At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to refer the decision of this Court in the case of Latabai (supra), which takes a following view on “ interpretation of provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of C.P.C. :- The proviso to Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where it is alleged by one part and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Bare reading of the said proviso makes it clear that it is only when adjustment and satisfaction is alleged by one party and denied by the other side, the question of setting aside the consent decree arises. It is only in those cases where the consent terms, as a whole, on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation or on similar grounds are challenged, then the Court has to decide the issue. The submission that in an application under Order 23, Rule 3, a party can seek modification of clause in the consent terms and consequently that part of the Decree on the ground that the same was not intended or agreed by the parties cannot be accepted. If argument is accepted, in a suit or in an appeal where consent terms are filed and consequently a consent decree is passed, any party thereto will be entitled to file an application under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code for modifying a clause in the consent terms and consequently that part of the consent decree on the ground that it was not intended to or was inserted by mistake. If such an interpretation is accepted, the same would lead to strange result and the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code is not available to a party who was not intended to or that it was inserted by mistake. The explanation to Order 23, Rule 3 does not advance It is inconceivable that a party can be the case any further. permitted to file an application for modifying a clause in the consent terms and consequently that part of the consent decree under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code.” (Emphasis added). It follows from the judgment in the case of Latabai (supra), that, it ig is not open for the party to seek modification of clause in the consent terms on the ground that, the same was not intended or agreed by the parties. It is only in those cases, where the consent terms as a whole, on the ground that fraud, misrepresentation or of similar ground are challenged, then the Court has to decide the issue.
DATE OF PRONOUNCING
THE JUDGMEIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
Akhil Mansuklal Mehta
Versus
Sheetal Deepak Karamchandani
CORAM : S. S. SHINDE, J.NT
: 29.01.2013
1.
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent, heard finally.
2.
This writ petition is filed challenging the order dated 20.7.2012,
passed below Exh.17 in R.C.S. No. 330 of 2012, by the learned C. J. J. D.
Rahata, District Ahmednagar.
3.
It is the case of the petitioner that on 24.9.1996, the petitioner and
respondent purchased (first) property bearing old survey No. 51/4 (new
51/5) situated at Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar, for consideration
of Rs.4,50,00/- and the names the petitioner and the respondent are
mutated in the revenue record.
Thereafter, they purchased (second)
property admeasuring 18 R out of 44 R from survey No. 51/1 situated at
Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar for consideration of Rs.1,26,000/-
(second property) out of the funds of the petitioner himself and his name is
also mutated in the 7x12 extract. It is further case of the petitioner that the
petitioner alongwith respondent purchased jointly (third) property at
admeasuring 1 H 48 R and survey No. 352 admeasuring 2H from the same
village, jointly in the name of the petitioner and the respondent. The said
properties was purchased during the period from 24.11.1996 to 17.4.1998.
village Vihigaon, Tq. Shahapur, District Thane from survey No. 351
4.
It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had faced with some
financial crises, therefore, he sold 50% share from the third party to one
Prakash Dwarkadas Jhunjhunwala on 25.2.2011 for consideration
and
remaining 50% share of the respondent was kept as it is. It is further case
of the petitioner that on 20.11.2011 respondent lodged a complaint with
Kasara police station and on 9.3.2012 F.I.R. No. I-13 of 2012 came to be
registered and the petitioner was arrested and sent to judicial custody on
17.3.2012 by the learned J.M.F.C. Shahapur.
It is further case of the
petitioner that on 12.4.2012 the learned Sessions Judge at Kalyan, has
released the petitioner after one month on bail, on condition to attend
Kasara police station on 15th and 25th of every month between 10.00 a.m.
to 12.00 noon until further orders. It is further case of the petitioner that, as
the petitioner was harassed and abused by investigating officer, Kasara
police station, he filed an application to Sessions Judge at Kalyan and
accordingly police station is changed from Kasara to Mahatma Phule police
station, vide order dated 16.6.2012.
It is further case of the petitioner that on 7.3.2012, the respondent
filed second complaint to police station Shirdi with a contention that she
has purchased the second property out of her own funds and further falsely
contended that the petitioner is trying to dispose of the first and second
property by preparing fraudulent documents. The respondent herein filed
R.C.S. No. 330 of 2012 in the Court of learned C.J.J.D. Rahata for
declaration and injunction in respect of the suit property. It is the case of
the petitioner that the respondent approached the petitioner and stated that
she is ready to withdraw the complaint with Kasara police station and
further expressed her willingness to purchase the share of the petitioner in
the first and second properties and also
offered to settle the dispute
regarding 3rd property by stating that release deed should be executed and
accordingly it was informed by her to the petitioner to come to court at
It is further case of the petitioner that on 11.6.2012, the
Rahata.
respondent took the petitioner to the premises of Rahata civil court and
orally informed about pendency of the suit and filing of consent terms. It is
further case of the petitioner that the petitioner was tuted by respondent to
sign on each and every papers and respondent also engaged advocate for
the petitioner. The said advocate was not paid any fees by the petitioner
nor the petitioner known the advocate nor he was willfully engaged. On
the same, pursis is filed by advocate regarding the waiver of summons and
also got executed the consent deed by playing fraud, exercising coercion
and undue influence on the petitioner. It is further case of the petitioner
that on 11.6.2012 itself the petitioner was taken to Sub Registrar’s office by
respondent and under pressure, a registered sale deed was executed by
respondent in her name. It is further case of the petitioner that on same
day, respondent took the petitioner to the office of notary public and during
the course journey, the respondent threatened the petitioner in case the
petitioner refused to sign the documents and also threatened that the
respondent shall pursue the criminal complaint dated 7.3.2012 in the same
manner, as it was done with Kasara police station. It is the case of the
petitioner that because of force and undue influence and threatening, the
petitioner was forced to sign on blank paper with intention to grab the
share of the petitioner. On the same day, the petitioner signed two deeds
of release, one of the first property and second is of the third party because
of threats and force by the respondent.
