Under Order Xi Rule 1 any party to a suit may with the leave of the Court deliver interrogatories in writing for the examination of the opposite parties for eliciting any relevant information, admissions or evidence of material facts to be adduced at the trial and to save expenses of lengthy evidence. The main object of delivering interrogatories by a party is to discover facts in order to facilitate the proof of his own case. However, the power to allow interrogatories to be administered by one parly to another is always subject to the discretion of the court. The discretion extends to allowing or refusing particular interrogatories. See para 103 of Volume 13, Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, wherein it is further stated that the Court of Appeal will not lightly interfere with the judge's exercise of his discretion, unless he acts on a wrong principle. That besides, it is well settled that interrogatories must be confined to the matters which are in issue or sufficiently material at the particular stage of the action at which they are sought to be delivered or to the relief claimed. [Para 105, Halsbury's Laws of England (supra)]. The proviso to Order Xi Rule 1 in terms states that the interrogatories which do not relate to any matter in question in the suit shall be deemed irrelevant notwithstanding that they might be admissible on the oral cross-examination of a witness. In other words, the interrogatories sought to be served must have reasonably close connection with the matters in question. They must not be unreasonable, vexatious, prolix, oppressive or scandalous. Further, they must not be of a fishing nature i.e. they must refer to some distinct and existing state of circumstances and must not be put merely in the hope of discovering something which may help a party interrogating to make out some case. [See Rofe v. Kevorkion, 1936(2) All Er 1334].
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Delhi High Court
The Rajasthan Golden Transport ... vs Avon Footwear Industries Pvt. ... on 8 November, 1985
Equivalent citations: AIR 1986 Delhi 286, 29 (1986) DLT 442
J.D. Jain, J.
(1) This revision petition is directed against order dated 15th January 1979 of an Additional District Judge disallowing certain interrogatories to be delivered to the plaintiff-respondent. 444
(2) The facts giving rise to this revision petition succinctly are that wayback in December 1977 the respondent instituted a suit against the petitioner for recovery of Rs. 47,51706 P on account of the price of goods of the total value of Rs 34,480.50 P which were dispatched by the plaintiff- respondent to Ahmedabad against 14 goods receipts issued by the defendant- petitioner, who carries on the business of a public carrir, during the period 5th May 1975 to 19th May 1975 as per annexure 'A' to the plaint. It was alleged that the said goods were consigned to Xx 'self and were to be delivered by the defendant-petitioner only on production of the goods receipts issued by them. the said goods receipts having been endorsed in blank by the plaintiff- respondent in favor of their banker viz. State Bank of India, to enable them to collect the value of the respective invoices from the respondent's customers. The procedure was that on payment of the price of goods as per invoice and the demand draft accompanying the goods receipts, the banker of the respondent was to endorse the consignments in favor of the concerned customer and the goods could then be delivered by the defendant-petitioner on production of the goods receipts. However, the defendant-petitioner did not deliver the goods to the plaintiff-respondent when the original goods receipts were produced for taking delivery of the consignments by the latter on account of their customer not honouring the demand drafts and paying the price of the goods as stipulated to the banker of the respondent. The respondent repeatedly called upon the petitioner to cleave the goods but there was no response. It was, therefore, averred that the petitioner had misappropriated the goods or in the alternative he had delivered the same to some unauthorised person without production of the original goods receipts.
(3) The stand taken by the petitioner in the written statement, inter alia, was that the goods booked by the plaintiff-respondent in the came of different persons were not delivered to them but were deliverer! to M/s Zeal Traders of Ahmedabad by the plaintiff-respondent themselves and price thereof was duly paid by the said M/s. Zeal Traders. The petitioner further asserted that Shri S. J. Walia, who was the representative of the plaintiff-respondent at Ahmedabad bad received the delivery of all the goods and settled all the claims, if any, finally on behalf of the plaintiff. They further averred that Shri Walia had been receiving the goods from 'hem even earlier on behalf of the plaintiff without production of goods receipts and they adverted to a letter dated 16th July 1975 written by Shri Walia on behalf of the plaintiff that there were no disputes between the parties about the delivery of the goods. According to the petitioner, the payments made by M/s Zeal Traders to the plaintiff were duly entered in the account books of M/s Zeal Traders.
(4) In the replication filed by the plaintiff-respondent, it was categorically stated that all the consignments were booked in favor of the plaintiff themselves as consignee and not in the name of any customer. They vehemently refuted the averment of the petitioner that the goods in question were delivered by the plaintiff to M/s. Zea! Traders, as alleged. The plaintiff re-affirmed that the question of the goods being delivered to anyone without the production of the original goods receipts did not arise and ihe original goods receipts were still with them They denied that Shri SJ. Walia was their authorised representative at Ahmedabad and as such was competent to receive the delivery of the goods without the production of the goods receipts They also denied the contention that the plaintiff's representative delivered any such goods to M/s. Zeal Traders and price thereof was received from them. They contended 445 that Shri Walia was no more in the service of the plaintiff and his services were terminated with effect from 30th September 1975.
