In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P.6
it has
been observed as follows: -
“We do not think that merely because the
appellant has tendered his apology we should
set aside the sentence and allow him to go
unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person
wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the
(1984) 3 SCC 405
grossest imputations against him has to do, is
to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on
tender a formal empty apology which costs him
practically nothing. If such an apology were to
be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception,
we would in fact be virtually issuing a “licence”
to scandalize courts and commit contempt of
court with impunity. It will be rather difficult to
persuade members of the Bar, who care for
their self-respect, to join the judiciary if they
are expected to pay such a price for it. And no
sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter
as per the dictates of his conscience on account
of the fear of being scandalized and persecuted
by an advocate who does not mind making
reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his
wishes. If this situation were to be
countenanced, advocates who can cow down
the Judges, and make them fall in line with their
wishes, by threats of character assassination
and persecution, will be preferred by the
litigants to the advocates who are mindful of
professional ethics and believe in maintaining
the decorum of courts.”
In the case at hand, we are absolutely convinced that
apology or for that matter the unconditional apology was
neither prompt nor genuine. The concept of mercy and
compassion is ordinarily attracted keeping in view the
infirmities of man’s nature and the fragile conduct but in a
court of law a counsel cannot always take shelter under
the canopy of mercy, for the law has to reign supreme.
The sanctity of law which is sustained through dignity of
courts cannot be marred by errant behaviour by any
counsel or litigant.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1430 OF 2010
Arun Kumar Yadav ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. Thru Dist. Judge ...Respondent
Decided on;May 29, 2013
This appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as
“the Act”) against the judgment and order dated
17.08.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Criminal Contempt No. 13 of 2006, by way of
which the High Court has convicted the appellant for
committing the contempt of court under Section 12 of the
Act and sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment for
one month and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- in default, toPage 2
undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of two
weeks.
On 5.9.2005 the appellant moved an application to
surrender Chhandra Pal @ Badara s/o Shri Mathura under
various sections of the Indian Penal Code in pursuance of
the order passed under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (for short “the Code”) by the learned Judicial
Magistrate. As the offences mentioned in the application
and the process issued under Section 82 of the Code were
different, the court asked a report from the police station
concerned fixing the next date for disposal. About 3.45
p.m., when the Presiding Officer of the Court was in the
midst of dictation of the order to his stenographer in
another case, i.e., Original Suit No. 200/90 titled Balraj V.
Rangpal, the appellant came inside the Court and shouted
loudly uttering as under: -
“As to why you did not take my accused in
judicial custody. You have passed arbitrary
orders. Now, my accused would be arrested
and he would be encountered. You have done
injustice. I will see you. If you have your official
force I am also having my own force.”
Apart from the aforesaid loud threatening utterances
the appellant had also used unparliamentary language for
the said Judicial Officer. The Judicial Officer sent a
complaint to the High Court against the appellant through
proper channel, the cognizance of which was taken by the
High Court, first on administrative side and, thereafter, on
judicial side. After hearing the parties, the High Court
framed the charges against the contemnor on 6.10.2006
in respect of this incident dated 5.9.2005 at Khaga Court,
District Fatehpur, using abusive language to Abdul
Qayum, learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division/Judicial
Magistrate, Khaga, District Fatehpur) and interrupted him
from working and shouting loudly while he was dictating
the order to his stenographer in other case. To the said
charge-sheet, the appellant filed the counter affidavit
dated 20.7.2006 denying all the allegations made in the
report of the Presiding Officer. However, at a later stage
by filing an affidavit dated 14.11.2006 he tendered
unconditional apology to the court. The matter was heard
at length. The High Court discussed the entire facts and
law and came to the conclusion that it was not a fit case
wherein unconditional apology tendered by the appellant
should be accepted and, thus, considering the gravity of
the charge against him, he had been convicted and
sentenced as referred to hereinabove.
We have heard Mr. T.N. Saxena, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant in detail, who has argued all
the legal and factual aspects before us. However, we can
express our anxiety and displeasure only on the issue that
we fail to understand how the High Court could afford to
take such a lenient view sentencing the appellant for one
month’s simple imprisonment only.