It is further case of the petitioner that on 19.6.2012, upon proper
legal advice the petitioner filed an application Exh.17 before the Civil Court
consent terms.
at Rahata in R.C.S. No. 330 of 2012, objecting to the documents of
The learned trial judge ordered to issue notice. The
respondent appeared in the matter and filed her reply to application Exh.17
and prayed to reject the application Exh.17. By the impugned order dated
20.6.2012, application Exh.17 came to be rejected by the learned C.J.J.D.
Rahata and the matter was kept for further arguments on 17.8.2012.
Being aggrieved by the said order passed below Exh.17, the petitioner has
5.
filed this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the
trial court has erred in not appreciating the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3
of C.P.C. which clearly contemplates that before passing the compromise
decree, the court must satisfy itself that suit has been adjusted wholly or in
part by any lawful agreement or compromise. It is submitted that, when
the petitioner has filed objection at Exh.17 and raised question to the
genuineness of the consent terms and raised allegations against the
plaintiff and created doubts of the consent terms then in such case, the
learned judge has erred in not appreciating that the provisions of Order
XXII Rule 3 of C.P.C. clearly contemplated that agreement or terms which
is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act 1872 shall not be deemed
to be lawful and therefore, instead of rejecting the application at Exh.17,
the trial court ought to have conducted proper enquiry in the suit. It is
submitted that consent terms are not obtained by free consent of the
petitioner. Hence, complete adjudication is necessary and instead the trial
court without adjudication has given such findings, which are premature.
It is submitted that the respondent has obtained signature of the
petitioner on two deeds of release through coercion, fraud and undue
influence, hence under such circumstance, full-fledged trial was necessary
but instead the trial judge directly rejected the application, as if delivering
the final verdict after completion of evidence. It is submitted that the trial
i.e. Vakilpatra,
court has erred in not appreciating that all documents
pursis of appearance, consent terms, deed of conveyance, deed of
release, have been executed on the same day i.e. on 11.6.2012. Hence
such circumstances lead to fraudulent attitude of the respondent to grab
the property of Crores of rupees. It is submitted that the trial judge has
erred in not appreciating that the petitioner did not read over the contents
of the said document executed by the petitioner in favour of the
respondent.
It is submitted that the trial judge erred in not appreciating that the
consideration paid to the petitioner, as disclosed in the consent terms, and
is the amount paid to him under the deed of conveyance for the said
second property, which is much lesser than the share, right, title and
interest in the said first property. The trial judge has also erred in not
appreciating that consideration paid to the petitioner, as disclosed in the
consent terms, is nearly equivalent to the market value as per the ready
reckoner available for the said second property and in no way concerned
with the said first property. It is submitted that the trial judge has erred in
not appreciating that the petitioner had paid 50% of the purchase price i.e.
Rs.2,25,000/- for purchasing the first property on 24.9.1996. It is submitted
that the trial judge has erred in not appreciating that although the petitioner
was paid a sum of Rs.1,45,000/- i.e. nearly equivalent market value for the
conveyance of the said second property admeasuring 18 gunthas, the
petitioner has not been paid any consideration for release of 50%
undivided share right, title and interest in the said first property, which is
equivalent to 48 gunthas.
It is submitted that the trial judge has erred in not appreciating that
although the law requires that the said Deed of Release should be duly
registered and although the petitioner present himself for registration of the
said deed of conveyance, the Deed is Release is not registered before Sub
Registrar on Assurances at Rahata. It is submitted that the trial court has
not appreciated that the said Deed of Release does not bear proper stamp
duty as contemplated in Bombay Stamp Act. It is submitted that the trial
judge has wrongly held that there is no mention of criminal complaint filed
by the respondent against the petitioner in the proceeding before the trial
court, in as much as, the respondent has herself in para 7 of the plaint
admitted the said fact even in the reply to her the same has not been
denied. Learned senior counsel invited my attention to the contents of the
compromise deed and submitted that as per the consent terms the release
of the property from survey No. 51/4 at Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District
Ahmednagar, no consideration has been paid by the respondent to the
petitioner. It is submitted that the criminal complaints were filed by the
thereafter the Sessions Court released him on bail.
respondent in which the petitioner was lodged in jail for some time and
It is submitted that it is clear from the documents placed on record
that the petitioner has applied for relaxation of condition of bail after such
consent terms are executed. It is submitted that it is only under coercion
and threats by the respondent, such consent terms are signed by the
ig
petitioner. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that
the remedy to file application for cancellation of such consent terms which
are obtained by fraud and undue influence of coercion, is only under Order
23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. In view of provisions of Rule 3-A of Order 23, the
petitioner cannot file any independent suit or any other proceedings.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner pressed into service a reported
judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sm. Sumitra Devi
Agarwalla v. Sm Sulekha Kundu and another, reported in AIR 1976
Cal. 196 (1) and submitted that the term “lawful agreement” in order 23
Rule 3 does not include with it, agreement which is initiated by fraud,
undue influence or coercion.
The learned senior counsel invited my
attention to paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment and submitted that
consent terms are signed by the petitioner by force and coercion.
Learned senior counsel further pressed into service, reported
judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Chand
Kaur vs. Raj kaur (died) and others, reported in AIR 1997 PH 155 and
submitted that the condition which normally must be satisfied for validly
invoking the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. and for passing of
such decree, firstly, there should be lawful agreement of compromise,
secondly, the compromise has to be in writing and signed by the parties,
thirdly, the compromise must be recorded by the court and, fourthly, the
decree on such compromise can be passed so far it relates to the parties
to the suit but may extend to a special matter which is not the subject
matter of the suit. Learned counsel invited my attention to paragraphs 8, 9,
10 and 13 of the said judgment and submitted that, applying the principles
laid down in the said judgment, in the facts of the present case, consent
decree does not satisfy the conditions as held by the Court in para 10 of
the said judgment. Learned counsel also submitted that consent terms are
also not registered and no proper stamp duty is paid. He also pressed into
service an exposition of the Supreme Court in the case of Banwarilal vs.
