A Full
Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of Francis Manjooram vs. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, reported in AIR 1966 Ker. 20 (FB), held that the expression personal liberty took in the right to travel.
23. In the
case of Satwant Singh Sawhney vs. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi,reported in AIR 1967 SC 1836, the Supreme Court held that right to travel abroad is fundamental right. In absence of law regulating or depriving a person of such right, refusal to give passport or withdrawal of one given violates Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution of India. The expression personal liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution takes in the right of locomotion and to travel aboard, but the right to move throughout the territories of India is not covered by it inasmuch as it is specially provided in Article 19. Under Article 21, no person can be deprived of his right to travel except according to the procedure established by law.From the
reasons mentioned in the aforesaid case, it follows that under Article 21 of the Constitution, no person can be deprived of his right to travel except according to the procedure established by law. The law means 'enacted law' or 'State law'. In absence of any such 'enacted law' or State law', we hold that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deprive the defendants, the respondents herein, of their right to go abroad.1
Gujarat High Court
State vs Prafulchandra on 9 February, 2011
The
only question involved in the present appeal is whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal is empowered to prohibit a borrower from leaving the country without prior permission of the Tribunal.
2. The
brief facts of the case are that the appellant State Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as the bank) preferred OA No. 156 of 2001 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the DRT Act, 1993). The application was filed on 29.3.2001. Though a prayer was made to restrain the defendant borrowers (the respondents in the present case) from leaving India without prior permission of the DRT, originally no such order was passed.
The
case was not decided for more than 6 years. After 6? years, on 6.8.2007, the bank filed an interlocutory application for various interim reliefs including the direction to the Regional Passport Authorities to provide passport numbers and addresses of the defendant borrowers, for bringing them from USA to India and for a direction to surrender the passports. Further prayer was made to direct defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 not to leave India without prior permission of the DRT.
The
DRT, after hearing the parties, by order dated 4.9.2009, while passed certain other interim orders, also restrained defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 from leaving India without prior permission of the Tribunal.
The
aforesaid defendants, who are the respondents in the present case, preferred Misc. Appeal No. 237 of 2009 before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai. The Appellate Tribunal by order dated 8.10.2009 observed that the defendants, the respondents herein, have not approached the Tribunal for seeking permission to leave the country, and further observed that they may approach before the DRT justifying the travel abroad and seek permission accordingly. If they do not get permission, in such case they may approach the DRAT. The matter was adjourned for 18.11.2009.
3. That
was the stage at which the defendants, the respondents herein, preferred the writ petition challenging the order of the DRAT prohibiting them from leaving the country without prior permission. The learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment dated 18/26.12.2009 held as follows :-
21. In
view of the aforesaid observations, following conclusions deserve to be recorded :-
(a) The
Tribunal has no power to control the physical movement of the defendants in absolute, merely because suit for recovery or the proceedings for recovery of the amount is filed, may be in capacity as the mortgagee by the plaintiff.
(b) The
Tribunal under RDB Act has power to command and control the properties of the defendants, may be in its possession or in possession of third party, and the powers are to be used for grant of injunction for such purpose. It is only when the Tribunal satisfactorily finds that the defendant is obstructing to the Tribunal or its officers to have command and control over the properties of the defendant may by in possession of the defendant or may be in possession of third party, the powers may be exercised by the Tribunal to control and restrict physical movement of the defendant, but not otherwise.
(c) The
Tribunal has no power in absolute to prohibit the physical movement of the defendants beyond its territorial jurisdiction or to prohibit the defendants from leaving the country.
(d) The
Tribunal has no power to direct impounding of the passport.
4. The
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant - bank referred to sub-sections (18) and (25) of the Section 19, Sections 22, 25 and 29 of the DRT Act, 1993 as well as Rule 18 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993. He would contend that under the aforesaid provisions, the DRT is not bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure and can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and after following the principles of natural justice, has wide power to pass order prohibiting the defendant to leave India for giving effect to its order. He relied upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. vs. Grapco Industries Ltd., reported in AIR 1999 SC 1975 = (1999) 4 SCC 710, wherein the following observations has been made at para 11 :-
When
section 22 of the Act says that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not mean that it will not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a court of civil procedure. Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its power is to observe the principles of natural justice.