It has been reiterated by this Court time and again
that the Bar and the Bench are required to maintain the
decorum of the Court, for Court is the temple of justice for
all. No one has the authority to conduct in a manner
which would demean and disgrace the majesty of justice
which is dispensed by a court of law. The administration
of justice is the paramount role of the court and both Bar
and the Bench have an equal role in performance of the
said sacrosanct duty.
In this context, we may refer with profit to the
pronouncement in R.K. Garg, Advocate v. State of
Himachal Pradesh1
, wherein the Court has observed
thus:-
“The Bar and the Bench are an integral part of
the same mechanism which administers justice
to the people. Many members of the Bench are
drawn from the Bar and their past association is
a source of inspiration and pride to them. It
ought to be a matter of equal pride to the Bar. It
is unquestionably true that courtesy breeds
courtesy and just as charity has to begin at
home, courtesy must begin with the Judge. A
discourteous Judge is like an ill-tuned
instrument in the setting of a court room. But
members of the Bar will do well to remember
that such flagrant violations of professional
ethics and cultured conduct will only result in
the ultimate destruction of a system without
which no democracy can survive.”
In Mahabir Prasad Singh v. M/s. Jacks Aviation
Pvt. Ltd.2
, this Court has observed that judicial function
cannot and should not be permitted to be stonewalled by
browbeating or bullying methodology whether it is by
litigants or by counsel. In the said case the two learned
Judges, after referring to a three-Judge Bench decision in
Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi
Administration)3
, has opined thus: -
1
(1981) 3 SCC 166
2
AIR 1999 SC 287
3
AIR 1984 SC 618
“It was further reminded that “having accepted
the brief, he will be committing a breach of his
professional duty, if he so fails to attend”.
“A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing
that shall detract from the dignity of the Court,
of which he is himself a sworn officer and
assistant. He should at all times pay deferential
respect to the Judge, and scrupulously observe
the decorum of the Court room.”
(Warevelle’s Legal Ethics at p. 182)
Of course, it is not a unilateral affair.
There is a reciprocal duty for the Court also to
be courteous to the members of the Bar and to
make every endeavour for maintaining and
protecting the respect which members of the
Bar are entitled to have from their clients as
well as from the litigant public. Both the Bench
and the Bar are the two inextricable wings of
the judicial forum and therefore the aforesaid
mutual respect is sine qua non for the efficient
functioning of the solemn work carried on in
Courts of law. But that does not mean that any
advocate or group of them can boycott the
courts or any particular Court and ask the Court
to desist from discharging judicial functions. At
any rate, no advocate can ask the Court to
avoid a case on the ground that he does not
want to appear in that Court.”
In In Re: Sanjiv Datta, Deputy Secretary,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New
Delhi, Kailash Vasdev, Advocate and Kitty
Kumaramanglam (Smt.), Advocate4
certain
4
1995 (3) SCC 619
observations were made, though in different context, yet
we think it apt to reproduce the same:-
“The legal profession is a solemn and serious
occupation. It is a noble calling and all those
who belong to it are its honourable members.
Although the entry to the profession can be had
by acquiring merely the qualification of
technical competence, the honour as a
professional has to be maintained by its
members by their exemplary conduct both in
and outside the court. The legal profession is
different from other professions in that what the
lawyers do, affects not only an individual but
the administration of justice which is the
foundation of the civilised society. Both as a
leading member of the intelligentsia of the
society and as a responsible citizen, the lawyer
has to conduct himself as a model for others
both in his professional and in his private and
public life. The society has a right to expect of
him such ideal behaviour.”
In M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and
Haryana5
, it has been opined that
“The tendency of maligning the reputation of
judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail
to secure the desired order is ever on the
increase and it is high time it is nipped in the
bud. And, when a member of the profession
resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to
browbeating the Judge into submission, it is all
the more painful. When there is a deliberate
attempt to scandalise which would shake the
confidence of the litigating public in the system,
the damage caused is not only to the reputation
5
(1991) 3 SCC 600
of the Judge concerned but also to the fair name
of the judiciary.”
From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is clear as
noon day that the judicial proceeding has its own
solemnity and sanctity. No one has any authority to sully
the same. It is the obligation of everyone to behave with
propriety when a judicial proceeding is conducted. Any
kind of deviancy not only affects the system but corrodes
the faith of the collective at large. Neither any counsel
nor a litigant can afford to behave in this manner. This
being the position, it is really shocking that a counsel who
was in his mid fiftees could afford to behave like that.