(5) During the course of the trial, the petitioner moved an application dated 7th August 1978 under Order Xi Rule J, Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the CPC) for permission to deliver certain interrogatories to the plaintiff-respondent. The said application was opposed by the respondent, inter alia, on the ground that all the relevant documents pertaining to the delivery of goods/consignments under the goods receipts in question must be in the possession of the petitioner on whom the onus of proving the said fact Jay. So the respondent pointed out that under the disguise of interrogatories the petitioner could not be permitted to make fishing inquiries from the business records of the plaintiff and thus widen the scope of the suit. Moreover, some of the interrogatories were said to be in the nature of crossexamination and as such not permissible to be exhibited under law. The learned Additional District Judge vide impugned order granted leave to the defendant to deliver interrogatories at serial Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 8 but disallowed the rest of the interrogatories. Feeling dissatisfied with the said order, the defendant has come up with this revision petition.
(6) The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has, at the outset, called in question the power of this Court to revise the impugned order in view of the limits prescribed by Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Before the amendment of Section 115 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act No. 104 of 1976, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court could be invoked only in cases in which no appeal lay and the subordinate court deciding the case appeared (a) to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; and (e) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The High Court had no power to interfere in revision except in the three situations mentioned above. It may be noticed that the expression "any case which has been decided" was not defined either in Section 115 itself or anywhere else in the Civil Procedure Code This gave rise to a conflict of judicial decisions with regard to the interpretation of these words. However, the conflict was set at rest by the Supreme Court in Baldevdas Shivlal and another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd and others, . Said the Supreme Court : "But it was not decided in Major SS. Khanna's case, , that every order of the Court in the course of a suit amounts to a case decided. A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
(7) The legislature has, however, amended Section 115 by adding a proviso to the main Section, re-numbered as sub-section (1) and also inserted a new sub-section (2) and an explanation. The Explanation reads as under : "In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding." 446
(8) On its plain language the Explanation which is an inclusive and not exhaustive provision is of wide amplitude. The expression "any order made" would take within its sweep almost all orders procedural or otherwise which are of some consequence made by a subordinate court in the course of a suit or other proceeding. In the absence of any qualifying words, therefore, the observation of the Supreme Court in Beldevdas Shivlal (supra) that "A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy" will no longer hold good. It is, however, to be noticed that besides the limitations imposed on the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 115(1), the legislature has specifically added two more conditions in the form of clauses (a) and (b) to the proviso which must also be satisfied before an interlocutory order i e. an order made or any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceedings can be varied or reversed by the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The proviso to sub-section (1) reads as under: Provided that the High Court shall not, under the section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where- (a) the order, if it had been made in favor of the parly applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Explanation-
(9) In view of the overriding language of the proviso, especially the words "shall not" occurring therein, it is manifest that the High Court is prohibited from interfering with an interlocutory order under unless it is of the category falling under clause (a) or clause (b). As a necessary corollary it would follow that any order which does not suffer from the infirmities specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of the proviso will be beyond the ambit of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Indeed, the effect of these two clauses is to ensure that only such orders which occasion miscarriage of justice or cause irreparable injury or which if set aside dispose of the matter finally can be interfered with by the High Court in revision. To add any further qualification to the expression "case decided" as envisaged in Baldevdas Shivlal (supra) would no longer seem to be necessary. In other words the question whether any interlocutory order made by a subordinate court calls for interference by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction will have to be answered in the light of the various restrictions and limitations embodied in clauses (a), 447 (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) and clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso thereto. In this view of the matter, I find ample support from M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. M/s- Rajorishi Exports (P.) Ltd , Air 1978 Orissa 179 and Food Corporation of India v. Birendra Nath Dhar, . In the former case a learned Single Judge of Orissa High Court observed : "By adding the aforesaid explanation to Section 115 the scope and ambit of a revision in this Court have been widened, and the limitation put on the expression any case which has been decided in Section 115 by the decision reported in Baldevdas Shivlal and another v. Filmistan Distributors (Pvt ) Ltd. and others, (supra) and some other decisions would no longer hold good in view of the amendment of the said .section."
(10) Likewise a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court said in Food Corporation of India (supra) : "The explanation, therefore, clearly lays down that any order that may be passed by a Court, subordinate to the High Court in course of a suit or other proceeding is a case decided within the meaning of Section 115. Though by an order a case may be said to be decided, yet it would not be revisable under Section 115, unless there is a question of jurisdiction within the meaning of clauses (a), (b) or (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 115 and further, unless it is an order as contemplated by clause (a) or clause (b) of the proviso added to Section 115."
