The judgment of Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mr. Hemendra Rasiklal Ghia .vrs. Subodh Mody (supra), has considered the judgment in case of Dayamanthibai .vrs. K.M. Shafi (2007 (4) SCC 107). In subsequent judgment reported at 2009 [10] SCC 239 (P.C. Thomas .vrs. P.M. Ismail and others) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once no objection to such document on plea either of inadmissibility or mode of proof, is raised at the time of exhibiting that document, or then during trial, such objection cannot be raised belatedly. It is therefore, obvious that opportunity to make amends or to rectify the procedural error was available to plaintiff [respondent no.1 herein] during trial. Had petitioner raised present objection then, plaintiff could have proved the resolution by producing the original proceeding book & tendering appropriate evidence. That opportunity is now lost to plaintiff and hence such
an objection cannot be allowed to be raised thereafter. Waiver of that objection has now become irreversible.
Bombay High Court
M/S. Mohanlal Kisanlal Agrawal vs Shri Ajitnath Jain Shetambar ... on 5 January, 2011
Bench: B. P. Dharmadhikari
Citation; 2011 (2)MH L J 512
By this petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners/defendants have questioned the concurrent judgments delivered by the Trial Court as also the Appellate Court granting a decree of their eviction to respondent no.1 - Public Trust. Respondent no.2 is the Appellate Forum namely District Court, Nagpur while the respondent no.3 is the Trial Court i.e. Small Causes Court at Nagpur. The judgment of Trial Court is dated 07.12.2009 and it is delivered by the 2nd Additional Small Causes Curt, Nagpur in Regular Civil Suit No. 238/2005. Judgment of Appellate Court is dated 23.07.2010 and it is delivered by District 3
Judge-9, Nagpur in Regular Civil Appeal No. 11/2010. Respondent no.1 - Public Trust sought eviction of defendants from a shop block ad-measuring 700 sq. ft. on account of their need to construct a temple and a community hall on the plot of trust. The trial Court as also Appellate Court have found suit maintainable, not bad for non- joinder of all Trustees and also need established by respondent no.1 landlord. It is also found that tenants could not establish that greater hardship will be caused to them.
2. I have heard Shri A.M. Gordey, learned Senior Counsel with Mrs. R.D. Raskar, learned Counsel for petitioners and Shri K.G. Sarda, learned Counsel for respondent no.1. Service of notice upon respondent nos. 2 and 3 was dispensed with, when this Court issued notice on 22.12.2010. Records and proceeding was also called for vide order dated 26.10.2010. Matter has been finally heard with consent of parties by issuing Rule & making it returnable forthwith.
3. Shri Gordey, learned Senior Counsel has contended that the resolution at Exh.20 on the basis of which the signatory to plaint Shri Bhushan Jain claimed authority to institute and file suit has not 4
been proved, as required by law. His contention is, what is produced on record is a photostat copy of alleged resolution not signed in original, no leave was sought to lead secondary evidence and contents of documents or signature upon it have not been proved. In view of this position, it is urged that the suit as filed is not maintainable and all Trustees ought to have been impleaded. Support is being taken from the Full Bench Judgment of this Court reported at AIR 2010 Bombay 88 (Shyamabai Surajkaran Joshi and others .vrs. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha). Attention is also invited to other Full Bench judgment of this Court reported at 2008 [6] All MR 352 (Mr. Hemendra Rasiklal Ghia .vrs. Subodh Mody) to urge that objection to admissibility of document (resolution) can be raised at any point of time.
4. Learned Senior Counsel has also relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at AIR 1971 SC 1865 (Sait Tarajee Khimchand .vrs. Yelamarti Satyam), to urge that mere marking of documents as Exhibit is not sufficient to prove its contents. Attention has also been invited to requirement of proving such resolution by producing original and in-admissibility of secondary evidence by
pointing out judgments reported at AIR 1954 SC 606 (Sitaldas .vrs. Santram), AIR 1994 SC 591 (Government of A.P. .vrs. Karri Chinnah ), AIR 1964 SC 1625 (Mohd. Ikram Hussain .vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh), and AIR 1975 SC 1748 (Ashok Dhulichand .vrs. Madhaolal Dubey).
