Every endeavor is being suggested and tried to be
The Civil Procedure Code primarily consists of two
parts. The first part comprises of various sections right
from sections 2 to section 158. The first part i.e. section 2
to 158 can be said to be a substantive part of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The procedure for carrying out the
objects of section 2 to 158, is laid down in the schedule,
which is titled as the First schedule. Order 1 makes
reference to parties to suits. Last is the Order 52 in the
first Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code. When it comes
to interpretation of the provisions of the Civil Procedure
Code, ordinarily, sections in the first part of the Code and
the orders which are made available in the first schedule
to the substantive part of sections in the Code.
are considered conjointly. Primacy however is to be given to the substantive part of section in the code.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
M/s. Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd.
V
Celem S.A.
K.K. TATED, J.
08/04/2013.
Citation;AIR 2013 BOMBAY108
1 Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2 Rule.
Rule made returnable forthwith.
4 By consent, the matter is taken on board for final hearing at
the stage of admission itself.
By this Civil Revision Application, the Defendant – Judgment
Debtor challenges the order dated 15th April, 2011 passed by the
ig
learned District Judge2, Nashik below Exhibit 1 in Special (Civil)
Darkhast no.1 of 2007, rejecting the Petitioner’s Application for
declaration that the recovery proceeding filed by the Respondents –
original Plaintiffs be disposed off/dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or
even otherwise on facts and holding that the execution proceeding
filed by Respondents being maintainable and the judgment and order
dated 19th October, 2006 passed by High Court of Justice, Chancery
Division, Patents Court is executable before District Court at Nashik.
6
A few facts of the matter are as under:
The Respondents – original Plaintiffs filed a Suit against the
Petitioner – original Defendant in the High Court of Justice, Chancery
Division, Patents Court in the England. In the said Suit, the Petitioner
preferred Application dated 11th May, 2006 for declaration that the
High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court, U.K. have no
jurisdiction to entertain the Claim no.HC 06C00720. The said
Application was rejected by the Hon’ble High Court of Justice,
Chancery Division, Patents Court, United Kingdom by an order dated
19th October, 2006 and imposed a costs in the sum of £12,429.75
ig
equivalent to `10,16,753.55 paise with interest at the rate of 8% per
annum. Thereafter, the Respondents – original Plaintiffs filed Special
(Civil) Darkhast no.1 of 2007 in the Court of District Judge 2, Nashik
for execution of the order passed by the Foreign Court, for recovery
of sum of `10,16,753.55 towards decretal amount under Order dated
19th October, 2006 (costs) and `.67,786/ towards interest at the rate
of 8% per annum on the principal amount from the date of the order
date i.e. 19th October, 2006 to 14th August, 2007 and further interest
till the recovery of the amount. In the said Execution Petition, the
Petitioner preferred Exhibit 1 on 1st March, 2008 for declaration that
the Execution Application filed by the Respondents is not
maintainable as the same is in respect of the costs imposed by the
foreign Court at the time of dismissing the Petitioner’s Interim
Application, whereas, the main matter is still pending for hearing and
final disposal on its own merits. The said Application is rejected by
the District Judge2, Nashik by impugned order dated 15 th April,
2011 and hence, the present Civil Revision Application.
