The petitioner has relied on the judgment reported in AIR
1986 SC 995 (Sawai Singh Versus State of Rajasthan). In paragraph 16,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down as follows:
"16. It has been observed by this Court in Surath Chandra C
Chakravarty v. State of West Bengal (1971) 3 SCR 1 : (AIR 1971 SC 752) that charges involving consequences of termination of service must be specific, though a departmental h
enquiry is not like a criminal trial as was noted by this Court
in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao H
(1964) 3 SCR 25 : (AIR 1963 SC 1723) and as such there is no such rule that an offence is not established unless it is proved beyond doubt. But a departmental enquiry entailing
consequences like loss of job which now-a-days means loss of
livelihood, there must be fair play in action, in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences against an
employee, there must be investigation to the charges consistent with the requirement of the situation in-accordance
with the principles of natural justice in so far as these are applicable in a particular situation."
Bombay High Court
C vs Disciplinary Authority, ... on 12 August, 2013
Bench: Anoop V.Mohta, Z.A. Haq
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, rtNAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 930/2013
Vinayak Narayan Navkar,
...VERSUS.....
1. The State of Maharashtra,
2. The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Through its Registrar (Judicial),
Fort, Mumbai - 400 032.
3. The Principal District and Sessions Judge
Disciplinary Authority, Chandrapur,
PRONOUNCED ON : 12.08.2013 .1
Citation ;2013 (6) MH L J 119
RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith.
2. This petition questions the legality of the order passed by
the Disciplinary Authority and the Principal District Judge, Chandrapur,
dismissing the petitioner from service, and the order passed by the Appellate Authority in Administrative Appeal, upholding the order of
dismissal of the petitioner.
3. The petitioner was appointed as Junior Clerk on 04.06.2005 h
and was posted on the establishment of the Court of 3rd Joint Civil Judge ig
(Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandrapur and till H
2008, that is when the incident took place, the petitioner was not served with any show cause notice nor any adverse remarks were communicated to the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that on the basis of a y
complaint made by one Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan alleging that ba
the petitioner had demanded Rs.12,00/- from her for disposing the case under the Bombay Prohibition Act, a preliminary enquiry was conducted om
and on the basis of the report of the preliminary enquiry, charge-sheet was issued by the learned Principal District Judge on 05.06.2009. The petitioner had given his explanation. The enquiry was conducted and in B
the enquiry, Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan was examined and the petitioner had cross-examined her and on the basis of the evidence of Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan, the impugned order was passed by the learned Principal District Judge dismissing the petitioner from service. ::: Downloaded on - 14/08/2013 18:06:20 ::: WP 930/13 3 Judgment
4. The challenges raised by the petitioner are that the charges rt
as framed against the petitioner are vague and, therefore, the punishment ou
imposed on the petitioner is unsustainable and that the view taken by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority is not possible on the C
basis of the material on the record.
5. The complaint, on the basis of which the enquiry is initiated h
against the petitioner, is reproduced hereinbelow: ig fnukad 17 lIVsacj 2008 cfcrk uanfd'kksj nq;ksZ/ku
H
jk- xkSjh ryko] ckcqisB] panziqj
dke& etqjh] o; & 40 o"kZs
lk/kkj.k 8 rs 9 eghU;kaifw oZ eh ekÖ;k nk:P;k dsl y
laca/kkckcrhr eh Jh tk/kolkgsckaP;k dksVkZr tkr vls- R;kosGsl Jh ukodj ckcq ;kauh eyk lkafxrys dh rqeP;k dslsl tqU;k vkgsr rj ba
rqEgkyk iSls Hkjkos ykxrhy o R;kauh ekÖ;kdMs 1200 :i;kaph ekx.kh dsyh- nql&;k fno'kh eh iSls ?ksmu dksVkZr xsys o dkVkZP;k ckgsj om
>kMktoG eh ukodj ckcqaP;k gkrh : 1200@& fnys- lnj iS'kkph ikorh oxSjs fnyh ukgh- rsOgk eh R;kaP;ktoG iS'kkph ekx.kh dsyh ijarq R;kauh rs iSls ns.;kl udkj fnyk- iSls nsrs osGsl eh Lor% ,dVhp gksrs- rlsp ukodj ckcq lq)k ,dVsp B
gksrs-
ofjy ek>h tckuh okpqu nk[kfoyh
o rh cjkscj vkgs le{k fu-vk- lgh cfcrk uanfd'kksj nq;ksZ/ku D.J.-1,panziwj fnukad 17 lIVsacj 2008
::: Downloaded on - 14/08/2013 18:06:20 ::: WP 930/13 4 Judgment It is clear that there is no allegation that the petitioner had made a rt
demand from Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan. A reading of the ou
abovereferred complaint shows that Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan had made a complaint that the petitioner had told her that as the cases C
pending against her are old, she will have to deposit the amount and he had demanded Rs.1,200/- It is relevant to note that Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan has stated in the complaint that she used to go to h
the Court approximately 8 to 9 months earlier to the date of the ig
complaint. It is clear that the complaint is not only vague but, is also H
substantially belated and this fact shows that the complaint as made was not reliable.
