Meaning of phrase “ Laws for the time being in force”

It is also not possible to accept the submission that the expression ''for the time being in force'' will have a nexus with the date of enactment of the Airports Authority of India Act. The expression ''for the time being in force'' merely implies that whenever the question of acquiring the land for the Airport Authority arises, the relevant corresponding laws of acquisition in force at that time can be resorted to. This is the clear thrust of section 19. Its scope and ambit cannot be circumscribed and frozen only to the point of time in the year 1994, when the Airports Authority of India Act was enacted. If such was the intention of the Parliament in framing Section 19, Section 19 would have employed a different phraseology, namely, ''laws at present in force'' instead of the phraseology ''laws for the time being in force". The phraseology ''laws for the time being in force" would necessarily mean laws in force from time to time and not laws in force only at a fixed point of time, i.e. the date on which the Airports Authority of India Act was enacted. The expression ''for the time being" denotes time indefinite and refers to indefinite state of facts which will arise in future and which may vary from time to time.1

Words and Phrases – “ Laws for the time being in force” - The phraseology “ laws for the time being in force” would necessarily mean laws in force from time-to-time and not laws in force only at a fixed point of time. The expression “for the time being” denotes time indefinite and refers to indefinite state of facts which will arise in future and which may vary from time-to-time.

Madras High Court
J.Parthiban vs State Of Tamil Nadu, Rep.By on 27 March, 2008

THE HONOURABLE MR.A.P.SHAH, THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE PRABHA SRIDEVAN

W.P.Nos.36423, 30273, 33336, 34120, 36968,
37018, 37026, 37876, 37071, 37757, 37630, 37357
to 37359 of 2007,

2. The challenge in all these petitions is to the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State Government under the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu Act 10 of 1999) (hereinafter referred to as the T.N.Acquisition Act ) for the expansion of the Chennai Airport. It appears that in the year 2005, the Airports Authority of India wanted to expand the existing Chennai Airport to meet the rapid development in air traffic and air transport. The Airports Authority of India is forced to develop the Chennai Airport as an international hub and to extend the runway to sustain the developing economic growth. The Minister of State for Civil Aviation, Government of India by a letter dated 21.4.2005 requested the State Government to provide land for expansion of the existing Chennai Airport. On 21.11.2005, the Airports Director, Chennai forwarded a proposal of the Airports Authority of India Board for acquisition/transfer of 583 Hectares (1457.20 acres) of land on the northern side of the existing Airport boundary, to the Government of Tamil Nadu. The Government, after careful consideration of the proposal made by the Airports Authority of India Board, decided to accept the request and granted administrative sanction for acquiring the required land of 583 Hectares in Anakaputhur, Pammal, Pozhichalur, Manapakkam, Kolappakkam, Tarapakkam, Cowl Bazaar, Pallavaram Cantonment and Gerugambakkam Villages in Kancheepuram District, on the northern side of Chennai Airport as per the Land Plan Schedule and Land Plan received from the Airports Authority of India. The necessary permission to acquire the land was also accorded vide order in G.O.Ms.No.91, Transport (I-2) Department, dated 14.12.2005.