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner
submits that the impugned order passed by the District Judge2,
Nashik dated 15th April, 2011 is against justice, equity and good
conscience and the same is liable to be set aside. He submits that the
District Court, Nashik failed to appreciate that the Execution
Application filed by the Respondents for recovery of costs imposed by
foreign Court on Interim Application, whereas, the main matter is
pending for hearing and final disposal on its own merits, therefore,
the Execution Petition is not maintainable for recovery of costs
imposed by the foreign Court at the time of deciding Interim
Application. He submits that the District Judge2, Nashik ought to
have seen that under Indian Law interim order for payment of costs
are not executable unless it has been made into a form of a decree,
which is passed at the time of final hearing of the suit and as such the
execution of an order passed by the Court in England which was
interim order awarding cost, could not have been held to be
maintainable. He further states that the learned Executing Court
failed to notice that only such part of an order or decree is
executable in India which part is in consonance with the law on the
subject in India as well. If there is any order passed by the foreign
ig
Court in respect of a legal position, which is contrary to the one
prevailing in India, such an order cannot be executed in Indian
Courts. Thus, the fundamental aspect of the matter has been
completely lost site of by the Executing Court. He further submits
that the decree as defined under section 2(2) of Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 can only be put in execution and not otherwise. He
submits that the Foreign Court has not passed any order on merits till
today, and, therefore, the present Execution filed by the Respondents
is not maintainable. He submits that the Respondents is seeking to
execute an interim order passed by the foreign Court. It involves the
question arising out of Sections 13 and 14 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. It relates to the enforceability of a foreign Court
Order in India. Only the interlocutory order for payment of cost
cannot be put to execution in India. According to him, therefore, the
execution proceedings commenced by the Respondents are liable to
be rejected. He submits that the foreign Court by an order dated 19 th
October, 2006 dismissed the Petitioner’s Application but no where it
is stated in the said Order that the Petitioner has to pay a cost of
£12,429.35. He submits that the operative part of the order issued
ig
separately shows the payment of costs. Therefore, the Respondents
have no right to execute the said order in India. He further submits
that imposing a costs for more than Rs.10,00,000/ is contrary to the
provisions of Section 35A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. He
submits that the maximum costs prescribed in Section 35A of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is only Rs.3,000/. On the basis of
these submissions, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner
states that the impugned order passed by the District Court, Nashik
rejecting the Petitioner’s Application below Exhibit 1 is liable to be set
aside and this Court be pleased to allow the Application below
Exhibit 1.
On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the Respondents – original Plaintiffs vehemently opposed the present
Civil Revision Application. He submits that after hearing both the
sides the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court
passed an order dated 19th October, 2006. He submits that in view of
provisions of Sections 2(2), 2(9) and 2(14) of Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, the Execution Application filed by the Respondents
ig
is according to law and the same is maintainable. He submits that in
view of Section 44A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 the District
Court at Nashik has jurisdiction to entertain the Execution
Application filed by them. He further submits that the High Court of
Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court issued the operative part of
order dated 19th October, 2006 in which it is specifically stated that
the Respondents have to pay the costs of the Application summarily
assessed in the sum of Pounds £12,429.75. Therefore, there is no bar
under law to execute the said order along with interest before the
Indian Court in view of Section 44A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
He submits that the term “order” as defined under Section 2(14) of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 means the formal expression of
any decision of a Civil Court and, therefore, it is executable as decree.
He submits that bare reading of Section 36 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 it is crystal clear that all provisions applicable for
execution of decree are also applicable for execution of order. In
support of his contention, he relies on unreported judgment of High
Court of Judicature at Bombay Bench at Aurangabad in the matter of
Satyapal s/o Vaidyaram Katariya vs. Sanjay s/o Jagannath
ig
Kanjune & Ors. in Writ Petition no.735 of 2010, dated 8 th
“9.
February, 2010. Paras 9 to 14 of that judgment read thus:
Expression "order" is defined under section 2 (14)
of the Code meaning thereby the formal expression of any
decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree. In the case
on hand, in my view, order passed by the competent Civil
Court under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code,
restraining the defendant, from interfering possession of
the plaintiff over the suit property is an order under
section 2 (14) of the Code.
10.
Having held that the order of temporary injunction
is an order within the parameters of section 2 (14) of
the Code, now it would be essential to consider, as to
competent Civil Court can be sought to be executed with
the mechanism provided under Order 21 of the Code. At
whether the order of temporary injunction, passed by the
this juncture, it would be beneficial to refer to section 36
of the Code, which reads:
"36. Application to orders. The provisions of
this Code relating to the execution of decrees (including
provisions relating to payment under a decree) shall, so
ig
far as they are applicable, be deemed to apply to the
11.
execution of orders (including payment under an order).
Part II of the Code is titled as "Execution", Subtitle
is General. Section 36 lays down that the provisions of
this Code relating to the execution of decrees (including
provisions relating to payment under a decree) shall, so
far as they are applicable, be deemed to apply to the
execution of orders (including payment under an order).
