“The basic rule of thumb over the years has been
the so called single transaction rule for concurrent
sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two
offences under two enactments generally, it is
wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper
and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But
this rule has no application if the transaction relating
to offences is not the same or the facts constituting
the two offences are quite different.”1
In conclusion, we may say that the legal position
favours exercise of discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in
cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction
no matter different complaints in relation thereto may have
been filed as is the position in cases involving dishonour of
cheques issued by the borrower towards repayment of a loan
to the creditor.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
V.K. Bansal
Versus
State of Haryana and Ors.
Decided on;July 5, 2013
1. Leave granted.
2. The short question that falls for determination in these
appeals by special leave is whether the High Court was right
in declining the prayer made by the appellant for a direction
in terms of Section 427 read with Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure for the sentences awarded to the
appellant in connection with the cases under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act filed against him to run
concurrently.
3. The material facts are not in dispute. The appellant is a
Director in a group of companies including Arawali Tubes
Ltd., Arawali Alloys Ltd., Arawali Pipes Ltd. and Sabhyata
Plastics Pvt. Ltd. The appellant’s case before us in that in
connection with his business conducted in the name of the
above companies, he had approached the respondent,
Haryana Financial Corporation for financial assistance and
facilities. The Corporation had accepted the requests made
by the Companies and granted financial assistance to the
first three of the four companies mentioned above. Several
cheques towards repayment of the amount borrowed by the
appellant in the name of the above companies were issued in
favour of the Haryana Financial Corporation which on
presentation were dishonoured by the banks concerned for
insufficiency of funds. Consequently, the Corporation
instituted complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act against the appellant in his capacity as the
Director of the borrowing companies. These complaints were
tried by Judicial Magistrates at Hissar culminating in the
conviction of the appellant and sentence of imprisonment
which ranged between 6 months in some cases to one year
in some others besides imposition of different amounts of
fine levied in each complaint case and a default sentence in
the event of non payment of amount awarded in each one of
those cases.
4. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence in the
cases filed against him the appellant preferred appeals which
were heard and dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Hissar in terms of separate orders passed in each case. In
some of the cases the Appellate Court reduced the sentence
from one year to nine months.
5. The appellant then approached the High Court by way
of revision petitions. The High Court dismissed 15 out of 17
revisions petitions in which the appellant was convicted. The
remaining two revision petitions are still pending before the
High Court. The High Court noticed that the appellant had
not questioned the correctness of the conviction before the
appellate Court which disentitled him to do so in revision.
That position was, it appears, not disputed even by the
appellant, the only contention urged before the High Court
being that instead of the sentences awarded to him running
consecutively they ought to run concurrently. That
contention was turned down by the High Court holding that
the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant was
not excessive so as to warrant its reduction or a direction for
concurrent running of the same. The High Court noted:
“As regards sentence, keeping in view the amount of
cheques, sentence of simple imprisonment for six
months in each case cannot be said to be excessive
so as warrant reduction or direction for concurrent
running of the sentences in all the 8 cases. Even
sentence in default of payment of fine, which is
huge amount, also cannot be said to be excessive”.
6. The revision petitions filed by the appellant along with
the criminal miscellaneous applications moved under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. were accordingly dismissed. The present
appeals assail the correctness of the orders passed by the
High Court which are no doubt separate but in similar terms.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously
argued that the High Court has committed an error in
declining the prayer made by the appellant for an
appropriate direction to the effect that the sentences
awarded to the appellant in the cases in which he was found
guilty ought to run concurrently and not consecutively. It
was urged that the trial Court and so also the appellate and
the revisional Courts were competent to direct that the
sentences awarded to the appellant should run concurrently.
The power vested in them to issue such a direction has not
been properly exercised, contended the learned counsel.
Reliance in support was placed upon the decision of this
Court in State of Punjab v. Madan Lal (2009) 5 SCC
238.
8. Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals
with situations where an offender who is already undergoing
a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life. It
provides that such imprisonment or imprisonment for life
shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to
which he has been previously sentenced unless the Court
directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently
with such previous sentence. Section 427 may at this stage
be extracted:
“427. Sentence on offender already sentenced
for another offence - (1) when an person already
undergoing sentence of imprisonment is sentenced
on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or
imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or
imprisonment for life shall commence at the
expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been
previously sentenced unless the Court directs that
the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently
with such previous sentence.