3. It appears that while initiating the acquisition proceedings it was found that a very large number of families, approximately 10000, are likely to be displaced due to the thickly populated settlement in the villages, particularly, Pammal, Cowl Bazar, Pallavaram Cantonment, Pozhichalur and Anakaputhur. In the light of this, a study was undertaken to identify an alternate site with the least number of structures and settlements. Finally, a fresh proposal was submitted by the District Collector, Kancheepuram vide D.O.No. 50376/2006 FI, dated 01.3.2007 to the Airport Director, Chennai to acquire approximately 832 acres of land for the expansion of the Chennai Airport. The Airports Authority of India on examination of the proposal observed that the land offered by the State Government is not sufficient for constructing a parallel runway of sufficient length and other connected infrastructure. The Airports Authority of India therefore suggested two options to make the proposal workable. Option-I entailed acquisition of additional land of 275 acres so as to have a 4000 m long parallel runway. Option-II proposed additional land requirement of 460 acres, where, in addition to the parallel runway, a new terminal building could also be built. By letter, dated 01.5.2007, the options were communicated to the State Government with a request to consider the options and communicate its views at an early date. On this basis, the State Government convened the All Legislative Party Leaders' meeting on 22.5.2007 and accepted option-I suggested by the Airports Authority of India. Accordingly, as a preliminary step of land acquisition as well as to avoid further investments by the general public in the proposed site for acquisition, an order was issued by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.70, Transport Department, dated 09.7.2007, wherein the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority was directed to issue suitable notification to freeze the building activity in the proposed area after getting necessary proposal with full details from the Airports Authority of India. Subsequently, the State Government in G.O.Ms.No.108, Transport (I-2) Department, dated 09.10.2007 accorded administrative sanction to acquire and alienate 1069.99 acres of land in Manapakkam, Kolapakkam, Gerugambakkam, Tarapakkam and Kovur Villages on the northern side of the existing Chennai Airport under the T.N.Acquisition Act to provide land to the Airports Authority of India, Chennai, free of cost and free from all encumbrances for the expansion of Chennai Airport. Out of these 1069.99 acres of land, 1014.38 acres is being acquired for the expansion scheme and 55.61 acres for providing an alternate site for rehabilitation at Kovur. In the light of the administrative sanction, the District Collector, Kancheepuram has issued notices under Section 3(2) of the Industrial Purposes Act to the landholders in respect of the lands which are sought to be acquired for the expansion of the Chennai Airport.

4. The petitioners, who were affected by the acquisition of lands at different villages, have filed these petitions challenging G.O.Ms.No.108, Transport (I-2) Department, dated 09.10.2007 as well as the notices issued under section 3(2) of the T.N.Acquisition Act, mainly on the ground that the proceedings are without jurisdiction and ultra vires the Airports Authority Act. On behalf of the petitioners, the following four major contentions have been urged: -

i) The State Government lacks competence to acquire the land for the purpose of expansion of the Airport, as the field is occupied by the Central Legislation, namely, Airports Authority of India Act, 1994;

ii) The acquisition, even if it is assumed can be made by the State Government, cannot be made under the T.N.Acquisition Act, as the Airport is neither an industrial area nor an industrial estate nor an industry for the purposes of the State Act for which acquisition can be made;

iii) Environmental clearance is a must for the proposed project and the same ought to have been obtained before the acquisition proceedings are initiated; and

iv) The State Government has no power to acquire the land for rehabilitation of the project affected persons under the T.N.Acquisition Act.

5. We have heard Mr.N.R.Chandran, Mr.K.M.Vijayan, Mr.T.V.Ramanujun, Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, Mr.R.Subramanian and Mr.A.Sivaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in the respective writ petitions as well as Mr.G.Masilamani, learned Advocate General appearing for the State Government, Mr.V.T.Gopalan, learned senior counsel appearing for the Airports Authority of India and Mr.P.Wilson, learned Assistant Solicitor General for Union of India. Mr.N.R.Chandran, Mr.K.M.Vijayan, and Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned senior counsel appearing for some of the petitioners filed in Court notes of written submissions, so also Mr.G.Masilamani, learned Advocate General appearing for the State Government.

Re.Contention (i)

6. The main thrust of the attack by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the State Government lacks competence to acquire the land for the expansion of the Airport. It is inter alia contended that in exercise of the legislative power flowing from Entry 29, Parliament has enacted the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 and in view of Section 19 of the said Act, the State Government is denuded of all power to acquire the land and, therefore, the impugned acquisition proceedings are void due to lack of competence. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents countered it by saying that the power to acquire the land derived from Entry 42 in List III is an independent power and the T.N.Acquisition Act being in pith and substance an Act to acquire properties for industrial development, the power of the State Legislature in that behalf is referable to Entry 42 and remains intact irrespective of the fact that the Parliament has enacted the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994.

7. The above controversy requires us to refer to the object of the two enactments, viz., Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 and the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu Act 10 of 1999) and the essential sources of the legislative competency with reference to the relevant Entries in Lists I to III of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.