(11) I am in respectful agreement with this view and the contrary view expressed by a Division Bench of Punjab High Court in Smt. Harvinder Kaur and another v. Godha Ram an another, and by a
learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co and another v. Mis. Ladha Ram and Co., , if I may say so with utmost respect, does not appear to .be correct. It may be noticed that the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has simply followed observations made by the Supreme Court in Baldevdas Shivlal (supra) while interpreting the expression "case decided'' without giving any reasons of their own with regard to the scope and ambit of the said expression in the light of the explanation an did to Section 115, Likewise, the learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court has followed the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Baldevdas Shivlal as also in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, , without dilating upon the amplitude of the explanation added to Section 115 and the further constraints imposed on the revisional jurisdiction by clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso.
(12) It is, therefore, to be seen whether the impugned order has occasioned failure of justice or causes irreparable injury to the petitioner against whom it was made. It is, of course, conceded that even if the impugned order is reversed the suit will not come to an end as contemplated in clause (a) of the proviso. Further, it has to be seen if it is vitiated by any of the vices envisaged in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 115(1).
(13) Under Order Xi Rule 1 any party to a suit may with the leave of the Court deliver interrogatories in writing for the examination of the opposite parties for eliciting any relevant information, admissions or evidence of 448 material facts to be adduced at the trial and to save expenses of lengthy evidence. The main object of delivering interrogatories by a party is to discover facts in order to facilitate the proof of his own case. However, the power to allow interrogatories to be administered by one parly to another is always subject to the discretion of the court. The discretion extends to allowing or refusing particular interrogatories. See para 103 of Volume 13, Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, wherein it is further stated that the Court of Appeal will not lightly interfere with the judge's exercise of his discretion, unless he acts on a wrong principle. That besides, it is well settled that interrogatories must be confined to the matters which are in issue or sufficiently material at the particular stage of the action at which they are sought to be delivered or to the relief claimed. [Para 105, Halsbury's Laws of England (supra)]. The proviso to Order Xi Rule 1 in terms states that the interrogatories which do not relate to any matter in question in the suit shall bs deemed irrelevant notwithstanding that they might be admissible on the oral cross-examination of a witness. In other words, the interrogatories sought to be served must have reasonably close connection with the matters in question. They must not be unreasonable, vexatious, prolix, oppressive or scandalous. Further, they must not bs of a fishing nature i.e. they must refer to some distinct and existing state of circumstances and must not be put merely in the hope of discovering something which may help a party interrogating to make out some case. [See Rofe v. Kevorkion, 1936(2) All Er 1334].
(14) The learned Additional District Judge has, to the course of the impugned order, said: "I find that there are certain information which is in possession of the plaintiff and that is material for proper and complete adjudication of the case and to cut short evidence."
(15) Obviously he has allowed those interrogatories which he considered lo be relevant and material for the proper and complete adjudication of the case and to cut short evidence. This is not an irrelevant consideration which would vitiate the order in not allowing the rest of the interrogatories. It is settled law that where a court has jurisdiction to determine any question and it determines that question it would not be said that it has acted illegally or with material irregularity because it has come to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law. (See Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh. 11 Indian Appeals 237). Thus. the mere fact that the decision of the court below is wrong affords no ground for the interference of the High Court under section 115.
(16) I have perused all the interrogatories carefully and I have noticed that some of the interrogatories are certainly fishing in nature, some of them are too cumbersome and oppressive while one or two may be said to be somewhat relevant to the point in issue. All the same that will be no ground for interference in revision, for withholding permission to administer interrogatories cannot be said to have occasioned a failure of justice or caused irreparable injury to the petitioner. The onus of proving issue No. 3 in respect of which interrogatories were sought to be exhibited by the petitioner lies squarely on the petitioner and he still has ample opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his contention. Reference in this context may be made with advantage to Food Corporation of India (supra) in which an order to 449 produce certain documents for the inspection of the plaintiff was challenged, M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (supra) in which an order made under Order Xi Rule 11 Civil Procedure Code and Raj Mohan Saha v. Maharaja Srila Sri Jukha Kirit Bikram Kishore Deba Barma Manikya Bahadur, Air 1961 Tripura 23, in which an order stricking out the interrogatories under Order Xi Rules 1 and 2 was challenged. The gist of all these decisions is that if a party is not allowed to serve interrogatories as being unnecessary or irrelevant or if the Court considers that the answers to the interrogatories furnished by the opposite party are incomplete, insufficient and/or ambiguous, the concerned party cannot be said to be materially affected. As already observed, there is nothing self-evident or palpably wrong with the impugned order and by no stretch of reasoning it can be said to be a case of material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction by the trial Court.
(17) The upshot of the whole discussion, therefore, is that the impugned order is not vitiated by any of the vices enumerated in Section 115 of the Cpc which would warrant interference by this Court. This revision petition is accordingly dismissed.
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