Provided that where a person who has been
sentenced to imprisonment by an order under
Section 122 in default of furnishing security is,
whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to
imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the
making of such order, the latter sentence shall
commence immediately.
(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence
of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a
subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or
imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall
run concurrently with such previous sentence.”
9. That upon a subsequent conviction the imprisonment or
imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the
imprisonment which has been previously awarded is manifest
from a plain reading of the above. The only contingency in
which this position will not hold good is where the Court
directs otherwise. Proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 427 is
not for the present relevant as the same deals with cases
where the person concerned is sentenced to imprisonment
by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing
security which is not the position in the case at hand.
Similarly sub-section (2) to Section 427 deals with situations
where a person already undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for
life. Sub-section (2) provides that the subsequent sentence
shall in such a case run concurrently with such previous
sentence.
10. We are in the case at hand concerned more with the
nature of power available to the Court under Section 427(1)
of the Code, which in our opinion stipulates a general rule to
be followed except in three situations, one falling under the
proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 427, the second falling
under sub-section (2) thereof and the third where the Court
directs that the sentences shall run concurrently. It is
manifest from Section 427(1) that the Court has the power
and the discretion to issue a direction but in the very nature
of the power so conferred upon the Court the discretionary
power shall have to be exercised along judicial lines and not
in a mechanical, wooden or pedantic manner. It is difficult to
lay down any strait jacket approach in the matter of exercise
of such discretion by the Courts. There is no cut and dried
formula for the Court to follow in the matter of issue or
refusal of a direction within the contemplation of Section
427(1). Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a
given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or
offences committed, and the fact situation in which the
question of concurrent running of the sentences arises. High
Courts in this country have, therefore, invoked and exercised
their discretion to issue directions for concurrent running of
sentence as much as they have declined such benefit to the
prisoners. For instance a direction for concurrent running of
the sentence has been declined by the Gujarat High Court in
Sumlo @ Sumla Himla Bhuriya and Ors. v. State of
Gujarat and Ors. 2007 Crl.L.J. 612 that related to
commission of offences at three different places resulting in
three different prosecutions before three different Courts.
The High Court observed:
“The rule of 'single transaction' even if stretched to
any extent will not bring the cases aforesaid under
the umbrella of 'single transaction' rule and
therefore, this application fails. The application is
rejected.”
11. Similarly a direction for concurrent running of sentence
has been declined by the same High Court in State of
Gujarat v. Zaverbhai Kababhai 1996 Crl.L.J. 1296 which
related to an offence of rape committed at different places
resulting in conviction in each one of those offences in
different prosecutions. The High Court observed:
“….It is true that it is left to the discretion of the
Court while ordering the sentence to run either
consecutively or concurrently. However, such
discretion has to be exercised judicially, having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
As observed by the Supreme Court, the rule with
regard to sentencing concurrently will have no
application, if the transaction relating to offence is
not the same and the facts constituting the two
offences are quite different. The respondent-accused
is found to be guilty for the offence punishable
under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code in two
different and distinct occurrences on two different
dates, and the transactions relating to the
commission of the offences have no nexus with each
other…
12. There are also cases where the High Courts have
depending upon whether facts forming the basis of
prosecution arise out of a single transaction or transactions
that are akin to each other directed that the sentences
awarded should run concurrently. As for instance the High
Court of Allahabad has in Mulaim Singh v. State 1974 Crl.
L.J. 1397 directed the sentence to run concurrently since
the nature of the offence and the transactions thereto were
akin to each other. Suffice it to say that the discretion vested
in the Court for a direction in terms of Section 427 can and
ought to be exercised having regard to the nature of the
offence committed and the facts situation, in which the
question arises.
13. We may at this stage refer to the decision of this Court
in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Assistant Collector of
Customs (1988) 4 SCC 183 in which this Court recognised
the basic rule of convictions arising out of a single transaction
justifying concurrent running of the sentences. The following
passage is in this regard apposite:
“The basic rule of thumb over the years has been
the so called single transaction rule for concurrent
sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two
offences under two enactments generally, it is
wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper
and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But
this rule has no application if the transaction relating
to offences is not the same or the facts constituting
the two offences are quite different.”