Chando Devi (Smt.) (through L.Rs.) and another, reported in (1993) 1
SCC 581 and submitted that the Supreme Court on interpretation of the
provisions of Order 23 Rule 3, proviso to explanation 1 and 3-A, Order 43
Rule 1-A (2) and Sections 96(1), (3) and 151 of C.P.C. has taken a view
that the compromise suit must be lawful and signed by the parties. Where
contract itself is fraudulent, it is void and unlawful. Whether compromise
lawful or void or voidable to be decided by the same court which
entertained the compromise petition. The Compromise decree is open for
challenge under Order 23 Rule 3 or in appeal under Section 96(1) on the
ground that compromise had not been arrived at lawfully and as such
should not have been recorded.
Learned senior counsel invited my
attention to para 7 of the said judgment and submitted that the compromise
terms which are recorded are not in form of provisions of Order 23 Rule 3
and also other relevant provisions and also law laid down by various High
Courts and Supreme Court and therefore, the application at Exh.17 filed by
the petitioner ought to have been allowed by the trial court. It is submitted
that consent terms is a result of fraud, coercion played by the respondent
and therefore, application Exh.17 for cancellation of compromise terms
6.
should have been allowed by the trial court.
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
relied upon the reasons recorded by the trial court for rejecting application
at Exh.17 and submitted that, the petitioner has not only signed the
consent terms but also conveyance deed, affidavit before the public notary
and therefore, it cannot be said that there is element of coercion or fraud
as alleged by the petitioner. It is submitted that as per the compromise
terms in respect of land survey No. 51/2A, conveyance deed is executed
and amount of Rs. 1 Crores 45 lacs is received by the petitioner herein.
The consent terms also recorded that the property bearing survey No. 51/4
at Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar shall be released by the
defendant in favour of the plaintiff.
It is submitted that the court has
verified the terms of compromise and also the signatures of the parties and
also signatures of the advocates. The parties were present before the
court, they were represented by the advocates and the court has recorded
the compromise after satisfying itself that, the parties have consented for
the compromise by filing pursis. The compromise pursis were read and
recorded by the Court. It is further submitted that when the compromise
terms are acted upon and admittedly the petitioner has received an amount
of Rs.1 Crore and 45 lacs for the property bearing survey No. 51/2A,
situated at Shirdi, Tq Rahata, District Ahmednagar, towards consideration
vide Pay Order, then it cannot be said that such consent terms were under
the influence of coercion or by playing fraud.
The learned counsel
pressed into service reported judgment of this Court in case of Latabai
Narcinha Telang vs. Suresh Narcinha Telang and another, reported in
2006 (1) Mh.L.J. 440 and submitted that this court while interpreting the
provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. held that it is only in those cases,
where the consent terms, as a whole, challenged on the ground of fraud,
misrepresentation or on similar grounds, then the Court has to decide,
whether challenge is sustainable. The party cannot seek modification of
clause in the consent terms and consequently that part of the decree on
the ground that the same was not intended or agreed by the parties.
Therefore, learned counsel appearing for the respondent relying upon the
reasons recorded by the trial court, affidavit in reply and reply filed before
the trial court and oral submissions advanced before this Court would
submit that this petition is devoid of any merits and the same be rejected.
7.
I have given due consideration to the rival submissions advanced by
the respective advocates. With the assistance of the learned counsel for
the parties, I have perused the pleadings in the petition, annexures thereto
and other material placed on record by respective parties, including the
additional documents and reply filed by the respondent herein before the
trial court to application Exh.17, relevant provisions of C.P.C., judgments
cited by both sides. At the outset, it would be apposite to reproduce herein
ORDER XXIII
“Rule 1 ....
below the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A of C.P.C., which reads thus:-
Rule 2 .....
ig
Rule 3 .....
[3-A. Bar to suit:- No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the
ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.”
8.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Chand Kaur
(supra), in paragraph 10 has laid down conditions which normally must be
satisfied for validly invoking the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C.
and for passing of such decree. The said conditions are as under:-
i) There should be a lawful agreement or compromise;
ii) This compromise has to be in writing and signed by the
parties;
iii) The compromise must be recorded by the Court.
iv) A decree on such compromise can be passed so far it relates
to the parties to the suit but may extend to a special matter
which is not the subject matter of the suit.
In the facts of the present case, it is admitted position that in
pursuance to the consent terms the petitioner has received consideration
of Rs.1 Crores and 45 lacs for the property bearing survey No. 51/2A
situated at Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar as per clause No.3 of
the consent terms. The said amount is received by the petitioner vide Pay
order No. 089063 dated 6.6.2012 drawn on H.D.F.C. Bank Limited Varsova
ig
Road Branch, being entire consideration as within mentioned paid to the
petitioner. A Photostat copy of the receipt is placed on record at page 105
of the compilation. Upon careful perusal of the copy of the consent terms,
it is abundantly clear that the consent terms are signed by the parties and
also their respective advocates. The said consent terms are recorded by
the Court at pages 12 and 13 of the impugned order.
9.
Therefore, in the facts of this case, the consent terms are signed by
the parties and their respective advocates. The compromise is recorded by
the Court. The parties were present before the Court. Their respective
advocates were also present before the Court when the court has read and
recorded the compromises. Therefore, it appears that mandate of Order 23
Rule 3 of C.P.C. is fulfilled in the present case.
The consent terms are signed on 11.6.2012, copy of the said
consent terms is placed on record at Exh.12 at page 92 of the compilation
of the writ petition. There are signatures of the parties and after signatures
there are photographs of the petitioner and the respondent. There is also
stamp of the court at Exh.13 at page 93 of the compilation of the petition.
