Whether suit for permanent injunction restraining opposite party from marrying any other person is maintainable?

 Suit for permanent injunction restraining opposite party from 

marrying any other person except petitioner would not maintainable U/s. 9 of CPC

because of impliedly bar by S.9 of CPC 

 The plaint of the suit which is Annexure-1 to the petition reveals that the 

petitioner, who is plaintiff in the suit, alleges that his marriage was agreed to be 

solemnized with respondent No. 2 but now it appears that she is likely to marry 

someone else and therefore, a decree of permanent injunction be passed 

restraining her from marrying any other person except the petitioner. 


 It is against the order of the court in the above suit directing notices to be 

issued to the other side before considering the matter for grant of interim 

injunction that the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this court. 

 The Court quite astonished at the relief which has been claimed in the 

suit. The suit ex facie appears to be against public policy and as such is impliedly 

barred by Section 9, CPC. 

 Section 26 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides that an agreement to 

restrain a marriage of any person is void. 

 A thing in respect of which no valid agreement can come into existence 

cannot be ordered to be done by the order of the court and therefore, the suit 

claiming such a relief would certainly be barred. 

 Right to marry is an integral part of right to life and liberty and is akin to 

a fundamental right. A fundamental right of a person cannot be taken away and 

therefore, also the suit as filed is clearly against the public policy. 

 The suit appears to have been instituted for harassing the respondent or to 

put some kind of pressure on her family members. It is not designed in good faith. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 62174 of 2012

Decided On: 04.12.2012

 Shrawan Kumar Vs. Nirmala Mauji Lal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Pankaj Mithal, J.

Citation: 2013(3) ALJ 651., 2013 6 AWC5728All

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. A very peculiar suit has been filed in the court below by the petitioner.

2. The plaint of the suit which is annexure-1 to the petition reveals that the petitioner, who is plaintiff in the suit alleges that his marriage was agreed to be solemnized with respondent No. 2 but now it appears that she is likely to marry someone else and therefore, a decree of permanent injunction be passed restraining her from marrying any other person except the petitioner.

3. It is against the order of the court in the above suit directing notices to be issued to the other side before considering the matter for grant of interim injunction that the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this court.

4. I am quite astonished at the relief which has been claimed in the suit. The suit ex facie appears to be against public policy and as such is impliedly barred by Section 9, C.P.C.

5. Section 26 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides that an agreement to restrain a marriage of any person is void.

6. A thing in respect of which no valid agreement can come into existence cannot be ordered to be done by the order of the court and therefore, the suit claiming such a relief would certainly be barred.

7. Right to marry is an integral part of right to life and liberty and is akin to a fundamental right. A fundamental right of a person cannot be taken away and therefore, also the suit as filed is clearly against the public policy.

8. The suit appears to have been instituted for harassing the respondent or to put some kind of pressure on her family members. It is not designed in good faith.

9. His Lordships of this court in Prem Shanker Tripathi v. The First Additional District judge, Allahabad and others, MANU/UP/0754/1986: 1986 AWC 925: (MANU/UP/0754/1986 : 1986 All LJ 1200) ruled that a suit of frivolous and vexatious nature which scandalizes the administration of justice is clearly against the dictates of the public policy should not be taken cognizance of as it is impliedly barred and the High Court in exercise of suo motu supervisory power can quash the plaint of such a suit.

10. A similar view has been expressed by Division Bench of this court in Gulab Chandra v. The Munsif West, Allahabad and others, MANU/UP/0686/1988: 1988 AWC 537: (MANU/UP/0686/1988 : 1988 All LJ 852) and it has been observed that a litigation which is sham, illusory, collusive or which is inspired by nefarious and vexatious designs should be nipped in the bud and the High court not only has jurisdiction but owes duty to check such litigation in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by quashing the plaint.

11. The counsel was put to notice to address the court to show how the suit was maintainable but he was unable to give any assistance.

12. In view of above legal position, when the plaint of the suit as is before me on its face is vexatious and nefarious in design, I not only consider it my responsibility to refuse to interfere with the order impugned but at the same time in exercise of my suo motu power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India consider it my obligation to quash the plaint itself.

13. In view of aforesaid facts and circumstances, the plaint of original suit No. 1033 of 2012 Shrawan Kumar alias Pappu v. Nirmala pending in the court of Additional Civil Judge, (Junior Division), Kanpur is quashed. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly.

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