14. In. Madan Lal’s case (supra) this Court relied upon the
decision in Akhtar Hussain’s case (supra) and affirmed the
direction of the High Court for the sentences to run
concurrently. That too was a case under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. The State was aggrieved of the
direction that the sentences shall run concurrently and had
appealed to this Court against the same. This Court,
however, declined interference with the order passed by the
High Court and upheld the direction issued by the High
Court.
15. In conclusion, we may say that the legal position
favours exercise of discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in
cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction
no matter different complaints in relation thereto may have
been filed as is the position in cases involving dishonour of
cheques issued by the borrower towards repayment of a loan
to the creditor.
16. Applying the above test to the 15 cases at hand we find
that the cases against the appellant fall in three distinct
categories. The transactions forming the basis of the
prosecution relate to three different corporate entities who
had either entered into loan transactions with the State
Financial Corporation or taken some other financial benefit
like purchase of a cheque from the appellant that was on
presentation dishonoured. The 15 cases that have
culminated in the conviction of the appellant and the award
of sentences of imprisonment and fine imposed upon him
may be categorised as under:
1) Cases in which complainant-Haryana State Financial
Corporation advanced a loan/banking facility to M/s
Arawali Tubes Ltd. acting through the appellant as its
Director viz. No.269-II/97; No.549-II/97; No.393-II/97;
No.371-II/97; No.372-II/97; No.373-II/97; No.877-
II/96; No.880-II/96; No.878-II/96; No.876-II/96;
No.879-II/96; No.485-II/96
2) Cases in which complainant-Haryana State Financial
Corporation advanced a loan/banking facility to the
appellant to M/s Arawali Alloys Ltd. acting through the
appellant as its Director viz. No.156-II/1997 and
No.396-II/1998
3) Criminal complaint No. 331-II/97 in which complainant-
State Bank of Patiala purchased/discounted the cheque
offered by Sabhyata Plastics acting through the
appellant as its Director.
17. Applying the principle of single transaction referred to
above to the above fact situations we are of the view that
each one of the loan transactions/financial arrangements was
a separate and distinct transaction between the complainant
on the one hand and the borrowing company/appellant on
the other. If different cheques which are subsequently
dishonoured on presentation, are issued by the borrowing
company acting through the appellant, the same could be
said to be arising out of a single loan transaction so as to
justify a direction for concurrent running of the sentences
awarded in relation to dishonour of cheques relevant to each
such transaction. That being so, the substantive
sentence awarded to the appellant in each case relevant to
the transactions with each company referred to above ought
to run concurrently. We, however, see no reason to extend
that concession to transactions in which the borrowing
company is different no matter the appellant before us is the
promoter/Director of the said other companies also. Similarly
we see no reason to direct running of the sentence
concurrently in the case filed by the State Bank of Patiala
against M/s Sabhyata Plastics and M/s Rahul Plastics which
transaction is also independent of any loan or financial
assistance between the State Financial Corporation and the
borrowing companies. We make it clear that the direction
regarding concurrent running of sentence shall be limited to
the substantive sentence only. The sentence which the
appellant has been directed to undergo in default of payment
of fine/compensation shall not be affected by this direction.
We do so because the provisions of Section 427 of the
Cr.P.C. do not, in our opinion, permit a direction for the
concurrent running of the substantive sentences with
sentences awarded in default of payment of
fine/compensation.
18. In the result, these appeals succeed but only in part
and to the following extent:
1) Substantive sentences awarded to the appellant by the
Courts of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Hissar and
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar, in Criminal
complaint cases No.269-II/97; No.549-II/97; No.393-
II/97; No.371-II/97; No.372-II/97; No.373-II/97; No.877-
II/96; No.880-II/96; No.878-II/96; No.876-II/96; No.879-
II/96; No.485-II/96 relevant to the loan transaction
between Haryana Financial Corporation and Arawali Tubes
shall run concurrently.
2) Substantive sentences awarded to the appellant by the
Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Hissar in Criminal
complaint cases No.156-II/1997 and No.396-II/1998
between Haryana Financial Corporation and Arawali Alloys
relevant to the transactions shall also run concurrently;
3) Substantive sentences inter se by the Court of Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Hissar in the above two categories
and that awarded in complaint case No.331-II/97 shall run
consecutively in terms of Section 427 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
4) No costs.
………………...…………J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
…………………...………J.