There is copy of deed of conveyance executed between the respondent
and the petitioner before the office of Sub Registrar at Rahata, District
Ahmednagar. It appears that on the said conveyance deed there is seal of
the Registrar. All particulars are mentioned including the copy of receipt of
receiving amount of Rs.1 Crores and 45 lacs by the present petitioner from
ig
the respondent. At Exh.14 page 114 of the compilation, there is release
deed in favour of respondent by the petitioner. The said document is also
signed and notary has placed the seal on the said document. At page 118,
there is photograph of the parties and also signatures are appearing.
Upon careful perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it is crystal
clear that the court has, in detail, considered the submissions of the parties
and also adverted to the provisions of Contract Act, other relevant
provisions and the judgments cited by the parties and rejected the
application Exh.17 filed by the petitioner. The findings recorded by the trial
court are in consonance with the material placed on record. The court has
considered the every aspects of the matter and this court is in agreement
with the findings recorded by the trial court.
10.
The reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner in the case of
Banwarilal (supra) is misplaced in the facts of the present case. In the
facts of that case, the compromise was not signed by the parties.
Therefore, the trial court allowed the application for cancellation of the
compromise terms. The said order was assailed before the High Court and
the High Court reversed the order of the trial court. Being aggrieved, the
parties approached the Supreme Court and in the facts of that case, the
Supreme Court held that the petition for compromise must be signed by
the parties concerned. In the facts of that case, the court found that the
trial court recorded the alleged agreement or compromise in casual
manner. However, in the facts of the present case, compromise terms are
not only signed by the parties but their advocates also, those are verified in
ig
presence of the parties and advocates. The said terms of the compromise
were read over to the parties and after due exercise, as contemplated
relevant
provisions,
the
compromise
terms
are
recorded.
under
Admittedly, the petitioner has received amount of Rs.1 Crores and 45 Lacs
towards consideration by Pay order. There is conveyance deed, affidavit
before Notary and all these actions of petitioner would lead to only
conclusion that there was no element of fraud or coercion involved when
the terms of compromise were arrived between the parties and
subsequently recorded.
11.
By introducing the amendment to the C.P.C. (Amendment) 1976
w.e.f. 1.2.1977, the Legislature have brought into force Rule 3-A to Order
23, which creates bar to institute the suit to set aside a decree on the
ground that the compromise on which decree is based was not lawful. The
Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Chand Kaur (supra) while
interpreting the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and 3-A in para 11 and 12,
held as under:-
The explanation to sub-rule (3) of Rule 23 of the Code further
“11.
makes legislative intent more clear by specifying that an agreement
or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract
Act shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the Rule.
The purpose of effecting a compromise between the parties is to put
an end to the various disputes pending before the Court of
competent jurisdiction fully and finally.
Finality of decisions is an underlying principle of all
12.
adjudicating forums. Thus creation of further litigation should never
be the basis of a compromise between the parties. Rule 3(a) of
Order 23 of the Code further provides that no suit shall lie to set
aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the
decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order 23, Rule 3 of
the Code is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit parties to
amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing and a
voluntary act on the part of the parties.
The Court can be
instrumental in having an agreed compromise effected and finality
attached to the same. The Court should never be party to imposition
of a compromise upon an unwilling party.” (Emphasis supplied).
It follows from the provisions of Rule 3-A of Order 23 that, no suit
shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which
the decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order 23, Rule 3 of the
Code is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit parties to amicably
come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing and a voluntary act on the
part of the parties.
12.
Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, as stated
earlier, the consent terms arrived at between the petitioner and the
13.
held by the trial Court, which needs no interference by this Court.
respondent, are in consonance with the relevant provisions of C.P.C. as
At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to refer the decision of this
Court in the case of Latabai (supra), which takes a following view on
“
interpretation of provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of C.P.C. :-
The proviso to Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil
ig
Procedure provides that where it is alleged by one part and denied
by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at,
the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be
granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court,
for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.
Bare reading of the said proviso makes it clear that it is only when
adjustment and satisfaction is alleged by one party and denied by
the other side, the question of setting aside the consent decree
arises. It is only in those cases where the consent terms, as a
whole, on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation or on similar
grounds are challenged, then the Court has to decide the issue.
The submission that in an application under Order 23, Rule 3, a
party can seek modification of clause in the consent terms and
consequently that part of the Decree on the ground that the same
was not intended or agreed by the parties cannot be accepted. If
argument is accepted, in a suit or in an appeal where consent terms
are filed and consequently a consent decree is passed, any party
thereto will be entitled to file an application under Order 23, Rule 3,
Civil Procedure Code for modifying a clause in the consent terms
and consequently that part of the consent decree on the ground that
it was not intended to or was inserted by mistake.
If such an
interpretation is accepted, the same would lead to strange result
and the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code is not
available to a party who was not intended to or that it was inserted
by mistake. The explanation to Order 23, Rule 3 does not advance
It is inconceivable that a party can be
the case any further.
permitted to file an application for modifying a clause in the consent
terms and consequently that part of the consent decree under Order
23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code.” (Emphasis added).
It follows from the judgment in the case of Latabai (supra), that, it
ig
is not open for the party to seek modification of clause in the consent terms
on the ground that, the same was not intended or agreed by the parties. It
is only in those cases, where the consent terms as a whole, on the ground
that fraud, misrepresentation or of similar ground are challenged, then the
Court has to decide the issue. Coming to the facts of the present case, the
petitioner has not disputed that he has received consideration of Rs.1
Crores and 45 Lacs for the property bearing survey No. 51/2A, situated at
Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar. It is evident that the deed of
conveyance is executed between the parties. The contention of learned
senior counsel for the petitioner that, clause 3 of the consent terms was
under fraud, coercion and it was signed by the petitioner under coercion
and signatures are obtained by fraud and therefore, the petitioner has
challenged the consent terms as
a whole, cannot be accepted.