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is a procedural code
for conduct of civil cases. Ordinarily, there are two
branches of law; civil laws and penal laws. Procedure to
be followed in relation to conduct of civil cases, is
provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. So far as
penal laws are concerned, procedure therefor is made
available under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
9/28
and the Criminal Procedure Code have undergone
amendments from the competent Legislature from time to
The procedural laws under the Code of Civil Procedure
time. The Higher Courts in the country and Legislature
are worried and concerned about pendency of cases in
various Courts and at all levels. To curtail life span of
civil cases, the Legislature, in its wisdom, has recently
introduced and implemented some amendments. In
substance, time span of civil cases in various Courts is
ig
being tried to be curtailed down by the Legislature and
the Honourable Supreme Court is also of the same view.
implemented.
Every endeavor is being suggested and tried to be
The Civil Procedure Code primarily consists of two
parts. The first part comprises of various sections right
from sections 2 to section 158. The first part i.e. section 2
to 158 can be said to be a substantive part of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The procedure for carrying out the
objects of section 2 to 158, is laid down in the schedule,
which is titled as the First schedule. Order 1 makes
reference to parties to suits. Last is the Order 52 in the
first Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code. When it comes
to interpretation of the provisions of the Civil Procedure
Code, ordinarily, sections in the first part of the Code and
the orders which are made available in the first schedule
to the substantive part of sections in the Code.
are considered conjointly. Primacy however is to be given to the substantive part of section in the code.12. In the case on hand, section 36 is the provision,
which I have referred here in above. I.n my view, it is
substantive provision which has made applicable
procedure for seeking implementation of the order, with
the aid of Order 21 of the Code. In this view of the
matter, any order passed under the provisions of the Code
ig
after hearing the parties and not altered by superior
Court, in my view, is implementable with the assistance
of Order 21 of the Code. Grant of temporary injunction
which has been uphold up to the High Court is an
important and significant facet of order passed by the
competent civil Court, in the case on hand. Such order is
required to be honoured, obeyed and implemented.
Orders passed by the Civil Court are not for decorating
the dwelling of the decree holder. Order passed in
accordance with the provisions of law are required to
executed and holder thereof is entitled to fruits of the
order in accordance with the provisions of law.
13.
The Legislature, however, in its wisdom, has made
available the mechanism for execution of decree for
perpetual injunction, Order 21 Rule 32 and also Order of
temporary injunction with the assistance of section 36
14.
and Order 21 of the Code.
Many a times, winner litigant, so far temporary
injunction is concerned, are/ is anxious to seek
implementation of the temporary injunction. It would be
unjust to say to such litigant to wait till passing of the
decree by the civil Court i.e. perpetual injunction. It is
more unjustifiable in this era of internet. It is for this
order 21 of the Code.”
ig
reason, in my view, section 36 will have to be read with
The learned counsel for Respondents further relies on the
Division Bench judgment of this Court in the matter of Janardhan
Mohandas Rajan Pillai (deceased through Lrs.) & Anr. vs.
Madhubhai Z. Patel & Ors. reported in 2010 (6) ALL MR 834, in
which it is held that order passed by the English Court staying
proceeding in Suit and order for payment of costs in those
proceedings can be executed in District Court in India as Orders or
decrees within the meaning of Section 44A of Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. Para 3 of the judgment reads thus:
Now in order to decide the controversy that falls
for consideration, it is necessary to refer to the
provisions of Section44A of the C.P It reads as
.C.
“3.
under:
“44A. Execution of decrees passed by Courts in
reciprocating territory.
(1) Where a certified copy of decree of any of the
superior Courts of any reciprocating territory has been
ig
filed in a District Court, the decree may be executed in
India as if it had been passed by the District Court.
(2) Together with the certified copy of the decree shall
be filed a certificate from such superior Court stating the
extent, if any, to which the decree has been satisfied or
adjusted and such certificate shall, for the purposes of
proceedings under this section, be conclusive proof of the
extent of such satisfaction or adjustment.