5. Attention is also invited to the notice dated 10.03.2005 issued before filing of the suit to urge that no specific purpose or need is pleaded in it and to urge that for the first time the purpose has been disclosed in suit. It is pointed out that the Trust already has a temple and there are other tenants in other blocks against whom no action has been taken. It is also urged that in this situation, as bonafides of Trust are not established, the decree for eviction could not have been passed. Attention is invited to examination-in-chief of the witness for defendant [petitioner no.3] to show that shop blocks are constructed with funds donated, which also carry name of donors and hence it cannot be demolished. It is pointed out that the plaintiffs did not continue with action against some tenants after they increased rent. It is stated that the standards which apply to an individual landlord under Section 16[1][g] of the Maharashtra Rent 6
Control Act, 1999 also apply with same rigor to respondent no.1 Trust.
6. Shri Sarda, learned Counsel for respondent no.1 has urged that there is no challenge to status of respondent no.1 as Public Trust. The resolution was allowed to be exhibited without any objection. He states that as there are several such matters, it is not possible to produce the original register on each date everywhere, hence a certified copy of the resolution at Exh.20 duly proved and exhibited in the matter of other tenants has been received from the office of the Small Causes Court only and that certified copy has been used in prosecuting Regular Civil Suit No. 238/2005 against the petitioners. In view of this position on record, the defendants permitted documents to be exhibited and also conducted cross examination in relation to that document. Attention is invited to the judgment of this Court reported at 2010 [2] Mh.L.J. 308 (Satira Narendra Shahu and others .vrs. Public Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Nagpur), particularly paragraph no.6 to state that in this situation, objection being raised before this Court is misconceived and unsustainable. 7
7. It is urged that as resolution is properly proved and it authorises Shri Jain to take appropriate steps to get the shop blocks vacated and also sanctioned funds for said purpose, suit filed by the Trust through said Shri Jain is in accordance with law and the Full Bench judgment mentioned above i.e. Shyamabai Surajkaran Joshi and others .vrs. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha (supra), helps the case of respondent no.1.
8. On merits, learned Counsel states that no notice before filing of such suit is required in law. The proceedings have been initiated against all tenants and the evidence on record has been correctly appreciated by both the Courts concurrently, hence this Court should not interfere in the matter. He also relies upon the judgment reported at 2003 [3] Mh.L.J. 472 (Bandu Ravji Nikam .vrs. Acharyaratna Deshbhushan Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Kolhapur) to urge that Trust has to prove its need only and rigorous norms sought to be applied to respondent no.1 Public Trust by petitioners are not relevant at all.
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9. After hearing respective counsel, I find that the trial court has relied upon evidence of Shri Jain and held that he is authorized by resolution Exh.20 dated 24.01.2005 to take necessary steps for acquiring the tenanted premises for the need of the public trust. The appellate judgment also considers this position and after noting the objection of petitioners to Exh.20 (resolution) in paragraph no.6, proceeds to consider the law on the point in paragraph nos. 13 and
14. It found in paragraph no.15 that no objection was raised regarding the mode of proof and effort to prove that document. The examination-in-chief of Shri Jain, is noted and appellate court finds that he deposed that copy of resolution bears signature of Managing Trustees and Secretary as also other members of the Trust. The document was then exhibited without any objection being taken by the defendants [petitioners]. In cross-examination said witness stated that he has filed copy of resolution to show his authority to sign plaint and vakalatnama. No suggestion was given to Shri Jain about not holding of a meeting or about absence of any such resolution. Then briefly contents of resolution are looked into and at the end of paragraph no.17, it is found that the suit was properly filed and presented on behalf of the trust by Shri Jain. The evidence
to which attention has been drawn by Shri Gordey, learned Senior Counsel, does not reveal any perversity in this consideration. In cross examination Shri Jain has accepted that the resolution does not specifically authorize him to sign the plaint and engage lawyer by signing vakaltanama. Perusal of resolution reveals that it is photocopy issued as certified copy by the court and signatures of all trustees appear on its first page including the signature of Shri Jain. Resolution no.4 authorize him to file suit for getting the shop block vacated. The suits to be filed are described as- fair rent suits and bonafide need suit. Fund of Rs. 2 lakhs are sanctioned. Shri Jain, was given power to initiate steps for this purpose. This document carries an impression as 'True Copy' with signature of Officer of Small Causes Court and necessary seals showing the date on which it was applied for, the date on which it was delivered.