The
contention appears to be that the property bearing survey No. 51/4 situated
at Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar is released without any
consideration. The said contention is devoid of any merits.
14.
It is not necessary to burden this judgment by reproducing the
when this Court is in complete
findings recorded by the trial court,
agreement with the said findings. Therefore, taking over all view of the
matter, in my considered opinion, the view taken by the trial court is
possible and reasonable view, which needs no interference in writ
jurisdiction. Hence, writ petition is devoid of any merits and the same
stands rejected.
Rule stands discharged. No order as to costs.
16. In view of disposal of writ petition, pending civil application No.
Print Page
DATE OF PRONOUNCING
THE JUDGMEIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
Akhil Mansuklal Mehta
Versus
Sheetal Deepak Karamchandani
CORAM : S. S. SHINDE, J.NT
: 29.01.2013
1.
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent, heard finally.
2.
This writ petition is filed challenging the order dated 20.7.2012,
passed below Exh.17 in R.C.S. No. 330 of 2012, by the learned C. J. J. D.
Rahata, District Ahmednagar.
3.
It is the case of the petitioner that on 24.9.1996, the petitioner and
respondent purchased (first) property bearing old survey No. 51/4 (new
51/5) situated at Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar, for consideration
of Rs.4,50,00/- and the names the petitioner and the respondent are
mutated in the revenue record.
Thereafter, they purchased (second)
property admeasuring 18 R out of 44 R from survey No. 51/1 situated at
Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar for consideration of Rs.1,26,000/-
(second property) out of the funds of the petitioner himself and his name is
also mutated in the 7x12 extract. It is further case of the petitioner that the
petitioner alongwith respondent purchased jointly (third) property at
admeasuring 1 H 48 R and survey No. 352 admeasuring 2H from the same
village, jointly in the name of the petitioner and the respondent. The said
properties was purchased during the period from 24.11.1996 to 17.4.1998.
village Vihigaon, Tq. Shahapur, District Thane from survey No. 351
4.
It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had faced with some
financial crises, therefore, he sold 50% share from the third party to one
Prakash Dwarkadas Jhunjhunwala on 25.2.2011 for consideration
and
remaining 50% share of the respondent was kept as it is. It is further case
of the petitioner that on 20.11.2011 respondent lodged a complaint with
Kasara police station and on 9.3.2012 F.I.R. No. I-13 of 2012 came to be
registered and the petitioner was arrested and sent to judicial custody on
17.3.2012 by the learned J.M.F.C. Shahapur.
It is further case of the
petitioner that on 12.4.2012 the learned Sessions Judge at Kalyan, has
released the petitioner after one month on bail, on condition to attend
Kasara police station on 15th and 25th of every month between 10.00 a.m.
to 12.00 noon until further orders. It is further case of the petitioner that, as
the petitioner was harassed and abused by investigating officer, Kasara
police station, he filed an application to Sessions Judge at Kalyan and
accordingly police station is changed from Kasara to Mahatma Phule police
station, vide order dated 16.6.2012.
It is further case of the petitioner that on 7.3.2012, the respondent
filed second complaint to police station Shirdi with a contention that she
has purchased the second property out of her own funds and further falsely
contended that the petitioner is trying to dispose of the first and second
property by preparing fraudulent documents. The respondent herein filed
R.C.S. No. 330 of 2012 in the Court of learned C.J.J.D. Rahata for
declaration and injunction in respect of the suit property. It is the case of
the petitioner that the respondent approached the petitioner and stated that
she is ready to withdraw the complaint with Kasara police station and
further expressed her willingness to purchase the share of the petitioner in
the first and second properties and also
offered to settle the dispute
regarding 3rd property by stating that release deed should be executed and
accordingly it was informed by her to the petitioner to come to court at
It is further case of the petitioner that on 11.6.2012, the
Rahata.
respondent took the petitioner to the premises of Rahata civil court and
orally informed about pendency of the suit and filing of consent terms. It is
further case of the petitioner that the petitioner was tuted by respondent to
sign on each and every papers and respondent also engaged advocate for
the petitioner. The said advocate was not paid any fees by the petitioner
nor the petitioner known the advocate nor he was willfully engaged. On
the same, pursis is filed by advocate regarding the waiver of summons and
also got executed the consent deed by playing fraud, exercising coercion
and undue influence on the petitioner. It is further case of the petitioner
that on 11.6.2012 itself the petitioner was taken to Sub Registrar’s office by
respondent and under pressure, a registered sale deed was executed by
respondent in her name. It is further case of the petitioner that on same
day, respondent took the petitioner to the office of notary public and during
the course journey, the respondent threatened the petitioner in case the
petitioner refused to sign the documents and also threatened that the
respondent shall pursue the criminal complaint dated 7.3.2012 in the same
manner, as it was done with Kasara police station. It is the case of the
petitioner that because of force and undue influence and threatening, the
petitioner was forced to sign on blank paper with intention to grab the
share of the petitioner. On the same day, the petitioner signed two deeds
of release, one of the first property and second is of the third party because
of threats and force by the respondent.
It is further case of the petitioner that on 19.6.2012, upon proper
legal advice the petitioner filed an application Exh.17 before the Civil Court
consent terms.
at Rahata in R.C.S. No. 330 of 2012, objecting to the documents of
The learned trial judge ordered to issue notice. The
respondent appeared in the matter and filed her reply to application Exh.17
and prayed to reject the application Exh.17. By the impugned order dated
20.6.2012, application Exh.17 came to be rejected by the learned C.J.J.D.
Rahata and the matter was kept for further arguments on 17.8.2012.