Referring
to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Allahabad Bank vs. Radhakrishna Maity, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 755, the learned counsel for the appellant bank would contend that while considering the provisions of Sections 19 and 22 and Rule 18, the Supreme Court held that Section 22(1) deals with the powers of the Tribunal and Section 22(2) deals with certain powers and Rule 18 also deals with powers of the Tribunal to pass orders and as per the said judgment, the Tribunal can exercise powers apart from the power conferred to a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. It can go even beyond the Code as long as it passes orders in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Referring to old Section 19(6) of the DRT Act, 1993, which is now sub-section (12) of Section 19, it was contended that an enabling provision has been made that certain types of injunction orders mentioned therein can be passed, but the same cannot be deemed to be exhaustive nor can be treated to be restricting the Tribunal's power. The width and amplitude of the powers are to be gathered from sub-section (1) of Section 22 as held in the case of Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. vs. Grapco Industries Ltd. (supra).
According
to the counsel for the appellant, the Tribunal has powers to pass other type of injunction orders or stay orders apart from what is stated in Section 19(6) of the Act and that Section 22(2) of the Act also does not limit the general powers referred to in Section 22(1).
He
would contend that the learned Single Judge had not properly appreciated the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Nahar Industrial
Enterprises Ltd. vs. Hong Kong and Shangai Banking Corporation, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 646. Though the said judgment relates to the power of the High Court and the Supreme Court to transfer a suit pending in a Civil Court situated in one State to a Debts Recovery Tribunal situated in another State, but therein the Supreme Court reiterated that a DRT having a plenary power even otherwise would be entitled to pass an order of injunction or interim order although ordinarily expressly it had no statutory power in relation to. The Tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure and for passing interim order of injunction, it can travel beyond of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The
counsel for the appellant would rely on a decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Smt. Annai Jayabharathi vs. Debts Recovery Tribunal, reported in Vol. 126 Comp. Cases 888. In the said case, the Kerala High Court considered the provisions of Sections 19, 22 and 25 and Rule 18 and Section 10 of the Passport Act as also Articles 14, 19, 21 and 226 of the Constitution of India and has come to the conclusion that the Tribunal has power to order impounding the passports of the defendants facing claim for recovery of debts by the banks and financial institutions.
Reliance
was also placed on the Supreme Court decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirrajkar vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1957 SC 1. Therein, it is held that the judicial verdict pronounced by the Court cannot be said to be affecting the fundamental rights and that the character of the judicial order remains the same, whether it is passed in a matter directly in issue between the parties or is passed incidental to make the adjudication of the dispute between the parties fair and effective.
5. Per contra,
according to Mr Mihir Joshi, the learned counsel for the respondent borrowers, the DRT, being a creature of statute, would have jurisdiction and power only to the extent the same are expressly conferred on it by the said statute.
According to
him, in absence of express power to restrain a person from travelling abroad, pending adjudication of the Original Application, the DRT has no jurisdiction to prohibit the defendant to leave the country. He submitted that the powers of the DRT were originally contained in Sections 19(4), 19(6) and 22(2) of the DRT Act, 1993 when it was enacted for the first time, but subsequently the same have been amended. After the amendment made in the year 2000, original Section 19 came to be wholly substituted by present Section 19. Sections 19(12), 19(13)(A), Section 19(13)(B), 19(14), 19(15), 19(16), 19(18) and 19(20) provide for the powers of the DRT. Section 19(17) provides for the powers of the DRT in the case of disobedience of an order made under Sections 19(12), 19(13) and 19(18) including the power to pass an order against the person guilty of disobedience to be detained in civil prison. Section 19(25) together with Rule 18 confers inherent powers upon the DRT akin to the powers conferred on a Civil Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
He submitted
that Section 19(25) read with Rule 18 cannot confer any power upon the DRT either to create or recognize right or to create liabilities or obligations. Like Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 19(25) read with Rule 18 are not provisions of law conferring power to grant any kind of substantive relief. The same is procedural provision only saving the inherent power of the Court/DRT. The inherent power is always in addition to and complimentary to the powers expressly conferred either under the Code of Civil Procedure or the DRT Act, 1993. However, the said inherent power cannot be exercised if its exercise is inconsistent with or come into conflict with any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by any other provision of the Code of Civil Procedure or the DRT Act, 1993. In this connection, he relied on the Supreme Court decision in Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills vs. Kanhayalal, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1899.
