Court can not add party in proceeding u/s30 of land acquisition Act

 The above observations in Municipality, Nalgonda v. Hakeem Mohiuddin & Co., , undoubtedly support the view I have taken

that if a person who was not a party before the Collector is allowed to be impleaded by the District Court in a reference lto it, the nature of the dispute referred to will be substantially changed, for a new dispute incorporating the claim of such a person will be raised. This is not permissible, as the jurisdiction of the District Court in a reference under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is restricted to the precise terms of the reference. Such impleading would amount to an enlargement of the terms of the reference and as such, the District Court would act without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, if it so orders.

Bombay High Court

Govind Narayan Loktlikar vs Savitribal Roghurira Lotlikar ... on 17 July, 1986

Bench: G Couto

1. Can the Dirstrict Court in a reference under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, implead persons who claim to be entitled to the compensation awarded in a land acquisition proceedings or to a part thereof, or who claim to be interested in the acquired property, when the same persons were not parties before the Collector, is the question that arises in this revision application. The petitioner's answer to this question is in the affirmative while the respondents are of the opposite view.

2. The facts are not in dispute and strictly speaking, it is not necessary for me to advert to them in detail. It suffices to say that proceedings hasd been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the acquisition of a plot of land situated at Curchorem, for the construction of Police Staff Quarters. It appears that initially, only the respondents Dr. Jusha Kudchadkar and Prabhakar Kudchadkar were shown as the persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired. However, before the passing of the award, the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 (Lotlikars) filed an application before the Collector alleging to be interested parties, since the acquired land belonged to them. The Collector passed his award, but since he feltt that he was unable to determin who was entitled to the compensation, he referred the dispute raised by the aforesaid respondents Lotlikar, to the district Court under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The said reference is still pending disposal in the District Clourt, Sourth Gon, and at one stage of the said proceedings, the petitioner herein filed an application dated 7th March, 1985 praying that he be impleaded as a party in the said reference, since, according to him, the acquired land is a joint property in which he also has a right, share and interest. The learned Judge however, by his order dated 14th August, 1985, dismissed the application on the ground that no new parties can be added in a reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer under S. 30 of the Land Acqusition Act. He held the view that such refeerence is to be disposed of only amongst the parties who are impleaded in the same reference which is to be otherwise adjudicated in its pricise terms. He added that apart from this, if the applicant/petitioner herein so desires, it was open to him to approach the Land Acquisition Officer to reframe the terms of the reference, or to file a suit in a Court of competent jursdiction to get redress to his grivances. It is against this order that the present revision application is directed.

3. Mr. S.K. Kakodkar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the District Judge, South Goa, was wrong in dismissing the application on the ground that ;no new parties can be added in a reference made under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Collector or Land Acqusition Officer. He invited my attention to S. 53 of the Act which provides that save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code will apply to the proceedings before the Court under the same Land Acquisition Act, and in its scheme, which is inconsistent with the impleading of interested parties in a reference and much to the contrary, this impleading is fully consistent with the Act. In fact. "person interested" is defined in S.3(b) as including all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be made on account of acquisition of land under the Act and that a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land. This definition is wide enough to include in it persons who claim any kind of interest in the land. Therefore, a person who claims to have a share in the said property is naturally, to be held as an interested party. The petitioner has approached the Court precisely with a case that he is on of the co-owners of the acquired land and as such, he is claiming a share in the said property. It cannot be disputed therefore that under the Land Acquisition Act he is a person interested. The learned conunsel further contended that the reference was made by the Land Acquisition Officer under S. 30 of the Act in order that the District Court would determine the persons to whom the compensation is payable. This reference is different from the reference under S. 18 of the Act, for under the latter provision, any person interested who has not accepted the award, may be written application to the Clollector requre the matter to be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection to be the measurement of the land or the amount of the compensation among th persons interested. When a reference under S. 18 is made, it is compulsory to the District Court to cause a notice to be served on the applicant as well as on all the persons interested in the objection, except such of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded. The Court is bound while giving this notice, to determine the objection. Now according to the learned counsel if in a reference under S. 18, the object of which is only the determination of the measurement of the acquired land or the amount oif the compensation to be paid, the Court is bound to give notice to all the persons interested in obe objection, even if some of them were not before the Collector there is no reason whatsoeve the close the doors of the Court to a person who claims to have a right or interest in the acquired land, but was not before the Collector in a reference made under S. 30. In fact 30 provides for a reference in two cases, one being a reference of any dispute as regards the apportionment of the compensation awarded among the parties who were before" the Collector, and the next being in respect of a dispute as regards the persons to whom the compensation or any part thereof is payable. In a reference of the second type, there is no reason whatsoever to close the doors of the Court to a person who claims to have a right or interest in the acquired land and therefore, has a claim to at least part of the awarded compensation. He placed reliance in support of this submission on the decisions of the Patna High Court in Babulal Mehtar v. Pakira Mehtar 'Mt. Sakalbaso Kuer v. Brijendra Singh