Being aggrieved by the said order passed below Exh.17, the petitioner has
5.
filed this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the
trial court has erred in not appreciating the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3
of C.P.C. which clearly contemplates that before passing the compromise
decree, the court must satisfy itself that suit has been adjusted wholly or in
part by any lawful agreement or compromise. It is submitted that, when
the petitioner has filed objection at Exh.17 and raised question to the
genuineness of the consent terms and raised allegations against the
plaintiff and created doubts of the consent terms then in such case, the
learned judge has erred in not appreciating that the provisions of Order
XXII Rule 3 of C.P.C. clearly contemplated that agreement or terms which
is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act 1872 shall not be deemed
to be lawful and therefore, instead of rejecting the application at Exh.17,
the trial court ought to have conducted proper enquiry in the suit. It is
submitted that consent terms are not obtained by free consent of the
petitioner. Hence, complete adjudication is necessary and instead the trial
court without adjudication has given such findings, which are premature.
It is submitted that the respondent has obtained signature of the
petitioner on two deeds of release through coercion, fraud and undue
influence, hence under such circumstance, full-fledged trial was necessary
but instead the trial judge directly rejected the application, as if delivering
the final verdict after completion of evidence. It is submitted that the trial
i.e. Vakilpatra,
court has erred in not appreciating that all documents
pursis of appearance, consent terms, deed of conveyance, deed of
release, have been executed on the same day i.e. on 11.6.2012. Hence
such circumstances lead to fraudulent attitude of the respondent to grab
the property of Crores of rupees. It is submitted that the trial judge has
erred in not appreciating that the petitioner did not read over the contents
of the said document executed by the petitioner in favour of the
respondent.
It is submitted that the trial judge erred in not appreciating that the
consideration paid to the petitioner, as disclosed in the consent terms, and
is the amount paid to him under the deed of conveyance for the said
second property, which is much lesser than the share, right, title and
interest in the said first property. The trial judge has also erred in not
appreciating that consideration paid to the petitioner, as disclosed in the
consent terms, is nearly equivalent to the market value as per the ready
reckoner available for the said second property and in no way concerned
with the said first property. It is submitted that the trial judge has erred in
not appreciating that the petitioner had paid 50% of the purchase price i.e.
Rs.2,25,000/- for purchasing the first property on 24.9.1996. It is submitted
that the trial judge has erred in not appreciating that although the petitioner
was paid a sum of Rs.1,45,000/- i.e. nearly equivalent market value for the
conveyance of the said second property admeasuring 18 gunthas, the
petitioner has not been paid any consideration for release of 50%
undivided share right, title and interest in the said first property, which is
equivalent to 48 gunthas.
It is submitted that the trial judge has erred in not appreciating that
although the law requires that the said Deed of Release should be duly
registered and although the petitioner present himself for registration of the
said deed of conveyance, the Deed is Release is not registered before Sub
Registrar on Assurances at Rahata. It is submitted that the trial court has
not appreciated that the said Deed of Release does not bear proper stamp
duty as contemplated in Bombay Stamp Act. It is submitted that the trial
judge has wrongly held that there is no mention of criminal complaint filed
by the respondent against the petitioner in the proceeding before the trial
court, in as much as, the respondent has herself in para 7 of the plaint
admitted the said fact even in the reply to her the same has not been
denied. Learned senior counsel invited my attention to the contents of the
compromise deed and submitted that as per the consent terms the release
of the property from survey No. 51/4 at Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District
Ahmednagar, no consideration has been paid by the respondent to the
petitioner. It is submitted that the criminal complaints were filed by the
thereafter the Sessions Court released him on bail.
respondent in which the petitioner was lodged in jail for some time and
It is submitted that it is clear from the documents placed on record
that the petitioner has applied for relaxation of condition of bail after such
consent terms are executed. It is submitted that it is only under coercion
and threats by the respondent, such consent terms are signed by the
ig
petitioner. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that
the remedy to file application for cancellation of such consent terms which
are obtained by fraud and undue influence of coercion, is only under Order
23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. In view of provisions of Rule 3-A of Order 23, the
petitioner cannot file any independent suit or any other proceedings.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner pressed into service a reported
judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sm. Sumitra Devi
Agarwalla v. Sm Sulekha Kundu and another, reported in AIR 1976
Cal. 196 (1) and submitted that the term “lawful agreement” in order 23
Rule 3 does not include with it, agreement which is initiated by fraud,
undue influence or coercion.
The learned senior counsel invited my
attention to paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment and submitted that
consent terms are signed by the petitioner by force and coercion.
Learned senior counsel further pressed into service, reported
judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Chand
Kaur vs. Raj kaur (died) and others, reported in AIR 1997 PH 155 and
submitted that the condition which normally must be satisfied for validly
invoking the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. and for passing of
such decree, firstly, there should be lawful agreement of compromise,
secondly, the compromise has to be in writing and signed by the parties,
thirdly, the compromise must be recorded by the court and, fourthly, the
decree on such compromise can be passed so far it relates to the parties
to the suit but may extend to a special matter which is not the subject
matter of the suit. Learned counsel invited my attention to paragraphs 8, 9,
10 and 13 of the said judgment and submitted that, applying the principles
laid down in the said judgment, in the facts of the present case, consent
decree does not satisfy the conditions as held by the Court in para 10 of
the said judgment. Learned counsel also submitted that consent terms are
also not registered and no proper stamp duty is paid. He also pressed into
service an exposition of the Supreme Court in the case of Banwarilal vs.
Chando Devi (Smt.) (through L.Rs.) and another, reported in (1993) 1
SCC 581 and submitted that the Supreme Court on interpretation of the
provisions of Order 23 Rule 3, proviso to explanation 1 and 3-A, Order 43
Rule 1-A (2) and Sections 96(1), (3) and 151 of C.P.C. has taken a view
that the compromise suit must be lawful and signed by the parties. Where
contract itself is fraudulent, it is void and unlawful. Whether compromise
lawful or void or voidable to be decided by the same court which
entertained the compromise petition. The Compromise decree is open for
challenge under Order 23 Rule 3 or in appeal under Section 96(1) on the
ground that compromise had not been arrived at lawfully and as such
should not have been recorded.