8. The Preamble of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 says that it is an Act to provide for the constitution of the Airports Authority of India and for the transfer and vesting of the undertakings of the International Airports Authority of India and the National Airports Authority to and in the Airports Authority of India so constituted for the better administration and cohesive management of airports and civil enclaves whereat air transport services are operated or are intended to be operated and of all aeronautical communication stations (for the purposes of establishing or assisting in the establishment of airports) and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 3 of the Act provides for constitution and incorporation of the Airports Authority of India. Section 12 lays down the functions of the Authority. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 says that without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the Authority may, (a) plan, develop, construct and maintain runways, taxiways, aprons and terminals and ancillary buildings at the airports and civil enclaves; (aa) establish airports, or assist in the establishment of private airports, by rendering such technical, financial or other assistance which the Central Government may consider necessary for such purpose. Section 19 of the Act, on which strong reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners appears in Chapter-IV pertaining to 'Property and Contract' and reads thus:-

''19. Compulsory acquisition of land for the Authority.- Any land required by the Authority for the discharge of its functions under this Act shall be deemed to be needed for a public purpose and such land may be acquired for the Authority under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or of any other corresponding law for the time being in force."

9. The Statement of Objects and Reasons leading to the enactment of the T.N.Acquisition Act reads as follows:-

''Provision of suitable sites for location of Industries is a prerequisite for quick establishment of industries. For the speedy industrial growth of this State, it is felt that lands for industrial purposes have to be acquired speedily so as to achieve the object. Therefore, the Government have decided to make special provisions for speedy acquisition of lands for industrial purposes by undertaking a special legislation."

As per Section 2(e) of the T.N.Acquisition Act, 'industrial purpose' includes the starting of a new industry, expansion of an existing industry, the development of an industrial area and establishment and management of an industrial estate. Section 3 of the Act empowers the Government to acquire the land for industrial purposes as follows:-

''3. Power to acquire land.- (1) If, at any time, in the opinion o the Government, any land is required for any industrial purposes, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, they may acquire such land by publishing in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette a notice specifying the particular purpose for which such land is required.

(2) Before publishing a notice under sub-section (1), the Government shall, call upon the owner and any other person, who in the opinion of the Government may be interested in such land, to show cause within such time as may be specified in the notice, why the land should not be acquired. The Government shall also cause a public notice to be given in such manner as may be prescribed.

(3) The Government may pass an order under sub-section (1) after hearing and considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner or person interested."

The land acquired pursuant to the notification under Section 3(1) of the Act vests absolutely with the Government free from all encumbrances as per Section 4 of the Act. As per section 6 of the Act, every owner or person interested in any land acquired under this Act, shall be entitled to receive and be paid an amount as determined under section 7 of the Act. Section 21 of the Act provides that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall cease to apply to any land which is required for the purpose specified in sub-section (1) of section 3, save as otherwise provided under the Act. Section 22 of the Act gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act.

10. We may now refer to the relevant Entries. Entry 29 in List I (Union List) reads as under:

''Airways; aircraft and air navigation; provision of aerodromes; regulation and organisation of air traffic and of aerodromes; provision for aeronautical education and training and regulation of such education and training provided by States and other agencies''.

Entry 24 in List II, (State List) reads:

''Industries subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I."

Entry 42 in List III (Concurrent List) reads:

''42. Acquisition and requisitioning of property. It may be noted here that Entry 33 in List I, Entry 36 in List II and Entry 42 in List III were amended by Section 26 of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956, by which, Entry 33 of List I and Entry 36 of List II were deleted and Entry 42 in List III was amended to read as set out hereinabove. Entry 33 in List I and Entry 36 in List II conferred legislative power on the Union and the States respectively for acquisition or requisitioning of property for its own purpose. Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, which made the aforementioned amendment was designed to clear the ambiguity about the power of acquisition and requisitioning of property being not a power incidental to any of the legislative powers but an independent power by itself. The object behind the amendment has been thus explained:

''The existence of three entries in the legislative lists (33 of List I, 36 of List II and 42 of List III) relating to the essentially single subject of acquisition and requisitioning of property by the government gives rise to unnecessary technical difficulties in legislation. In order to avoid these difficulties and simplify the constitutional position, it is proposed to omit the entries in the Union and State Lists and replace the entry in the concurrent list by a comprehensive entry covering the whole subject. (see Statement of Objects and Reasons in respect of Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956)."