as well as on the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bagh Singh v. The Special Land Acquisition Collector Jalandhar The learned counsel finally contended that the view taken by the learned District Judge should not be affirmed, for it will give unnecessarily cause to multiplicity of proceedings.

4. This view of the learned counsel for the petitioner was however strongly opposed by Mr. B. Reis and Mr. L. V Talaulikar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents Nos. and 4 and 7 and 8 respectively In fact Mr. Reis contended that the problem is not one of mere procedure or of mere formalities but on the contrary is a question of jurisdiction. According to him under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, the District Court has a limited and restricted jurisdiction and can dispose of the matters only within the strict terms of the reference. He further argued that the reference by the Collector is, in the circumstances a condition precedent to the exercise of jursdication by the District Judge. Mr Talaulikar fully adhered to the submissions made by Mr. Reis. Reliance was placed by both the counsel in this connection on the decisions of the High Courts of Punjab and Harayana, Patna Allahabad, Bombay, Calcutta, Andhra Pradesh and also of the Suprem Court in 'Niranjan Singh v. Amar Singh' , "State of Bihar v. Parsuram prasad Verma" AIR 1977 Pat 78. Tejdhan Baul Mahadeo Krishna Parkar v.

Mamlatdar of Alibag AIR 1944 Bom 200. 'Rai Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadurs'. The Secretary of State for India in Council . 'Manjur Ahmed (deceased) v. Rajlakshmi Dassi'

. Mohammed lbrahim Sahib v. Land Acquisition Officer, Bhimavaram AIR 1958 Andh Pra 226, 'Municipality, Nalgonda v. Hakeem Hohiuddin'. Mohammed Hasnuddin v. The State of

Maharashtra .

5. The proposition advanced by Mr. Reis is not at all disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In fact, in all fairness, he accepted that the question to be dealt with is one touching the jurisdiction of the District Judge who has to decisde whether or not he can implead parties who were not referred to in the reference made to him by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer under S. 30 of Act. It is not necessary, in the circumstances, to deal in detail with this submission of Mr. Reis and it suffices to say that it is well settled that the jurisdiction of the District Court in a reference made under the Land Acquistion Act is restricted by the terms of the reference. I need not therefore, advert lto lthe different authorities relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents to support this view particularly to the decisions in . Therefore, the question to which I have to address myself is whether the District Judge will have jurisdiction to allow, in a reference made to him by the Collector under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, the impleading of a person who claims entitlement to the compensation awarded in acquisition proceedings or to a part thereof, although the said person was not a party before the Collector.

6. Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that when the amount of compensation has been settled under S.11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. This provision of law, therefore, enables the Collector tomake a reference to the District Court when a dispute arises as to the apportionment of the compensation awarded in the proceedings, or in respect of the person to whom the same compensation or part thereof is payable. Mr. Kakodkar contended that since under the Act "person interested" includes all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of the land, any person who has a right in the acquired property will be an interested party and, therefore, will be entitled to get the compensation awarded or part thereof. Now, according to the learned counsel, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to the proceeding before the District Court by virtue of S. 53 of the Act. Thus, if a person interested for some reason or the other was not before the Collector, there is no bar under the Act for him to be impleaded in the reference proceedings before the District Clourt. He further contended that the dispute is as to who is entitled to the payment of the compensation and, therefore, in a reference made under S. 30 to determine the persons to whom the compensation or part thereof is payable, the adding of a party who claims interest in the property and, therefore, an entitlement to the compensation or part thereof, is entirely permissible, since the dispute is the same. In fact, such dispute is related only to the determination of the person or persons who are entitled for the compensation. This is not in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, the learned counsel further argued, for the compensation. Thus is not in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, the learned counsel further argued, for in a reference under S. 18, the District Court is bound under the provisions of S. 20 to give a notice not only to the applicant, but also to all persons interested in the objection. If this is so, ther is not reason for not allowing the impleading of an interested party in a reference under S. 30 of the Act. I am afraid that these submissions of the learned counsel are not well-founded. The Land Acquisition Act is a piece of legislation enacted for the purpose of compulsory acquisition of land whenever so required for a public need. This acquisition has, naturally, to be expeditious in order to satisfy the public requirements and that adequate and quick compensation is awarded to the owners of the acquired land. Under the scheme of the Act, therefore, only jthose persons who have a right or interest in the acquired land ;are persons interested and, as such, only such persons can take part in the proceedings, which, by their own nature, could not be complicated. The proceedings begin with a notification under S. 4 making public that a particular piece of land may be needed to be acquired for a public purpose. This notification is meant to give an opportunity to the owners of the land proposed to be acquired to raise objections, if any, to the said acquisition and such objections are heard as provided in S. 5-A of the Act. Then, the declaration under S. 6 is to specify the particular area that is going to be acquired for a particular public purpose. After that a notice is given under S. 9 to the persons interested meaning by that the persons whose names are entered in the survey records relating to the concerned land. Thereafter, inquiry is held and the award is passed. It is thus clear that under the scheme of the Act, the persons interested and who take part in the proceedings are those whose names are entered in the relevant survey records. Section 18 of the Act, however, provides that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, be written application, require the Collector to refer the matter for detyermination of the Court as regards the measurement of the land proposed to be acquired and the amount of compensation awarded. This means that any person who is a person interested within the meaning of the Act, can even after the award is made by the Collector and even if he has not been made a party in the proceedings, intervence in the same by making an application for a reference under S. 18. The Collector has no discretion to dismiss such application land he is bound to make the reference, provided of course, such application is made within the time specified in sub-section (2),(a) and (b) of S. 18. Therefore, when such reference is made on application of a person who was not a party lto the proceedings before, the said person becomes a party before the Collector and the reference is made with such person as a party. Now, under S. 18, the reference can be made only for determination of the .....................acquired or for dispute arises as to the apportionment of the compensation awarded or as to whom the compensation is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the dicision of the District Court. This is a discretionary power of the Collector, for under the Act he is empowered to decide the said dispute himself and only if he is of the opinion that he is unable to ;decide such dispute, he may refer such ispute to the decision of the District Court. It becomes thus clear from the scheme of the Act that there are four kinds of disputes that can be referred to the District Court for deter-mination. These disputes are in respect of the measurement of the area acquired, in respect of the quantum of fair compensation, of the apportionment of the awarded compensation, and finally, in respect of the persons to whom the compensation is payable. These disputes are manifestly the disputes raised by persons who are before the Collector, for obviously, the Collector will not be aware of the claims of persons who are not before him and think that they have a right, share or interest in the acquired land and therfore, ar entitled to the awarded compensation or a part thereof. This being the case, the dispute that is referred to in S. 30 is the dispute that the persons interested who are before the Collector had raised before him. This dispute is the one which is referred by the Collector for the determination of the District Court.