Learned senior counsel invited my
attention to para 7 of the said judgment and submitted that the compromise
terms which are recorded are not in form of provisions of Order 23 Rule 3
and also other relevant provisions and also law laid down by various High
Courts and Supreme Court and therefore, the application at Exh.17 filed by
the petitioner ought to have been allowed by the trial court. It is submitted
that consent terms is a result of fraud, coercion played by the respondent
and therefore, application Exh.17 for cancellation of compromise terms
6.
should have been allowed by the trial court.
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
relied upon the reasons recorded by the trial court for rejecting application
at Exh.17 and submitted that, the petitioner has not only signed the
consent terms but also conveyance deed, affidavit before the public notary
and therefore, it cannot be said that there is element of coercion or fraud
as alleged by the petitioner. It is submitted that as per the compromise
terms in respect of land survey No. 51/2A, conveyance deed is executed
and amount of Rs. 1 Crores 45 lacs is received by the petitioner herein.
The consent terms also recorded that the property bearing survey No. 51/4
at Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar shall be released by the
defendant in favour of the plaintiff.
It is submitted that the court has
verified the terms of compromise and also the signatures of the parties and
also signatures of the advocates. The parties were present before the
court, they were represented by the advocates and the court has recorded
the compromise after satisfying itself that, the parties have consented for
the compromise by filing pursis. The compromise pursis were read and
recorded by the Court. It is further submitted that when the compromise
terms are acted upon and admittedly the petitioner has received an amount
of Rs.1 Crore and 45 lacs for the property bearing survey No. 51/2A,
situated at Shirdi, Tq Rahata, District Ahmednagar, towards consideration
vide Pay Order, then it cannot be said that such consent terms were under
the influence of coercion or by playing fraud.
The learned counsel
pressed into service reported judgment of this Court in case of Latabai
Narcinha Telang vs. Suresh Narcinha Telang and another, reported in
2006 (1) Mh.L.J. 440 and submitted that this court while interpreting the
provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. held that it is only in those cases,
where the consent terms, as a whole, challenged on the ground of fraud,
misrepresentation or on similar grounds, then the Court has to decide,
whether challenge is sustainable. The party cannot seek modification of
clause in the consent terms and consequently that part of the decree on
the ground that the same was not intended or agreed by the parties.
Therefore, learned counsel appearing for the respondent relying upon the
reasons recorded by the trial court, affidavit in reply and reply filed before
the trial court and oral submissions advanced before this Court would
submit that this petition is devoid of any merits and the same be rejected.
7.
I have given due consideration to the rival submissions advanced by
the respective advocates. With the assistance of the learned counsel for
the parties, I have perused the pleadings in the petition, annexures thereto
and other material placed on record by respective parties, including the
additional documents and reply filed by the respondent herein before the
trial court to application Exh.17, relevant provisions of C.P.C., judgments
cited by both sides. At the outset, it would be apposite to reproduce herein
ORDER XXIII
“Rule 1 ....
below the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A of C.P.C., which reads thus:-
Rule 2 .....
ig
Rule 3 .....
[3-A. Bar to suit:- No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the
ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.”
8.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Chand Kaur
(supra), in paragraph 10 has laid down conditions which normally must be
satisfied for validly invoking the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C.
and for passing of such decree. The said conditions are as under:-
i) There should be a lawful agreement or compromise;
ii) This compromise has to be in writing and signed by the
parties;
iii) The compromise must be recorded by the Court.
iv) A decree on such compromise can be passed so far it relates
to the parties to the suit but may extend to a special matter
which is not the subject matter of the suit.
In the facts of the present case, it is admitted position that in
pursuance to the consent terms the petitioner has received consideration
of Rs.1 Crores and 45 lacs for the property bearing survey No. 51/2A
situated at Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar as per clause No.3 of
the consent terms. The said amount is received by the petitioner vide Pay
order No. 089063 dated 6.6.2012 drawn on H.D.F.C. Bank Limited Varsova
ig
Road Branch, being entire consideration as within mentioned paid to the
petitioner. A Photostat copy of the receipt is placed on record at page 105
of the compilation. Upon careful perusal of the copy of the consent terms,
it is abundantly clear that the consent terms are signed by the parties and
also their respective advocates. The said consent terms are recorded by
the Court at pages 12 and 13 of the impugned order.
9.
Therefore, in the facts of this case, the consent terms are signed by
the parties and their respective advocates. The compromise is recorded by
the Court. The parties were present before the Court. Their respective
advocates were also present before the Court when the court has read and
recorded the compromises. Therefore, it appears that mandate of Order 23
Rule 3 of C.P.C. is fulfilled in the present case.
The consent terms are signed on 11.6.2012, copy of the said
consent terms is placed on record at Exh.12 at page 92 of the compilation
of the writ petition. There are signatures of the parties and after signatures
there are photographs of the petitioner and the respondent. There is also
stamp of the court at Exh.13 at page 93 of the compilation of the petition.
There is copy of deed of conveyance executed between the respondent
and the petitioner before the office of Sub Registrar at Rahata, District
Ahmednagar. It appears that on the said conveyance deed there is seal of
the Registrar. All particulars are mentioned including the copy of receipt of
receiving amount of Rs.1 Crores and 45 lacs by the present petitioner from
ig
the respondent. At Exh.14 page 114 of the compilation, there is release
deed in favour of respondent by the petitioner. The said document is also
signed and notary has placed the seal on the said document. At page 118,
there is photograph of the parties and also signatures are appearing.