(GYAN SUDHA MISRA)
New Delhi
July 5, 2013
Print Page
the so called single transaction rule for concurrent
sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two
offences under two enactments generally, it is
wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper
and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But
this rule has no application if the transaction relating
to offences is not the same or the facts constituting
the two offences are quite different.”1
In conclusion, we may say that the legal position
favours exercise of discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in
cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction
no matter different complaints in relation thereto may have
been filed as is the position in cases involving dishonour of
cheques issued by the borrower towards repayment of a loan
to the creditor.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
V.K. Bansal
Versus
State of Haryana and Ors.
Decided on;July 5, 2013
1. Leave granted.
2. The short question that falls for determination in these
appeals by special leave is whether the High Court was right
in declining the prayer made by the appellant for a direction
in terms of Section 427 read with Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure for the sentences awarded to the
appellant in connection with the cases under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act filed against him to run
concurrently.
3. The material facts are not in dispute. The appellant is a
Director in a group of companies including Arawali Tubes
Ltd., Arawali Alloys Ltd., Arawali Pipes Ltd. and Sabhyata
Plastics Pvt. Ltd. The appellant’s case before us in that in
connection with his business conducted in the name of the
above companies, he had approached the respondent,
Haryana Financial Corporation for financial assistance and
facilities. The Corporation had accepted the requests made
by the Companies and granted financial assistance to the
first three of the four companies mentioned above. Several
cheques towards repayment of the amount borrowed by the
appellant in the name of the above companies were issued in
favour of the Haryana Financial Corporation which on
presentation were dishonoured by the banks concerned for
insufficiency of funds. Consequently, the Corporation
instituted complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act against the appellant in his capacity as the
Director of the borrowing companies. These complaints were
tried by Judicial Magistrates at Hissar culminating in the
conviction of the appellant and sentence of imprisonment
which ranged between 6 months in some cases to one year
in some others besides imposition of different amounts of
fine levied in each complaint case and a default sentence in
the event of non payment of amount awarded in each one of
those cases.
4. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence in the
cases filed against him the appellant preferred appeals which
were heard and dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Hissar in terms of separate orders passed in each case. In
some of the cases the Appellate Court reduced the sentence
from one year to nine months.
5. The appellant then approached the High Court by way
of revision petitions. The High Court dismissed 15 out of 17
revisions petitions in which the appellant was convicted. The
remaining two revision petitions are still pending before the
High Court. The High Court noticed that the appellant had
not questioned the correctness of the conviction before the
appellate Court which disentitled him to do so in revision.
That position was, it appears, not disputed even by the
appellant, the only contention urged before the High Court
being that instead of the sentences awarded to him running
consecutively they ought to run concurrently. That
contention was turned down by the High Court holding that
the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant was
not excessive so as to warrant its reduction or a direction for
concurrent running of the same. The High Court noted:
“As regards sentence, keeping in view the amount of
cheques, sentence of simple imprisonment for six
months in each case cannot be said to be excessive
so as warrant reduction or direction for concurrent
running of the sentences in all the 8 cases. Even
sentence in default of payment of fine, which is
huge amount, also cannot be said to be excessive”.
6. The revision petitions filed by the appellant along with
the criminal miscellaneous applications moved under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. were accordingly dismissed. The present
appeals assail the correctness of the orders passed by the
High Court which are no doubt separate but in similar terms.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously
argued that the High Court has committed an error in
declining the prayer made by the appellant for an
appropriate direction to the effect that the sentences
awarded to the appellant in the cases in which he was found
guilty ought to run concurrently and not consecutively. It
was urged that the trial Court and so also the appellate and
the revisional Courts were competent to direct that the
sentences awarded to the appellant should run concurrently.
The power vested in them to issue such a direction has not
been properly exercised, contended the learned counsel.
Reliance in support was placed upon the decision of this
Court in State of Punjab v. Madan Lal (2009) 5 SCC
238.
8. Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals
with situations where an offender who is already undergoing
a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life. It
provides that such imprisonment or imprisonment for life
shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to
which he has been previously sentenced unless the Court
directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently
with such previous sentence. Section 427 may at this stage
be extracted:
“427. Sentence on offender already sentenced
for another offence - (1) when an person already
undergoing sentence of imprisonment is sentenced
on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or
imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or
imprisonment for life shall commence at the
expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been
previously sentenced unless the Court directs that
the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently
with such previous sentence.