(3) The provisions of section 47 shall as from the filing
of the certified copy of the decree apply to the
proceedings of a District Court executing a decree under
this section, and the District Court shall refuse execution
of any such decree, if it is shown to the satisfaction of
the Court that the decree falls within any of the
exceptions specified in clauses (a) to (f) of section 13.
country or territory outside India which the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
[Explanation I "Reciprocating territory" means any
declare to be a reciprocating territory for the purpose of
this section; and "superior Courts", with reference to any
such territory, means such Courts as may be specified in
the said notification.
Explanation II. "Decree" with reference to a superior
Court means any decree or judgment of such Court
ig
under which a sum of money is payable, not being a
sum payable in respect of taxes or other charges of a like
nature or in respect to a fine or other penalty, but shall
in no case include an arbitration award, even if such an
award is enforceable as a decree or judgment.]
Perusal of the above provisions of Section 44A of the
C.P
.C. shows that where a certified copy of a decree of
any of the Superior Court's of any reciprocating
territory is filed in a District Court, the decree is capable
of being executed treating it as a decree passed by the
District Court. The term “decree” is defined by
Explanation II, to mean any decree or judgment of such
Court under which a sum of money is payable. The
term “decree” is defined by Section 2(2) of the C.P
.C.
and still the Parliament chose again to define the term
intention, therefore, is clear that the Parliament wanted
to either expand or reduce the scope of the term “decree”
“decree” by Explanation II to Section 44A. The
found in Section 2(2) of the Code. Section 2(2) of the
C.P
.C. reads as under:
“2. Definitions – In this Act, unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context
(2) "decree" means the formal expression of an
ig
adjudication which, so far as regards the Court
expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the
parties with regard to all or any of the matters in
controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or
final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a
plaint and the determination of any question within
section 44, but shall not include
(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an
appeal from an order, or
(b) any order of dismissal for default.
Explanation A decree is preliminary when further
proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be
completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication
completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly
preliminary and partly final.”
The term “judgment” is defined by Section 2(9) of the
“2(9)
C.P
.C. which reads thus:
"judgment" means the statement given by
the judge on the grounds of a decree or order;
A comparison of the two above quoted definitions shows
that “Judgment” is a wider concept than “decree”.
Perusal of the Explanation II in Section 44A of the Code
ig
shows that the legislature intentionally has included
even “judgment” within the meaning of the term
“decree” for the purpose of Section 44A. The intention
was to expand or to enlarge the scope of term “decree”
for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code. Therefore,
an order which may not amount to a decree, but may
amount to a judgment would be a decree for the purpose
of Section 44A of the Code. The term “order” is defined
by Section 2(14) of C.P
.C. which reads as under:
“2
Definitions:
(14) "order" means the formal expression of any
decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree;
Perusal of definition of term “decree” found in Section
2(2), definition of term “judgment” found in section
2(9) and definition of term “order” found in Section
a “decree” or a judgment may amount to an “order”. To
our mind, it is clear that the intention of the legislature
2(14), makes it clear that a “judgment” may amount to
behind incorporating “Explanation II” was to permit
execution under Section 44A of the Code of such orders
which may not amount to decrees but which amount to
orders.”
The learned counsel for Respondents submits that the present
case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Division Bench in the
matter of Janardhan Mohandas Rajan Pillai (supra). In respect of
payment of interest he relies on the provision of section 17 of the
Judgments Act, 1838 which reads thus:
“17 Judgment debts to carry interest.
(1) Every judgment debt shall carry interest at the rate
of 8 pounds per centum per annum from such
(2)
time as shall be prescribed by
rules of court until
the same shall besatisfied, and such interest may
be levied under a writ of execution on such
judgment.
Rules of court may provide for the court to
disallow all or part of
any interest otherwise
payable under subsection (1).”
In view of the above provision the Respondents are entitled to
claim interest while executing the order for payment of costs being
decree holder as defined in section 2(3) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. In view of this provision Respondents are entitled
interest on the decretal amount.
With the above submissions, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of Respondents states that there is no substance in the present
Civil Revision Application and the same is liable to be dismissed with
costs.