10. Perusal of Full Bench judgment in case of Mr. Hemendra Rasiklal Ghia .vrs. Subodh Mody (supra), in paragraph no.43 clearly shows that when copies of documents are admitted without objection in trial Court, no objection to their admissibility can be taken after wards in Court of appeal. Here the objection is about the mode and
manner of offering proof of that resolution. The objection therefore, was required to be raised before the trial Court at the first available opportunity , so as to enable respondent no.1 Trust to take corrective measures, if necessary. When a certified copy of already exhibited document ie resolution was being produced, the decision not to object may be deliberate also.
11. Even before this Court the petitioners have not demonstrated that the certified copy of the resolution was not properly proved in other suit from where its certified copy was procured & used by the plaintiff Trust. It is therefore, obvious that the objections sought to be urged by petitioners is misconceived and unsustainable.
12. In Shyamabai Surajkaran Joshi and others .vrs. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha (supra), the Full Bench of this Court was required to consider the question about effect of non-joinder of all trustees in a suit filed by Public Trust for eviction of tenants. The Hon'ble Full Bench has found that there is no bar to filing of the suit by one of the trustees, but then question will be required to be 11
decided on facts and circumstances of the case. Here there is express authorization in favour of Shri Bhushan Jain to institute and prosecute these proceedings. The said Full Bench judgment, therefore, requires the question as raised by the petitioners to be answered in negative and in favour of respondent 1 Trust.
13. The judgment of Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mr. Hemendra Rasiklal Ghia .vrs. Subodh Mody (supra), has considered the judgment in case of Dayamanthibai .vrs. K.M. Shafi (2007 (4) SCC 107). In subsequent judgment reported at 2009 [10] SCC 239 (P.C. Thomas .vrs. P.M. Ismail and others) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once no objection to such document on plea either of inadmissibility or mode of proof, is raised at the time of exhibiting that document, or then during trial, such objection cannot be raised belatedly. It is therefore, obvious that opportunity to make amends or to rectify the procedural error was available to plaintiff [respondent no.1 herein] during trial. Had petitioner raised present objection then, plaintiff could have proved the resolution by producing the original proceeding book & tendering appropriate evidence. That opportunity is now lost to plaintiff and hence such 12
an objection cannot be allowed to be raised thereafter. Waiver of that objection has now become irreversible.
14. Sitaldas .vrs. Santram (supra), is the judgment which considers dispute about Will and in that background observations about Section 90 of Evidence Act, presumption and its applicability to production of copy or then about need to lead foundation before producing secondary evidence, find place. The document of Will was under objection and the facts there, therefore, did not call for consideration of question of not raising objection, which arises here. Government of A.P. .vrs. Karri Chinnah (supra), arises form question of admissibility of photostat copies before the High Court. The documents were produced as additional documents in Writ Petition and challenge was as to tampering of records, fictitious nature of documents. Said judgment, therefore, has no application in present facts.
