my view, therefore, the Trial Court has erred in coming to a 
conclusion that it has jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit.  The Trial Court 
has   therefore   assumed   jurisdiction   not   vested   in   it.   The   impugned   order   is 
therefore   required   to   be   set   and   aside   and   is   accordingly   set   aside   in   the 
revisionary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure.   The preliminary issue  is answered in  favour of the  Defendants. 
The suit in question is accordingly held to be not maintainable and dismissed 
as such.  The above Civil Revision is accordingly allowed.
[R.M.SAVANT, J]

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