y
6. The document at Annexure P-4 is an earlier letter dated ba
25.08.2008 from Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan in which it is stated that the petitioner had told her that she need not apply for bail and om
demanded Rs.1,200/- and assured of disposing the case. There is variance in the two complaints dated 25.08.2008 and 17.09.2008. It is not clear as to when the amount was given to the petitioner by Babita B
w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan. It is stated that Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan is illiterate and has put her thumb impression on the complaint which is said to have been written by some writer. No steps are taken by the Presenting Officer to examine the writer of the complaint. ::: Downloaded on - 14/08/2013 18:06:20 ::: WP 930/13 5 Judgment
7. The final order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is rt
perfunctory. In the final order, the Disciplinary Authority has recorded ou
the fact that complainant-Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan and the Preliminary Enquiry Officer Shri P.D. Vishwasrao were examined and C
cross-examined and that during the cross-examination, the complainant- Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan stuck to her version about demand of bribe, its payment, acceptance by delinquent and refusal to repay it on a h
demand. The Disciplinary Authority has recorded that the Enquiry Officer ig
has submitted his report concluding that the charges of demand and H
acceptance of bribe are proved against the petitioner. On the basis of these observations, the Disciplinary Authority has proceeded in the matter and in paragraph 8 of the order, it has recorded that the material on y
record shows that complainant-Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan did ba
not have any axe to grind against the petitioner and from her cross- examination, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that she has any om
grudge against him to make false complaint against him and, therefore, the enquiry report is accepted. In paragraph 9 of the order, it is recorded that in the case of Disciplinary Enquiry, the technical Rules of Evidence B
and Doctrine of proof beyond doubt have no application and preponderance of probabilities and some material on record would be necessary to reach to the conclusion as to whether the delinquent has committed the misconduct or not. In paragraph 10 of the impugned ::: Downloaded on - 14/08/2013 18:06:20 ::: WP 930/13 6 Judgment order, it is recorded that in the enquiry, there is sufficient material to hold rt
that the delinquent has committed misconduct and there is some ou
foundation to form opinion that delinquent was actuated with proclivity to commit corruption and, therefore, it is held that the misconduct stands C
proved against the delinquent. The approach of the Disciplinary Authority is erroneous. The general principles which are applicable to the Disciplinary Enquiries are stated in the order but, how the general h
principles are applicable to the facts of the case have to be considered ig
after examining the factual aspects. In the final order passed by the H
Disciplinary Authority imposing punishment on the petitioner, there is no consideration of the facts at all. On a complete reading of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, it appears that the allegations made y
by complainant-Babita w/o Nandkishor Duryodhan are accepted only ba
because, as recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, she is an illiterate lady. This cannot be the reason for holding that the petitioner has committed om
misconduct as contemplated by Rule 3(1) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1979. The Disciplinary authority has not only failed to examine the facts of the case but, has also overlooked that there B
is no sufficient material on record to conclude even by applying the principles of Preponderance of Probabilities that the petitioner has committed misconduct for which penalty is imposed upon him. The petitioner has been deprived of his employment and his livelihood in view ::: Downloaded on - 14/08/2013 18:06:20 ::: WP 930/13 7 Judgment of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. When the order of the rt
Disciplinary Authority is having such drastic consequences, the order ou
imposing penalty cannot be based on the general principles of law de hors the facts of the case. Though in the Disciplinary Proceedings, the charges C
need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal trial but, there has to be sufficient material on the record placed in the Disciplinary Enquiry which in no uncertain terms lead to the conclusion of guilt and h
misconduct by the delinquent and the conclusion of guilt and misconduct ig
can be reached only after examining the factual aspects. H
8. It is recorded in the final order that the Preliminary Enquiry Officer Shri P.D. Vishwasrao is examined and cross-examined as witness. y
It is not understood as to why Shri P.D. Vishwasrao, who was District ba
Judge-1, Chandrapur and who conducted the preliminary enquiry, is examined. In fact, the material which is collected in the preliminary om
enquiry should have been considered by the Disciplinary Authority for arriving at the conclusion that the delinquent has committed misconduct. The persons, whose statements were recorded in the Preliminary Enquiry, B
should have been examined as witnesses and the petitioner should have been given the opportunity to cross-examine those persons. The evidence of the Preliminary Enquiry Officer cannot be the foundation for imposing the penalty on the petitioner.