7. I already said that it is well-settled that the jurisdiction of the District Court while disposing a reference under the Land Acquisition Act is restricted by the terms of the reference itself. This being so, if a dispute that arose before the Collector among the parties who are before him is referred to the District Court, it necessarily follows that a person who was not before the Collector and who claims to have interest in the land and, therefore, is entitled to the payment of a compensation or part thereof is raising a new dispute and, as such, such person cannot be impleaded. This in no manner means that such person is deprived of a remedy to get redress to his grievances. The doors of a civil court are always open to him and he may kjapproach the Court with a suit to get his right duly determined. I am aware of the contrary......................... the Patna High Court in the case of Sakalbaso Kuer (above). It was held in that case that since no other proceeding has been prescribed for a reference under S. 30, aid has to be taken to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in that respect and that there is nothing inconsistent with the application of the provisions of O.I.R. 10. C.P.C. in regard to a refeerence under S. 30 of the Act. It was also observed that under S. 30 there are two kinds of references, one being in respect of the apportionment of the compensation awarded among the interested persons, and the other, as to the persons to whom the compensation awarded or part thereof is payable. The Court held the view that in the second type of reference, undoubtedluy, the impleading of a party in the District Court under O.I.R. 10, is permissible. A similar view was also taken by the learned single Judge of the said Hight Court in Babulal Mehtar's case (above) and also in Bagh Singh's case

(above) by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

However, I am unable to accept lthe said view, for I am on the considered opinion, for the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraph, and above that the impleading of a party under O.I.R. 10, C.P.C is inconsistent with the scheme of the Act. I may also note that Bagh Singh's case is distinguishable and what the learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held was in the background of the particular facts of the said case. In fact, the learned Judge, after having discussed the law on the subject, observed that:

" In the face of this settled legal position, how can the petitioners who even in the absence of mentioning of their names in the Reference are entitled to all the benefits arising from the award itself by denied the right to be impleaded as parties to the litigation at a stage prior to the passing of the said award. As per the observations in the above noted judgments, the petitioners have virtuaally to be deemed to be parties to those References. Their innocuous prayer is only that their names be so mentioned. This cannot possibly be denied to them."

That was a case where the petitioners where alleging that the acquired land was from their respective joint Khatas in which they were co-owners along with the persons who actually made the application under S. 18(2) of the Act. They also had alleged that though the individual co-sharers who had filed and signed those applications under S. 18 of the Act did so as their authorised agents, yet even in the absence of such authorisation they were entitled to be joined as jparties to the litigation pending in the lower court. Their applications had been ;dismissed and the learned Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court considering that, in such a case, it can be safely concluded that the co-owner, who is wanting enhancement in the compensation was also acting on behalf of other co-owners because their interests are joint and indivisible, can be made a party. The learned Judge further observed, following the decisions, of the Allahabad High Court in 'Kishen Chand v. Jagannath Parshad' (1903) ILR 25 All 133, 'Padmanabha Menon v. Bhaskara Menon' 1963 Ker LJ 724 and Mr. Sakalbaso Kuer v. Brijendra Singh (above). that it has been