Hence, we have expressed our displeasure.
The learned counsel for the appellant has
endeavoured had to impress us that when the appellant
had offered unconditional apology, the same should have
been accepted. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P.6
it has
been observed as follows: -
“We do not think that merely because the
appellant has tendered his apology we should
set aside the sentence and allow him to go
unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person
wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the
6
(1984) 3 SCC 405
grossest imputations against him has to do, is
to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on
tender a formal empty apology which costs him
practically nothing. If such an apology were to
be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception,
we would in fact be virtually issuing a “licence”
to scandalize courts and commit contempt of
court with impunity. It will be rather difficult to
persuade members of the Bar, who care for
their self-respect, to join the judiciary if they
are expected to pay such a price for it. And no
sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter
as per the dictates of his conscience on account
of the fear of being scandalized and persecuted
by an advocate who does not mind making
reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his
wishes. If this situation were to be
countenanced, advocates who can cow down
the Judges, and make them fall in line with their
wishes, by threats of character assassination
and persecution, will be preferred by the
litigants to the advocates who are mindful of
professional ethics and believe in maintaining
the decorum of courts.”
In the case at hand, we are absolutely convinced that
apology or for that matter the unconditional apology was
neither prompt nor genuine. The concept of mercy and
compassion is ordinarily attracted keeping in view the
infirmities of man’s nature and the fragile conduct but in a
court of law a counsel cannot always take shelter under
the canopy of mercy, for the law has to reign supreme.
The sanctity of law which is sustained through dignity of
courts cannot be marred by errant behaviour by any
counsel or litigant. Even a Judge is required to maintain
the decorum and dignity of the court.
In view of the above, we do not find any force in the
appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. The appellant is
directed to surrender and deposit the fine within a period
of thirty days from today, failing which the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Fatehpur, shall ensure to give effect to the
judgment and order passed by the High Court.
...................................................J.
[Dr. B. S. Chauhan]
....................................................J.
[Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
May 29, 2013
1
Print Page
it has
been observed as follows: -
“We do not think that merely because the
appellant has tendered his apology we should
set aside the sentence and allow him to go
unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person
wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the
(1984) 3 SCC 405
grossest imputations against him has to do, is
to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on
tender a formal empty apology which costs him
practically nothing. If such an apology were to
be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception,
we would in fact be virtually issuing a “licence”
to scandalize courts and commit contempt of
court with impunity. It will be rather difficult to
persuade members of the Bar, who care for
their self-respect, to join the judiciary if they
are expected to pay such a price for it. And no
sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter
as per the dictates of his conscience on account
of the fear of being scandalized and persecuted
by an advocate who does not mind making
reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his
wishes. If this situation were to be
countenanced, advocates who can cow down
the Judges, and make them fall in line with their
wishes, by threats of character assassination
and persecution, will be preferred by the
litigants to the advocates who are mindful of
professional ethics and believe in maintaining
the decorum of courts.”
In the case at hand, we are absolutely convinced that
apology or for that matter the unconditional apology was
neither prompt nor genuine. The concept of mercy and
compassion is ordinarily attracted keeping in view the
infirmities of man’s nature and the fragile conduct but in a
court of law a counsel cannot always take shelter under
the canopy of mercy, for the law has to reign supreme.
The sanctity of law which is sustained through dignity of
courts cannot be marred by errant behaviour by any
counsel or litigant.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1430 OF 2010
Arun Kumar Yadav ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. Thru Dist. Judge ...Respondent
Decided on;May 29, 2013
This appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as
“the Act”) against the judgment and order dated
17.08.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Criminal Contempt No. 13 of 2006, by way of
which the High Court has convicted the appellant for
committing the contempt of court under Section 12 of the
Act and sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment for
one month and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- in default, toPage 2
undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of two
weeks.
On 5.9.2005 the appellant moved an application to
surrender Chhandra Pal @ Badara s/o Shri Mathura under
various sections of the Indian Penal Code in pursuance of
the order passed under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (for short “the Code”) by the learned Judicial
Magistrate. As the offences mentioned in the application
and the process issued under Section 82 of the Code were
different, the court asked a report from the police station
concerned fixing the next date for disposal. About 3.45
p.m., when the Presiding Officer of the Court was in the
midst of dictation of the order to his stenographer in
another case, i.e., Original Suit No. 200/90 titled Balraj V.
