Tuesday, 7 January 2014

Factors to be considered for discharge of accused discussed


After considering Union of India v.
Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC 4, this Court has expounded
the law in these words :
“14. ...... In fact, Section 227, itself contains enough guidelines
as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an
accused. It provides that ‘the judge shall discharge when he
considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused’.
The ‘ground’ in the context is not a
ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on
trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused
will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The
court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in
sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve
deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is

whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted,
would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more
need be enquired into.”
The Court is neither a substitute nor an adjunct of the prosecution. On the
contrary, once a case is presented to it by the prosecution, its bounden
duty is to sift through the material to ascertain whether a prima facie case
has been established which would justify and merit the prosecution of a
person. The interest of a person arraigned as an accused must also be kept
in perspective lest, on the basis of flippant or vague or vindicative
accusations, bereft of probative evidence, the ordeals of a trial have to be
needlessly suffered and endured.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1833
OF 2013
[Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.4221 of 2012]
L. Krishna Reddy
.....Appellant
Versus
State by Station House Officer & Ors.
.....Respondents
Citation; 2013 (4) Crimes 485 SC1
Dated; 24-10-2013

Leave granted. This Appeal assails the Order of the High Court of
Judicature at Madras while exercising its Criminal Revisional
Jurisdiction. The facts disclose a human tragedy. Ramachandra
Reddy was married to Sujatha on 2.5.1999. At the initial stages of
their marriage the deceased couple was staying with the bride’s
relatives, significantly, not with her parents-in-law who are the
remaining accused. They had set up their own separate residence
about six months prior to the unfortunate incidents. On 26.3.2006
Sujatha was found murdered in the hotel room in Pondicherry [now
Puducherry] rented by her soon to be deceased husband. Her body
bore several stab wounds. Thereupon, Crime No.86/2006 under

Section 302 IPC dated 26.3.2006, leading to Charge Sheet
No.59/2007 dated 31.5.2007 under Sections 302, 498-A read with
34, IPC was registered.
It then transpires that the husband of the
deceased, namely, Ramachandra Reddy, possibly suffering from
guilt and remorse, committed suicide shortly thereafter.
The
question before us is whether the criminal proceedings could or
should have been continued against his parents, namely Vidyasagar
and Narasamma, who had preferred a Discharge Petition under
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘Cr.PC’
henceforward) in which they eventually succeeded.
2.
The Final Report dated 31.5.2007 reads so –
“Since the date of marriage at the residence at No.2-7/10,
Lakma Reddy Colony, Uppal, Hyderabad, the accused
No.1 Ramachandra Reddy, S/o Vidyasagar Reddy, No.-
7/10, Lakma Reddy Colony, Uppal, Hyderabad (husband
of the deceased) who is no more now, the accused No.2.
Vidyasagar Reddy, S/o Ramachandra Reddy, No.2-7/10,
Lakma Reddy Colony, Uppal, Hyderabad (Father-in-law
of the deceased) and the accused No.3 Narasamma
Reddy, w/o Vidyasagar Reddy, No.2-7/10, Lakma Reddy
Colony, Uppal, Hyderabad (Mother-in-law) of the
deceased, in furtherance of their common intention,
subjected the deceased Sujatha to cruelty and harassment
relating to dowry demand and rendered themselves liable
to be punished u/sec.498-A IPC r/w 34 IPC.

That on 25.3.2006 at about 19.00 hrs. at Room
No.306, Hotel Aruna, Second Floor, No.3, Zamindar
Garden, near Ajantha Theatre, S.V.P. Salai, Muthialpe,
Puducherry-3, about 800 meters South-East to PS,
accused No.1 noted above in furtherance of common
intention with his father, the second accused and his
mother, the third accused, caused death of his wife
Sujatha, as she was unable to meet out their unlawful
demand of dowry by inflicting 11 multiple injuries by
means of knife with the knowledge that such injuries
would be likely to cause death or would be sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death and rendered
themselves liable to be punished u/sec.302 IPC r/w 34
IPC.
Hence, the charges.
CHARGE ABATED.
The accused above said A1 Ramachandra Reddy,
S/o Vidyasagar Reddy, No.2-7/10, Lakma Reddy Colony,
Uppal, Hyderabad had committed suicide by hanging and
he is no more now. In this connection a separate case in
Cr.No.244/2006 u/sec.174 Cr.P.C. was registered at PS
D’ Nagar, dt.24.9.2006 and investigation was taken-up.
Therefore, the charge against him is abated”.
3.
The IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Pondicherry favoured the
position that the proceedings could continue against the
Respondent-parents (Accused Nos.2 and 3) notwithstanding the
devastating death of their son (Accused No.1) despite prosecution
against him having abated. The Learned Additional Sessions Judge