Provided that where a person who has been
sentenced to imprisonment by an order under
Section 122 in default of furnishing security is,
whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to
imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the
making of such order, the latter sentence shall
commence immediately.
(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence
of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a
subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or
imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall
run concurrently with such previous sentence.”
9. That upon a subsequent conviction the imprisonment or
imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the
imprisonment which has been previously awarded is manifest
from a plain reading of the above. The only contingency in
which this position will not hold good is where the Court
directs otherwise. Proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 427 is
not for the present relevant as the same deals with cases
where the person concerned is sentenced to imprisonment
by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing
security which is not the position in the case at hand.
Similarly sub-section (2) to Section 427 deals with situations
where a person already undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for
life. Sub-section (2) provides that the subsequent sentence
shall in such a case run concurrently with such previous
sentence.
10. We are in the case at hand concerned more with the
nature of power available to the Court under Section 427(1)
of the Code, which in our opinion stipulates a general rule to
be followed except in three situations, one falling under the
proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 427, the second falling
under sub-section (2) thereof and the third where the Court
directs that the sentences shall run concurrently. It is
manifest from Section 427(1) that the Court has the power
and the discretion to issue a direction but in the very nature
of the power so conferred upon the Court the discretionary
power shall have to be exercised along judicial lines and not
in a mechanical, wooden or pedantic manner. It is difficult to
lay down any strait jacket approach in the matter of exercise
of such discretion by the Courts. There is no cut and dried
formula for the Court to follow in the matter of issue or
refusal of a direction within the contemplation of Section
427(1). Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a
given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or
offences committed, and the fact situation in which the
question of concurrent running of the sentences arises. High
Courts in this country have, therefore, invoked and exercised
their discretion to issue directions for concurrent running of
sentence as much as they have declined such benefit to the
prisoners. For instance a direction for concurrent running of
the sentence has been declined by the Gujarat High Court in
Sumlo @ Sumla Himla Bhuriya and Ors. v. State of
Gujarat and Ors. 2007 Crl.L.J. 612 that related to
commission of offences at three different places resulting in
three different prosecutions before three different Courts.
The High Court observed:
“The rule of 'single transaction' even if stretched to
any extent will not bring the cases aforesaid under
the umbrella of 'single transaction' rule and
therefore, this application fails. The application is
rejected.”
11. Similarly a direction for concurrent running of sentence
has been declined by the same High Court in State of
Gujarat v. Zaverbhai Kababhai 1996 Crl.L.J. 1296 which
related to an offence of rape committed at different places
resulting in conviction in each one of those offences in
different prosecutions. The High Court observed:
“….It is true that it is left to the discretion of the
Court while ordering the sentence to run either
consecutively or concurrently. However, such
discretion has to be exercised judicially, having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
As observed by the Supreme Court, the rule with
regard to sentencing concurrently will have no
application, if the transaction relating to offence is
not the same and the facts constituting the two
offences are quite different. The respondent-accused
is found to be guilty for the offence punishable
under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code in two
different and distinct occurrences on two different
dates, and the transactions relating to the
commission of the offences have no nexus with each
other…
12. There are also cases where the High Courts have
depending upon whether facts forming the basis of
prosecution arise out of a single transaction or transactions
that are akin to each other directed that the sentences
awarded should run concurrently. As for instance the High
Court of Allahabad has in Mulaim Singh v. State 1974 Crl.
L.J. 1397 directed the sentence to run concurrently since
the nature of the offence and the transactions thereto were
akin to each other. Suffice it to say that the discretion vested
in the Court for a direction in terms of Section 427 can and
ought to be exercised having regard to the nature of the
offence committed and the facts situation, in which the
question arises.
13. We may at this stage refer to the decision of this Court
in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Assistant Collector of
Customs (1988) 4 SCC 183 in which this Court recognised
the basic rule of convictions arising out of a single transaction
justifying concurrent running of the sentences. The following
passage is in this regard apposite:
“The basic rule of thumb over the years has been
the so called single transaction rule for concurrent
sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two
offences under two enactments generally, it is
wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper
and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But
this rule has no application if the transaction relating
to offences is not the same or the facts constituting
the two offences are quite different.”