Mohd. Ikram Hussain .vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), is the judgment which considers the admissibility of a report of Doctor to determine question of age of a girl. That report was not before the Court, but it was referred to in the affidavit of one Mahesh 13
and a Sub-Inspector. The observations that primary documentary evidence ought to have been summoned, appear in this background. In Ashok Dhulichand .vrs. Madhaolal Dubey (supra), the question was of proof of a statement made by a rival candidate & in election petition. The document filed was photostat copy of the manuscript of a leaflet alleged to have been written by candidate making defamatory and false averments against an unsuccessful candidate and election petitioner. The circumstances in which the photostat copy was prepared, possession of original were not explained and document was not found beyond suspicion. The petitioner was therefore, found not entitled to lead secondary evidence. Again on facts the matter is entirely different. In S. Taraji Khamchand .vrs. Yelamarti Satyam (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has found that the act of mere marking a document as Exhibit does not dispense with its proof. The proceeding arise out of suit based on mortgage bond. The bone of contention between the plaintiff and defendant was about endorsement Exhibit A-2 on the bond, which according to the plaintiff was Rs. 26,000/- and it was later on tampered to made to read Rs. 2600.00, while according to defendant, endorsement was for
Rs. 2600.00 only. The Hon'ble Apex Court found that the day book and ledger respectively were not proved by the plaintiff and there was no reference to these books in the judgment, though they were marked as Exh. A-12 and A-13. In this background the Hon'ble Apex Court has found that mere marking of a document as Exhibit does not dispenses with its proof. It is apparent that contents of these two documents i.e. day book and ledger needed to be proved to show correctness of the figure alleged to have been tampered in mortgage. The application of mind proceeds on this line and considers other evidence on record. Again this judgment therefore, has no application in present facts. Here the suit was filed admittedly by a public trust and person authorized by it has deposed on its behalf on the strength of a resolution conferring that authority on him. The document i.e. resolution is also been used for cross examination by the defendants.
15. In legal notice, specific need as such is not pointed out. In plaint the details are given in paragraph no.3. In written statement those details are denied. In affidavit of examination-in-chief need again is spoken of. In addition, it is also pointed out that the map is
sanctioned for construction of temple and community hall. Cross examination has been then conducted on the basis of this material. No specific prejudice is pointed out by the petitioners to this Court while conducting that cross examination. In his cross examination, petitioner no.3 tenant has accepted filing of cases by plaintiff Trust against other tenants and has also accepted that a godown is situated at a distance of 1 furlong from the tenanted premises in a three storied building. Total area of that building of godown is accepted to be 8000 to 9000 sq. ft. by him. He voluntarily stated that said building of godown belonged to his brother namely Kisanlal. He accepted that ground floor of that building was being used as godown, while the remaining premises and floors were let out on rent. He also accepted that a board advertising availability of premises on rent might have been displayed on the said building. All this evidence is concurrently appreciated by the Appellate Court and also by the Trial Court, and a finding on "need" in favour of plaintiff landlord Trust has been recorded.
16. Provisions of Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates (Control) Act contains an identical provision like present 16
Section 16[1][g] of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. That provisions is Section 13[1][g]. Said provision is considered in judgment in case of Bandu Ravji Nikam .vrs. Acharyaratna Deshbhushan Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Kolhapur (supra), by this Court in the light of its earlier judgment reported at AIR 1973 Bombay 46-- Kishinchand Murjimal and others v. Bai Kalavati and others. It is found that being Public Trust ,requirement of pleading as well as proof to establish the ground under section 13[1][g] of the Bombay Act is different than one required to be shouldered by any other landlord. The distinction between two parts of Section 13[1] [g] is noted for said purpose. Section 16[1][g] of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 is pari-materia and that discussion is also material for present purpose. This Court in 1973 judgment holds that if the Legislature intended that the requirement of the trustees should also be proved to be bona fide and reasonable they would have stated so. Instead they have merely used the words, "or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust". It is an alternative ground in respect of premises belonging to public charitable trusts added to the ground which originally stood in Clause (g) of Section 17
13 (1), by Bombay Act 61 of 1953 to advance the cause of public charity by not allowing it to suffer for want of accommodation. The ground merely requires the trustees to establish that there is some requirement importing an element of necessity which compels them to file a suit for eviction. This logic applies here also & the contention that rigorous standards required to be applied to a case of private landlord while examining his bonafide need must also apply to public trust like present respondent no.1, therefore, cannot be accepted. I, do not find anything wrong with the concurrent consideration even in this respect by the Appellate Court and Trial Court.
17. With the result, as I do not notice any jurisdictional error or perversity in the matter, no case warranting interference is made out. The proceedings as filed are therefore dismissed. However, the same shall be without any order as to costs. Rule discharged. JUDGE
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