specifically recorded the fact that the Public Prosecutor had
conceded that there appeared to be no direct involvement of the
father-in-law and mother-in-law in the murder, but that since it was
a murder case the discharge may not be considered before the Trial.
The Learned Additional Sessions Judge noted that the parents were
implicated only on the basis of the Statements recorded under
Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.; it was of the prima facie view that the
motive behind the murder of Sujatha was dowry. These aspects
would be established by the prosecution, beyond all reasonable
doubts, only in an exhaustive Trial “where the entire truth could be
unearthed”. It is also evident that the Learned Additional Sessions
Judge was influenced by the direction of the High Court, on the
petition of the present Appellant, ordering that the case be disposed
of within two months.
4.
However, the High Court has come to the contrary conclusion, after
having reviewed the Statements and evidence available on the
record. There is no dispute as regards the factum of the deceased
married couple having set up their separate and independent
residence.
According to the Complainant/Appellant who is the
father of the unfortunate lady the deceased Sujatha, he had
telephonically been informed by her that the married couple had left
Hyderabad on 23.3.2006 and were proceeding to Vijayawada. The

impugned Judgment records that none of the Statements under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. incriminate the parents of the deceased
husband of any connection with the offence under Section 302 IPC,
and no common intention can be inferred. So far as the dowry
demands and offence under Section 498A goes, the High Court
opined that even the father of the deceased wife namely the
Appellant/Complainant in his Statement confined the demand only
to his deceased son-in-law.
Holding this to be insufficient the
Respondents Nos.2 and 3 have been discharged.
5.
There can be no cavil that if a fine is imposed on an accused/convict
even upon the death of an accused his estate will continue to be
liable for its discharge. This is not the case before us inasmuch as
that stage in the prosecution has not been arrived at. In any event
the pecuniary liability of the deceased/ convict can be fastened only
on the beneficiaries of his legal estate.
There is no evidence
whatsoever that this is the position that obtains in the present case.
6.
The Charge Sheet does not indicate any complicity so far as the
parents of the deceased are concerned. Obviously, if the murder has
been committed in Pondicherry a direct role in that unfortunate
event cannot be ascribed to them. Of course, it is theoretically
possible that they may have abetted or conspired in the crime or
persuaded their son to have perpetrated the crime. However this

version is not forthcoming from the Charge Sheet. The Appellant,
in his Further Statement, has alleged that – “on the last 25.03.06
night as per the plans of Ramachandra Reddy, his father Vidyasagar
Reddy and mother Naarasamma, Ramachandra Reddy had killed my
daughter Sujatha brutally at a Hotel at Pondicherry due to dowry
harassment. ....”
This is the only statement which contains an
allegation pertaining to the possible conspiracy of the husband’s
parents who, it must be kept in focus, were not in Pondicherry at the
time when Sujatha was done to death by her husband.
In our
opinion, it is not sufficient to merely make a bald statement but
further catenation should exist linking all the conspirators together.
Sifting through the evidence, i.e., the Statement made by several
witnesses, there is no direct imputation that either of the Respondent
nos.2 and 3 before us had either independently or along with their
deceased son, made a demand for dowry. We should not lose sight
of the fact that the deceased couple had earlier been living with the
unfortunate wife’s family, and thereafter independently of either of
the parents-in-law. In fact, as has been noted by the High Court in
the impugned order the statement of the complainant father of the
deceased, some demands have been made by his son-in-law.
Out
attention has been drawn to a recent Judgment titled Central Bureau
of Investigation v. K. Narayana Rao (2012) 9 SCC 512, wherein

after discussing the previous opinions of this Court in a number of
cases including State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC
335, it was opined that in order to make good the commission of an
offence of criminal conspiracy, it should be evident that an
agreement between the conspirators should have been in existence
at the material time.
7.
Our attention has been drawn to Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v.
Dilip Nathumal Chordia and Anr. (1989) 1 SCC 715 as well as K.
Narayana Rao but we are unable to appreciate any manner in which
they would persuade a Court to continue the prosecution of the
parents of the deceased.
After considering Union of India v.
Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC 4, this Court has expounded
the law in these words :
“14. ...... In fact, Section 227, itself contains enough guidelines
as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an
accused. It provides that ‘the judge shall discharge when he
considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused’.
The ‘ground’ in the context is not a
ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on
trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused
will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The
court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in
sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve
deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is

whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted,
would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more
need be enquired into.”
The Court is neither a substitute nor an adjunct of the prosecution. On the
contrary, once a case is presented to it by the prosecution, its bounden
duty is to sift through the material to ascertain whether a prima facie case
has been established which would justify and merit the prosecution of a
person. The interest of a person arraigned as an accused must also be kept
in perspective lest, on the basis of flippant or vague or vindicative
accusations, bereft of probative evidence, the ordeals of a trial have to be
needlessly suffered and endured. We hasten to clarify that we think the
statements of the complainant are those of an anguished father who has
lost his daughter due to the greed and cruelty of his son-in-law. As we
have already noted, the husband has taken his own life possibly in remorse
and repentance. The death of a child even to avaricious parents is the
worst conceivable punishment.
8.
Since the prosecution would be an exercise in futility it should be
brought to a quick end; and this is possible only if an order of
discharge vis-à-vis the parents who are the remaining accused is
passed. This is exactly what has transpired in the wisdom of the
High Court by means of the impugned Order. We find no error
therein. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.

.......................................J.
[T.S. THAKUR]
.......................................J.
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN]
New Delhi
October 24, 2013
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