According to
him, neither Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure nor Section 19(25) read with Rule 18 were intended to create a new procedure or any new right or obligation. The inherent powers are not to be exercised against the intentions of the legislature. The inherent powers are not powers over the substantive rights which any litigant possesses. Specific powers have to be conferred on the Courts for passing such orders which would affect such rights of a party.
6. Chapter IV
of the DRT Act, 1993 deals with Procedure of Tribunals. Under Section 19, a bank or a financial institution for recovery of any debt from any person may make an application before the Tribunal of competent jurisdiction. The Tribunal is required to summon the defendant requiring him to show cause and the defendant may present a written statement of his defence within the time stipulated. The defendant may also claim to set off. Under Section 19(12), the Tribunal can make an interim order during pendency of the case. In case the defendant intended to obstruct or delay or frustrate the execution of any order, the Tribunal is empowered to pass order under Section 19(13). In case of disobedience of an order made by the Tribunal under sub-sections (12), (13) and (18) of Section 19 or breach of any of the terms on which the order was made, the DRT is empowered to hold such person guilty and may detain such person in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months. The Tribunal is also empowered to appoint a receiver and remove any person from the possession or custody of the property, etc. under Section 19(18). Under Section 19(25) the Tribunal is empowered to make such orders and give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. The aforesaid provisions being relevant are quoted hereunder.
19. Application
to the Tribunal,-
(12) The
Tribunal may make an interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or attachment) against the defendant to debar him from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing of, any property and assets belonging to him without the prior permission of the Tribunal.
(13)(A)
Where, at any stage of the proceedings, the Tribunal is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay or frustrate the execution of any order for the recovery of debt that may be passed against him,-
(i) is
about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property; or
(ii) is
about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or
(iii) is
like to cause any damage or mischief to the property or affect its value by misuse or creating third party interest,
the
Tribunal may direct the defendant, within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Tribunal, when required, the said property or the value of the same, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the certificate for the recovery of debt, or to appear and show cause why he should not furnish security.
(B) where
the defendant fails to show cause why he should not furnish security, or fails to furnish the security required, within the time fixed by the Tribunal, the Tribunal may order the attachment of the whole or such portion of the properties claimed by the applicant as the properties secured in his favour or otherwise owned by the defendant as appears sufficient to satisfy any certificate for the recovery of debt.
(17) In
the case of disobedience of an order made by the Tribunal under sub-sections (12), (13) and (18) or breach of any of the terms on which the order was made, the Tribunal may order the properties of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Tribunal directs his release.
(18) Where
it appears to the Tribunal to be just and convenient, the Tribunal may, by order -
(a) appoint
a receiver of any property, wither before or after grant of certificate for recovery of debt;
(b) remove
any person from the possession or custody of the property;
(c) commit
the same to the possession, custody or management of the receiver;
(d) confer
upon the receiver all such powers, as to bringing and defending suits in the courts or filing and defending application before the Tribunal and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Tribunal thinks fit; and
(e) appoint
a Commissioner for preparation of an inventory of the properties of the defendant or for the sale thereof.
(25) The
Tribunal may make such orders and give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice.
7. Section 22
relates to procedure and powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal including the power to summon and enforce the attendance for the purposes mentioned therein and quoted hereunder :-
22. Procedure
and Powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal.- (1) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act any of any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate their own procedure including the places at which they shall have their sittings.
(2) The
Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging their functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely :-
(a) summoning
and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring
the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving
evidence on affidavits;
(d) issuing
commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;
(e) reviewing
its decisions;
(f) dismissing
an application for default or deciding it ex parte;
(g) setting
aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte;
(h) any
other matter which may be prescribed.