::: Downloaded on - 14/08/2013 18:06:20 ::: WP 930/13 8 Judgment
9. The order passed by the Appellate Authority in the rt
Administrative Appeal also suffers from the same erroneous ou
approach. The Appellate Authority has recorded that there may be some inaccuracy in the recollection of the events of the witness but, C
on the question of demand and payment of bribe, the testimony was unshaken. In our opinion, the general observations or consequences cannot be the foundation of the order imposing penalty h
of dismissal from service, on the petitioner. The Appellate Authority, ig
as a fact finding authority, has to advert to the facts, the material, H
the evidence and the documents on the record and the order has to be on the basis of the factual aspects and in consonance with the documents and the material and the evidence on record. In the present y
case, looking to the background and the fact that the complaint was got ba
written from some petition writer, who is neither examined as witness and, therefore, there is no cross-examination of that petitioner writer and om
in view of the fact that the complaint is belated, it was necessary for the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority to examine the veracity of the complaint on the basis of the other cogent material to B
support the allegations. On the record, we do not find any material on the basis of which the penalty of dismissal inflicted on the petitioner can be sustained.
::: Downloaded on - 14/08/2013 18:06:20 ::: WP 930/13 9 Judgment
10. The petitioner has relied on the judgment reported in AIR rt
1986 SC 995 (Sawai Singh Versus State of Rajasthan). In paragraph 16, ou
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down as follows: "16. It has been observed by this Court in Surath Chandra C
Chakravarty v. State of West Bengal (1971) 3 SCR 1 : (AIR 1971 SC 752) that charges involving consequences of termination of service must be specific, though a departmental h
enquiry is not like a criminal trial as was noted by this Court ig
in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao H
(1964) 3 SCR 25 : (AIR 1963 SC 1723) and as such there is no such rule that an offence is not established unless it is proved beyond doubt. But a departmental enquiry entailing y
consequences like loss of job which now-a-days means loss of ba
livelihood, there must be fair play in action, in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences against an om
employee, there must be investigation to the charges consistent with the requirement of the situation in-accordance B
with the principles of natural justice in so far as these are applicable in a particular situation."
11. The petitioner has also relied on the judgment reported in AIR 1999 SC 2142 (Purushottam Eknath Nemade v. D.N. Mahajan & ::: Downloaded on - 14/08/2013 18:06:20 ::: WP 930/13 10 Judgment another). The facts of the abovereferred case are similar to the facts of rt
the present case. In paragraph 4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as ou
follows:
"4. ..................Therefore, it is highly unlikely that C
the demand of that nature could have been made. The whole foundation of the case is based upon this slender material which is a vague statement made by the complainant and, therefore, h
we do not think that the Disciplinary Committee was justified in ig
coming to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of H
misconduct on the basis of the evidence and the material placed before it. ....................."
y
12. Mr. Mirza, the learned advocate appearing for the ba
respondent nos.2 and 3, has submitted that this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot om
appreciate or re-appreciate the facts of the case.
13. Mr. Morande, the learned advocate appearing for the B
petitioner, has controverted the submission by relying on the judgment reported in AIR 1964 SC 364 (Union of India v. H.C. Goel). In paragraph 20 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down as follows:
::: Downloaded on - 14/08/2013 18:06:20 ::: WP 930/13 11 Judgment "20. .....................In dealing with rt
writ petitions filed by public servants who have ou
been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Art.311(2), the High Court under C
Art.226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the h
impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of ig
dismissal which may be passed against a Government H
servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under y
the statutory rules to determine whether he is ba
guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can om
be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to B
satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal, is based on no evidence."
::: Downloaded on - 14/08/2013 18:06:20 ::: WP 930/13 12 Judgment Apart from this, the submission of Mr.Mirza that we cannot appreciate or rt
re-appreciate the factual aspects is misconceived inasmuch as, as already ou
discussed earlier, the impugned orders are not supported by any material or evidence and we have neither appreciated nor re-appreciated the C
material on the record. We are interfering with the impugned orders on the ground that the impugned orders are not supported by any material or evidence and, therefore, are not sustainable in law. h
14.
The writ petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (1) of H
the writ petition. The orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chandrapur on 20.07.2010 and confirmed by the Appellate Authority in Administrative Appeal on y
29.11.2012 are set aside. It is directed that the petitioner be reinstated in ba
service with continuity of service. However, in the circumstances of the case, the petitioner will be entitled for 25% of the back wages from the om
date of his dismissal till the date of his reinstatement. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. There will be no orders as to costs.
B
(Z.A. HAQ, J.) (ANOOP V. MOHTA, J.) APTE
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