I heard both the counsel at length. I have gone through the
12
impugned order passed by the learned District Judge2, Nashik, order
passed by the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court
dated 19th October, 2010 and other relevant documents. For deciding
the issue involved in the present Civil Revision Application, it is
necessary to reproduce Sections 2(2), 2(9), 2(14), 35A, 36, 44A of
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which. read thus:
“2.
Definitions – In this Act, unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context
adjudication which, so far as regards the Court
expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the
(2) "decree" means the formal expression of an
parties with regard to all or any of the matters in
controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or
final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a
plaint and the determination of any question within
section 44, but shall not include
(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an
ig
appeal from an order, or
(b) any order of dismissal for default.
Explanation A decree is preliminary when further
proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be
completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication
completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly
preliminary and partly final.”
“(9)
"judgment" means the statement given by
the judge of the grounds of a decree or order:”
“(14)
"order" means the formal expression of any
decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree;”
Compensatory costs in respect of false or
vexatious claims or defenses.
(1) If any suit or other proceeding, including an
“35A.
execution proceedings but excluding an appeal or a
revision any party objects to the claim or defence on the
ground that the claim or defence or any part of it is, as
against the objector, false or vexatious to the knowledge
of the party by whom it has been put forward, and if
thereafter, as against the objector, such claim or defence
is disallowed abandoned or withdrawn in whole or in
part, the Court, [if it so thinks fit] may, after recording
its reasons for holding such claim or defence to be false
or vexatious, make an order for the payment the objector
by the party by whom such claim or defence has been put
forward, of costs by way of compensation.
(2) No Court shall make any such order for the
payment of an amount exceeding three thousand rupees
or exceeding the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction,
whichever amount is less:
Provided that where the pecuniary limits of the
jurisdiction of any Court exercising the jurisdiction of a
Court of Small Causes under the Provincial Small Cause
Courts Act, 1887 or under a corresponding law in force
extend and not being a Court constituted under such Act
or law are less than two hundred and fifty rupees, the
in any part of India to which the said Act does not
High Court may empower such Court to award as costs
under this section any amount not exceeding two
hundred and fifty rupees and not exceeding those limits
by more than one hundred rupees:
Provided, further, that the High Court may limit
the amount which any Court or class of Courts is
empowered to award as costs under this section.
(3) No person against whom an order has been
made under this section shall, by reason thereof, be
exempted from any criminal liability in respect of any
claim or defence made by him.
(4) The amount of any compensation awarded
under this section in respect of a false or vexatious claim
or defence shall be taken into account in any subsequent
suit for damages or compensation in respect of such
claim or defence.”
“36. Application to orders:
The provisions of this Code relating to the
execution of decrees (including provisions relating to
(including payment under an order).”
applicable, be deemed to apply to the execution of orders
payment under a decree) shall, so far as they are
“44A. Execution of decrees passed by Courts in
reciprocating territory.
(1) Where a certified copy of a decree of any of the
superior Courts of any reciprocating territory has been
filed in a District Court, the decree may be executed in
India as if it had been passed by the District Court.
(2) Together with the certified copy of the decree
shall be filed a certificate from such superior Court
stating the extent, if any, to which the decree has been
satisfied or adjusted and such certificate shall, for the
purposes of proceedings under this section, be conclusive
proof of the extent of such satisfaction or adjustment.
(3) The provisions of section 47 shall as from the
filing of the certified copy of the decree apply to the
proceedings of a District Court executing a decree under
this section, and the District Court shall refuse execution
of any such decree, if it is shown to the satisfaction of the
Court that the decree falls within any of the exceptions
specified in clauses (a) to (f) of section 13.
country or territory outside India which the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
[Explanation I "Reciprocating territory" means any
declare to be a reciprocating territory for the purposes of
this section; and "Superior Courts", with reference to any
such territory, means such Courts as may be specified in
the said notification.