Rangpal, the appellant came inside the Court and shouted
loudly uttering as under: -
“As to why you did not take my accused in
judicial custody. You have passed arbitrary
orders. Now, my accused would be arrested
and he would be encountered. You have done
injustice. I will see you. If you have your official
force I am also having my own force.”
Apart from the aforesaid loud threatening utterances
the appellant had also used unparliamentary language for
the said Judicial Officer. The Judicial Officer sent a
complaint to the High Court against the appellant through
proper channel, the cognizance of which was taken by the
High Court, first on administrative side and, thereafter, on
judicial side. After hearing the parties, the High Court
framed the charges against the contemnor on 6.10.2006
in respect of this incident dated 5.9.2005 at Khaga Court,
District Fatehpur, using abusive language to Abdul
Qayum, learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division/Judicial
Magistrate, Khaga, District Fatehpur) and interrupted him
from working and shouting loudly while he was dictating
the order to his stenographer in other case. To the said
charge-sheet, the appellant filed the counter affidavit
dated 20.7.2006 denying all the allegations made in the
report of the Presiding Officer. However, at a later stage
by filing an affidavit dated 14.11.2006 he tendered
unconditional apology to the court. The matter was heard
at length. The High Court discussed the entire facts and
law and came to the conclusion that it was not a fit case
wherein unconditional apology tendered by the appellant
should be accepted and, thus, considering the gravity of
the charge against him, he had been convicted and
sentenced as referred to hereinabove.
We have heard Mr. T.N. Saxena, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant in detail, who has argued all
the legal and factual aspects before us. However, we can
express our anxiety and displeasure only on the issue that
we fail to understand how the High Court could afford to
take such a lenient view sentencing the appellant for one
month’s simple imprisonment only.
It has been reiterated by this Court time and again
that the Bar and the Bench are required to maintain the
decorum of the Court, for Court is the temple of justice for
all. No one has the authority to conduct in a manner
which would demean and disgrace the majesty of justice
which is dispensed by a court of law. The administration
of justice is the paramount role of the court and both Bar
and the Bench have an equal role in performance of the
said sacrosanct duty.
In this context, we may refer with profit to the
pronouncement in R.K. Garg, Advocate v. State of
Himachal Pradesh1
, wherein the Court has observed
thus:-
“The Bar and the Bench are an integral part of
the same mechanism which administers justice
to the people. Many members of the Bench are
drawn from the Bar and their past association is
a source of inspiration and pride to them. It
ought to be a matter of equal pride to the Bar. It
is unquestionably true that courtesy breeds
courtesy and just as charity has to begin at
home, courtesy must begin with the Judge. A
discourteous Judge is like an ill-tuned
instrument in the setting of a court room. But
members of the Bar will do well to remember
that such flagrant violations of professional
ethics and cultured conduct will only result in
the ultimate destruction of a system without
which no democracy can survive.”
In Mahabir Prasad Singh v. M/s. Jacks Aviation
Pvt. Ltd.2
, this Court has observed that judicial function
cannot and should not be permitted to be stonewalled by
browbeating or bullying methodology whether it is by
litigants or by counsel. In the said case the two learned
Judges, after referring to a three-Judge Bench decision in
Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi
Administration)3
, has opined thus: -
1
(1981) 3 SCC 166
2
AIR 1999 SC 287
3
AIR 1984 SC 618
“It was further reminded that “having accepted
the brief, he will be committing a breach of his
professional duty, if he so fails to attend”.
“A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing
that shall detract from the dignity of the Court,
of which he is himself a sworn officer and
assistant. He should at all times pay deferential
respect to the Judge, and scrupulously observe
the decorum of the Court room.”
(Warevelle’s Legal Ethics at p. 182)
Of course, it is not a unilateral affair.