11. The scope of Entry 42 in List III of the Seventh Schedule has been considered in detail inRustom Cavasjee Cooper -vs- Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248). After tracing the history of different Entries in Lists I and II in relation to acquisition of property, the Court stated as under:- (SCC pp.281-282, para 38)

38. Before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, Entry 33 List I invested Parliament with power to enact laws with respect to acquisition or requisitioning for the purpose of the Union, and Entry 36 List II conferred upon the State Legislature the power to legislate with respect to acquisition or requisitioning for the remaining purposes. Those entries are now deleted, and a single Entry 42 List III invests Parliament and the State Legislatures with power to legislate with respect to acquisition and requisitioning of property. By Entry 42 in the Concurrent List power was conferred upon Parliament and the State Legislatures to legislate with respect to Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purpose of the Union or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form in which such compensation is to be given . Power to legislate for acquisition of property is exercisable only under Entry 42 List III, and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists; (emphasis supplied)

12. In Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. -vs- State of U.P. (1980) 4 SCC 136, following the R.C.Cooper case, the court stated as follows:-

''25. There is thus a long line of decisions which clearly establishes the proposition that power to legislate for acquisition of property is an independent and separate power and is exercisable only under Entry 42, List III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists. This power of the State legislature to legislate for acquisition of property remains intact and untrammelled except to the extent where on assumption of control of an industry by a declaration as envisaged in Entry 52, List I, a further power of acquisition is taken over by a specific legislation."

13. In a subsequent judgment in Shri Krishna Gyanoday Sugar Ltd. -vs- State of Bihar, 2003 (4) SCC 378, a three-Judge Bench expressly rejected the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners therein that the decision in Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. -vs- State of U.P., 1990 (1) SCC 109, overrules the decision in Iswari Khetan case, cited supra, and held that the said argument is plainly untenable. The Bench observed as follows: -

''In Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. case, this court was concerned with the question of levy of excise duty on alcohol not fit for human consumption and three questions have been posed by this Court for consideration and they are as under: (SCC p.123, para 2) i. Whether the power to levy excise duty in case of industrial alcohol was with the State Legislature or the Central Legislature?

ii. What is the scope and ambit of Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution?

iii. Whether the State Government has exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing, selling, distributing, etc. of alcohols including industrial alcohol? In this connection, the extent, scope and ambit of such right or privilege has also to be examined.

None of these questions covers the aspects raised before us. Therefore, we hold that the decision in Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. case does not overrule impliedly or otherwise the decision in Ishwari Khetan case. The argument that at any rate the takeover of distillery is bad cannot also be sustained inasmuch as the concept of acquisition of an undertaking is an entirely different matter from the control and regulation of the industries."

14. It is thus a settled position of law that the power of acquisition is an independent power emanating from Entry 42 of List III in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and it is not ancillary or incidental to any of the Entries in List I, List II or List III. Entry 29 (List I) does not include power of acquisition and such power of acquisition flows independently from Entry 42 of List III.

15. On behalf of the petitioners, it is strenuously contended that Section 19 of the Airports Authority Act inasmuch as it refers to the Land Acqusition Act for the purpose of acquisition under the Airports Authority Act is undoubtedly an occupied field on legislation by reference, and reference to the corresponding law in Section 19 also implies only a Central Act, and the State cannot by its statutory power under the T.N.Acquisition Act acquire the land in the face of the existing Central Acts namely, Airports Authority Act and the Land Acquisition Act. It is contended that under the Land Acquisition Act, the definition appropriate Government has classified the acquisition into two categories i.e., Union purpose and all other purposes (State purpose). The State except the Union purpose can acquire the land for any other purpose including the companies under the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, the State has no power to acquire the land for airport expansion, which is essentially a Union purpose. We find absolutely no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Section 19 of the Airports Authority of India Act is only a referral provision referring to Land Acquisition Act and any other corresponding law. A mere declaration that the land can be acquired for the Authority under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or of any other corresponding law for the time being in force, does not affect the power of the State Government under Entry 42 of List III. It is difficult to see that how the field of acquisition could be said to be occupied by the Central Act by enacting Section 19. A reference to the Land Acquisition Act or any other corresponding law for the time being in force has to be construed as acquisition laws emanating from Entry 42 List III. In fact, the Airports Authority of India Act, generally speaking, does not deal with acquisition of property and it merely provides that the land may be acquired for the purpose of the Authority. There is no conflict between the State Act and the control exercised by the Central Government under the provisions of the Airports Authority of India Act and there is not even a remote encroachment on the field occupied by the Airports Authority of India Act. There is no reason to accept the narrow interpretation of the expression ''any other corresponding law'' in Section 19 of the Airports Authority of India Act to mean only the Central Act. The expression ''any other corresponding law'' would naturally include a State law as power of acquisition is held to be an independent power under Entry 42, List III of Seventh Schedule.

16. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that even assuming that the expression ''any corresponding law'' would include a State law, it must be a law in force as on the date of the enactment of the parent Act, i.e. Airports Authority of India Act. It is submitted that when theAirports Authority of India Act was enacted in 1994, the T.N.Acquisition Act was not in existence nor the Parliament could in 1994 have conceived that such an Act would be passed in 1997. The expression ''corresponding law for the time being in force" should include only the law which was there on the date of commencement of the Airports Authority of India Act. Therefore, the law which was there on the date of the commencement alone will apply and not future Act like the T.N.Acquisition Act, 1999. It is contended that construing the expression in such a way to include future laws will amount to abdication of legislative power as held in B.Shama Rao -vs- Union Territory, Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1480.

17. We are afraid that the decision in B.Shama Rao s case (cited supra) has no application to the present case. In B.Shama Rao case, the Supreme Court held that the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act (10 of 1965), which extended the Madras General Sales Tax Act (1 of 1959), as it stood immediately before the date on which the Pondicherry Act would be brought into force in the territory of Pondicherry by a notification issued by the Government as provided in S.1 (2) was void and still born, because the Pondicherry Legislature in enacting the Act in that manner had totally abdicated its legislative functions in the matter of sales tax legislation and surrendered it in favour of the Madras Legislature. In that case the Pondicherry Legislature adopted not only the Madras Act as it was when it enacted the Principal Act but also such amendment or amendments in that Act which might be passed by the Madras Legislature upto the time of the commencement of the Act. Whereas in the present case Section 19 of the Airports Authority of India Act merely provides that the land can be acquired for the Authority either under the Land Acquisition Act or under any corresponding law in force and the question of abdication of power by the Union Legislature does not arise at all. It is also not possible to accept the submission that the expression ''for the time being in force'' will have a nexus with the date of enactment of theAirports Authority of India Act. The expression ''for the time being in force'' merely implies that whenever the question of acquiring the land for the Airport Authority arises, the relevant corresponding laws of acquisition in force at that time can be resorted to. This is the clear thrust of section 19. Its scope and ambit cannot be circumscribed and frozen only to the point of time in the year 1994, when the Airports Authority of India Act was enacted. If such was the intention of the Parliament in framing Section 19, Section 19 would have employed a different phraseology, namely, ''laws at present in force'' instead of the phraseology ''laws for the time being in force". The phraseology ''laws for the time being in force" would necessarily mean laws in force from time to time and not laws in force only at a fixed point of time, i.e. the date on which the Airports Authority of India Act was enacted. The expression ''for the time being" denotes time indefinite and refers to indefinite state of facts which will arise in future and which may vary from time to time.

18. In Management of M.C.D. -vs- Prem Chand Gupta, AIR 2000 SC 454, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a similar argument that for construing regulation of conditions of service, only relevant rules in force at that time must be looked into. It was held that the phrase ''rules for the time being in force'' occurring in Regulation 4 (1) of Delhi Municipal Corporation Service Regulations of 1959, means rules in force from time to time and not rules in force only at first point of time in the year 1959, when service regulations are promulgated.

19. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the power to acquire land is a separate, distinct and independent power and is not an incident of the power to legislate under other entries. The Entries, which deal with airport and acquisition, are entirely different subject matters. Therefore, we do not think it is any longer open to the learned counsel for the petitioners to contend that the impugned acquisition of the land for the expansion of the airport is beyond the competence of the State Legislature.