Explanation II. "Decree" with reference to a Superior
Court means any decree or judgment of such Court under
ig
which a sum of money is payable, not being a sum
payable in respect of taxes or other charges of a like
nature or in respect to a fine or other penalty, but shall
in no case include an arbitration award, even if such an
award is enforceable as a decree or judgment.]”
13
Admittedly, in the present proceeding, the High Court of
Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court passed an order dated 19 th
October, 2006 dismissing the Petitioner’s Application challenging the
jurisdiction of that Court. At the time of dismissing the Petitioner’s
Application, the English Court passed an order for payment of costs
in the sum of £12,429.75. In the Certificate under Section 10 of the
Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal Encroachment) Act, 1933 in Para 6, it
is specifically stated that the order carries interest at the rate of 8%
per annum, therefore, the objection raised by the learned counsel for
the Petitioner that there is no order passed by the English Court
about payment of interest is not correct. Another objection raised by
the Petitioner is about the quantum of costs. Though under Section
35A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it is stated that maximum
costs can be paid only `3,000/ that is not applicable in the present
case at all. As per the rules and regulations of that Country, the
English Court has passed an order for payment of costs and the same
is binding on the Petitioner in view of Section 44A of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. Whether the order passed by the English Court
dated 19th October, 2006 is executable or not is the main question
involved in the present Civil Revision Application. It is to be noted
that bare reading of Sections 2(2), 2(14) and 36 of Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 makes it clear that the said order is executed in
India also.
Section 44A read with relevant explanation shows that before
it is invoked by any decree holder, he must satisfy the following
conditions:
A DecreeHolder who seeks execution must be armed with a
i)
money decree passed by any of the superior court of any
reciprocating territory, being any foreign country or territory
which the Central Government may, by notification in the
official gazette, has declared to be a reciprocating territory for
the purpose of the section.
Such an Execution Petition can be entertained by executing
ii)
Court in India being the District Court that will be clothed with
the legal fiction as if the said foreign decree was passed by
itself and whose aid and assistance are required for executing
such a decree.
iii)
Such a decree can be put for an execution before a District
Court in India being the principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction and which will include the local limits of original
iv)
civil jurisdiction of a High Court.
Once such Execution Petition is filed before the appropriate
District Court the entire machinery of section 47 for execution
of India decree would be automatically get attracted.
In such execution proceedings, the judgment debtor of a
v)
foreign court decree/order will be entitled to satisfy the
executing Court in India that the foreign decree/order cannot
be executed against him as it is hit by any of the exceptions
specified in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 13 of Code of Civil
Section 44A of Code of Civil Procedure indicates an
Procedure.
independent right confirmed on to a foreign Decree Holder for
enforcement of a decree/order in India. It is a fresh cause of action
and has no corelation with the jurisdictional issues. The factum of
the passing of the decree and the assumption of jurisdiction
pertaining thereto, do not really obstruct the full play of the provision
of section 44A of Code of Civil Procedure which gives a new cause of
action irrespective of its original character.
16
Perusal of the explanation in section 44A of Code of Civil
Procedure shows that legislation intentionally has included even
judgment within the meaning of the term decree for purpose of
section 44A of Code of Civil Procedure. The intention was to expand
or enlarge the scope of term decree for the purpose of this section.
Therefore, an order which may not amount to a decree but may
amount to judgment would be a judgment for the purpose of Section
44A of Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, awarding costs would amount
to decree within the meaning of section 44A and can be recovered
The issue of jurisdiction of this Court to execute order/decree
by executing order under section 44A of Code of Civil Procedure.
of a country having reciprocal arrangement with our country is
squarely covered by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of
Janardhan Mohandas Rajan Pillai (deceased through Lrs.) & Anr.
(supra). Therefore, I am of the opinion that the Execution Petition
filed by the Respondents for execution of the order dated 19 th
October, 2006 passed by the English Court is maintainable in law. The
Petitioner has not pointed out any provision of law or the facts for
coming to the conclusion that the District Court, Nashik has acted in
exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity in
passing the impugned order which needs to be corrected by this
Court by exercising revisional jurisdiction.
Civil Revision Application is accordingly dismissed.
Rule is discharged.
(K.K. TATED, J.)
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