ruled that in the Land Acquisition Act there is nothing inconsistent with the provisions of O.I.R. 10.C.P.C. and thus, the Land Acquisition Court in exercise of its powers under the later mentioned provision read with S. 53 of the Act can certainly add a person as a party if it appears to it just to do so, or necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the questions involved in the case. He added that if under the provisions of S. 20 of the Act the Land Acquisition Court is required to cause a notice specifying the day on which it will proceed lto determine the objection and directing all "persons interested" to put in appearance before the Court on that day, it is rather difficult to hold that a person interested with reference to a particular land which has been compulsorily acquired under the Act, could not come before the said Court and claim such notice and be heard. A part from the fact that the case dealt with by the learned single Judge was n\one where the property acquired was joint and the co-owners had no distinct and specified shares therein and therefore, the claim for compensation made by one co-owner would enure for the benefit of the other co-owners as well, a circumstance that makes that case completely distinguishable from the case at hand, with utmost respect I may say that it appears to me that the learned Judge failed to appreciate a very important and essential aspect of the case. The dispute referred by the Collector under S. 30 of the Act is either in respect of the apportionment of the compensation awarded among the persons who were before him, or as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable. In either of these cases, it is clear in my view that the impleading of a third person to determine the said dispute is not at all necessary, nor it will be just and proper. In fact the claim raised by such a person will give cause to a new dispute, a dispute that was not at all before the Collector. This being so naturally, the adding of such person will not be necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the questions involved in the referred dispute, nor it will be just to do so, since the scope of the reference will be completely changed and this will definitely exceed the terms fo the reference and therefore will go beyong the restricted jurisdication of the District Court action in a refernce under the Land Acquisition Act. In my view, therefore, the reasoning of the learned Judge is not acceptable. I am otherwise fortified in this view by the decision of theAndhra Pradesh High Court in Municipality. Nalgonda v. Hakeem Mohiuddin (above). That was a case under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act and a reference for apportionment under S. 25 of the said Act which corresponds to S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act has been made. A person who had not appeared before the Acquisition Officer and whose name was not mentioned in the reference, had applied to be made a party to the proceedings before the District Court, it was held that such a person connot be added as a party to the proceedings before the Court, no can he urge his claim to compensation on such refernce. In this connection, it was observed that on the terms of S. 25. the Collector can pass no award until rival claims are adjudicated on a reference by the Court and that in fact, when a reference by the Court and that in fact, when a reference is made either under s. 25 of the Hyderbad Act or under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector will have to wait until the matter referred to the Court is finally adjudicated before completing the award. Then, it was added that this being the scheme of the Act, the question is whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim of any ;person who has not filed his claim before the Collector and that it cannot be frogotten that the Land Acquisition Act is a special legislation prescribing a special procedure for the compulsory acquisition of the property and the fixation of compensation. It also provides for special remedies in the event of the persons interested being aggrieved by the award or any matters dealt with by it. One of the remedies is the right to have a reference made to the Civil Court. It was further observed that it is now uniformly held by all the Courts in this country that no person who is not a partly to the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer can have the benefit of the reference, nor can he agitate the claims before the Court on such refernce being made under S. 18 of the India Act. Then, after discussing the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1958 Andh Pra 226 (above). the Court observed that the addition of parties by the Civil Court who have not been made parties to the reference by the Collector, is wholly inconsistent with the Land Acquisition Act and, therefore, the Civil Court cannot add such parties to a land acquisition proceedings before it nor can it award any compensation to one who joined in the proceedings for the first time in the Court of the Special Judge without applying to the Collector for any order of refernece. Then, making a reference to what was held by the Calcutta High Court in the case 'Indumathi Debi v. Tulsi Thakurani', as well as the view taken by the Allahabed High Court in Kishen Chand v. Jagannath Prasad, (1903) ILR 25 All 133) (above), it was observed as under:--

"In the Allahabad case the Bench had held that the provisions of S. 53 of the Land Acquisition Act which provide for the application of lthe jprovisions of the Civil Procedure Code in so far as they may be applicable to the proceedings under that Act are sufficiently large lto allow the adaptation of s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code corresponding to O.I.R 10 of the resent Civil Procedure Code to the matter before the Judge and a person who was not a party the to proceedings before the Collector and who claims title by advedrse prossession was allowed to be added as a party to the reference before the Judge that was made by the Collector under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. In our view also the Allahabad decision does not sufficiently consider the question that where a reference made to it is restricted to the determination of a particular dispute between specified persons, it has no jurisdiction to enlage the scope of the dispute or the parties to that dispute other than those who are specified. Nor is there any justification in applying the entire provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to the matters referred to it. Section 53 is specific in empowering the application of those provisions save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. As such, the application of O.I.R. 10 and the addition of the parties who have not been made parties to the reference by the Collector is unwarranted and is without jurisdiction being wholly inconsistent with the Act, and therefore not covered by S. 53."

8. The above observations in Municipality, Nalgonda v. Hakeem Mohiuddin & Co., , undoubtedly support the view I have taken

that if a person who was not a party before the Collector is allowed to be impleaded by the District Court in a reference lto it, the nature of the dispute referred to will be substantially changed, for a new dispute incorporating the claim of such a person will be raised. This is not permissible, as the jurisdiction of the District Court in a reference under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is restricted to the precise terms of the reference. Such impleading would amount to an enlargement of the terms of the reference and as such, the District Court would act without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, if it so orders.

9. I this find no substance in this revision application and consequently, dismiss it with costs.

10. Revision dismissed