Sunday, 10 November 2013

Mere long possession or entries for many years in the revenue record cannot confer title on co-owner of joint Hindu family



 Admittedly, Bhima 
died   intestate   and   therefore,   his   estate   or   property   ought   to   be 
distributed in accordance with provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 
1956.  Mere long possession or entries for many years in the revenue 
record cannot confer title on Mathura or the appellants since it has 
not   been   shown   that   Bhima   had   by   any   legal   instrument 
relinquished his share in the property or estate in favour of Mathura 
or Appa.   It is in that situation, Lower Appellate Court has partly 
decreed the suit with which I find no fault.  

BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
SECOND APPEAL NO. 173 OF 2013
Kondiba s/o Shankar Navgire 
   
VERSUS
  Smt. Jijabai w/o Ramchandra Dhanke

CORAM : A. B. CHAUDHARI, J.
Dated: August 02, 2013
Citation; 2013 (6) MH L J 231


Heard   Mr.   Deshmukh,   learned   counsel   for   the 
appellants.   Mr.   Deshmukh,   strenuously   contended   that   Lower 

Appellate Court committed an error in reversing the decree of the 
trial court and partly decreeing the suit to the extent of declaration 
in the absence of any prayer.  According to him, the suit was clearly 
barred by limitation in relation to the sale deeds of the year 1973 
and   1983   and   the   mutations   in   favour   of   the   vendor   of   the 
appellants   were   carried   in   the   year   1970   which   were   never 
challenged.  He fairly stated that this issue about limitation was not 

framed by the Trial Court nor was argued before the Courts below. 
However, the same can be urged before this court since it is a pure 
question of law.  He relied on the decision of learned Single Judge of 
this Court in case of Nagorao Narayan Diwane deceased through Lrs. 
Smt.   Laxmibai   wd/o   Nagorao   Diwane   and   others   Vs.   Narayan 
Awadutrao   Dighe   since   deceased   Through   Lrs.   Smt.   Sulochana 
Narayan Dighe and ors. Reported in 2000 (2) Mh.L.J. 273.  He then 
argued that the Lower Appellate Court has given no importance to 
the revenue record or mutation entries which were never challenged 
and   thus   according   to   him,   the   same   constitutes   a   substantial 
question of law.
2.
Per   contra,   Mr.Kolpe   learned   counsel   for   respondents 
supported   the   impugned   judgment   rendered   by   Lower   Appellate 

Court and argued that there is no instrument to show how the estate 
of Bhima went to either Appa or his wife Mathura. Since Bhima died 
intestate,   his   estate   must   be   distributed   in   accordance   with 
succession   provided   by   law   and   that   is   why   there   is   no   need   to 
challenge the sale deeds in favour of the appellants.  He then argued 
that, at any rate the sale deed to the extent of share of Mathura has 
been  protected. He  therefore, submitted that the  Lower Appellate 
I   have   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   rival   parties. 
3.

Court has correctly decreed the suit in part.
Perused impugned judgment recorded by the Lower Appellate Court. 
As to the aspect of limitation, it is an admitted fact that said issue 
was not at all raised before the trial court or First Appellate Court, 
and   it   is  being   raised   for   the  first   time  by   Mr.  Deshmukh   in   this 
Second   Appeal.     There   is   a   decision   of   the   (4   Judges   )   of   the 
Supreme Court in case of  Banarasi Das and Kundanlal Vs. Kanshi 
Ram and ors. reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1165  herein in 
paragraph No.15 observed thus :­
“15. The High Court has overlooked  the fact that  
even upon the argument addressed before it on behalf 
of  Kanshi Ram, the question of limitation was not  
one purely of law but was a mixed question of fact  

and law and, therefore, it was not proper for it to be  
raised   for   the   first   time   in   argument.     We   are 
satisfied   that   what   the   High   Court   has   done   has  
caused   prejudice  to  some  of   the parties  to  the  suit  
and on that ground alone, we would be justified in  
setting   aside   its   decision.     If   the   High   Court   felt  
overwhelmed   by   the   provisions   of   S.3   of   the  
Limitation   Act,   it   should   at   least   have   given   an  
opportunity to the parties which supported the decree  

of the trial Court to meet the plea of limitation by  
amending   their   pleadings.     After   allowing   the  
pleadings to be amended, the High Court should have  
framed as issue and remitted it for a finding to the  
trial   Court.     Instead   of   doing   so,   it   has   chosen   to  
treat   the   pleadings   of   one   of   the   defendants   as  
conclusive not only on the question of fact but also  
on the question of law and dismissed the suit.   It is  
quite possible that had an opportunity been given to 
the   defendants   they   could   have   established,   in  
addition   to   proving   the   dates   on   which   the  
summonses were served, that the suit was not barred  
by time because of acknowledgments.   In the course  
of the discussion, the High Court has said that it was  
not suggested before it anyone that the claim was not  
barred by reason of acknowledgments.   Apparently, 
no such argument was advanced before it on behalf  
of   the   plaintiff   and   the   defendant   Banarsi   Das  

because   the   counsel   were   apparently   taken   by  
surprise   and   had   no   opportunity   to   obtain  
instructions on this aspect of the case.  We are clearly  
of   opinion   that   the   High   Court   was   in   error   in  
allowing the plea of limitation to be raised before it  
particularly by defendants who had not even filed a  
written statement in the case.  We do not think that  
this   was   a   fit   case   for   permitting   an   entirely   new  
point to be raised by a non­contesting party to the 
Thus,   the   submission   based   on   limitation,   which   is 
4.

suit.”
raised by Mr. Deshmukh,  learned counsel for appellants before this 
Court will have to be answered against the appellants.  
5.
Next question is about succession.   Admittedly, Bhima 
died   intestate   and   therefore,   his   estate   or   property   ought   to   be 
distributed in accordance with provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 
1956.  Mere long possession or entries for many years in the revenue 
record cannot confer title on Mathura or the appellants since it has 
not   been   shown   that   Bhima   had   by   any   legal   instrument 
relinquished his share in the property or estate in favour of Mathura 
or Appa.   It is in that situation, Lower Appellate Court has partly 
decreed the suit with which I find no fault.  At the same time, Lower 

Appellate Court has taken care in consonance with the judgment of 
the Supreme Court in case of  Khemchand Shankar Choudhary Vs. 
Vishnu   Hari   Patil   reported   in   1983   (1)   SCC   18,    protected   the 
interest of the purchaser.  
6.
In view of above, it is clear that learned Lower Appellate 
Court has rightly applied the law and passed the decree.  Neither I 

find any fault nor any substantial question of law involved is in this 
second appeal.  Hence following order is passed.
ORDER
Second Appeal No. 173/2013 is summarily dismissed.  
No costs.
...
( A. B. CHAUDHARI )
    JUDGE


Print Page

No comments:

Post a Comment