There is a reciprocal duty for the Court also to
be courteous to the members of the Bar and to
make every endeavour for maintaining and
protecting the respect which members of the
Bar are entitled to have from their clients as
well as from the litigant public. Both the Bench
and the Bar are the two inextricable wings of
the judicial forum and therefore the aforesaid
mutual respect is sine qua non for the efficient
functioning of the solemn work carried on in
Courts of law. But that does not mean that any
advocate or group of them can boycott the
courts or any particular Court and ask the Court
to desist from discharging judicial functions. At
any rate, no advocate can ask the Court to
avoid a case on the ground that he does not
want to appear in that Court.”
In In Re: Sanjiv Datta, Deputy Secretary,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New
Delhi, Kailash Vasdev, Advocate and Kitty
Kumaramanglam (Smt.), Advocate4
certain
4
1995 (3) SCC 619
observations were made, though in different context, yet
we think it apt to reproduce the same:-
“The legal profession is a solemn and serious
occupation. It is a noble calling and all those
who belong to it are its honourable members.
Although the entry to the profession can be had
by acquiring merely the qualification of
technical competence, the honour as a
professional has to be maintained by its
members by their exemplary conduct both in
and outside the court. The legal profession is
different from other professions in that what the
lawyers do, affects not only an individual but
the administration of justice which is the
foundation of the civilised society. Both as a
leading member of the intelligentsia of the
society and as a responsible citizen, the lawyer
has to conduct himself as a model for others
both in his professional and in his private and
public life. The society has a right to expect of
him such ideal behaviour.”
In M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and
Haryana5
, it has been opined that
“The tendency of maligning the reputation of
judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail
to secure the desired order is ever on the
increase and it is high time it is nipped in the
bud. And, when a member of the profession
resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to
browbeating the Judge into submission, it is all
the more painful. When there is a deliberate
attempt to scandalise which would shake the
confidence of the litigating public in the system,
the damage caused is not only to the reputation
5
(1991) 3 SCC 600
of the Judge concerned but also to the fair name
of the judiciary.”
From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is clear as
noon day that the judicial proceeding has its own
solemnity and sanctity. No one has any authority to sully
the same. It is the obligation of everyone to behave with
propriety when a judicial proceeding is conducted. Any
kind of deviancy not only affects the system but corrodes
the faith of the collective at large. Neither any counsel
nor a litigant can afford to behave in this manner. This
being the position, it is really shocking that a counsel who
was in his mid fiftees could afford to behave like that.
Hence, we have expressed our displeasure.
The learned counsel for the appellant has
endeavoured had to impress us that when the appellant
had offered unconditional apology, the same should have
been accepted. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P.6
it has
been observed as follows: -
“We do not think that merely because the
appellant has tendered his apology we should
set aside the sentence and allow him to go
unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person
wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the
6
(1984) 3 SCC 405
grossest imputations against him has to do, is
to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on
tender a formal empty apology which costs him
practically nothing. If such an apology were to
be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception,
we would in fact be virtually issuing a “licence”
to scandalize courts and commit contempt of
court with impunity. It will be rather difficult to
persuade members of the Bar, who care for
their self-respect, to join the judiciary if they
are expected to pay such a price for it. And no
sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter
as per the dictates of his conscience on account
of the fear of being scandalized and persecuted
by an advocate who does not mind making
reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his
wishes. If this situation were to be
countenanced, advocates who can cow down
the Judges, and make them fall in line with their
wishes, by threats of character assassination
and persecution, will be preferred by the
litigants to the advocates who are mindful of
professional ethics and believe in maintaining
the decorum of courts.”
In the case at hand, we are absolutely convinced that
apology or for that matter the unconditional apology was
neither prompt nor genuine. The concept of mercy and
compassion is ordinarily attracted keeping in view the
infirmities of man’s nature and the fragile conduct but in a
court of law a counsel cannot always take shelter under
the canopy of mercy, for the law has to reign supreme.
The sanctity of law which is sustained through dignity of
courts cannot be marred by errant behaviour by any
counsel or litigant. Even a Judge is required to maintain
the decorum and dignity of the court.
In view of the above, we do not find any force in the
appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. The appellant is
directed to surrender and deposit the fine within a period
of thirty days from today, failing which the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Fatehpur, shall ensure to give effect to the
judgment and order passed by the High Court.
...................................................J.
[Dr. B. S. Chauhan]
....................................................J.
[Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
May 29, 2013
1
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