Upon careful perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it is crystal
clear that the court has, in detail, considered the submissions of the parties
and also adverted to the provisions of Contract Act, other relevant
provisions and the judgments cited by the parties and rejected the
application Exh.17 filed by the petitioner. The findings recorded by the trial
court are in consonance with the material placed on record. The court has
considered the every aspects of the matter and this court is in agreement
with the findings recorded by the trial court.
10.
The reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner in the case of
Banwarilal (supra) is misplaced in the facts of the present case. In the
facts of that case, the compromise was not signed by the parties.
Therefore, the trial court allowed the application for cancellation of the
compromise terms. The said order was assailed before the High Court and
the High Court reversed the order of the trial court. Being aggrieved, the
parties approached the Supreme Court and in the facts of that case, the
Supreme Court held that the petition for compromise must be signed by
the parties concerned. In the facts of that case, the court found that the
trial court recorded the alleged agreement or compromise in casual
manner. However, in the facts of the present case, compromise terms are
not only signed by the parties but their advocates also, those are verified in
ig
presence of the parties and advocates. The said terms of the compromise
were read over to the parties and after due exercise, as contemplated
relevant
provisions,
the
compromise
terms
are
recorded.
under
Admittedly, the petitioner has received amount of Rs.1 Crores and 45 Lacs
towards consideration by Pay order. There is conveyance deed, affidavit
before Notary and all these actions of petitioner would lead to only
conclusion that there was no element of fraud or coercion involved when
the terms of compromise were arrived between the parties and
subsequently recorded.
11.
By introducing the amendment to the C.P.C. (Amendment) 1976
w.e.f. 1.2.1977, the Legislature have brought into force Rule 3-A to Order
23, which creates bar to institute the suit to set aside a decree on the
ground that the compromise on which decree is based was not lawful. The
Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Chand Kaur (supra) while
interpreting the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and 3-A in para 11 and 12,
held as under:-
The explanation to sub-rule (3) of Rule 23 of the Code further
“11.
makes legislative intent more clear by specifying that an agreement
or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract
Act shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the Rule.
The purpose of effecting a compromise between the parties is to put
an end to the various disputes pending before the Court of
competent jurisdiction fully and finally.
Finality of decisions is an underlying principle of all
12.
adjudicating forums. Thus creation of further litigation should never
be the basis of a compromise between the parties. Rule 3(a) of
Order 23 of the Code further provides that no suit shall lie to set
aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the
decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order 23, Rule 3 of
the Code is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit parties to
amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing and a
voluntary act on the part of the parties.
The Court can be
instrumental in having an agreed compromise effected and finality
attached to the same. The Court should never be party to imposition
of a compromise upon an unwilling party.” (Emphasis supplied).
It follows from the provisions of Rule 3-A of Order 23 that, no suit
shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which
the decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order 23, Rule 3 of the
Code is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit parties to amicably
come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing and a voluntary act on the
part of the parties.
12.
Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, as stated
earlier, the consent terms arrived at between the petitioner and the
13.
held by the trial Court, which needs no interference by this Court.
respondent, are in consonance with the relevant provisions of C.P.C. as
At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to refer the decision of this
Court in the case of Latabai (supra), which takes a following view on
“
interpretation of provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of C.P.C. :-
The proviso to Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil
ig
Procedure provides that where it is alleged by one part and denied
by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at,
the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be
granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court,
for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.
Bare reading of the said proviso makes it clear that it is only when
adjustment and satisfaction is alleged by one party and denied by
the other side, the question of setting aside the consent decree
arises. It is only in those cases where the consent terms, as a
whole, on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation or on similar
grounds are challenged, then the Court has to decide the issue.
The submission that in an application under Order 23, Rule 3, a
party can seek modification of clause in the consent terms and
consequently that part of the Decree on the ground that the same
was not intended or agreed by the parties cannot be accepted. If
argument is accepted, in a suit or in an appeal where consent terms
are filed and consequently a consent decree is passed, any party
thereto will be entitled to file an application under Order 23, Rule 3,
Civil Procedure Code for modifying a clause in the consent terms
and consequently that part of the consent decree on the ground that
it was not intended to or was inserted by mistake.
If such an
interpretation is accepted, the same would lead to strange result
and the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code is not
available to a party who was not intended to or that it was inserted
by mistake. The explanation to Order 23, Rule 3 does not advance
It is inconceivable that a party can be
the case any further.
permitted to file an application for modifying a clause in the consent
terms and consequently that part of the consent decree under Order
23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code.” (Emphasis added).
It follows from the judgment in the case of Latabai (supra), that, it
ig
is not open for the party to seek modification of clause in the consent terms
on the ground that, the same was not intended or agreed by the parties. It
is only in those cases, where the consent terms as a whole, on the ground
that fraud, misrepresentation or of similar ground are challenged, then the
Court has to decide the issue. Coming to the facts of the present case, the
petitioner has not disputed that he has received consideration of Rs.1
Crores and 45 Lacs for the property bearing survey No. 51/2A, situated at
Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar. It is evident that the deed of
conveyance is executed between the parties. The contention of learned
senior counsel for the petitioner that, clause 3 of the consent terms was
under fraud, coercion and it was signed by the petitioner under coercion
and signatures are obtained by fraud and therefore, the petitioner has
challenged the consent terms as
a whole, cannot be accepted.
The
contention appears to be that the property bearing survey No. 51/4 situated
at Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, District Ahmednagar is released without any
consideration. The said contention is devoid of any merits.
14.
It is not necessary to burden this judgment by reproducing the
when this Court is in complete
findings recorded by the trial court,
agreement with the said findings. Therefore, taking over all view of the
matter, in my considered opinion, the view taken by the trial court is
possible and reasonable view, which needs no interference in writ
jurisdiction. Hence, writ petition is devoid of any merits and the same
stands rejected.
Rule stands discharged. No order as to costs.
16. In view of disposal of writ petition, pending civil application No.
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