Re.Contention (ii)

20. The contention advanced is that the State Government cannot resort to the T.N.Acquisition Act, as airport is not an industry for the purpose of the said Act. This contention also proceeds on the premise that the airport being a Union subject the State lacks competence to acquire the land. We have already seen that the State Act in question is in pith and substance a law for acquisition under Entry 42 of List III of the 7th Schedule. It can hardly be disputed that the State Government is primarily interested in development of the industries and in order to ensure industrial growth, infrastructural facilities like airport, railways, etc, are vitally important. In the broad sense, the purpose of expansion of the airport is also a State purpose or in other words a general public purpose. In this view also the acquisition in this case must be held to have been validly made.

Re.Contention (iii)

21. The next submission before us is about the failure to obtain prior environmental clearance before initiation of the acquisition proceedings. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board -vs- C.Kanchappa, 2006(6) SCC 371. In that case, the Court set aside the direction given by the Karnataka High Court to KIADB to leave a land of one kilometre as a buffer zone from the outer periphery of the village in order to maintain a ''green area'' towards preservation of land for grazing of cattle, agricultural operation, etc. The Court, however, directed that in future, before acquisition of lands for development, the KIADB must properly comprehend the consequence and adverse impact on the environment and that the lands acquired for development do not gravely impair the ecology and environment. The Board was further directed to incorporate the condition of allotment to obtain clearance from the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board before the land is allotted for development. The Court has not issued a general direction that in all the projects the authority is duty bound to obtain prior environmental clearance before initiation of the acquisition proceedings. In fact, para.2 of the Notification dated 14.9.2006 issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, provides that any project, which is covered by category (A) or category (B) before any construction work, or preparation of land by the project management except for securing the land, prior permission would be obtained. In a similar case, in respect of expansion of Mangalore Airport in the case of Environment Support Group & Others -vs- Union of India, decided on 07.2.2003, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order of the Karnataka High Court permitting the authority to proceed with the acquisition of lands, but directed that the Government shall comply with all applicable laws and also with environmental norms in constructing the Airport. Learned senior counsel Mr.V.T.Gopalan, appearing for the Airports Authority of India, as well as Mr.P.Wilson, learned Assistant Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India gave a categorical assurance that no construction activity would commence on the land before obtaining environmental clearance. It is also brought to our notice that an application has already been made to the competent authority for necessary clearance.

Re.Contention (iv)

22. The last contention advanced is that the State has no power to acquire the land for rehabilitation of the project affected persons under the State Act, and for acquisition of the rehabilitation purpose, the State must resort to the Land Acquisition Act. The argument is liable to be rejected as Section 3 of the T.N.Acquisition Act empowers the State Government to acquire the land which is required for industrial purpose or for any other purposes in furtherance of the objects of this Act. The rehabilitation of the persons affected by the expansion scheme is in furtherance of the object of the Act, and thus, the State has power to acquire the land needed for the rehabilitation purpose under Section 3 of the T.N.Acquisition Act.

23. It appears that the State has taken a policy decision to allot plots to the householders. A contention is raised before us on behalf of some of the landholders that their houses are not fully constructed due to the Notification and their cases also deserve to be considered on the same footing for allotment of alternative plots. The landholders are free to make a representation in that behalf and if such representation is received, the State will take appropriate decision in that regard in accordance with law. We may mention that W.P.No.36968 of 2007 is filed by the Management of an International School located in an area of nearly 3.54.5 Hectares and having more than 1300 students. Learned Advocate General has assured the Court that if the Management in the said writ petition makes a representation, the State will consider the same for allotment of an alternate site for the school in the nearby areas and will also take appropriate measures to ensure that the academic studies of the students are not affected.

24. In the result, in view of the foregoing discussion, we find absolutely no merit in the challenge raised to the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State Government for expansion of the Chennai Airport and the notices issued under Section 3(2) of the T.N.Acquisition Act, and we hold that the State is entitled to proceed with the acquisition and acquire the land and handover the same to the Airports Authority. Learned Advocate General assured the Court that if the objections are filed on or before 26.04.2008, the District Collector will consider the same on their own merits.

25. The writ petitions are dismissed with the above directions. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. No costs.

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