(3) Any
proceeding before the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
8. The modes of
recovery of debts determined by the Tribunal have been prescribed under Section 25, which includes attachment and sale of the movable or immovable property of the defendant, arrest of the defendant, etc. as mentioned therein and quoted hereunder :-
25. Modes
of recovery of debts.- The Recovery Officer shall, on receipt of the copy of the certificate under sub-section (7) of section 19, proceed to recover the amount of debt specified in the certificate by one or more of the following modes, namely :-
(a) attachment
and sale of the movable and immovable property of the defendant;
(b) arrest
of the defendant and his detention in prison;
(c) appointing
a receiver for the management of the movable or immovable properties of the defendant.
9. The
detention in a civil prison or arrest of a defendant and detaining him in prison is prescribed only under Sections 19(17) and Section
25. The power under Section 19(17) can be exercised only if an order passed by the Tribunal under sub-sections (12), (13) and (18) of Section 19 is disobeyed. Only in case of disobedience of of an order or breach of any of the terms on which the order was made, the power under Section 25 can be exercised by the Recovery Officer only after the decree is passed at the time of attachment or sale of movable or immovable property and in case it is not due to any act on the part of the defendant.
10. Sub-section
(12) of Section 19 deals with the interim order as may be passed by the Tribunal during pendency of the case which may be by way of injunction or stay or attachment against the defendant, who may also be debarred from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing of, any property and assets belonging to him without the prior permission of the Tribunal. Under sub-section (13)(A) of Section 19, only when the Tribunal is satisfied that the defendant, with an intent to obstruct or delay or frustrate the execution of any order for the recovery of debt passed against him or is about to dispose of the whole or any part of the property, or is about to remove the whole or any part of the property or is likely to cause any damage or mischief to the property or affect its value by misuse or creating third party interest, it has the power to direct the defendant to furnish security or pass such order as specified therein.
11. It has
already been noticed that any order under sub-section (17) of Section 19 can be passed in case of disobedience of the order passed under sub-sections (12), (13) and (18) or breach of any of the terms on which the order was made.
12. Sub-section
(18) of Section 19 does not deal with any injunction order, but empowers the Tribunal to appoint a receiver and remove a person from the possession or custody of the property.
13. Thus, it
will be evident from sub-sections (12), (13)(A), 17 and 18 of Section 19 that the Tribunal is not empowered to issue any prohibitory order prohibiting the defendant from leaving the country without prior permission.
14. Sub-section
(25) of Section 19 empowers the Tribunal to make such order and to give such direction as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. Rule 18 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 is similar to Section 19(25). Under the said Rule, the Tribunal is empowered to make such orders or to give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice.
15. The only
question arises for determination is whether under sub-section (25) of Section 19, the Tribunal can issue order prohibiting a defendant from leaving the country to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice.
16. Similar
question fell for consideration before the Delhi High Court in AS Mittal vs. P.O. Debt Recovery Tribunal in CM(M) No. 505 of 1999 and an analogous case. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court by his unreported judgment dated 21.11.2003 held that the Tribunal had authority whatsoever to either impound the passport or to put a restriction on the travel of the defendant.
17. When a
similar matter fell for consideration before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Sanjeev R Apte vs. IFCI Ltd. in Writ Petition No. 9576 of 2007, the Division Bench by unreported judgment dated 21.5.2008, while upheld the Single Judge order, observed that the determination of law by the leaned Single Judge that the Tribunal had no authority whatsoever to either impound the passport of the petitioner or to put any restriction on the travel of the petitioner abroad in exercise of its powers to pass an interim order under Section 19(6) of the Act is not dependent upon determination of of liability by the Tribunal.