14. In. Madan Lal’s case (supra) this Court relied upon the
decision in Akhtar Hussain’s case (supra) and affirmed the
direction of the High Court for the sentences to run
concurrently. That too was a case under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. The State was aggrieved of the
direction that the sentences shall run concurrently and had
appealed to this Court against the same. This Court,
however, declined interference with the order passed by the
High Court and upheld the direction issued by the High
Court.
15. In conclusion, we may say that the legal position
favours exercise of discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in
cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction
no matter different complaints in relation thereto may have
been filed as is the position in cases involving dishonour of
cheques issued by the borrower towards repayment of a loan
to the creditor.
16. Applying the above test to the 15 cases at hand we find
that the cases against the appellant fall in three distinct
categories. The transactions forming the basis of the
prosecution relate to three different corporate entities who
had either entered into loan transactions with the State
Financial Corporation or taken some other financial benefit
like purchase of a cheque from the appellant that was on
presentation dishonoured. The 15 cases that have
culminated in the conviction of the appellant and the award
of sentences of imprisonment and fine imposed upon him
may be categorised as under:
1) Cases in which complainant-Haryana State Financial
Corporation advanced a loan/banking facility to M/s
Arawali Tubes Ltd. acting through the appellant as its
Director viz. No.269-II/97; No.549-II/97; No.393-II/97;
No.371-II/97; No.372-II/97; No.373-II/97; No.877-
II/96; No.880-II/96; No.878-II/96; No.876-II/96;
No.879-II/96; No.485-II/96
2) Cases in which complainant-Haryana State Financial
Corporation advanced a loan/banking facility to the
appellant to M/s Arawali Alloys Ltd. acting through the
appellant as its Director viz. No.156-II/1997 and
No.396-II/1998
3) Criminal complaint No. 331-II/97 in which complainant-
State Bank of Patiala purchased/discounted the cheque
offered by Sabhyata Plastics acting through the
appellant as its Director.
17. Applying the principle of single transaction referred to
above to the above fact situations we are of the view that
each one of the loan transactions/financial arrangements was
a separate and distinct transaction between the complainant
on the one hand and the borrowing company/appellant on
the other. If different cheques which are subsequently
dishonoured on presentation, are issued by the borrowing
company acting through the appellant, the same could be
said to be arising out of a single loan transaction so as to
justify a direction for concurrent running of the sentences
awarded in relation to dishonour of cheques relevant to each
such transaction. That being so, the substantive
sentence awarded to the appellant in each case relevant to
the transactions with each company referred to above ought
to run concurrently. We, however, see no reason to extend
that concession to transactions in which the borrowing
company is different no matter the appellant before us is the
promoter/Director of the said other companies also. Similarly
we see no reason to direct running of the sentence
concurrently in the case filed by the State Bank of Patiala
against M/s Sabhyata Plastics and M/s Rahul Plastics which
transaction is also independent of any loan or financial
assistance between the State Financial Corporation and the
borrowing companies. We make it clear that the direction
regarding concurrent running of sentence shall be limited to
the substantive sentence only. The sentence which the
appellant has been directed to undergo in default of payment
of fine/compensation shall not be affected by this direction.
We do so because the provisions of Section 427 of the
Cr.P.C. do not, in our opinion, permit a direction for the
concurrent running of the substantive sentences with
sentences awarded in default of payment of
fine/compensation.
18. In the result, these appeals succeed but only in part
and to the following extent:
1) Substantive sentences awarded to the appellant by the
Courts of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Hissar and
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar, in Criminal
complaint cases No.269-II/97; No.549-II/97; No.393-
II/97; No.371-II/97; No.372-II/97; No.373-II/97; No.877-
II/96; No.880-II/96; No.878-II/96; No.876-II/96; No.879-
II/96; No.485-II/96 relevant to the loan transaction
between Haryana Financial Corporation and Arawali Tubes
shall run concurrently.
2) Substantive sentences awarded to the appellant by the
Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Hissar in Criminal
complaint cases No.156-II/1997 and No.396-II/1998
between Haryana Financial Corporation and Arawali Alloys
relevant to the transactions shall also run concurrently;
3) Substantive sentences inter se by the Court of Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Hissar in the above two categories
and that awarded in complaint case No.331-II/97 shall run
consecutively in terms of Section 427 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
4) No costs.
………………...…………J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
…………………...………J.
(GYAN SUDHA MISRA)
New Delhi
July 5, 2013
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