18. In the case
of Smt. Annai
Jayabharathi vs. Debts Recovery Tribunal, reported in Vol. 126 Comp. Cases 888, when the Kerala High Court noticed the provisions of the DRT Act, 1993, held that Section 22(1) relieves the Tribunal for the bondage of rigour of procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, leaving it to be guided by the principles of natural justice, subject to other provisions of the Act and the Rules. The powers of the Tribunal cannot be read to have been truncated by Section 22(1) and have to be read as giving a free hand to the Tribunal to pass any such orders which have the effect of not only speedy trial but effective enforcement of the decree in the event of the same being passed. In the said judgment, the order passed by the DRT prohibiting the defendant from leaving the country and impounding the passport of the defendant was upheld by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court.
19. In the case
of Allahabad Bank vs.
Radhakrishna Maity, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 755, the Supreme Court held that in view of Section 22(1) of the Act, the Tribunal can exercise powers contained in CPC and can even go beyond as long as it passes orders in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Section 19(6) does not in any manner limit the generality of the powers of the Tribunal under Section 22(1). Section 19(6) is an enabling provision and merely states that certain types of injunction or stay orders mentioned therein can be passed by the Tribunal, but such an enumeration cannot be deemed to be exhaustive nor restricting the Tribunal's powers only to those types of injunction or stay orders.
20. In the case
of Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. vs. Grapco Industries Ltd., reported in AIR 1999 SC 1975 = (1999) 4 SCC 710, the Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal while granting ex-parte order of stay or injunction must record reasons, may be brief one, and cannot pass a stereo-typed order in terms of the prayer made. The Supreme Court noticed the provisions of Section 22 - the power of the Tribunal.
21. The
question arises whether for taking recourse of Section 19(25) read with Rule 18 of the 1993 Rules or Section 22 of the DRT Rules, a person can be prohibited to go aboard.
22. A Full
Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of Francis Manjooram vs. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, reported in AIR 1966 Ker. 20 (FB), held that the expression personal liberty took in the right to travel.
23. In the
case of Satwant Singh Sawhney vs. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi,reported in AIR 1967 SC 1836, the Supreme Court held that right to travel abroad is fundamental right. In absence of law regulating or depriving a person of such right, refusal to give passport or withdrawal of one given violates Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution of India. The expression personal liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution takes in the right of locomotion and to travel aboard, but the right to move throughout the territories of India is not covered by it inasmuch as it is specially provided in Article 19. Under Article 21, no person can be deprived of his right to travel except according to the procedure established by law.
24. In the case
of Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1978 SC 597(1), the Supreme Court held that the expression personal liberty in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional protection under Article 19. From the language of Article 21, it will be seen at once that the protection it secures is a limited one. It safeguards the right to go abroad against executive interference which is not supported by law; and law here means 'enacted law' or 'State law'. Thus, no person can be deprived of his right to go abroad unless there is a law made by the State prescribing the procedure for so depriving him and the deprivation is effected strictly in accordance with such procedure. Obviously, the procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable. If a law depriving a person of 'personal liberty' and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation, ex hypothesis it must be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14.
25. From the
reasons mentioned in the aforesaid case, it follows that under Article 21 of the Constitution, no person can be deprived of his right to travel except according to the procedure established by law. The law means 'enacted law' or 'State law'.
26. In the
present case, there is nothing on record to show that a law has been made by the State regulating or depriving a person of such right in case proceeding under Section 19 of the DRT Act, 1993 is pending. Section 19(25) read with Rules 18 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure), Rules, 1993 empowers the Tribunal to make such orders and give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. It is an enabling provision empowering the Tribunal to pass interim order to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. Section 19(25) or Rule 18 cannot be held to be procedural law.
27. Section 22
deals with the procedure and powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal. It relates to summoning and enforcing the attendance, requiring the discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits, issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents, reviewing its decisions, dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex-parte, setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex-parte, or any other matter which may be prescribed, but no provision has been made therein or by a separate notification issued by the Central Government empowering the Tribunal to deprive a person of his personal liberty to move abroad as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In absence of any such 'enacted law' or State law', we hold that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deprive the defendants, the respondents herein, of their right to go abroad. The learned Single Judge for the very same reason having set aside the order passed by the Tribunal, no interference is called for. In absence of any merit, the appeal is dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs.
[S. J.
MUKHOPADHAYA, CJ.]
[K.
M. THAKER, J.]
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